

EARLY MONASTIC BUDDHISM

VOLUME I



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EARLY MONASTIC BUDDHISM

VOLUME I

BY

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PREFACE

The scope of the present work as indicated by the title is "Early Monastic Buddhism" as distinguished from 'Early Buddhism', which is supposed to have been preached by Gotama the Buddha and his co-founders as Mrs. Rhys Davids would call them.¹ The Pāli Piṭakas undoubtedly passed through several redactions with accretions and omissions till the texts reached the form in which we have them now. The artificial and stereotyped form of each sutta takes away the original freshness of the sayings and distinctly reveals the clipping and shaping hands of the redactors of a time far away from the time of the Teacher. While recognising that Gotama Buddha's teaching might have been a little different from what is found in the Pāli Nikāyas, it appears to my mind to be beating about the bush to ascertain what Gotama Buddha had in mind and actually preached. All that is permissible at the present stage is to state what the Nikāyas and the Vinaya have got to say without confusing the already confused issues.

To be accurate according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, the scope of the present treatise is limited to the texts as edited by the ancient monks and preserved in the monasteries, and interpreted by the ancient commentators, and does not aspire to delve into the unknown, and so the word 'monastic' is used in the title in conformity to the suggestion of Miss I. B. Horner.²

In the present volume an attempt has been made to answer three principal questions, *viz.*, what is *not* Buddhism, what is

1 Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Sākyā* (1931), *Buddhism* (1934).

2 *The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected* (1936), Ch. I.

early (monastic) Buddhism, and how a Buddhist should live. The first seven chapters (pp. 1-92) are devoted to the first question while in the next four and the last chapter is delineated the career of Buddhism during the century immediately following Buddha's demise along with an account of the first council. The second question is dealt with in chapters XII-XV (pp. 198-273) and the third in the rest.

For the answer to the first question we have depended mainly on the *Brabmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala suttas* supplemented by Nāgārjuna's comments as far as they were needed to elucidate the enigmatic expressions of the *Brabmajāla*. This has led to a discussion of two of the most complicated problems of Buddhist thought, viz., the conceptions of *Tathāgata* and *Anatta*.

In dealing with the second question we have depended on the Nikāyas but have taken the *Visuddhimagga* as our guide. There is no gainsaying the fact that Buddhaghosa is still the best expositor of early monastic Buddhism and his statements are always supported by quotations from the Pāli texts, and so we may state that by following the *Visuddhimagga* we have not deviated from the original interpretation of the Theravādins.

For the third question we have utilised as far as possible the *Pātimokkha* codes and the Vinaya texts and tried to remove the misconceptions of the present day writers on ancient Indian democracy about the constitution of the Buddhist Saṅgha.

Some of the chapters were published some time ago in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, the *Mahābodhi* and other periodicals and my work,— the *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism*.

As there are still many problems of Early Monastic Buddhism to be discussed, another volume devoted to the same will be published in the near future. The Index of both the volumes will appear with Vol. II.

Before I conclude I must express my deep gratitude to Dr. Narendra Nath Law; but for the help rendered by him in several ways it would not have been possible for me to present this work to the students of Buddhism.

My thanks are also due to Mr. P. Das, Manager of the *I.H. Quarterly* for arranging my mss. and getting them through the press—a task exceedingly arduous, particularly for an author.

N. DUTT



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CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF VEDIC AND BUDDHIST CULTURE

A long period intervened between the Vedic people and the sacrificing Brāhmaṇas of Kuru-pāñcāla. This period witnessed the growth and development of Brāhmaṇism and Brāhmaṇic sacrificial literature to an extent "unparalleled in the history of the world."¹ It is when this sacrificial system reached its climax about the 7th century B.C. that Buddhism made its appearance with its voice of protest. But this Brāhmaṇism rooted itself so deep in northern India and made its hierarchy so strong that non-Brāhmaṇic religions including Buddhism could hardly make its way into this stronghold.

To go back to the advent of Aryans, it is the inference of scholars like Grierson, and Oldenberg,² that they entered into India in two groups, the later being separated from the earlier by a pretty long distance of time. The later group represented by the Kuru tribe settled in the mid-land comprising the country near the modern Delhi and its immediate north, while the earlier group settled in the outlands encircling the mid-land on the east, south and west. Prof. Keith thinks that the home of the Indo-Aryans of the earliest Vedic period lay in the countries "drained by the Indus river system, corresponding roughly to the N.W.-Frontier Province and the Punjab of the present day. The eastern limit was probably the Yamunā, though the Ganges was already

1 Sir Charles Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, p. 53.

2 Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Excursus I.

known."¹ In the subsequent Vedic period—that of the later *Vedas* and the *Brāhmaṇas*—the Indo-Aryan settlers gradually occupied the whole of Kuru-pañcāla country extending later to the Gangetic Delta of that river. Evidently Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy had its home in the mid-land while the outland represented unorthodoxy roughly in proportion to the distance from the actual centre of orthodoxy, because distance hindered the process of keeping on the same level the orthodoxy of the people of the remote districts while it is also recognised that between the two groups of the Aryans, there were differences of ideas, manners, customs and even perhaps of language. The tradition preserved in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* (i. 4. 1. 10 f.) that Videgha Māthava, an Aryan conqueror, crossed the Sadānīrā (modern Gandak) but could not take with him Agni the sacrificial fire points to the fact that the Brāhmaṇas of the West considered themselves as superior both in culture and purity of descent to those of the Eastern countries (i.e., modern Tirhut and Behar). The diluted orthodoxy of the people of the eastern outland favoured the growth of systems of thought that did not care to be in correspondence with those prevailing in the Kuru-pañcāla country. The eastern outland comprised the Magadhan area as one of its components. It became a fruitful field for the growth of non-Brāhmaṇic religions like Jainism, Ājīvikism and Buddhism. There are evidences in the *Pitakas* that Brāhmaṇical organization in Magadha and Vidya was not so strong and well-knit as to resist effectively the progress of Buddhism. The members belonging to the community were not also so strong in dialectics as to defeat in argument Buddha or the more eminent of the Buddhist monks and several cases are recorded of debates between the Brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists,

1 *Vedic Index*, I, p. xiv.

in which the former could hardly outwit the latter by exposing the hollowness of the logic underlying the arguments.

The fact that the Brāhmaṇas of this part of the country are found, in the Buddhist works, to be tracing their descent from the Brāhmaṇas of the northern parts of India (*udicca*) shows that the source of nobility and purity of descent were believed to be existing in the north and not in the region where Buddhism flourished at first.¹ The inference drawn from the above evidences that Buddhism flourished only in the tract where the Brāhmaṇic orthodoxy was not so strong is partially corroborated by the evidences furnished by the Pāli texts. The first evidence is the definition of the *Majjhima-desa* of the Buddhists.² Its boundary is given as follows: On the east Kajaṅgala, a place 400 li east of Campā (Bhagalpur); on the south-east the river Salalavatī (Sarāvatī); on the south Satakaṇṇika; on the west the Brāhmaṇa district of Thūna (identified by S. N. Mazumdar with Sthāneśvara); and on the north Uśīra-dhaja mountain (identified by Hultzsch with Usiragiri near Kankhal, Hardwar). The boundaries show that the Buddhists went a little beyond the limits of the less Brāhmaṇised country on the western side. The second and stronger evidence is the names of countries found in the Nikāyas. The northernmost places said to have been visited by Buddha are Kammassadhamma and Thullakoṭṭhita of the Kuru³ while the other place-names are included within the territories of Kāśi-Kosala, Aṅga-Magadha, Videha, and the eastern districts ruled by the several clans. The third evidence

1 R. Fick, *Sociale Gliederung* etc., transl. pp. 34, 40, 213.

2 Mazumdar's Intro. to *Cunningham's Geography*, p. xliii; B. C. Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, p. 2; Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 13; B. C. Law, *Geographical Essays*, p. 8; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 21-2.

3 See *Infra*.

is the list of places suggested by Ānanda as desirable for Buddha's parinibbāna, viz., Campā, Rājagaha, Sāvattihī, Sāketa, Kosambī and Benares.¹ Though the list is not expected to be exhaustive, it gives an idea of the area wherein resided the largest number of Buddhist lay-devotees. The fourth and last evidence that we can adduce regarding the early home of Buddhism is the list of countries, the rulers of which claimed a share of Buddha's relics for the purpose of worship. They are Licchavis of Vesālī, Sakyas of Kapilavattu, Bulis of Allakappa, Koliyas of Rāmagāma, Brāhmaṇas of Veṭṭhadīpa, Mallas of Pāvā, Mallas of Kusinārā, Moriyas of Pipphalivana. It is further mentioned that besides the above who wanted to worship the relics there were other worshippers, in Rāmagāma, Gandhārapura, Kāliṅga,² but this seems to be a later interpolation. Though Buddhism was confined mainly to the territories mentioned above, the geographical knowledge of the Buddhists extended all over India; they were acquainted with the sixteen *mahājanapadas* and one *suttanta*, viz., the *Mahāgovinda*,³ relates how India was divided into eight dominions, thus, the Central kingdom of Reṇu and around it Kāliṅga (Dantapura), Assaka (Potana), Avanti (Māhissatī), Sovīra (Roruka), Videha (Mithilā), Aṅga (Campā), Kāśī (Bārāṇasi). There were, however, adherents hailing from distant countries

1 *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta*, p. 146: Santi hi bhante aññāni mahā-nagarāṇi seyyathidam Campā Rājagahaṃ Sāvattihī Sāketaṃ Kosambī Bārāṇasi. Ettha Bhagavā parinibbāyatu, ettha bahū khattiya-mahāsālā brāhmaṇa-mahāsālā gaṇapati-mahāsālā Tathāgate abhippasannā, te Tathāgatassa sarira-pūjaṃ karissanti tū.

2 *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta*, p. 167.

3 See Rai Choudhury, *Political History of Ancient India*, 3rd ed., p. 67, B. C. Law, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, p. 2; *Geographical Essays*, p. 12.

like Madda and Gandhāra¹ in the north, Paṭṭhān in the south and Avanti in the west. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, one of the oldest books of the Sutta-piṭaka, we have the following account of Bāvari's tour: the ascetic Bāvari lived on the banks of the Godāvari in the country of the Assakas (the district round Paṭṭhān)² ruled by king Aḷaka. He sent his sixteen disciples to Buddha. Their route lay through Paṭṭhāna, Māhissati, Ujjeni, Gonaddha, Vedisa, Kosambī, Sāketa, Sāvatti, Setavyā, Kapilavattu, Kusinārā, Pāvā, Bhoganagara, and Vesālī (Pāsānakacetiya).³ Most of the place-names are well-known and indicate that though Buddhism did not actually spread as far as the western part of the present Central Provinces, there were adherents hailing from these far off districts. Taking all the above evidences into consideration we may conclude that Buddhism during the first century of its existence did not have its centres beyond Sāvatti on the north, Campā on the east, and Kosambī on the west and south, but there is no doubt that the fame of this religion spread all over western and northern India from the country of the Assakas to that of the Maddas of the North, attracting converts and lay-devotees from regions beyond the limits of *Majjhima-desa*.

1 *Digba*, II, *Mahāgovindasuttanta*, p. 235.

2 B. C. Law, *Geog. of E. B.*, p. 21.

3 *Sutta Nipāta* (PTS), pp. 194-5.

CHAPTER II

EARLY INDIAN THOUGHTS AND BELIEFS

Vedic Beliefs

The history of Indian religion and thought commences with the appearance of the Vedas, say about 3000 B.C. when the people were very simple in their habits and thoughts, and were in fact, children of nature, who looked upon the physical forces as so many friends and foes created by the Almighty Father for their reward and punishment. To them Dyaus (sky) was the father and Pṛthivī (earth) the mother, and other natural phenomena, viz., Uṣas, the Aśvins, Agni, Parjanya, Sūrya, the Ādityas, the Maruts and so forth¹ were the children of Dyaus. To Varuṇa, they accorded the place of the ruler, dispensing justice and preserving ethical laws of the world and maintaining at the same time the order of the universe (*ṛta*) in the interest of sentient beings. With the growth of cosmological ideas, Varuṇa was superseded by another god and that was Prajāpati who was made the creator, ruler and preserver of the universe.² He was self-created, the first principle, the unity behind the diversity of the universe, and to him all gods and sentient beings owed their origin. He was in short the "material and efficient cause of the world."³ As the highest being he had no concern with moral laws,⁴ the maintenance of which was entrusted to Varuṇa.

1 Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 95; Dalal, *History of India*, pp. 51 ff.

2 Keith, *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 437.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 438.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

Most of their hymns are nothing but invocations to and adorations of the gods to help them in gaining their worldly ends. They were optimistic and possessed a strong desire to live the life of the world. Their prayer was mainly for cattle and victory over the Dasyus,¹ who lived in fortified cities and offered them effective opposition. Their constant struggle with the Dasyus hardly gave them any respite to give their thoughts to matters spiritual.

They were not devoid of any religious belief: to them nature in her beneficent aspect was a constant friend, and to her they approached for having their wants fulfilled. They conceived of Indra and other gods as so many replicas of human beings, endowed with supernatural powers, which they exercised in aid of those who satisfied them by offering sacrifices. Indra was always ready to help his votaries; so also other gods whose aid was constantly sought for by their worshippers.² They were mainly physiologists. The pessimistic view of life in this world was yet unknown and hence to them, the question of liberation from the worldly existence did not arise.³ The theory of transmigration did not trouble them nor the influence of *Karma* in shaping one's destiny. They, however, had a fear for the unknown which in fact led them to perform sacrifices.⁴ They knew that a punctilious performance of the rituals of a sacrifice was all that was necessary for a happy life not only in this world but also in the next. A heavenly existence was all that they sought for by means of sacrifice.⁵ This outlook on life and the world continued among the Vedic Indians

1 Were they the builders of the cities discovered at Mohenjodaro and Harappa?

2 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

4 Dalal, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 243-257.

5 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 461.

up to the close of the *Brāhmaṇa* period (8th century B.C.) and it was only with the appearance of the *Upaniṣads* that we notice a change in their outlook, their mind turning from the outward to the inward, culminating in the appearance of the philosophy of *anitya* and *Brahman*. In short, the physiocracy of the Vedic people gave way in course of time to the idolatory and sacrifices of the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Upaniṣads* representing a further development from the objective to the subjective.

The simple hymns of the *R̥g Veda* were followed up by the *Sāma* and *Yajur* which had already come to look upon the sacrifices as a means to worldly successes, heavenly bliss and emancipation and prescribed rituals for the sacrifices, the proper performance of which was believed to ensure to the sacrificer all the benefits prayed for by him.

After these came the *Brāhmaṇas*, the well known *Śatapatha* and *Taittirīya*, the *Aitareya* and *Pañcaviṃśa* and several other texts devoted solely to the sacrificial rituals. Side by side with the *Brāhmaṇas* there grew up another class of sacrificial literature known as the *Āraṇyakas*, the only difference from the *Brāhmaṇas* being that these prescribed shorter rituals for the sacrifices suited to the conditions of the *Vānaprasthas* and *Yatis*, cogitation of the Supreme forming its chief feature.

Ancient Brāhmaṇas as depicted in the Pāli Texts

An interesting picture of the ancient *Brāhmaṇas*¹ is furnished by the one of the latest Pāli texts, *Sutta Nipāta* (*Brāhmaṇa-dhammika-sutta*). It runs as follows:—

“The ancient sages (*ṛṣis*) were ascetics (*tapassino*) and lived in self-control avoiding the five pleasures of sense. Their wealth

1 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 50: Na kho brāhmaṇa sandissanti etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇānam brāhmaṇānam brāhmaṇadhamme ti.

consisted not of cattle, gold or grains but of learning and purity. They lived on food left at the door by the faithful and used the bed and clothes offered to them reverentially by the well-to-do. They were never harmed nor dominated, protected as they were by the *dhamma*, and their access to any house was never barred. They spent 48 years of their lives as *brahmacārins* in quest of knowledge and good conduct. Even when they married they lived a life of restraint. They held austerities, rectitude, tenderness, love and forbearance in high esteem. They performed sacrifices with rice, beds, clothes, ghee or oil, which they could collect by begging and never killed cows in sacrifices.

"They possessed a noble stature and a tender and bright mien, and remained always engaged in their own pursuits. In course of time, however, they began to covet king's riches and splendour and objects of pleasure such as women with ornaments, chariots yoked with stately horses. With an eye to these gains they approached king Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), persuaded him to celebrate *śuvamedha*, *puruṣamedha*, *samyāprāsa*, *vājapeyya*,¹ and received as fees from him wealth, women and chariots, horses and cows, beds and clothes. Coveting more and more they again persuaded king Okkāka to celebrate sacrifices by the offering of cows, which, they said, constituted also wealth of men as are land, gold or grains, and as such were equally fit objects for offering. This slaughter of cows enraged the gods Brahmā, Indra, and even the Asuras and Rākṣasas and multiplied the diseases which were originally three, *viz.*, desires, hunger and decrepitude to ninety-eight and further caused to appear discord among the people and within the household, and to acts, improper and impious, among the various classes of men."

1 Cf. *Samyutta*, I, 76.

It is stated in the *Subhasutta*¹ that the Brāhmaṇas are expected to observe five *dhammas*, namely, *saccaṃ* (truthfulness), *tapam* (austerity), *brahmacariyaṃ* (pure moral life), *ajjbenam* (study), and *cāgaṃ* (gifts). In the *Sundarika-Bhāradvāja-sutta*² there is a reference to the Brāhmaṇas learning *Sāvitti* (*Sāvitri*) consisting of three *padas* and twenty-four *akṣaras*, and in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, to the Vedic Śākhās, in these words:

"All paths lead to *Brahma-sabavvyatā* but the paths are different according to the different Brāhmaṇic schools, viz., *Addhariyā* (= Sk. *adhvaryu* or White Yajurvedic), *Tittiriya* (= Sk. *Taittirīya* or Black Yajurvedic), *Chandokā* (= *Sāmavedic*), *Bavharija* (= *Bahvṛca* or *Ṛgvedic*)."³

Incidentally the names of *ṛṣis* or hymn-composers⁴ are referred to as *Aṭṭhako*, *Vāmako*, *Vāmadevo*, *Vessāmitto*, *Yamataggi*, *Aṅgirasō*, *Bhāradvājo*, *Vāsetṭho*, *Kassapo*, and *Bhagu*. It is then pointed out that the Brāhmaṇas of Buddha's time were merely repeaters of the hymns composed by these ancient sages.⁵

According to the statements mentioned above as also according to the *Mahāgovinda* and other *suttas*, the goal of the Brāhmaṇas of the 6th century B.C. was mainly the attainment of *Brahmaloka* by acquisition of merit either through sacrifices or austere practices (*tapasyā*).

The ideal ancient Brāhmaṇas as envisaged in the *Brāhmaṇa-dhammika-sutta* must have been the ancient seers to whom the authorship of the *Ṛgvedic* hymns is attributed. They were, however, not conversant with the sacrificial system which we notice

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 199. 2 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 79.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 237 (The Burmese reading is preferred here).

4 *Ibid.*, *mantānaṃ kattāro mantānaṃ pavattāro*; also *Dīgha*, I, p. 104; *Majjhima*, II, p. 200.

5 *Dīgha*, I, p. 241.

in the Ṛgveda. They, it seems, were given to intellectual culture alone and depended for their necessities of life on the charity of the village-folk and towns-people. They belonged to the ancient families of priests like Aṅgirasas, Atharvans and Bhṛgu, who, according to Weber, were Indo-Iranian priests, and were, as Macdonell says, accorded a place intermediate between men and gods.¹ These ancient priests are treated in the Ṛgveda as semi-divine beings and are spoken of as *ṛṣis*, the exact term by which they are referred to in the *Sutta-Nipāta*.² They practised self-control and performed sacrifices with honey only.³ According to the Ṛgvedic tradition, Manu was the first of sacrificers, and he was followed by Aṅgiras, Bhṛgu, Atharvan and others.

The time when Brāhmaṇas began to approach for sacrifice to the kings, the first of whom was Okkāka (Ikṣvāku), the eldest son of Manu, must have been the time when the *Ṛgveda* was about to take its present shape; for, in it are found already the various classes of priests required for a sacrifice, e.g., Hotṛ, Adhvaryu, Brahman, and the system of taking the aid of a priest by the *yajamāna* for performing a sacrifice, a custom not prevalent in the pre-Ṛgvedic period. The practice of the *yajamāna* giving rich rewards to the priests had already become current at the time of the completion of the Ṛgveda, while by the time of the *Yajurvedas*, it became an indispensable religious necessity.

It is in the period of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Śrauta-sūtras*, that we notice an abnormal increase in the avarice of the priests officiating at the sacrificial ceremonies. The references in the Pāli texts are to the state of things as found in the *Yajur*

1 See Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, p. 224.

2 Isayo pubbakā āsum saññatattā tapassino—*Sutta Nipāta*, p. 28.

3 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 224-225. Cf. *Kūṭadantasutta* in the *Digha*.

Vedas and the *Brāhmaṇas*. The different *śākhās* viz., *Addharyā*, *Tittirīyā*, *Chandokā* and *Baubriyā* evidently refer to *Suklayajurveda*, *Kṛṣṇa-yajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *R̥gveda* respectively. In a sacrifice, the presence of priests of these four classes was compulsory, each being in charge of a particular function.¹

In the early *R̥gvedic* days, according to the *Sutta Nipāta*, the objects of offering consisted of rice, ghee, beds and clothes which the *Brāhmaṇas*, who were generally *brahmacārins* engaged in study and meditation, had to collect by begging. Later on, the offering of animals in a sacrifice came into vogue and it was certainly a fine reasoning, as we find it in the account of the *Sutta Nipāta*, that in the days when cows were treated as wealth like gold, they came to be included among the objects of offering, and perhaps it was this idea that prompted the *Brāhmaṇas* of a very early period to introduce the system of offering cows in a sacrifice. With the lapse of time the original idea passed out of people's minds but cows continued to be sacrificed, bringing in its train the system of killing all sorts of beings in a sacrifice. The Pāli texts abound in references to such prevalence of animal sacrifices, against which Buddha raised his voice of protest,² but it is a matter of note that Buddha was not alone or the first in suggesting the various objects of offering in a sacrifice in an descending scale from animals to barley³ but that a similar suggestion is also to be found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, one of the late works of the *Brāhmaṇa* period. It runs thus: "At first the gods offered up a man as the victim. When he was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of him. It

1 For details, see Law, *Ancient Indian Polity*, ch. IX.

2 Dutt, *Early History of the Spread of Buddhism*, pp. 5, 6.

3 *Ibid.*

entered into a horse; they offered up the horse." In this way the horse was replaced by the ox, the ox by the goat, and the goat by barley and rice.¹

This shows that about the sixth century B.C., the practice of offering animals in a sacrifice had already become repugnant to a section of the Brāhmaṇic society, and this feeling found the strongest expression in Buddhism. In this connexion, we have also to take into consideration the appearance of the *Āraṇyakas* and the method of sacrifice prescribed in them. Among the Brāhmaṇas there was a section who favoured the ancient Brāhmaṇic ideal of living the life of a recluse and earning merit by the performance of sacrifices by means of meditation, and repetition of Vedic hymns,² and disliked offering of animals. From the Pāli texts it is apparent that at the time of the rise of Buddhism, the system of killing animals in a sacrifice was as much in vogue as that of meditation and repetition of *mantras*. We have in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, pp. 343-4) a clear hint to that effect.³ "A king or a rich brāhmaṇa sometimes gets a hermitage (*saṁbhāgāra*) built outside the town and lives there after having his hair and beard shaven and putting on rough skins. He is accompanied by his queen and *purohita*. He sleeps on bare ground and lives on a portion of the milk of a cow, and tends the sacrificial fire. He, however, orders that for sacrifice so many cows, calves, goats, etc., be killed, so many trees be cut

1 "The sacrificial essence then entered into this earth . . . They found it in . . . rice and barley. Therefore . . . as much efficacy as those sacrificed victims would have for him, so much efficacy has this oblation of rice . . ."

See Dalal's *History of India*, pp. 128-9 quoting from Eggeling's translation of *Ś. Br.*

2 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

3 See also *Aṅguttara*, II, p. 207.

down for *yupa*, *dabba*, etc." This account shows that the Brāhmaṇas of the 5th century B.C. combined asceticism with animal sacrifices, but there is no adequate evidence to prove that they took to the extreme forms of self-mortification,¹ to which references are so frequently found in the *Nikāyas*. It seems that these extreme forms of ascetic practices were confined to the Jains, Ājīvikas and such other non-Brāhmaṇic ascetic orders.

The Goal of Life

We shall now consider the value of the remark found in the Pāli texts that the ancient Brāhmaṇas of different schools believed that all paths led to union with Brahmā (*Brāhma-sahavyatā*).² In the cosmological accounts of the Pāli texts, Brahmāloka is deemed as the highest sphere of existence, next to Ābhassarā and the gods who first appeared there regarded themselves as the first born and as such the lord and creator of all beings who originated after them.³ They deemed themselves as eternally existing.⁴ In the *Mahāgovinda-suttanta*, it is clearly stated that the highest ambition of Mahāgovinda was to visualize Brahmā the highest god, and a graphic description⁵ is also given of Brahmā Sanamkumāra. Brahmāloka, the highest sphere of existence, according to Buddhism, was attainable through the

1 The following is a stock passage occurring repeatedly in the Pāli texts: *Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo acelako hoti muttācāro hatthā-palekhano na ehibhadantiko* etc. See *Infra*, p. 18.

2 See *Dīgha*, II, p. 251; Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic etc.*, pp. 43-44.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 18: *Aham asmi Brahmā Mahābrahmā abhibhū anabhibhūto aññad-atthu-daso vasavattī issaro kattā nimmātā seṭṭho sañjātā va pitā bhūta-bhavyānaṃ*.

4 *Dīgha*, I, p. 18: *nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāma-dhammo*.

5 *Dīgha*, II, p. 240: *vaṇṇavā yasavā sirimā* etc.

practice of the four brahmavihāras, viz., *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā*, and *upekkhā*. The Buddhist accounts of Brahmā and Brahmāloka are practically an echo of the notions current among the ancient Brāhmaṇas, with this difference that the attainment of union with Brahmā was possible, according to the *Brāhmaṇa* texts,¹ through the study of the Vedas or the performance of a sacrifice correctly, while, according to the Buddhist texts, it was possible only by becoming a recluse, leading an austere life of a brahmācārin and practising the four *brahmavihāras*.²

The conception of Brahmā as the first born can be traced in the R̥gvedic account of Prajāpati or Viśvakarman who is described thus: "He is the god who is the first born, the golden germ, Hiranyagarbha, who creates the whole universe, who gives life, whose commands the gods obey, whose shadow is death and immortality, who is lord of man and beast, of the mountain and the sea."³ In the *Brāhmaṇa* period too, *Prajāpati* is given the place of the creator, the supreme god, the ruler of the universe.⁴

Though to Prajāpati the highest place is accorded in the Vedic texts, and the same finds corroboration in the tradition preserved in the Buddhist texts, the idea of unity behind the diversity, the absence of any being at the very beginning appear also in the Vedic texts, though not in the earlier section i.e.,

1 *S. Br.*, XI, 44; 5, 6, 9 quoted in Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

2 *Dīgha*, II, p. 241:

Hievā mamattaṃ manujesu brahme
Ekodibhūto karuṇādhimutto
Nirāmagandho virato methunasmā
Etthaṭṭhito ettha ca sikkhamāno
Pappoti macco amataṃ brahmālokan ti.

See also *Majjhima*, II, p. 207.

3 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 442.

(Maṇḍalas, II-IX) of the *Ṛgveda*. The earliest trace of this conception of unity is found in the Ṛgvedic hymn X. 86 of Dirghatamas, where it is said: "They call it Indra, they call by many names, Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan."¹ It is further developed in the hymn X. 129 where is stated: "in the beginning there was neither being nor not-being: there was no atmosphere nor sky . . . there was neither death nor immortality, nor night nor day: there was nothing else in the world save the One which breathed, but without wind, of its own power."² The above-mentioned two conceptions are linked up together in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* thus: "the first thing is stated to be not-being, then arises Prajāpati, who is the same as Puruṣa, and then the Brahman, the holy science, . . ."³ In the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* again, the order is changed: the first entity is not-being, then springs into life mind i.e., the Brahman, and then Prajāpati."⁴ In the same *Brāhmaṇa* again, we notice a further development, viz., the identification of Brahman with Ātman and the enunciation of the theory that the knowledge of the Ātman can free one from his actions—a notion traceable in the *Śatapatha* also.⁵ Its development into the philosophy of *tat tvam asi* or *so'ham* which we find in the early Upaniṣads followed as a matter of course. Buddhism did not go so far as to identify Brahman with Ātman, but like the *Taittirīya* and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇas*, asserted that Brahman was preceded by 'not-being,' which was also, according to it, the beginning or the real form of the manifest, which began with the god Mahābrahmā. The 'not-being' in Buddhism is termed *Nirvāṇa* or *Buddhatva*, and

1 Keith, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 443.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 450.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 435-6.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 444.

hence one who attains that state is placed above the Brahmaloka or Brahman the personal. Buddhism only kept up the logical sequence by looking upon Brahman or the beings that originated after him as essentially *anātman* and avoided the illogical step of deriving a being (*ātman*) from the non-being. It is this little but vital difference that made the Buddhist and Brāhmaṇic schools, though issuing, in fact, from the same line of thought, separate from each other wider and wider. Hence Buddhism and Upaniṣadic thoughts may be treated as contemporary developments, the former paving the way for the advent of non-Brāhmaṇic schools of thought, and the latter bringing forth in its train the various systems of Brāhmaṇic philosophy.

Asceticism

As the ancient brāhmaṇas were mainly occupied with sacrifices, they practised asceticism only so far as was necessary for their proper performance. Neither in the Pāli nor in the early Vedic texts, there are references to Brāhmaṇas practising extreme self-mortifications as were common among the non-Brāhmaṇic religious sects (*samaṇa-brāhmaṇā*) and a few ascetic orders which claimed to be Brāhmaṇic. In the *Āraṇyakas* too, there is not much of ascetic practices, and the central theme of this literature also is the performance of sacrifices, the only difference being that emphasis is laid in it more on meditational exercises than on rituals. In the Pāli text the extreme ascetic practices are spoken of generally in connexion with the paribbājakas and the non-Brāhmaṇic sects. Side by side with the sacrificial rituals of the Brāhmaṇas, there grew up a belief among a certain class of men that *buddhi* (purity), or *vimukti* (emancipation), or *svarga* (heavenly existence) could be obtained

by means of self-mortifications alone. The Nigaṇṭhas, e.g., held that *sukha* or *duḥkha* or *aduḥkha-asukha* *vedanā* was due to previous *karma*; hence, if by ascetic practices (*tapas*) one could purge off the effects of his former deeds and avoid performing fresh acts, he could put an end to his *karma*. On the complete stoppage of karmic effects, advent of *duḥkha* would be arrested, and without *duḥkha* there could be no *vedanā* (feeling), and absence of *vedanā* led to an end of *duḥkha*.¹ Such reasoning could not but encourage rigorous ascetic practices and in fact it did among the non-Brāhmaṇic religious people.²

The ascetic practices appear in the *Nikāyas* in a stereotyped form with hardly any change. These may be summarised as follows: There are ascetics some of whom remain almost naked (*acelaka*), some are devoid of social manners (*muttācāra*), some take food by licking hand, while some do not accept food if invited or if any courtesy be shown to them or if food be offered from any form of storing vessel or the interior of a house or by women in certain circumstances, or from a place infested with flies, or where dogs look for food. They do not drink any intoxicating liquors, restrict their visits for alms to one or two or at most seven doors, or limit the quantity of alms to one or two or at most seven pots and so forth. There are some again who live on self-grown vegetables, fruits, or food rejections, and even grass. There are some who put on barks, rags, skins, rough hair-blankets or feathers. There are some who shave their heads, moustaches etc., take to different kinds of sitting postures, use beds of spikes, sleep in the open sky or accept for bed whatever comes to them by chance. There are some who

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 214. Cf. B. C. Law, *Mahāvīra* p. 67. See *Infra*.

2 See *IHQ.*, II, pp. 698 ff.

bathe thrice to wash away sins, or are extremely careful in injuring the smallest beings, and sometimes even go to the length of not cleaning their body lest they might injure any being. There are some who live on cow-dung and such other loathsome food or live on just one small fruit and so forth.¹ It will be observed that these ascetic practices are enumerated with a view to show that they are not of much use for *citta-vimutti* (mental freedom), and that Buddha himself in his Bodhisattva stages practised most of these and realised for himself their inefficacies.

In the account given in the *Mahāniddesa*² of the various superstitious beliefs current among the ancient Indians for the attainment of purity, a few ascetic practices are mentioned, e.g., strict observance of *sīlas* (moral precepts), living the life of animals, e.g., elephant, horse, cow and so forth, rubbing the body by earth, cow-dung, etc. In the *Jātakas* also, we get a picture of ascetic life,³ but as the dates of composition of the above mentioned works are still under controversy, we leave the details for our present purpose.

1 *Digba*, I, Kassapasihanādasutta; *Majjhima*, II, Mahāsihanādasutta.

2 The *Mahāniddesa* (I, pp. 89) furnishes us with two lists of religious (*samaṇabrāhmaṇā*) who seek emancipation through the performance of *Vatas* (vowed observances) and *Mutas*. The *Vata-suddhikas* are Hatthivatika, Assav., Gov., Kukkurav., Kākav., Vāsudevav, Baladevav, Puṇṇabhaddav., Maṇibhaddav. The *Mutasuddhikas* are those who in proper time rub their body by earth, *harita*, *gomaya*, etc. Cf. "Browsers." "These were solitaries of Mesopotamia, and were so called because they lived on grass like cattle." *E.R.E.*, VIII, p. 783.

3 See *Indian Culture*, IV, pp. 211-216.

The Upaniṣads

Strangely enough the Pāli texts as also the Buddhist-Sanskrit literature do not breathe a word about the Upaniṣads or the Upaniṣadic teachers. Now that it has been definitely settled that some of the Upaniṣads like the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, *Aitareya*, *Kauṣītaki*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya*, *Kena* are pre-Buddhistic,¹ the silence of the Buddhist texts needs some words of explanation. One explanation that may be offered is 'that the Buddhists accepted the principal philosophic viewpoints of the Upaniṣads with certain modifications, and hence had nothing to say against them.

The Upaniṣads and the Buddhist texts, in fact, are at one about the highest reality with this vital difference that according to the Upaniṣads the highest reality is *ātman*, the self *par excellence*, the soul of the universe, and it is *manomaya* while according to the Buddhists, excepting the *Vijñānavādins*, the highest reality is *anātman*, indescribable, and is absolutely without any attributes (*suññatā*) and it is not even *manomaya* and also not *vijñaptimātra* as the *Vijñānavādins* would have us accept. The *Chā. Up.* (vi. 7) is emphatic in its assertion that there is a very subtle substance (*sa ya eṣo'ṇimā*) which becomes apparent to us as diverse objects which therefore exist only in appearance not in reality. With the help of several similes the underlying oneness of all objects has been explained to Śvetaketu by his father.

1 Radhakrishnan, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, pp. 17-18.

2 मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो मा-रुपः सत्यसंकल्पः आकाश-आत्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वज्ञः सर्वैशः सर्वमिदं जगत्तोऽवाक्यं अनादरः। For refs. to *Chā.*, see *Indian Culture*, IV, i, p. 155. For parallel thoughts see *Bṛ. Up.* V, 6; *Mund.* III, i, 7; *Śvet.* III, 20. IV, 4, etc.

The *Mūlapariyāya Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* attempts also to establish that the so-called objects are not really what they appear to be, that even the so-called Nirvāṇa is unreal, but the Sutta does not drop any hint about the nature of the reality as the Upaniṣads do. The similes of saline taste of all waters, the same water having different names in different places, clay as a common material for different earthen objects and so forth are utilised alike in the Upaniṣads and in the Buddhist texts.

In the early Pāli texts, any attempt to give an idea of the reality has been avoided as far as possible. The only hints thrown out are that the Reality, the Tathāgata, is outside the four-fold probabilities, that is, it cannot be said to exist, or not exist, or both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist.¹ It is by silence that the definition of Nirvāṇa has been given and the only positive account available in the early Pāli texts is that it is *nipuṇo paṇḍitavedaniyo atakkāvacarō paccattam veditabbo viññūhi* (subtle, comprehensible by the wise, indescribable and realisable only within one's own self). In the course of criticism of the Brāhmanic conception of soul, the Pāli texts distinctly maintain that the real soul, if any, can never exist in the body and that the soul of the body can only be an empirical self. In the words of Prof. Radhakrishnan, we may say that the Pāli texts like "the Upaniṣads refuse to identify the self with the body or the series of mental states or the presentation continuum or the stream of consciousness."² It is a fact that the Buddhists maintain that a

- 1 (i) Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?
- (ii) Na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?
- (iii) Hoti ca na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā.
- (iv) Na hoti ca na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā?

2 Radhakrishnan, *Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 35. See Stcherbatsky's *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*.

being is *skandhasantāna*, a continuous series of mental and physical states but it is without any persisting entity.

Karma

The *skandha-santāna* is admitted by the Buddhist as subject to the effects of *karma*. A being can never get away from the effects of his *karma*,¹ a law accepted almost universally. The Vedic belief that performance of sacrifices can bring all that a man desires was at a discount in the Upaniṣadic period when *karma* came to be regarded as the inexorable law. The *Bṛ. Up.*, (iii. 2. 13) after discussing the various theories relating to *karma*, concludes "*puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpāt pāpeneti*" (merits accrue from meritorious acts while demerits from demeritorious acts). Likewise in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (iii. p. 203) we have "Ko nu kho, bho Gotama, hetu ko paccayo yena manussānam yena satam manussabhūtaṇaṃ dissati hīnappaṇītā ti?" "*kammaṣṣakā, māṇava, vātā, kammaḍḍāyāḍā, kammatayoti, kammabandhu, kammapaṭisaraṇā, kammam satte vibhajati yad idaṃ hīnappaṇītāyā ti.*" (What is the reason of men being in

1 There are six kinds of *karma* viz.,

- (i) *Diṭṭhadhammavedaniya-karma*.
- (ii) *Uppajjavedaniya-karma*.
- (iii) *Aparāparavedaniya-karma*.
- (iv) *Yadāsanna-karma*.
- (v) *Upapilaka-karma*.
- (vi) *Upatthambhaka-karma*.

See Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 447. *Kamma*=saṅkhāra, it is one of the links of the Paṭiccasamuppāda, see Childers, *sv. Kamma, Majjhima*, II, p. 220; *Cullakammavibhaṅgasutta* in *Majjhima*, III, pp. 202 ff.; *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 186; *Milindapañha*, p. 65. Cf. *Mahā-karmavibhaṅga* edited by S. Lévi. 1932; *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* translated into French by Prof. Lamotte in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, 1936.

good and bad circumstances? O māṇava, beings inherit the effect of their own deeds, they are produced by karma, they are dependent on karma, it is karma that divides men into good and bad). The *Sutta-nipāta* (654, 666) expresses in a similar strain that a being is subject to his *karma* and that none can evade its effects. Buddhism, however, teaches at the same time that effects of the *kamma* can be neutralised by one following the Buddhist principles. *Kamma* is like a *bija* (seed) growing only in a suitable soil which is *lobha* or *rāga* (desire), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion) and so it is ineffective in the case of a person who is without *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*;¹ arhats are therefore not subject to *kamma*. Buddha's pain caused by Devadatta or his illness was not due to *kamma*.² The Brāhmaṇic philosophical schools hold a similar view. According to them, *karma* is ineffective for a person who has acquired the highest knowledge (*tattvajñāna*). *Kamma* is described as the *bija* (seed), *ātmā* the soil, false knowledge as water, *karmaphala* as sprout and the knowledge of the highest truth as summer-heat.³ For an average being who is not an arhat, *kammavipāka* is unavoidable whether in this life or the next or the following.⁴ It follows the person like the unavoidable shadow.⁵ *Kamma* may be both internal and external. It is internal when a person enters into *saṃādhi* and

1 *Āṅguttara* I, pp. 134-6; 263-4; V, p. 262.

2 See *Milindapañha*, p. 135. It adds that there may be accidents which are not *Kamma-mūlaṃ*. Cf. *Asa Major*, II, p. 49.

3 *Hindu-darśan* by Candrakanta Tarkalankāra p. 26.

4 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 415.

5 *Milindapañha*, p. 72. It adds that *Kamma* before fructification cannot be pointed out, as mangoes before they have sprouted cannot be located on any branch:—*abbhacchinnāya santatiyā na sakkā tāni kammāni dassetum; idha vā idha tāni kammāni tiṭṭhanti*.

remains externally inactive, and it is external when one performs a deed by the movement of his physical limbs. 'The effects of kamma cannot be counteracted by *iddhi* (miraculous power).¹ Buddha vehemently criticised the teachers like Makkhali Gosāla or Pūraṇa Kassapa who taught *natthi kammaṃ* (acts), *natthi kiriyaṃ* (deeds), *natthi viriyaṃ* (energy), and declared himself as a *kammavādin*, *kiriyaavādin* and *viriyaavādin*.²

Metempsychosis or Rebirth

The ancient brāhmaṇas and the Buddhists were in agreement in the belief that the *karma* of a previous existence shaped a being's subsequent existence, but the two systems differed in respect of the carrier of the *karma* from one existence to another. The Brāhmaṇic system insisted on the conception of an undying soul (*ātman*) as the unit keeping up the link between two existences while the Buddhists vehemently denied any such entity and maintained in its stead a changing group of entities called *skandhas* which are divided into two classes, viz., *rūpa* (matter) and *nāma* (mental states) such as *vedanā* (feeling, good, bad and indifferent), *saṃjñā* (vague perception), *saṃskāras* (impression), and *viññāna* (clear perception by the organs of sense). The *skandhas*, according to the Buddhists, may be of the grossest or the subtlest form, and are changing every moment (*kṣaṇika*) and as such they are having their normal course even when a being dies and takes rebirth, which event also is a momentary affair. Of the five khandhas, *viññāna* is sometimes misconceived as the unit maintaining the link between one existence and another. A discussion relating to this misconception and the Buddhist attitude towards metempsychosis is clearly brought out in the

1 *Milindapañha*, p. 189.

2 *Digba*, I, p. 132.

Mabātaṇhāsāṅkhabayasutta:¹ a bhikkhu Sāti, son of a Kevaṭṭa, gave out that the *viññāṇa* is the speaker, feeler and enjoyer of the fruits of *karma*, good or bad,² and that it is the self-same *viññāṇa* which passes from one existence to another.³ Buddha condemned the view of Sāti as wrong and corrected him by pointing out that *viññāṇa* can originate only through cause and condition⁴ and may well be compared to fire. As fire is given a name according to the nature of the fuel, so *viññāṇa* is given a name in accordance to its source and sphere of function, e.g. when it originates by means of *cakkhu* and have *rūpa* as its basis, it is called *cakkhu-viññāṇa*, and so forth. In the formulae of the chain of causation, it is shown that *viññāṇa* originates out of *saṅkhārā* which in their turn issue out of *avijjā* (ignorance of the truth) or *taṇhā* (desire) or *āhāra* (food), hence *viññāṇa* cannot have an independent existence of its own. Its appearance is always dependent on an immediately preceding cause and condition (*paṭiccasamuppanna*). In short, the Buddhists excepting the Sammitiyas rejected the Brāhmaṇic view that a soul (*pudgala*) or *viññāṇa* keeps a link between two existences, and held that it is as momentary as any one of the other *khandhas*.

1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 256 ff.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 258: Katamaṃ taṃ Sāti viññāṇaṃ ti? Yvāyaṃ vado vedecyya tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetīti.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 256: tad ev' idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaṇṇaṃ.

4 *Majjhima*, p. 259: aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇasa sambhavo ti. Buddhaghosa in commenting upon the view of Sāti says that as Sāti was merely a *Jātakabbāṇaka* (reciter of the Jātakas), he was misled by the concluding words in a Jātaka, in which Buddha identified himself with the Bodhisatta. A similar reason is assigned by Buddhaghosa in his comments on the view held by the Pudgalavādins. See Dutt, *Doctrines of the Three Principal Schools of Buddhism* 1939.

CHAPTER III

THE RELIGIOUS OF ANCIENT INDIA

In the pre-Buddhistic days, people found more leisure to busy themselves with the questions relating to the ultimate problems. The literature produced was all religious, e.g., the *Brāhmaṇas*, *Āraṇyakas*, *Srautasūtras*, other kinds of *Sūtras*, *Āgamas* and so forth. In view also of the existence of *koṭubala-sālās* and *paribbajākārāmas* in towns and villages, it may well be inferred that religious discussions formed an important feature of the cultural life of the period, and the life of a recluse was generally encouraged, no exception being made in the case of sons of even well-to-do families.

The various classes of religious people that we come across in the Pāli texts may broadly be divided thus:

(i) *Brāhmaṇical Teachers:*

These teachers kept up the Vedic tradition and were mainly engaged in reciting the Vedic hymns and performing the sacrifices. They are referred to in *Tevijja* and other *Suttas* in these terms: there were the *ṛṣis*, e.g. *Aṭṭhaka*, *Vāmaka*, *Vāmadeva*, *Vessāmitta*, *Yamataggi*, *Aṅgirasa*, *Bhāradvāja*, *Vāseṭṭha*, *Kassapa* and *Bhagu*,¹ who are said to be the ancestors

1 Of these few names, five are found in the *Ṛg-Veda*, three being reputed as composers of the *Ṛg-Vedic Maṇḍalas*, (viz. *Vāmadeva* of the 4th *Maṇḍala*, *Bhāradvāja* of the 6th and *Vāseṭṭha* of the 7th). The rest are well-known names of the *Brāhmaṇa* and *Srauta-Sūtra* period. *Aṭṭhaka* is found in the *Aitr. Br.* (VII. 17) and *Sāṅkhāyana Śr. S.* (XV.

of the present-day Brāhmaṇas, and composers of hymns (*mantānam kattāro*). From them have been handed down *mantras* which are being recited at present (*etarabhi*) by Brāhmaṇas, proficient in the three Vedas. According to the *Tevijja sutta*, they were not only reciters of Vedic hymns but were also students and teachers of the sacrificial literature. From the accounts of Brāhmaṇic sacrifices found in the *Kūṭadanta* and other *suttas*, it becomes apparent how much, at the time of the rise of Buddhism, the ancient system of Brāhmaṇic sacrifices was in vogue. In these elaborate sacrifices, services of learned Brāhmaṇas had to be requisitioned. In a passage of the *Kūṭadanta sutta* it is stated that Brāhmaṇas of pure origin, well-versed in the *Vedas* and the subsidiary literature, were only engaged for the performance of sacrifices. So evidently there was a class of Brāhmaṇas who studied mainly the sacrificial literature and earned their livelihood by officiating at sacrifices.

(ii) *Brāhmaṇical Academic Teacher:*

In the *Tevijja*,¹ *Kūṭadanta*,² *Subba*³ and other *suttas* we come across the names of Caṅki, Tārukkha, Pokkharasāti, Jānussoṇi, Toḍeyya, Kūṭadanta and other Brāhmaṇas who are described as teachers enjoying the revenues of villages given to them by the king of the country.⁴ These Brāhmaṇas were quite rich, and

26) as one of the sons of Viśvāmitra; Vāmaka and Bhagu appear as teachers and sages in the *Ś. Br.* (X. 6.5.9; VII. 2.1.11) while Yamataggi (Jāmadagni) is well-known as the rival of Vasiṣṭha; and Aṅgira as a teacher is mentioned in the *Tait. Sam.* (III 1.7.3. and VII. 1.4.1).

1 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 235 f.

2 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 127 f.

3 *Majjhima*, II, p. 202.

4 The terms in which this is expressed are the same in every account, viz., "Kūṭadanto brāhmano Khānumataṃ (Magadhānam brāhmaṇagāmaṃ) ajjhāvasati sattussadam satinakatthodakam sadhaññam

were known as *mahāsāla-brāhmaṇas*. They occasionally celebrated sacrifices by spending large sums. The thought that troubled Kūṭadanta, viz., that he is not fully aware of the *tividha yaññasampadaṃ soḷasa-parikkhāram*, leads us to infer that their knowledge relating to sacrifices was only limited. These Brāhmaṇa teachers had all the four qualities mentioned below¹ beside being *brahmavaṇṇī*, *brahmavaccasī*, *kalyāṇavāco*, *kalyāṇavākkaraṇo*, etc.² They taught *mantras* to 300 to 500 students (*māṇavakas*) who flocked to them from different countries (*nānādisā nānājanapadā māṇavakā āgacchanti*). They are described as proficient in the three Vedas with *nighaṇḍu* and *ketubha*, in the traditional lore, in worldly sciences and in the science of physiognomy. They commanded respect of the people who thought that it would be beneath the teacher's dignity to approach Gotama (Buddha) for discussion, and suggested that the latter should come to them. The maxim that guests should be honoured led, however, the Brāhmaṇa teachers, in some instances, to approach Gotama

rājabhoggaṃ rañṇā Māgadhenā Seniyena Bimbisārena dinnam rājadeyyam brahmadeyyam. The custom of giving away lands to Brāhmaṇas is ancient in India and it still prevails.

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 210; *Digha*, I, p. 128: The Purohitas are endowed with the following four qualities:

- (i) Pure in descent up to the 7th generation both from father's and mother's side.
- (ii) engaged in study, remembering mantras, proficient in the three Vedas, Nighaṇḍu, Ketubha, Itihāsa, Lokāyata, Mahāpurisa-lakkhaṇas, etc.
- (iii) observant of moral precepts; and
- (iv) wise, intelligent and so forth.

2 *Digha*, I, p. 114; these attributes were also applied to Buddha; see *Digha*, I, 132.

Buddha. The Pāli accounts make it clear that these Brāhmaṇas were expected to enter into discussions with distinguished teachers who paid visits to their countries, and convince the people of their great erudition. The description of the discussions is, however, scanty and one-sided, but it leaves no room for doubt in our mind that these Brāhmaṇas were distinguished scholars and teachers, and were maintained by the king as such; they were not required to officiate at sacrifices as the previously-mentioned class had to do in order to earn their livelihood.

(iii) *Anchorites or Hermits*

This form of monastic life is very old, and was found in ancient times in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and many other countries of the East. In India, eremitic life was the earliest form of monasticism. In the *Āraṇyaka* literature of the pre-Buddhistic period, we are introduced to a class of Brāhmaṇas who retired to forest and were commonly known as Vānaprasthas. They studied the *Āraṇyakas*, resorted to the forest and performed sacrifices in their own way by means of meditation and chanting of mantras, and there is no indication in these texts that they practised austerities (*tapasyā*).¹

It is in the *Upaniṣads* (*Br. Up.*, IV. 422; *Chā.* II. 23. 1) that we come across, for the first time, the terms like *muni*, *pravrajin*, and *tapas* referring to persons living in the forests and practising austerities.²

1 For details about the life of the *Āraṇyakas*, see Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, II, pp. 489 ff.

2 In the *Rgveda* (X. 109. 4; 154. 2. VI. 5-4) the words *muni*, *yati*, *tapas* and *tapasvānu* occur but particulars are lacking as to the sense they bore at the time. *Muni* is found to refer to those who read the

The division of the people in the Upaniṣads as *Pitryānists* and *Devayānists* indicates that austerities were regarded as a better means for going to the higher planes.¹ The *Pitryānists* were those who lived in the villages, performed sacrifices, made gifts, practised austerities, and were engaged in works of public utility like the digging of wells etc. and passed to the higher regions along the path called *Pitryāna* but had to return to this world (*Chā.* VI. 2. 16);² while the *Devayānists* were those who lived in the forests and practised *śraddhā*, *satya* and *tapasyā*, went to the *brahmaloka* along the path called *Devayāna* and never returned to this world (*Chā.* V. 10. 10 1; *Br.* VI. 2. 15).³ The latter were certainly *Sannyāsins* who dwelt in the forests, practised austerities, wandered about and lived on alms.

The term "*muni*" is used in the Pāli works in the sense of a person who is restrained in word, thought and speech,⁴ a sage, a good Buddhist, a monk. Like *muni*, the term *tapassin* in Pāli also bears the meaning of a person having mastery over his senses (*Dīgha*, III, pp. 48ff; *Anguttara*, IV, p. 184). It retained also the sense that a *tapassin* is one who resorts to the austere practices of remaining naked, or wearing barks, skins, rough

stotras (VII. 56. 8), possessed occult powers (X. 136) and wore long hairs (Cf. *Keśins* in X. 136). In the *Saṃhitās* and *Brāhmaṇas*, the term *yati* occurs, but the details of the life of a *yati* are again lacking.

1 Law, *Studies in Indian History and Culture*, p. 13.

2 Cf. *Sakṛdāgāmiṣhala*.

3 Cf. *Anāgāmiṣhala*.

4 In the *Niddesa* (I, p. 58) Munis are subdivided into six classes:

(i) *āgāramunayo*=those who lead a household life but know the path and doctrine, (ii) *anāgāramunayo*=those who retire from the world and know the path and the doctrine; (iii) *sekhamunayo*=those who have attained one of the 7 *maggas* and *phalas*; (iv) *asekhamunayo*=the Arhats; (v) *pacceya-munayo*=paccekabuddhas; and (vi) *muni-munayo*=*sammā-sambuddhas*.

cloths or rags etc. (see above p. 18). From the above accounts, it may safely be concluded that rigorous ascetic practices were in vogue in pre-Buddhist times, attaining climax in the 6th century B.C., and that among them were found both Brāhmaṇas and non-Brāhmaṇas.

(iv) *Parivrājakas*

The *Carakas* of the Vedic period may be pointed out as the forerunners of the *Parivrājakas* of the 6th century B.C. The students after completing their education in *Gurugṛha* wandered about in order to give a finishing touch to their education by acquiring a knowledge of the beliefs and customs of different countries. The aim of the *Parivrājakas*, however, was different. They preferred to lead a wandering life and for 7 or 8 months of the year they roamed about with a view to ascertain the truth by coming into contact with the various expositors of truth.

In the *Bṛ. Up.* (IV, 4. 22) we come across the term *Parivrājaka* meaning one who takes *pravrajyā* (going out from household life) with the object of attaining Him. Yājñavalkya (*Bṛ. Up.* IV. 5. 1) left his wife and took *pravrajyā*. In the *Upaniṣads*, the line of demarcation between the *Sannyāsins* (*Yatis*) and *Parivrājakas* is not very well-defined, and the two almost overlap each other. In the *Bṛ. Up.* (IV. 4. 22), the *Parivrājins* were also called *Sannyāsins* and said to have been in the habit of wandering about.

In the Pāli works, the *Parivrājakas* are described as actually wanderers, whose chief object was to meet distinguished religious teachers and philosophers, listen to their discourses, and enter into discussions with them "on matters of ethics and philosophy, nature lore and mysticism."¹ The following is a typical des-

cription that we get of them in the *Nikāyas* (see e.g. *Udumbarika Sihanāda-sutta* in *Digha*, III pp. 36 ff.): "Three hundred paribbājakas were dwelling at a paribbājaka-ārāma near Rājagaha. They were making great noise and were engaged in discussions about kings, ministers, wars, articles of food and luxury, and such other desultory talks. They were approached by a distinguished lay devotee of Buddha apparently with the object of having some talks with them on religious or philosophical topics. He was followed by Buddha who at the very outset of his talk condemned the ascetic practices. Nigrodha, the leader of the *parivrajakas* endorsed Buddha's view by saying that he and his followers also were not in favour of the ascetic practices. Buddha did his best to convince them of the excellences of his teaching but failed to produce any effective impression." Throughout the *Nikāyas* are scattered such accounts of Buddha or his disciples meeting *parivrajakas* and discussing with them such topics as the nature of the soul, value of ascetic life, 500 states of consciousness, eternality or finiteness of the world and the soul, *karma*, knowledge of Buddha, etc.¹

For the convenience of discussions, villagers and towns people provided *Kotubalasālās*² where congregated the *parivrajakas* as also the religious teachers and philosophers.

1 See B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, pp. 16-20; *Buddhist Studies*, pp. 89-112; Cf. Sarabaites and Gyrovagi or Circumcelliones. "The first kind lived together in towns and threes in a monastery, in order to live a life without rule or law; the Gyrovagi went from monastery to monastery, demanding a lodge for a few days." *E.R.E.*, VIII, pp. 786-7.

2 *Papañcasūdanī*, III, p. 235: Yattha pana nānātitthiyā samaṇa-brāhmaṇā nānāvidhaṃ kathaṃ pavattenti.

Many of these *parivrājakas* hailed from the Brāhmaṇa society, but the majority, it seems, were non-Brāhmaṇas. Instances are not rare of the *parivrājakas* changing their faith and embracing that of the vanquisher in arguments.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya*,¹ there are references to a class of *samaṇabrāhmaṇas* who lived in company with female wanderers who used to tie the hair on the top of their head (*molibaddhā paribbājikā*) while in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, there are references to the existence of female wanderers (*paribbājikā*).²

(v) *Saṅghas or Gaṇas*

Out of these *parivrājakas* were formed, from time to time, groups who expressed their allegiance to a certain teacher, or subscribed to some common tenets, marks, or style of dress. Of these we may refer to the Māgaṇḍikas,³ Vekhanassas,⁴ Pārāsāriyas, orders of the six Teachers: Sañjaya, Pakudha, Ajita, Mañkhalī Gosālā, Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and Gautama Buddha (Sākya-puttiya-samaṇas); and to the Jaṭilas,⁵ Tedaṇḍikas,⁶ Aviruddhakas,⁷ and Devadhammikas. In the *Nikāyas* we have scanty accounts of the teachings of the six teachers, to be dealt with in the next chapter, but none of the rest.⁸

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 305.

2 *Saṃyutta*, III, pp. 238-240; Cf. *Sutta Nipāta*, II, p. 421-422.

3 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 501-13.

4 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 40-44.

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 282.

6 *Vinaya*, II, pp. 132, 196; *Lalitavistara*, p. 238.

7 *Sutta Nipāta*, vs. 365, 704, 854.

8 See *Buddhist India*, p. 145-6. *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 276.

CHAPTER IV

THE SIX TITTHIYAS

Among the religious orders (*Saṅghas* or *Gaṇas*) that were prevalent in Aṅga and Magadha¹ about Buddha's time, six are often referred to as either contemporaneous with or anterior to the Buddhist Saṅgha. The names of the teachers of these six orders are:—

- (i) Pūraṇa Kassapa
- (ii) Makkhali Gosāla
- (iii) Ajita Kesakambali
- (iv) Pakudha Kaccāyana
- (v) Sañjaya Belatthiputta, and
- (vi) Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.²

These teachers were respected by wise men, nobles and even kings. In the Pāli texts their doctrines are occasionally referred to but these are given in such a stereotyped form that they are not of much use for a detailed treatment.

In his *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, Dr. Barua has exhaustively dealt with the life and doctrines of each of these teachers by utilising all the available Buddhist and Jaina sources.

¹ Cf. *Digha*, I, pp. 47 ff.; *Majjhima*, II, p. 2. Lābhā vata bho Aṅga-Māgadhaṇam.....yatth' ime samaṇabrāhmaṇā saṅghino gaṇino gaṇācariyā nātā yasassino titthakarā sādhusammata bahujaṇassa Rājagahaṇi vassāvāsam osatā.

² For details, see B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, p. 21 ff.; *Buddhist Studies*, pp. 73 ff.; see also his *Mahāvira*, pp. 75 ff. for the light thrown on these teachers by the Jaina sources.

We shall therefore confine ourselves to the bare doctrines of the six teachers as presented in the Pāli texts:—

(i) *Pūraṇa Kassapa*

This teacher held the view that a person earns neither merit by pious acts such as gifts, sacrifices or austerities nor demerit by impious acts such as killing, stealing, lying and so forth. In other words, he taught *Akiriya-vāda* (theory of non-action), in Dr. Barua's words "passivity of soul." Soul, according to this teacher, is inactive, and it is the body which acts; hence, soul remains unaffected by the results of good or bad deeds. This teaching is allied to that of Sāṅkhya as has been pointed out by the Jaina commentator Sīlāṅka, but it would be wide of the mark if we say Kassapa's teaching is the same as that of Sāṅkhya, for the latter school of philosophy does not teach *akiriya* though it holds that *Puruṣa* is only an onlooker, an inactive agent, the functioning factor being the *Prakṛti*. It does not however deny the doctrine of *karman* and the theory of transmigration.¹ The Vedantic or the Mādhyamika view of the world also makes a person *niṣkriya*, for it teaches that the world in its diversity does not exist; hence all actions, a person is supposed to perform, are purely imaginary. Though it is risky to identify Pūraṇa's teachings with those of Vedānta or Mādhyamika or Sāṅkhya, there is no reason why his teachings should be condemned as leading to moral depravity as the *Majjhima Nikāya*² wants to establish. The suggestion of Dr. Barua based on the *Dīgha* that Pūraṇa's teaching should be classified as *adhi-*

1 Cf. Keith, *Sāṅkhya System* (Heritage of India Series), p. 33.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 404.

3 *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 279; *Dīgha*, I, p. 28-29.

ccasamuppanikavāda is more appropriate, i.e., things happen fortuitously without any cause or condition,¹ and have nothing to do with 'soul'.

(ii) *Makkhali Gosāla*

This teacher of the Ājīvikas, it is said, was originally a follower of Pārśvanātha, the first Jaina Tīrthaṅkara, but later on he gave up his old faith on account of his conviction that living beings have only reanimation and not death.

Makkhali Gosāla upheld the doctrine of fatalism (*niyati-saṅgati-bhāva*) viz. a being's sufferings or happiness does not depend upon any cause or condition. A being is helpless; he can neither help himself nor others, and he cannot attain perfection (*vimutti*) by exertion. He must transmigrate from one existence to another, and it is only after repeated existences that he will attain emancipation (*suddhi*). The consecutive existences of a being including the periods and types of existences are unalterably fixed (*niyata*). The several existences of a being may be compared to a ball of yarn unwinding itself, the ultimate end of the yarn being the *suddhi* or *vimutti* i.e., end of existence of a being. In every existence a being is endowed with certain characteristics (*saṅgati-bhāva*), peculiar to the particular form of existence without any reference to his past deeds just as "fire is hot, ice cold."² In the *Majjhima Nikāya* this doctrine is described as *abhetuka* and *akiriya-ditṭhi*,³ while in the *Aṅguttara* (I, p. 287) it is said to be a doctrine which denies *kamma* (deed), *kiriya* (action) and *virīya* (energy).

1 See *Infra*, ch. V.

2 Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 409; cf. II, p. 121.

Dr. Barua says that according to Gosāla, there are infinite gradations of existence, and each type of existence is eternal.¹ The Pāli expression for the different types of existence is *chalābbhijātiyo*, which means six types of human beings, the types being distinguished according to the qualities (*gunas*).²

These fatalists, in the opinion of the Buddhists, have no hope of deliverance. Like the followers of other teachers,³ they are liable to evil deeds. They belong to *abrahmacariyāvāsas* (those who lead impure lives) and are fond of eulogising themselves and disparaging others.⁴

(iii) *Ajita Kesakambali*

Ajita was an out and out materialist. He held that a being is composed of the four *mahābhūtas* (elements), viz., earth, water, air and fire, and *ākāśa* (space), and that after death the physical body disintegrates and merges in the four elements, while the *indriyas* (organs of sense) pass into space (*ākāśa*).⁵

1 Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

2 (i) *Kaṇhābhijāti*:—Bird-catchers, hunters, fishermen, etc.

(ii) *Nilābhijāti*:—Recluses who take to rigorous ascetic practices including the *Sākyaputtiya Samāṇas*.

(iii) *Lohitābhijāti*:—Nigaṇṭhas who wear one piece of cloth.

(iv) *Haliddābhijāti*:—Lay-devotees of *Acclakas* including *Ājivikasāvakas*.

(v) *Sukkābhijāti*:—*Ājivika* ascetics like Nanda, Vaccha, Saṅkicca. In the *Majjhima* (I, p. 238) these ascetics are said to be engaged in *kāyabbhāvanā* and not *cittabbhāvanā*.

(vi) *Paramasukkābhijāti*: *Ājivika* saints.

See *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, I, p. 162; *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 121.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 401-2; see also I, p. 483.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 524.

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 515.

There is no rebirth or transmigration, and hence performance of sacrifices and practice of austerities are of no avail, and there are no such acts as good or bad. Dr. Barua points out that Ajita's doctrine is similar to that of *Pāyāsi*¹ who held that the soul is not an entity distinct from the body.²

In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 402), Ajita's teaching is criticised as leading to improper acts, speech and thoughts, and to indulgences in worldly pleasures. Dr. Barua disagrees with the opinion expressed above and in its stead says that Ajita's teaching has a moral leaning inasmuch as it believed in life rather than in death, and it advocated proper service towards men when they are alive rather than honouring them after death.³ Dr. Barua, in fact, is trying here to justify the materialistic point of view.

Ajita's materialistic teaching was not unknown in India. It had been coming down as the Lokāyata or Bārhaspatya School of philosophy,⁴ which later on became popular as the doctrine of Cārvāka. In the *Nikāyas* it is classified as *Uccheda-vāda* or the doctrine of annihilation after death or *Tam jīva tam sarīravāda* or the doctrine of identity of the soul and body.⁵

1 *Digha*, II, no. 23: Pāyāsisuttanta.

2 Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

3 *Ibid.*

4 Cf. *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, p. 5-6.

लोकान्तिकपथे तु तच्च भूतचतुष्टयम् ।

वृथिज्वापसथा तेजो वायुरित्येव नापरम् ॥

... ..

...इह एवास्मा न ततोऽप्यो विल्लवथः ॥

इहल्लोकात् परो नान्यः स्वर्गोऽस्ति नरको नच ।

... ..

... ..

तपोभिरुपवासायैर्मूढ एव प्रशुष्यति ॥

5 See *Infra*, pp. 46, 47.

(iv) *Pakudha Kaccāyana*

This teacher held that a being is composed of seven elements, viz., earth, water, air, fire, pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukkha*) and soul (*jīva*), and that these elements even when they compose a being do not interact upon one another. These seven elements eternally exist and they are uncreated, and unalterably fixed, and hence any action, good or bad, is ineffective, e.g., cutting of a man in two pieces means nothing more than passing a sword through some elements. This teaching is classified in the Buddhist texts as *Akiriya-vāda* as also *Sassata-vāda*.¹ It is *akiriya*² inasmuch as it teaches that any act, good or bad, is not capable of bearing any fruit, and it is *sassata* as the elements remain in their original state unaffected by any composition whatsoever. From the Buddhist stand-point, this teaching is as undesirable as the *Ucchedavāda*, for it also teaches moral irresponsibility leading men to evil deeds.

(v) *Saṅjaya Belatṭhiputta*

Saṅjaya was an *ajñānavādin*, i.e., an agnostic or sceptic.³ He refuses to give a definite answer to questions dealing with ultimate problems, e.g., "Is there an after-life or not?" "Is there any fruit of good or evil deeds?" "Does the Tathāgata exist or not after death?" It is rather strange that Saṅjaya's attitude towards the ultimate problems is criticised by the Buddhists, for the Buddhists themselves admit these problems as indeterminable (*avyākata*).⁴ It may be that Saṅjaya unlike the Buddhist thinkers carried his logic too far inasmuch as he refused to give a definite answer to questions relating even to moral

1 See *Infra*, ch. V, pp. 49 ff.

2 Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 319, 328.

4 See *Infra*, ch. V, pp. 44 ff.

responsibility. In any case, he is criticised as an *Amarāvikkhepikā*¹ but not as an *Akiriyaavādin*. The story that *Sāriputta* was the *quondam* disciple of *Śaṅkya* is not unworthy of belief, for *Śaṅkya*'s teaching is only a stepping stone to that of *Buddha*, who dissuaded men from wasting their time on the solution of ultimate problems before they had developed their intellectual faculties and convinced themselves of the process of origin and destruction of worldly things.

(vi) *Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta*

In the Pali texts, only the ethical aspect of *Nigaṇṭha*'s teaching has been dealt with. There is not a word about his *Syādvāda*,² or the *Navatattva*,³ etc., the only distinctive feature

1 See *Infra*, p. 47 & ch. VI.

2 The *Syādvāda* of the Jainas is allied to the *Vibhajjavāda* (as opposed to *Ekamsavāda*) of the Buddhists and the *Vikkhepa* attitude of *Śaṅkya*. By this doctrine the Jainas assert that the answer to a problem may be correct from one standpoint but not from another; in other words, it cannot be absolutely correct. *Buddha* also advocated this view as he pointed out that answers ought to be given by taking into consideration the motive of the inquirer and the answer should be directed to a particular aspect of the problem.

3 The nine substances are *jīva*, *ajīva*, *puṇya*, *pāpa*, *āsrava*, *samvara*, *bandha*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa*. *Jīva* indicates the soul—that which is conscious while *ajīva* the non-soul—that which is unconscious. *Jīva* acts with the help of *ajīva* just as soul or mind functions with the help of body. The results of such actions (*karman*) through mind, speech and body may be either good (*puṇya*) or bad (*pāpa*), which are also substances. These substances, which are karmic effects, normally flow (*āsrava*) into *Jīva*, but again mind, speech and body may function in such a way that the flow of karmic effect into *Jīva* may be arrested (*samvara*). In the case of *āsrava*, the *jīva* is invested (*bandha*) with *karman* and suffers on account of

pointed out in the Buddhist texts is that it is like Buddhism a *Kiriyavāda* as opposed to *Akiriyavāda* of the other teachers.

The principal teaching of Mahāvīra, as embodied in the *Nikāyas*, is that perfection can be attained only by neutralising the effects of past karma and avoiding the accumulation of either merit or demerit. It advocates rigorous asceticism (*tapasyā*) for counteracting the past *karma*. By easy means, it teaches, the highest bliss cannot be attained; it is only by means of rigorous ascetic practices that it can be obtained.¹ In the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, the doctrine is described as *Cātuyāmasaṃvara* or the four restraints, viz., (i) to be free from passion and desire; (ii) to keep aloof from all kinds of traffic; (iii) to get rid of all *parigrahas* (ideas of possession); and (iv) to remain absorbed in knowledge and meditation of self². The Nigaṇṭhas laid the utmost emphasis on the doctrine of *ahiṃsā*³ (non-injuring of living beings). In the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, 56), it is shown that the Nigaṇṭhas laid more emphasis on physical deeds (*kāyadaṇḍa*) than on mental (*manodaṇḍa*), a point of view which is just the opposite of the Buddhists. Though the Buddhists and the Nigaṇṭhas differed widely in their philosophic viewpoints, there are several agreements between the two systems in moral outlook and disciplinary rules.

repeated existence (*saṃsāra*). A Jaina monk is enjoined to destroy (*nirjarā*) the effects of *karman* by means of *saṃvara* and when the effects are completely destroyed he attains liberation (*mokṣa*) from *saṃsāra* (repeated existences). See Shah, *Jainism in North India*, p. 39 f.

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 93. Na sukhena sukhādhigantabbam, dukkhena kho sukhādhigantabbam. Sukhena ca sukhādhigantabbam abhaviṣṣa rāja Māgadho Seniya Bimbisāro sukhādhigaccheyya.

2 B. C. Law, *Mahāvīra*, p. 14.

3 *Gradual Sayings*, I, p. 186.

CHAPTER V

OTHER NON-BUDDHISTIC DOCTRINES

Besides the six teachers dealt with above there was a number of other teachers who offered, according to their own lights, solutions of the ultimate problems relating to the soul, the world and the *summum bonum* of the man's life, basing them not so much on reasoning as on intuition or inner experiences acquired through meditation. The use of logic was not much in evidence, and if there was any, it was due to the endeavour of the disciples to establish on a firm basis the theories already propounded by their respective teachers. Along with the various expositions of the highest Truth, the pre-Buddhistic religious and philosophical literatures contain a large body of cosmological and metaphysical speculations together with analyses of the elements composing the living beings of this world as also of the various spheres of existences as conceived in their cosmology. The analyses also have as their basis the intuition or meditational experiences, or the traditional beliefs handed down from the hoary past. Though ostensibly Buddhism wanted to offer a rational solution of the ultimate problems, it did not quite succeed to keep itself free from the intuitional and traditional exposition of the metaphysical themes. It inherited a mass of beliefs relating, for instance, to the origin and form of the universe (*tridhātu*), classification of the worlds and beings (*viññāṇaṭṭhitis*) and so forth. The gradual evolution of the world (vide *Aggaññasuttanta*),¹ the existence of heavenly beings

¹ *Digha*, II, no. 27.

(vide *Mahāsamayasuttanta*),¹ the six mystical powers (*chaḷa-abhiññā*), the *mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇas*,² the eight causes of earthquake, the seven treasures (vide e.g. *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta*),³ the causes leading to the origin of castes are a few among the various beliefs that were inherited by the early Buddhists. The Buddhist texts, on the other hand, rendered a service to the cause of Indian philosophy by laying bare the irrationality of many of the religious and philosophical views current in Northern India before and after the rise of Buddhism. It has been shown in some of the texts that the views were nothing but inner experiences of persons who had made some progress on the path of spiritual advancement but were far beneath the stage at which the highest truth could be realised. In the Pāli texts these views are summarily dismissed away as untenable without a detailed logical examination of them.⁴

1 *Digha*, II, no. 20.

2 *Ibid.*, III, no. 30.

3 *Ibid.*, II, no. 16.

4 A notion has been made widely current by some of the modern scholars that the ostensible object of the *Brahmajālasutta* is to give a bird's-eye view of the non-Buddhistic opinions. This notion is wholly wrong, for the *Brahmajālasutta* has no presumption of that kind. (Cf. *Samantapāsādikā*, pp. 60-61; *Majjhima*, I, p. 40: *attavāda* and *lokavāda*; II, pp. 233-8; *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 443, 587; *Mahābodhi*, 1933, pp. 166 ff.; E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 19). The doctrine of the six *tittthiyas*, (see chap. IV) not to speak of the *Upaniṣadic* thoughts, are beyond the purview of the *Sutta*. Its main object is to draw up a list of the possible theories about the world and the soul that might haunt the minds of the monks who, by meditating according to the Buddhist path of meditation, acquired certain powers but did not reach the highest state. The so-called sixty-two views are really a systematic exposition of the experiences of a Buddhist monk and have very little to do with the then existing non-Buddhistic opinions. There may be a few agreements between some of the sixty-two views and the philo-

The Avyākatas

There are a few problems said to have been left unanswered (*avyākata*) by Buddha, the reason assigned for doing so being either that they relate to topics or notions which have

sophical tenets embodied in the *Upaniṣads* and other Brāhmanic philosophical works, but that does not go to establish that the *Brahmajālasutta* was composed with any reference to them, the cases of agreement being only accidental. The *Sutta*, however, has served two important purposes, viz., disabusing our minds of many deep-rooted current notions about the world, the soul and their ultimate condition, and cautioning us against interpreting the doctrine of Buddha in the light of our preconceived notions. By way of illustration, I may point out that the notion of *Ātman* as a permanent, immaculate entity existing within our body unaffected by *karma* (actions) is likely to distort the true import of the *Attā* or *Puggala* of the Buddhist texts, and in the same way the notion of Nihilism (*Ucchedavāda*=*Natthatta*) may influence the interpretation of *Anattā* or *Suññatā* doctrine of the Buddhists. A typical instance is given in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, pp. 136-137): A *Sassatavādin* hears Buddha's teaching about the attainment of *Nibbāna* by the destruction of passion, desire, wrong views etc. and concludes therefrom that Buddha is an *Ucchedavādin*. Childers writes in his article on *Nibbāna* (*Pali Dictionary*, p. 267): "There is probably no doctrine more distinctive of *Sākyamuni's* original teaching than that of the *annihilation of being*" (p. 274): Burnouf "is decidedly in favour of the opinion that the goal of Buddhism is *annihilation*."

The best purpose that has been served by the *Sutta* is that it shows us the way to distinguish Buddha's doctrines from those that were not his. In the fifth century B.C. or a little later, it was almost impossible for any teacher to give out any fresh line of thought without the chance of its being confused with one or other of the current opinions, and this confusion could best be avoided by pointing out the pitfalls, in which the later interpreters were likely to fall. This has been done in this *Sutta* to a certain extent. Then again, Buddha, like the other great teachers, had at times recourse to enigmatical language, baffling

nothing to do with the highest Truth, or that they divert our attention from the real goal of our life.¹ These problems are mentioned almost in the identical language throughout the Piṭaka thus:

1. *Sassato loko* (the world is eternal)
2. *Asassato loko* (the world is not eternal);

the attempts of many an erudite commentator to find out the exact sense. The Buddhist texts abound in such enigmatic expressions. This *Sutta*, in marking out *what Buddhism is not*, serves, therefore, as an excellent guide for the comprehension of the sense of such expressions. In spite of this *Sutta*, the terse saying did give rise to so many Buddhist schools of thought within a century or two after Buddha's death, not to speak of the divergent explanations offered by the present day scholars of Buddha's conception of Soul and Nibbāna. Though the *Sutta* contains many statements of doubtful value, an exposition of it as a whole may serve to remove many of our misconceptions.

1 The usual English synonym chosen for *avyākata* is 'indetermined.' It is equated to *avyākṛta*, which, literally, means 'not-explained' or 'not-determined.' *Avyākṛta* is a Buddhist-Sanskrit form derived from the word *Avyākata*. The Pāli word *avyākata* may well be taken as corresponding in sense to Sanskrit *avyakta*, meaning 'inexpressible' or 'unanswerable' because the question does not arise, and all answers are inadmissible. It, however, does not bear the philosophical sense of *avyakta* which is commonly in use in Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, but it is quite plausible to hold that Buddha meant by *avyākata*, inexpressible in worldly language, i.e., the nature of Nibbāna is as unfit for answer as is the question of the existence of the sky-flower. See Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, I, p. 228.

It is this *avyākata* attitude of Buddha to the ultimate problems that has led the present day scholars to dub Buddha as agnostic. Prof. Kieth goes further and remarks (in his *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 45) that Buddha's "agnosticism in these matters is not based on any reasoned conviction of the limits of knowledge; it rests on the two-fold ground that the Buddha has not himself a clear conclusion of the truth on these issues, etc."

3. *Antavā loko* (the world is finite);
4. *Anantavā loko* (the world is not finite);
5. *Taṃ jīvam taṃ sarīram* (the soul is identical with the body);
6. *Aññaṃ jīvam aññaṃ sarīram* (the soul is different from the body);
7. *Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata exists after death);
8. *Na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does not exist after death);
9. *Hoti ca na ca hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata both exists and not exists after death);
10. *N'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā* (Tathāgata does neither exist nor not exist after death).¹

Of the problems mentioned in the list, the first six are exhaustively dealt with in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*. Though the treatment is not quite philosophical, it gives us a clear idea of what the early Buddhists had in their minds as to the implication of these problems. The heads of subjects as arranged in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* are as follows:—

1. Four kinds of *Sassatavādā*;
2. Four kinds of *Ekaccasassatavādā*;
3. Four kinds of *Antānantikā*;
4. Four kinds of *Amarāvikkhepikā*;
5. Two kinds of *Adhiccassamuppannikā*;
6. Sixteen kinds of *Saññivādā*;

¹ See, e.g., *Aggi-Vacchagotta-sutta* in the *Majjhima*, I, pp. 157, 426, 483-489, *Avyākata-samyutta* in *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 376 ff., also III, pp. 214 ff.; *Porūthapāda-sutta* in *Digba*, I, p. 191; see also *Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, p. 446 (mentioning 14 problems), 536; and ch. XXII; *Mahāvuyyapatti*, 206.

7. Eight kinds of Asaññivādā;
8. Eight kinds of N'evasaññināsaññivādā;
9. Seven kinds of Uccedavādā; and
10. Five kinds of Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā.

The correspondences between the two lists may be indicated thus:—

<i>Indeterminable problems</i>	<i>Problems in the Brahmajāla Sutta</i>
1. Sassato loko	{ 1. Sassatavādā
2. Asassato loko ¹	{ 2. Ekaccasassatavādā
3. Antavā loko	9. Uccedavādā
4. Anantavā loko ²	{ 3. Antānantikā
5. Taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sariraṃ	{ 6. Saññivādā
6. Aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sariraṃ	{ 7. Asaññivādā
7. Hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇā	{ 8. N'evasaññināsaññivādā
8. Na hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇā	} 4. Amarāvikkhepikā
9. Hoti ca na hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇā	
10. N'eva hoti na na hoti Tathāgato parammaraṇā ³	
Nil	
	{ 5. Adhiccasaṃuppannikā
	{ 10. Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā

The above comparative table reveals the fact that the problems, which are generally treated in the Pāli text as indeterminable and their exposition as not conducive to the spiritual welfare of persons, are explained in as much detail as possible in the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, and therefore the charge of

1 The first and second are sometimes put as Sassato loko; Asassato

2 The third and fourth are usually put thus: Antavā loko; loko; Sassatāsassato loko; N'eva sassato nāsassato loko.

Anantavā loko, Anantānantavā loko; N'eva antavā nānantava loko.

3 The items 7th to 10th are dealt with here in chapter VI.

agnosticism sometimes laid against the founder of the religion by the present day writers is unwarranted. The explanations, however, have been given more or less in the light of the inner experiences of the Buddhist monks as stated above and are without any reference to the existing non-Buddhistic opinions, or any attempt to refute or reconcile them.

Nāgārjuna, in his *Mādhyamaka-kārikās*, has shown as logically as possible what the indeterminable problems signify and how they are untenable. From the arguments put forward by him, it seems that he is true to the letter and spirit of the discourse as given in the Pāli texts, and that he penetrates right into the innermost core of the problems and brings out what the Teacher had in his mind.

All of these views have been described in the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnayānic or Mahāyānic, as wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*) and are attributed to people's natural inclination of adhering to the heresy of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), consisting in regarding the body or any particular element of it as soul.¹

Speaking about the object of the introduction of this indeterminable problems into the Buddhist texts, Buddhaghosa² almost echoed what the Mahāyāna teachers had said, namely, that they were necessary for the exposition of *Suññatā*, by which Buddhaghosa, of course, meant only *Puggalasūññatā* while the Mahāyānists meant both *Pudgalaśūnyatā* and *Dharmaśūnyatā*.

¹ See *Samyutta*, IV, p. 286; also E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 202. *M.Vr.*, pp. 340, 361: *Sakkāyadṛṣṭyupasaṃmāṇaṃ sarvadrṣṭyupasaṃmāṇaṃ*; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 287: *imā diṭṭhiyo sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti*. See also *Paṭis.*, I, pp. 149-150.

² *Sam. Vd.*, I, p. 102. *Tasmā sabbaññūta-ñāṇassa mahanta-bhāvadassanattamaṃ desanāya ca suññatā-pakāsana-bhāvattham. . . .*

In our exposition of the problems we shall follow the arrangement of the *Brahmajāla Sutta* adding, where available, the arguments of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as presented in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*.

Sassatavāda

I. Four kinds of *Sassatavāda* (Eternalists), i.e. those who hold that the soul and the world exist eternally.¹

The reason assigned by the *Brahmajāla Sutta* as the basis of this view is that some people on account of their spiritual advancement develop the power (*abhiññā*) of remembering their former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) up to a certain number. They may be divided into three classes in accordance with the number of births that can be remembered by them. The fourth class refers to those persons who arrive at the conclusion that the world and the soul are eternal by means of logic and reasoning only. In short, the memories of the past and future existences, according to the *Sutta*, make a person a *Sassatavādin*, for he thinks that the world has been rolling on from eternity and will be rolling on for ever and that he will be born again and again.² Times out of number Buddha was confronted with the question whether he was a *Sassatavādin* or not, and every time he had to say that he was neither a *Sassatavādin* nor an *Asassatavādin* because the question of *Sassata* or *Asassata* does not arise in reference to the highest truth.³ It should, however, be re-

1 Cf. *Samyutta*, IV, p. 40: *atthatta*.

2 *Dīgha*, III, p. 109-110: *Atitaṃ kho aham addhānaṃ jānāmi, samvattī pi loko, anāgataṃ ca kho aham addhānaṃ jānāmi samvattissati vā ti*.

3 The Truth or *Nibbāna*, according to Buddha, is uncaused and unconditioned (*abetaṃ-appaccaya*) and hence is non-relative, absolute, and

membered that *Sassata* in the Pāli Nikāyas does not bear the metaphysical sense in which it is used in the Upaniṣads while speaking of the great Ātman. The Sassatavādins, according to the Nikāyas,¹ are those who take *attā* or self as one of the five khandhas or something apart from them, and hold that it continues for ever and without any change. It is stated in the *Majjhima Nikāya*² that the self (*attā*), according to the Sassatavādins, is the speaker, feeler, and enjoyer of the fruits of good and evil actions (*kamma*), is permanent (*nicca*), fixed (*dhuvā*), eternal (*sassata*), unchangeable (*avipariṇāmadhamma*), and is steadfast like the so-called eternal objects, viz., the Sun, Moon, ocean, earth and mountain. The Buddhists, because of their *kṣaṇikavāda* and the denial of a permanent entity, are not prepared to admit that the identical being feels the consequences of his action, which as the *Nidāna-Samyutta* asserts, would make them Sassatavādins.³

Sassatavāda and Sāṃkhya

The only Brāhmaṇic school of philosophy to which the Sassatavāda bears resemblance is the Sāṃkhya. According to this school, there are two distinct eternals, the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, the former corresponding to *Attā* and the latter to *Loka*,

is only realisable within one's ownself (*paccattaṃ veditaḥko vññūhi*). It cannot be described by any of the empirical terms, and hence the question of eternity or non-eternity does not arise.

1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 98; 182, IV, p. 400.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 8; *Papañcasūdanī*, I, p. 71. See *Infra*, ch. VIII.

3 *Samyutta*, II, p. 20: So karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho Kassapa ādito sato sayamkatam dukkhaṃ ti iti vadam sassatam etaṃ pareti.

Cf *M.Vr.*, p. 344, see *infra*. Also Franke, *Dīgha* (transl.), p. 23.

with this difference that, according to the Sassatavādins, the soul is an active agent while the *Puruṣa* (= eternal *attā*) of the Sāṅkhya is an inactive onlooker, the active agent being *Ahaṅkāra*, the principle of individuation, which however, issues out of the *Prakṛti* or matter in its primeval form. The eternal *Loka* of the Sassatavādins is the evolved world in its variety.

Four kinds of *Ekaccasassatavāda*

II. *Ekaccasassatavāda* (Partial Eternalists), i.e., those who hold that one of the three classes of the higher gods exists eternally while the rest do not do so; or those who contend that the body or the organs of sense are impermanent while the mind or consciousness (*citta* = *mano* = *viññāṇa* = *attā*) is permanent.

The three classes of the higher gods referred to above are (A) *Ābhassarā*, (B) *Khiddhāpadosikā*, and (C) *Manopadosikā*.¹

(A) *Ābhassarā*. According to the cosmogonic speculations of the Buddhists, as also of some of the Upaniṣadic teachers,² there were in the beginning no beings and the first to appear were the *Ābhassarā* gods, capable of taking shape at will,³ feeding themselves only with joy (*pīti*), self-luminous (*sayampabbhā*), moving about in the sky and getting all that they desired.⁴

¹ *Dīgha*, I, pp. 17 ff.; III, pp. 28 ff. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, pp. 326 ff.

² *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 110: *pakatiyā nibbatta-sattānaṃ natthitāya suññāṃ. Taṭṭ. Up.* (II, 7): *asad vā idam agra āsit. Tato vai sad ajāyata.* See *Bṛhad. Up.* I, 1-2. Cf. the Egg-legend in *Cbā. Up.* 19, 1-3. See also *RV*, X, 129. To this conception, it seems the *Cbā. Up.* (VI, 2, 1) refers in the following words: *Taddhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsid ekam evādvitīyam. Tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata iti.*

³ *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 110: *jhānamattena nibbattatā manomayā.*

⁴ *Dīgha*, III, pp. 84-5.

After existing for aeons, there appeared a palace of Brahmā (*Brahma-vimāna*). One of the Ābhassarā gods came to be reborn in the Brahmavimāna or the Brahma-world at the exhaustion of his merits or the span of his life.¹ But he felt very lonely and wished for companions. Like him other Ābhassarā gods also made their appearances in the Brahma-world.² The first Ābhassarā god, however, regarded himself as Brahmā or Mahābrahmā thinking that as it was by means of his reflection that other beings appeared in the Brahma-world, he must be their creator. The other beings were also under the impression that the first Ābhassarā god, Mahābrahmā, having been in existence before them, must have been their lord and originator (*issaro kattā nimmātā*).³

The text says further that in course of time, some of these beings happened to be reborn in the mortal world and through meditation and such other practices could visualize their former existences up to their birth in the Brahma world and gave out the view that Mahābrahmā, who had been existing when they were first born, is the creator of all beings and is eternal (*sassata*), whereas the beings who were born after Mahābrahmā were created by him and hence impermanent (*asassata*).

1 *Dīgha*, I, p. 17, *āyukkhayā va puññakkhayā*. Cf. *Gītā*, ix, 21.

Te taṃ bhuktvā svargalokaṃ viśāmaṃ/

kṣīṇe punye martyalokaṃ viśanti//

2 *Brahmakāyikā bhūmi*, see *Sam. Vā.*, I, p. 110.

3 Mahābrahmā is described in the Pāli texts as: abhūbhū anabhūbhūto aññadatthu-daso vasavatti issaro kattā nimmātā setṭho sañjitaṃ vasi pitā bhūtabhavyānaṃ (the supreme, the unsurpassed, the all-seeing, the mighty, the lord, the creator, the maker, the chief the best, the ruler, and the father of all present and future beings).

This doctrine naturally reminds us of the Upaniṣadic speculations about the creation of the world by Brahmā the Prajāpati, the Primeval Being, who by reflection produced fire, which in its turn produced water, which again produced earth (food or matter). Through these three elements the Primeval Being produced the whole universe. According to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* the created things and beings are mere appearances hence evanescent, while the real, i.e. the eternal things are the Primeval Being and the three above-mentioned elements.¹

(B) *K h i ḍ ḍ ā p a d o s i k ā*.² This class of partial eternalists holds that the Nimmāṇarati, Paranimmita-vasavattī and such other gods,³ who are not given to excessive pleasure and enjoyment (*khiḍḍā*), exist eternally, while others do not. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one, viz., that some of these gods were reborn in the mortal world, where through meditation and other practices they remembered their former births up to the *Khiḍḍāpadosika-deva* stage and not further. This led them to hold the belief as above.

(C) *M a n o p a d o s i k ā*.⁴ This class of partial eternalists believe that the *Cātummahārājikā* gods,⁵ who do not bear ill-will towards one another, exist eternally, while those, who are not so, fall from that state and are impermanent. The reason assigned is similar to the previous one with this difference that in this case they remembered up to their existence as *Cātummahārājikā* gods.

(D) The *T a k k ī E k a c c a s a s s a t i k a s*: These, constituting the fourth class, were the logicians who arrive at the

¹ See Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, pp. 85-87.

² *Digha*, I, p. 19; III, p. 31.

³ *Sum. Vil*, I, p. 114.

⁴ *Digha*, I, p. 21; III, pp. 32-3.

⁵ *Sum. Vil*, I, p. 114.

conclusion that the soul (= *citta* = *mano* = *viññāṇa*) is permanent, unchangeable, steadfast, and so forth, while the body is not so. This naturally reminds us of the *Maitrī Upaniṣad* (II. 3-4) where the soul is described as pure (*śuddha*), tranquil (*śānta*), eternal (*śāśvata*), great by itself (*sve mahimni*), and making the body living (*anenedam śarīram cetanavat pratiṣṭhāpitam*). A similar conception is found in the *Kauṣītaki* and other *Upaniṣads*.¹

Six of the eight forms of the so-called *Sassatavādas* and *Ekaccasassatavādas*, if critically examined, will be found to be based on one of the six *abhiññās* (higher powers) attained by the Arhats, viz., the *Pubbenivāsañāṇa* (knowledge of former births). It is regarded as one of the various but not essential attainments of an Arhat. This power may be obtained by a person by practising concentration of mind but without fully developing insight into the truth, which is an essential condition of Arhat-hood. These meditators, who have not yet attained the Arhat stage, but have acquired the power of recalling some of their former births, think that they have known what is to be known and give an interpretation of the truth, i.e. of the ultimate beginning and end of existence, according to their own experiences.

The remaining two classes of speculators, the logicians, one holding the soul and the world to be eternal, and the other holding the soul to be eternal but not the body, have been passed over in the *Bhahmajāla Sutta* with the remarks that opinions are sometimes formed by the logicians who depend purely on reasoning and not on meditation.

¹ See Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upaniṣads*, p. 295; Ranade, *Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy*, p. 134.

Nāgārjuna assails the Sāśvatavādin

As no attempt has been made in the *Brahmajāla Sutta* to refute the above-mentioned views, it will be worth while to turn to Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakārikās*, in the last chapter of which, he takes up for refutation the various doctrines, two of which are the *Sāśvata*- and *Āśāśvata-vādas*.

Refuting *Sāśvatavāda*, Nāgārjuna says¹ that if a person of the past could be shown to be the same as that of the present, then only *Sāśvatavāda* could stand, but this is not possible as it would give rise to the contingency of permanency (*nityatva*) of a being as also to the possibility of a being, having a particular form of existence, to assume different bodies (lit. different forms of existence).² A permanent being should not be said to transmigrate nor a human being who was formerly an animal but became a human being through good *karma* should say that he was an animal, for, *Sāśvatavāda* should insist that a man must remain a man, an animal an animal, and that is absurd.³

1 *M. Vṛ.*, pp. 574-5.

2 *Ibid.*, *Ekagatisthasyāpi nānāgatisaṃgrhitatvaprasaṅgāt*. That is, it would lead to the absurdity of an animal, for instance, (if it is *nitya*) to become a man or a god without passing through death.

3 To comprehend the arguments of Nāgārjuna, it should be remembered that Nāgārjuna uses the undermentioned synonyms of the Real and the Unreal in the absolute sense.

The Real: *Nitya*=*Sāśvata*=*Svabbāva*=*Ātmā*, meaning that which is permanent, remains eternally the same without origin and destruction and never undergoes the slightest change, something like the so-called eternal Himālaya mountains, the Sun, the Moon.

The Unreal: *Anitya*=*Āśāśvata*=*Niḥsvabbāva*=*Anātmā*, meaning that which is impermanent and undergoes change is really non-existing like the two Moons seen by a person with diseased eyes.

One may however question, "Well, how could Śākyamuni say, 'At that time I was the Cakravartī king Māndhatā', if Śākyamuni was not the same as Māndhatā." The object of such a statement, says Nāgārjuna, is (i) to negative the notion of complete separateness (*anyatvapratishedhakam*) and (ii) to establish the non-identity (*naikatva-pratipādakam*) of the two existences of a transmigrating being. Admitting that Śākyamuni was not totally different from Māndhatā, what harm is there in holding that he was identical with Māndhatā. Nāgārjuna's reply is that, besides the objection of *nityatva* (permanency), it would land us in the absurd position that *upādāna* is responsible for the distinction between the two existences and not *ātmā*. The absurdity is shown thus: Let us assume that *ātmā* and *upādāna* are indistinguishable, and that *ātmā* of the previous existence is the same as the one in the present, from this it would follow that *upādāna* (having *pañcaskandhalakṣaṇa*) of the previous existence is the same as that of the present. But this is absurd as no change in *upādāna* in two existences is admissible. Then again, if *ātmā* and *upādāna* be distinguished as the agent and its object, then also it is not proper to say that object (*upādāna*) has changed but not its agent (*ātmā*, i.e., holder, *upādātṛ*).¹

Nāgārjuna then points out that *ātmā* is inseparable from *upādānas*, because it cannot exist apart from the *upādānas*. If it is *upādāna* which comes into existence and undergoes change on account of ignorance, *karma*, etc., and not *ātmā*, then one has to say that the existence of *ātmā* is without any cause (*ahetukavaprasaṅgāt*) and that is impossible according to Nāgārjuna. Hence *ātmā* and *upādāna* are not separable.

1 For details see *infra*, Ch. VII.

Nāgārjuna then attacks the position of the *Asāśvatavādins*.¹ He says that if 'men' and the 'men reborn as gods' be regarded as different, like the Neem and Mango trees, then only the *Asāśvatavādins* can maintain that the soul of the man has been destroyed and a different soul has come into existence; but to maintain such a distinction in characteristics as between the Neem and Mango trees goes against the theory of the characteristic continuity (*saṃtānānuvṛtti*) of beings which is admitted to exist between 'men' and 'the men reborn as gods' and so the position of the *Asāśvatavādins* becomes untenable.

Nāgārjuna, explaining the position of the *Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins* (Pāli. *Ekaccasassatikas* = Partial Eternalists), says that according to this class of thinkers, a man when reborn as a god should partially give up his human attributes and take the divine in their place; so by the destruction of one part of his being he is *asāśvata*, and by the retention of the other, he is *śāśvata*. To hold that one part of a being is divine and the other human is not proper; hence the position of the *Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins* is untenable.²

After refuting the three positions mentioned above it becomes easy for Nāgārjuna to disprove the contention of the *Naivaśāśvatanāśāśvatavādins*. He says that one may use the

1 Though it should have been dealt with along with the doctrines of *Ucchedavāda* (see *infra*) we cannot help treating it here in order to bring out the force of Nāgārjuna's arguments.

2 Nāgārjuna, it seems, is evading the issue here. The contention of the *Śāśvatāśāśvatavādins* is that the soul is divine and immortal while the body is not so. Nāgārjuna here is not distinguishing the soul from the body. He is refuting those only who hold that the soul is one of the constituents of the body, or is at least not distinguishable from the body. This, however, is never accepted by the Brāhmanic *Śāśvatavādins*.

expression *na śāśvata* or *na āśāśvata* only when he has shown that there was something *śāśvata* which later on became *āśāśvata*. But it has been already shown that the *śāśvata* and *āśāśvata* nature of beings cannot be established; hence there can be no such being as *naivāśāśvatanāśāśvata*.¹

He now rounds up this refutation by examining whether there is, in fact, any *padārtha* (thing) going about in this beginningless world, the existence of which (thing) we have supposed on the basis of the continuous succession of birth and death without any beginning. If it could be proved that the *samskāras*,² or, the self is leaving one *gati* (lit. state of existence) to go to another, from this again, it is going elsewhere, then the *samsāra* (stream of existence) could be proved to be without a beginning. But this is not possible, because a thing which is permanent (*nitya*) or impermanent (*anitya*) cannot be said to be coming and going. That being so, is it right to say that the stream of existences (*samsāra*) has a beginning only because of the remoteness and non-perception of the beginning of the chain of births and death (*janmaparamparāyā atidīrghatvenā-dyanupalambhāt*)? Then again, when no entity can be shown as transmigrating (*samsartur abhāvāt*), how can the stream of existences (*samsāra*) be said to have a beginning or not? So it is quite wrong to hold that there is something (*kaścit padārthaḥ*) which has been going about in this beginningless world and which can be perceived. There is, in fact, nothing eternal (*śāśvata*) and so it is meaningless to think of anything as non eternal (*āśāśvata*), or both, or neither of the two.³

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 585.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 586; cf. *Ibid.*, p. 529.

3 For Nāgārjuna's position see *M. Vr.*, pp. 537, 591.

Antānantikā

III. Four kinds of *Antānantikā* (limitists and unlimitists). The *Antānantikā* are those who hold that

- (a) the world is limited in extent and circular in shape;
- (b) the world is unlimited in extent and is without any end;
- (c) the world is limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise;
- (d) the world is neither limited nor unlimited (in any direction whatsoever).¹

The reasons assigned for these conclusions are as follows: Some meditators who take the finite and circular world as their object of meditation and do not extend it to all the world systems (*Cakkavālas*),² arrive at the first conclusion. Those who take all the *Cakkavālas* as their object of meditation, arrive at the second,³ while those who take the *Cakkavālas* limited upwards and downwards but unlimited breadthwise as their object of meditation, arrive at the third.⁴

These three classes of speculators are, in fact, not concerned about the ultimate end of the world. They speak about the

1 In the usual enumeration of *ditthīs*, only the first and second are mentioned. See e.g., *Paṭis.*, I, p. 153.

2 A *Cakravāla* has a Sun and a Moon as also a multitude of stars moving around the *Mahāmeru*.

3 See also *Paṭis.*, I, p. 152-3.

4 As an approach to this view we may point to the theory of the origin of the world in the *Aitareyopaniṣad*, where the heaven and the earth are conceived as "encompassed on the upper and nether sides by regions of water." Ranade, *op. cit.*, p. 95. In the Buddhist cosmology a chiliocosm consisting of 1,000 or more worlds is encompassed by a gigantic wall. See McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 48; Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 89.

finiteness and infiniteness of the shape of the world or the universe. In popular Buddhism, the universe is believed to be composed of an infinite number of world systems, of which one thousand or one million or one thousand millions form a chiliocosm. The first three conclusions are, according to the *Sutta*, nothing but the three kinds of experiences obtained gradually through meditation. The author of the *Sutta* wants to show that those who have one of these experiences but have not yet obtained the highest conception of *Suññatā*,¹ give out one's own individual experience as the true conception of the universe.

As regards those who reach the fourth conclusion, the text says they are logicians who depend on pure arguments. The Buddhist logicians are evidently responsible for the fourth theory. Their characteristic method of exposition of all metaphysical topics is by the fourfold process (*catuskoṭika*).² It is, as a rule, not applied to empirical things. By this fourfold process it is contended that the world is non-existent as the *Sūnyatāvādins* hold, or is only a creation of the mind as the *Vijñānavādins* assert, and hence the question of the attributes of *anta* and *ananta* with reference to the world does not arise.

Nāgārjuna's Comment

The exposition of the four *Antānantādi* views given above relates to cosmogony and appears to be a little laboured due, perhaps, to the expositor's desire to bring them into a line with the previously mentioned *Sassatādi* views and to attribute three

1 Cf. *Sam. Vil.*, p. 123: *Imasmim pi Brahmajāle heṭṭhā dīṭṭhi-vasena desanā uṭṭhitā, upari suññatāpakāsanam āgatam.*

2 Viz., *hoti; na hoti; hoti ca na hoti ca; n'eva hoti na na hoti.*

of the four views to ecstatic experiences. The exposition of these views elsewhere is of quite a different nature and sounds reasonable. Nāgārjuna has taken up these problems in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* and has shown how these are untenable. He first states their four positions thus:

(a) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world (*ātmano lokasya vā*), regard the world as limited (*antavān*);

(b) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world, regard the world as unlimited (*na antavān*);

(c) Those, who can foresee the future appearance of the self or the world partially and not fully, regard the world as both limited and unlimited;

(d) Those, who cannot foresee the future appearance of the self or the world either partially or fully, regard the world as neither limited nor unlimited.

Refuting the above four propositions, Nāgārjuna says:

(a) The existence of *paraloka* (after-life or after-world) is admitted by the Buddhists, hence those who admit it should not say that the self or the world has an end because in that case there could not be an after-life or after-world.

(b) Similarly if the existence of *paraloka* is admitted, one should not say that the self or the world has no end (*ananta*) because in that case also there cannot be a *paraloka*.

(c) The third view that the world is both limited and unlimited is not tenable for the following reasons:

(i) Take for instance, the case of a *man* reborn as a *god*; if it be held that the *skandhas* of the man had been destroyed at his death (i.e. *antavān*), then it cannot be said that they have

given rise to a god. They would be like the extinguished lamp with oil but lacking a wick. As it is admitted that a being reappears after death, it should not be said that the self or the world is limited.

(ii) Applying similar reason, it can be shown that the self or the world cannot be said to be unlimited. In the case when a man is reborn as a god, if it be said that the *skandhas* of the man had not been destroyed at his death, they could not have given rise to a god. The self or the world would be endless and indestructible (*ananto 'vināśī*) on account of not giving up its own form. It is only when the previous *skandhas* cease to exist, and that another set of *skandhas* comes into existence, as a result of the same, hence it is not proper to say that the self or the world is unlimited (*ananta*) as the previous *skandhas* do not exist any further.

In Buddhism, the repeated existences of a being is nothing but the continuous flow of *skandhas* (*skandhasantāna*), the *skandhas*, however, are being destroyed every moment and have fresh existence like the flame of a lamp. In other words, the previous set of *skandhas* is destroyed every moment but at the same time it becomes a cause for the appearance of the next. It happens uninterruptedly and so it is said to be continuous, though it is not strictly so. The flame of a lamp appears to be continuous and even identical, but, in fact, it is not so because the drop of oil which once fed the flame is exhausted and another drop of oil takes its place to feed the flame, which therefore cannot be the previous one. On account of this apparent uninterruptedness, it is believed to be continuous and even identical. Hence to a Buddhist philosopher, the self or the world cannot be both limited and unlimited, it is ever flowing, like a stream undergoing change every moment (until it reaches Nirvāṇa).

Nāgārjuna then takes up for refutation the third view of both limitedness and unlimitedness. He says that the adherents of this view may say that one part of the man (i.e. body) is destroyed, hence *antavān*; while the other part (i.e. soul) remains undestroyed, hence *anantavān*. Nāgārjuna in reply says that it is absurd to hold that one part of a being is destroyed and the other is not. He, however, as a Buddhist philosopher, is not prepared to admit the existence of soul and body as two separate entities. He says that, according to his opponents then, a man, if reborn as a god, should be partly human and partly divine, but this is not possible, hence the opponents cannot uphold the view of the self or the world being both limited and unlimited.

He then proceeds to show that this partial identity and partial change cannot be attributed either to the soul (*upādātā*) or to the elements of the body (*upādāna*) because it has been established elsewhere¹ that the soul has no existence of its own apart from the *skandhas*, hence to speak of a non-existing entity as partially the same and partially different is absurd on the face of it.

(d) When the third position is not tenable, i.e. when it cannot be said that the self or the world is both limited and unlimited, Nāgārjuna says that no argument need be adduced to refute the fourth view that the self or the world is neither limited nor unlimited.

Amarāvikkhepika

IV. Four kinds of *Amarāvikkhepikas* (evasive disputants).

There are some thinkers who do not want to draw a line of demarcation between good and evil actions; so when they are

¹ See *infra*, Ch. VII.

confronted with inquiries about good and evil, they do not give a categorical answer, for they believe that they may be wrong in their answer and be opposed by others and that will produce in their mind either conceit and pride, or ill-will and hatred,¹ both of which will be a hindrance to their spiritual progress. If the opinion of an Amarāvikkhepika be contradicted, he would bear ill-will or hatred and this fact proves that he was wrong and guilty of speaking a falsehood, and hence would create a hindrance to his spiritual progress. Should he, however, obstinately adhere to his own view and not accept the view as corrected by his opponents, he would have *upādāna* (cause for rebirth) and that would also be a hindrance to his further spiritual progress.

The third and fourth classes of Amarāvikkhepikas are those who are afraid of facing a well-trained logician with any positive opinion about good and evil, lest they be vanquished in the dispute and thus be led to bear an ill-will towards their opponents. This ill-will would cause hindrance to their spiritual progress.²

These disputants have thus their own good reason for the line of action followed by them in view of the fact good (*kuśala*) and evil (*akuśala*) are relative terms, and no hard and fast line can be drawn between them. To a Mahāyānist or a Vedāntist there is ultimately nothing as good or evil, and hence no positive statement can be made about them, the best course therefore would be either to remain silent or evade a positive answer, and the latter course has been pre-

1 See *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 116. Chando=dubbalarāgo; rāgo=balavarāgo; doso=dubbala-kodho; patigho=balava-kodho.

2 See B. M. Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 329.

ferred by the Amarāvikkhepikas. Whatever may have been the justification for the disputants becoming Amarāvikkhepikas, they were, in the eyes of the Buddhists, men of weak intellect and deluded, and supposed to have been generally incapable of being thorough *brahmacārins*. Hence they were not regarded as capable of attaining the highest truth.¹

Sañjaya, one of the six heretical teachers, has been classed as an Amarāvikkhepika.² The advocates of Navya Nyāya love to indulge in evasions of issues. It is not improbable that these Amarāvikkhepikas were the fore-runners of the Naiyāyikas who very often indulged in slippery arguments (*vitandā*).

Adhiccasamuppannika

V. Two classes of *Adhiccasamuppannikas* (Fortuitous Originists). There are some thinkers who hold that the soul and the world originate accidentally without any cause (*adhiccasamuppannika*).³

(a) The texts speak of one class of such thinkers thus: There are some meditators who take up *Vāyo-kasina*⁴ for meditation and then reaching the fourth *jhāna* discover that mind is the source of all troubles, and so they induce a state in which mind does not function. Should they die while thus meditating, they are reborn as 'Asaññasattā' gods. Some of these again fall from that state by developing *saññā* and are reborn in the mortal world where some of them practise meditation and develop the

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 521.

2 See chap. IV, p. 39-40.

3 In the *Samyutta*, II, p. 20 it is said that Kassapa once asked Buddha whether misery is uncaused and not due to one's own and others' actions (*asayaṃkāraṃ aparāṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ dukkhaṃ ti*). See also *Digha*, III, p. 139; *ante*, chap. IV, p. 35-6.

4 See *Vis. M.*, p. 172; Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 10.

power of remembering former births. Their memory does not go beyond the *Saññūppāda* state, i.e., the time of their fall from their position as 'Asañña-sattā' gods, and so they declare that the soul and the world originate fortuitously.

(b) The second class of *Adhiccasamuppannikas*¹ comprises those who arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion through reasoning. As a parallel to this doctrine, we may refer to the *Lokāyatikas* or *Bārhaspatyas* who hold that the happiness and misery of persons are brought about by the laws of nature, and that there is no other cause. It was by an accidental combination of elements that the living beings such as a peacock of variegated colours or a human being is born. The conceptions of heaven and hell, merit and demerit, and so forth, according to them, are creations of designing minds. The doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalin is similar to what has been stated above. According to him, there is no preceding cause or condition for the affliction or purification of a person and hence there is no need for exertion. It is a mistake to think, he says, that one can change the course of his life by the observance of precepts or performance of rituals or practice of asceticism.*

¹ *Digba*, I, p. 53-54; *Samyutta*, III, p. 211. Cf. *ante*, ch. IV, p. 37-38.

* NOTE: In the *Digba Nikāya* (I, p. 30) the five classes of thinkers including the *Antānantikas* dealt with before are called *Pubbantakappikas* (i.e. those who speculate about the beginning of the universe). In the *Mādhyamika-ūrtti* (pp. 536, 572), however, the *Sāsvatavādins* are only called *Pūrvāntikas*, while the *Antānantikas* are called *Aparāntikas* (i.e. those who speculate about the future of the universe) (See also *Majjhima*, II, pp. 228 ff.; *Paṭis.*, I, p. 155). Buddhaghosa remarks in a general way that some of those who have developed the power of remembering former births (*pubbenivāsānussati*) become *Pubbantaka-*

Uddhamāghātanika

VI. Sixteen kinds of *Uddhamāghātanika-saṅnīvādins*¹ (those who believe in the existence of a *conscious* soul after death).² The sixteen conceptions are as follows:—

(a) Soul is material (*rūpī*)³ and remains healthy and conscious after death (*aroga param maraṇā saṅnī*). This view, says Buddhaghosa, is due to the meditator developing the notion that the soul is identical with the object of his meditation. He further says that such beliefs are held by the Ājīvikas. From the information collected by Dr. Barua, it is apparent that the Ājīvikas conceived of soul as an entity absolutely pure in its nature, but there is nothing to show that the soul, according to the Ājīvikas, is material.

ppikas, while some who have developed higher vision (*dibbacakkhu*) become Aparāntakappikas (*Sumaṅgala Vilāsini*, I, p. 119).

1 The Aparāntakappikas, according to the *Dīgha Nikāya*, number forty-four from the Uddhamāghātanikas to the Diṭṭha-dhammanibbānavādins.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 31; *Majjhima*, II, p. 229.

3 *Rūpī attā*. 'Rūpa' is usually translated as 'form.' On the basis of the connotation of 'rūpa' in *nāmarūpa*, I think it should be translated by the word 'matter.' In the Buddhist cosmological speculations, 'rūpadhātu' means not 'the world of forms,' but the 'material world.' Likewise 'Arūpadhātu' means not the 'world of the formless' but the 'non-material world.'

In the *M. Vr.*, it is clearly stated that 'nāma' is a collective name of the four *arūpīnaḥ skandhā* (i.e. immaterial skandhas) while *rūpa* is that which takes form and offers obstruction (*rūpyata iti rūpaṃ bādhyata ityarthah*). The Tibetan rendering of *rūpyate* is *gshig tu, run bus*=because it is susceptible of examination and that of *bādhyate* is *gnod, par, bya, bar, nun*=it is susceptible of being struck (see *M. Vr.*, p. 544 fn.). Cf. Another conception of soul similar to this

(b) Soul is non-material (*arūpī*) but remains healthy and conscious after death. Buddhaghosa thinks that this view is due to the meditator reaching the Arūpasamāpatti stage and confusing the *nimitta* (object of meditation) of Arūpasamāpatti with *attā* (soul). He attributes to Mahāvīra a doctrine similar to this. Buddhaghosa seems to be correct in his suggestion, for the Jainas also describe their soul (*jīva*) as non-material (*arūpa*) and formless (*amūrta*).¹

The next six views are more or less stereotyped combinations of *rūpī* and *arūpī*, *anta* and *ananta*. These are as follows:—
The soul after death is

- (c) both material (*rūpī*) and non-material (*arūpī*)
- (d) neither *rūpī* nor *arūpī*
- (e) finite (*anta*)

in the Mahānidāna Sutta (*Dīgha*, II, p. 64): *Rūpī me paritto attā ti* and *Rūpī me ananto attā ti*.

It may be observed that if *Rūpī* means 'form' it cannot be *ananta* (infinite) hence *rūpī* should mean 'material.'

1 See *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 309. See also Guérinot, *La Religion Djaina* (Paris, 1826), ch. VI: *L'âme le dīva, est le principe de la vie, la force vitale. Elle possède une série de qualités: elle est immatérielle, amourta, sans forme, aroupa.....*"

The only point to which I want to draw attention is that the word '*aroupa*' (*arūpa*) should have been rendered into French by the word 'immatérielle' and '*amourta*' (*amūrta*) by 'sans forme.' Mr. Jaini also in his *Outlines of Jainism* (Cambridge, 1916), p. 83, translates *amūrta* by the word 'immaterial.' In the *Dravyasaṃgraha* (edited by Sarat Chandra Ghosal, 1917, The Sacred Books of the Jainas Series), pp. 4, 5, 22, *amūrta* is translated by the word 'formless.'

Mons. Guérinot, however, does not mention the source from which he traced the word '*arūpa*.' From the *Dravya-saṃgraha* (p. 22) it is apparent that soul, according to the Jainas, in its pure state, is invisible and it takes matter (*puṅgalu*) when it is afflicted by passions.

- (f) infinite (*ananta*)
- (g) both *antavān* and *anantavān*
- (h) neither *antavān* nor *anantavān*

The soul after death is conscious of

- (i) only one object (*ekatta*)¹
- (j) many objects (*nānatta*)²
- (k) limited space or object (*paritta*)³
- (l) unlimited space or object (*appamāṇa*).⁴

These four views are attributed by Buddhaghosa to the various experiences acquired by ecstatic meditation. He says that the first (i) view is held by those who have attained the fourth *saṃpatti*, while the second (j) by those who have not attained any one of the *saṃpattis*. The third (k) and fourth (l) are held by those meditators who have for meditation an object or space or *viññāṇa*, limited (*paritta*) or unlimited (*appamāṇa*). The soul after death has

- (m) unmixed happiness (*ekanta-sukhī*), e.g., when a being is in the third or fourth *jhānabhūmi*;
- (n) unmixed misery (*ekanta-dukkhī*), e.g., when a being is in hell;

1 Similar to the Brahmakāyikā and Subhakiṇṇā gods=2nd and 4th *Viññāṇaṭṭhitis* (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

2 Similar to Ābhassarā gods=3rd *Viññāṇaṭṭhiti* (*Dīgha*, II, p. 69).

3 Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 13: Sabbaso rūpaṇñānaṃ samatikkamo, paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamo, nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikāro ananto ākāso ti ākāsaṇācāyatanam upasampajja viharati ayaṃ catuttho vimokkho.

4 Cf. *Majjhima*, II, p. 229: Etaṃ va paṇ' ekesam upātivattatam viññāṇakasinam eke abhivadanti appamāṇam āneñjam; for further elucidation see *Majjhima*, II, p. 13.

- (o) mixture of happiness and misery, e.g., when a human being is in the mortal world;
- (p) neither happiness nor misery, e.g., when a being is in the Vehapphala heaven.

Buddhaghosa attributes these four views to those who form their conception of soul on the basis of the four different kinds of future existences as indicated above.

Uddhamāgbhātanika-asaññivāda

VII. Eight kinds of *Uddhamāgbhātanika-asaññivādins* (upholders of the existence of *unconscious* soul after death).

Among those who are of opinion that the soul remains *unconscious* but healthy after death, the following eight conceptions of the soul are current:

The soul is

- (a) material (*rūpī*)
- (b) non-material (*arūpī*)
- (c-h) both *rūpī* and *arūpī* and so forth as stated above in connection with the conscious soul (c-h)¹

Uddhamāgbhātanika-n'eva-saññināsaññivādins

VIII. Eight kinds of *Uddhamāgbhātanika-n'evasaññināsaññivādins* (supporters of the view that the soul after death is *neither conscious nor unconscious*).

Among those who adhere to the view that the soul after death remains healthy, but is neither conscious nor unconscious, the following eight opinions exist:

The soul is (a) material (*rūpī*), (b-h) non-material (*arūpī*) and so forth, as shown under the previous head 'unconscious soul after death.'

¹ See above, p. 68.

The opinions placed under the headings 'Adhiccasamuppannikas' and 'Uddhamāghātanikas', are formed, says Buddhaghosa, according to the object (*kasina*) of meditation selected by a meditator. He says that the meditators sometimes become so much engrossed with the object of their meditation that they lose their power of judgment. They are carried away by their ecstatic experiences and give out their individual experiences as the Truth. In the exposition of the thirty-four views given above, he pointed out, as far as possible, how far a *kasina* could be responsible for a particular view.¹ There are some views, however, based on the Buddhist notion of heavens and hells, e.g. *attā hoti ekantasukhī, ekantadukkhi, sukhī-dukkhi*, and so forth.

Ucchedavāda

IX. Seven kinds of *Ucchedavāda* (*Natthattavādis*² = Annihilationists). The following are the seven different conceptions of soul held by the Annihilationists in a gradual ascending order but the soul, in every case, is believed to become extinct after death:

- (a) The soul has form (*rūpavā*) and is made of the four elements, and is like the body born of father and mother. In short, its composition is similar to that of the human being.
- (b) The soul is heavenly³ and has form. It remains in

¹ An instance is given in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, p. 21) as to how a meditator is sometimes bewildered by the object of his meditation. See *Papañcasudani*, p. 121-2 commenting on the passage 'Eke samanabrāhmaṇā rattim eva samānaṃ divā ti sañjānāti, etc.'

² *Samyutta*, IV, p. 401.

³ *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 120: Dibbo to devaloke sambhūto (by heavenly we mean that it is produced in one of the spheres of Kāmāvacara gods).

the Kāmāvacara sphere and is nourished by material food.

- (c) The soul is heavenly, has form and is of the same substance as mind (*manomaya*). It possesses all the parts of the physical body, major and minor, as also the organs of sense (*indriyas*).¹
- (d) The soul is of the same substance as beings of the *ākāsānañcāyatana*² i.e. like these beings, it has neither *rūpasāññā* (perception of material objects) nor *paṭigbasāññā* (perception of obstructing objects) and is indifferent to the distinctions made between one thing and another identifying itself with infinite space (*anantākāsa*).
- (e) The soul is of the same nature as beings of the *viññāṇaṇañcāyatana*.³ Like these beings it can remain beyond the sphere of the *Ākāsānañcāyatanu-paga* gods and identifies itself with 'infinite consciousness' (*anantaṃ viññāṇaṃ*).
- (f) The soul is like the beings of the *ākīñcāññāyatana*.⁴ Like these beings, it can stay outside the sphere of the *Viññāṇaṇañcāyatanu-paga* gods.
- (g) The soul is similar to the beings of the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*,⁵ and hence superior to the *Ākiñcāññāyatana-paga* gods. This state of the soul is considered as the best (*paṇīta*) and the most tranquil (*santa*). It also becomes extinct after death.

1 *Sum. Vil.*, I, p. 120. It is similar to the Rūpāvacara gods.

2 i.e. similar to the 4th class of Arūpāvacara gods.

3 i.e. similar to the 3rd class of Arūpāvacara gods.

4 i.e. similar to the 2nd class of Arūpāvacara gods.

5 i.e. similar to the 1st class of Arūpāvacara gods.

The seven conceptions of the soul are apparently based on the Buddhistic classification of beings as shown below, namely, two classes of the Kāmāvacaras, one class of the Rūpāvacaras and four classes of Arūpāvacaras.¹ The underlying idea of these conceptions is that the soul is made of elements that constitute one or other of the above-mentioned categories of beings. In short, these theories amount almost to the identification of the soul with the body (*taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ*), a theory not accepted by any of the Buddhist philosophers.²

If we critically examine the views under the head 'Uccheda-vāda', we find nothing but the Buddhist conception of the seven classes of beings (*viññāṇatthitis*). First, the soul is identified with the body, and then it is shown that as the body of beings may be of seven different varieties, so also is the soul. The soul may also be interpreted as something separate from the body but of the same nature as the body.

1 The subdivisions of the Kāmāvacara beings are as follows:—

(a) Beings of Niraya, Tiracchānayani, Petaloka, Asurabhavana and Manussaloka.

(b) The gods of Cātummahārājikadevaloka, Tāvatisabhabhavana, Nimmanaratiadevaloka and Paranimmitavasavattiadevaloka.

Those of the Rūpāvacara gods are: Brahmāpārisajjadevas, Brahmāpurohitadevas etc. up to Akanitthadevas.

Those of the Arūpāvacara gods are: (a) Ākāśānācāyatana, (b) Viññāṇānācāyatana, (c) Ākiñcaṇāyātana and (d) Nevasāññānāyātana.

For further details see McGovern, *Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 49-50, 60-70; *Abhidharmakśāra*, ch. III, cf. also 'Satta Viññāṇatthitayo' in *Digba*, II, p. 68-69.

For Nāgārjuna's refutation of the Aśśvatavāda (=Ucchedavāda), see *ante*, p. 57.

2 See *Digba*, I, p. 157.

Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavāda

X. Five classes of *Diṭṭha-dhammanibbānavādins* (theorisers about the attainment of Nibbāna in this life).

The five classes are as follows:—

Those who believe that the soul attains Nibbāna (perfection)

(a) when it fully enjoys the pleasures of the five senses, viz., *rūpa*, *rasa*, *śabda*, *gandha* and *sparśa*;

(b) when it, free from desires (*kāma*) and evil thoughts and actions (*akusala-dhamma*), enters into the first *jhāna* in which state, there is reflection (*vitakka*) and judgment (*vicāra*) and a feeling of joy derived through dissociation from the world;

(c) when it, in the second *jhāna*, becomes free from reflection and judgment, internally serene, and remains with thoughts concentrated and in the enjoyment of happiness derived through meditation;

(d) when it, in the third *jhāna*, becomes indifferent to happiness and unhappiness, remains conscious of all that is happening, and is pervaded by a sense of ease; and

(e) when it, after dismissing both happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, is in the fourth *jhāna*, which is a pure state having only equanimity (*upekkhā*) and memory (*sati*).

These five views hardly need any comment. The first is that of the worldly man running after worldly pleasures and may well be compared to the materialistic school of philosophy like the Lokāyatikas or the Bārhaspatyas according to whom the *summum bonum* of human life lies in the full enjoyment of the worldly pleasures attainable through wealth yielded by cattle-rearing, trade, agriculture etc.¹ The next four views refer

¹ See *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha*, edited and translated by Prem Sundar Bose, 1929, p. 7.

to the four *jhānas*, which are regarded as the lowest rungs in the ladder of spiritual advancement.

Hence those who have reached one of them are far from Nibbāna, but the people, as the *Brahmajāla Sutta* wants to show, are led away by their own beliefs and aver that the happy state reached in those stages must be the highest and constitutes Nibbāna in the present life. These four views are also based like the previous ones, on ecstatic experiences, and are given out by those only whose highest attainment has been one of the *jhānas*.¹



1 It is evident from the above exposition of the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, that its compiler has spoken more of the opinions of the imperfect Buddhist monks than those of the non-Buddhist thinkers existing at the time of the appearance of Buddhism. It enumerates the misconceptions and misinterpretations current among the Buddhist monks after Buddhism had been in existence for some time.

CHAPTER VI

THE TATHĀGATA

In the previous chapter the six indeterminables have been discussed. The remaining four relate to the question, what is Tathāgata in other words, Nibbāna? Throughout the Buddhist literature, whether Hīnayānic or Mahāyānic, the problems are thus presented:

- (i) *Hoti Tathāgato param maraṇā ti?* (Does Tathāgata (henceforth abbreviated as T.) exist after death?)
- (ii) *Na hoti T. param maraṇā ti?* (Does not T. exist after death?)
- (iii) *Hoti ca na ca hoti T. param maraṇā ti?* (Does not T. exist and not exist after death?)
- (iv) *Neva hoti na na hoti T. param maraṇā ti?* (Does T. neither exist nor not exist after death?).

Though in the Buddhist texts, the problems have been treated as *avyākata* (inexplainable) and not conducive to the spiritual welfare of the inquiries, we find that in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iv. pp. 382ff.), the *Mādhyamikavṛtti* and a few other Mahāyāna texts, there are attempts to offer an explanation of the problems. These have been, in fact, utilized in the Mahāyānic texts to establish their contention of *Sūnyatā* or *Vijñānamātratā*.

From the available expositions of these problems, it is apparent that the underlying reason for negating all the four propositions is that the inquirers, who seek a solution of the problems, labour under the misconception that the Tathāgata is an individual, a composite of skandhas, and that the only differ-

ence between a man of the world and the Tathāgata is that the former is composed of impure (*sāsrava*) skandhas and the latter of pure (*anāsrava*). In other words the inquirers want to ascertain whether Buddhism has anything to say about the existence of the soul (*ātman*) and its state when an individual attains *mukti*. The four problems hinge on the question whether the Tathāgata is a person, and whether his personality, which becomes pure by constant spiritual culture through ages, continues to exist after death (which in this case is *Nirvāṇa*). As Buddhism denies the existence of personality, the only course open to it is therefore to answer all questions relating to soul in the negative, as such questions do not arise. It is like putting the question whether the flower in the sky is red or blue. Any answer, positive or negative, would be misleading; hence the four propositions stated above are treated in the Buddhist texts as *avyākata*. The real issue therefore is not the existence of Tathāgata after death, but whether there is *attā*, and if so, does the *attā* of Arhats or Buddhas remain eternally in *Nirvāṇa* in any form, or become extinct.

In the *Samyutta Nikāya* (iv. pp. 383-384), just after the discourse that *attā* should not be identified with one or more or all of the skandhas, it is shown that the Tathāgata likewise should not be identified with one of the *skandhas* thus:

- (a) whether rūpa or vedanā or saññā or saṅkhārā or viññāṇa is Tathāgata?
- (b) whether T. is in rūpa, vedanā etc.
- (c) whether T. is something different from rūpa or vedanā etc.
- (d) whether rūpa, vedanā etc. all taken together are T.
- (e) whether T. is devoid of rūpa, vedanā etc. (*arūpī, avedanō, asaññī, asaṅkhāro, aviññāṇo*).

The answer to each of these questions evidently could be nothing but *no h'etaṃ*.

What the *Samyutta Nikāya* has laid down by a few simple statements has been elaborated into a whole chapter¹ in the *Mādhyamikavṛtti*. Nāgārjuna (henceforth abbreviated as N.) commences (the chapter) with the statement that, if the existence of transmigrating beings (*bhavasamtati*) in reality be proved then only the reality of the Tathāgata, the perfect Buddha, the saviour of the world, can be established, but as the former, is not proved, the existence of the Tathāgata cannot be established. It must be shown that the

- (a) Tathāgata is the same as the skandhas; or
- (b) T. is different from the skandhas; or
- (c) T. is in the skandhas; or
- (d) the skandhas are in T.; or
- (e) T. is possessed of skandhas (*skandhavān*), but as none of these are true, and so there is no T. in reality.

Is T. the same as the skandhas?

N. first takes up the proposition that the T. is something pure and indescribable and is identical with the skandhas. There are two sets of skandhas, one being the usual five viz., *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskārā* and *viññāna* and the other, the five dharmas which make one a Buddha viz., *śīla*, *saṃādhi*, *prajñā*, *vimukti* and *vimuktijñānadarśana*. As the latter set of skandhas is not found in all beings (*avyāpaka*), he takes up the question of identity of the first set of skandhas, *rūpa*, *vedanā* etc. with the T., and points out the absurdities, to which this identity would lead. He argues thus:

¹ Ch. XXII: *Tathāgataparikṣā*.

(i) If fire be taken as identical with firewood, or Buddha with upādāna (= skandhas, i.e., elements which make an individual) then the doer, and the thing done, become one.

(ii) If Buddha (i.e., the Ātman of pure being) be identical with skandhas, then Buddha (or pure Ātman) would be subject to origination and destruction¹

Is. T. different from the skandhas?

N. then assumes that T. is different from the skandhas, and points out the absurdities, to which this assumption would lead. He says:

(i) If fire be different from firewood, fire could exist without the firewood. Again not being dependent on any other material, it does not require to be ignited. It would be self-existent, proving thereby the futility of exertion (*ārambha-vaiyartham*). Analogously it may be said that Buddha and upādāna being different, Buddha is devoid of upādāna, so he is causeless and is self-existent from this it follows that no exertion is needed to become a Buddha.

(ii) If Buddha be different from the skandhas, he would be devoid of the characteristics of the skandhas.²

It follows then that skandhas cannot be different (*vyatirikta*) from the T. Now, when skandhas and T. are not different entities, the other propositions, viz., skandhas are in T., T. is in skandhas or T. is possessed of skandhas, fall to the ground, for these relations can exist only between two distinct entities.

Thus, Nāgārjuna by the line of reasoning *reductio ad absurdum*, establishes that the Tathāgata can neither be proved

¹ See *M. Vr.*, p. 434 and *infra*, pp. 85, 89 f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 434; for detailed treatment, see *infra*, pp. 89 f.

to be identical with the skandhas nor different from them, and hence there is no Tathāgata—the Tathāgata which is popularly supposed to be the ultimate perfect state of beings. At the same time Nāgārjuna adds, there is no transmigrating being (*bhava-saṃtati*), who is supposed to become the Tathāgata ultimately.

Does T. exist relatively?

N. then says that it may be contended by some that though it has not been possible to establish the existence of T. directly, it may be done, at least, indirectly (*parabhāvatā*) by proving the existence of the upādānas, and T. as their image. But this also is shown untenable by N. by the application of *reductio ad absurdum* thus:

Against the argument that the existence of T. can be proved at least as a reflection of pure skandhas similar to the image of an object on a mirror, Nāgārjuna advances the following arguments:

(a) That which appears by depending on something else, e.g. the reflection on a mirror is *anātma* (substanceless) and whatever is *anātma* is unreal (*niḥsvabhāva*). Hence, there is no ground for holding that the so-called T. exists in reality.

(b) Again, if T. had been really existent, then only it would have been possible to establish the separate existence (*parabhāva*) of skandhas by showing their apartness (*paratvam*) from T. As it has been already proved T. is non-existent by its own nature (*svabhāvatā*), the question of separate existence (*para-bhāva*) of skandhas cannot arise, so it is futile to argue that the existence of T. can be proved at least indirectly (*para-bhāvatā*) with reference to the skandhas, with which *paratva* (apartness) and hence *parabhāvatva* (separate existence) of T. is out of the question.

An object must have either an existence of its own (*svabhāva*) or at least, its existence can be established with reference to some other thing (*parabhāva*) but T. has neither; hence, how can T. be said to be real.

Does T. become apparent by means of skandhas?

Now, it may be contended that T. is not to be spoken of as identical with, or different from, the skandhas; he is known only on account (*upādāya*) of the skandhas.¹ Nāgārjuna replies that the position also is not tenable, the reason being that it implies the existence of T. as prior to, and distinct from, skandhas; and that T. had the skandhas later on, just as we say, Devadatta exists and he later on acquires wealth. From all considerations, the conclusion that is arrived at is that T. cannot have an existence before he has taken up the skandhas, i.e., he cannot exist uncaused (*anupādāya*), for that would again give rise to the fallacy that things can originate without cause. That which does not exist at all,² how can it take up something else,³ in this case, the skandhas (*upādānas*).

From the above it follows that a thing, which is not taken up by something else, cannot be regarded as *upādāna*. N. says: now that it has been established that T. was non-existent before the acquisition of skandhas, and that T., in fact, did not take up the skandhas, then, is it proper to regard a thing as a cause of some other thing even if the latter does not receive the former

1 The object of the opponents of Nāgārjuna is to say that T. exists for ever, but only when he takes up the aggregates (*skandhas*), he becomes apparent to us.

2 e.g. flower in the sky, son of a barren woman.

3 Just as it is meaningless to say that the flower in the sky has red petals.

(in some shape or other). Hence, the skandhas should not be regarded as the cause of T. A thing when not taken up by something else cannot be called *upādāna* (cause) of the latter; in the absence of such cause (*upādāna*), there can be nothing as producer (*upādātṛ*) out of that cause. As there is nothing without substantial cause (*nirupādāna*), there can be no Tathāgata.¹

The T., when examined in the five-fold way (i.e. identity, difference etc.), has been shown as neither existing by itself (*svabhāvataḥ*), nor with reference to the skandhas (= *upādānas*), (i.e. *parabhāvataḥ*). Moreover the skandhas themselves are non-existent, because they are dependently originated (*pratītya-samutpannatvāt*).² Their existence also cannot be established indirectly (*parabhāvataḥ*), that is, by their relation to something else, e.g. the *upādātṛ*. The existence of *upādāna* is not possible without an agent (*upādātṛ*). Even if the existence of the agent (*upādātṛ*) be assumed, how can the reality of a thing be established by showing its relation to the agent (or originator) when the thing itself is non-existent which N. has shown in the chapter on *skandhaparīkṣā*. Nāgārjuna thus concludes that there is neither *upādāna* nor *upādātṛ*.³

We need not follow Nāgārjuna any further, for he passes next to the abstruse conception of *Sūnyatā*, which is beyond our

1 This may be cleared by the following simile: Earth is normally the material cause of a jar. But unless a quantity of earth is taken up and converted into a jar, it cannot be called the cause of the jar. When earth remains unutilised, it is not the material cause of the jar; and the existence of the jar cannot be asserted. From this N.'s conclusion is that there is neither the material cause nor the jar.

2 For detailed arguments see *M. Vṛ.*, ch. IV.

3 *M. Vṛ.* pp. 440-1:

scope here. He is not satisfied with establishing his point that there is no Tathāgata the person—a fact accepted by the Hīnayānists, he goes further and shows that there are no *skandhas*, the existence of which is admitted by the Hīnayānists.

Both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists agree in holding that there is no persisting entity (*pudgala*) in a being apart from the *skandhas*, and any question about the existence of the Tathāgata after his passing away really raises the issue whether there is any persisting entity in a being, and whether that entity continues to exist after the being is thoroughly cleansed of his impurities and passes away for ever. To put it in another way, does the entity (*pudgala*) exist in Nirvāṇa eternally, or not? As both the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists deny the existence of that entity—the personality of beings, both refuse to give any answer to the question whether there is Tathāgata (the person) after he has passed away, for a question like that cannot arise and hence any answer, if given, would be misleading,¹ and so it is safer and better to leave it as *avyākata* or *anirvacanīya*.

1 It should be remembered that Nāgārjuna denies the existence of Tathāgata the person but not of Tathatā or Śūnyatā, for an exposition of which see my *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 214-5.

To the Hīnayānists, Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, Nirvāṇa exists but is devoid of any individuality. It is like the sea of one taste, one colour etc. and in which all rivers of different names, colours, tastes lose their individual characters.

CHAPTER VII

DOCTRINE OF ANATTĀ

Most of the doctrines discussed in the previous two chapters relate to the notions current among the imperfect Buddhists and the non-Buddhists about the nature of the soul and its existence. Buddhism wholly denies the existence of the soul which is permanent, immaculate, unaffected by *karma*, and in this denial (i.e. *pudgalanairātmya*) there is no difference of opinion between the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists. The Pāli texts aver that the belief in the existence of the soul, or in other words, the heresy of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhī*) is due to the misapprehension¹ of one of the five khandhas as soul in the following four ways:

1. *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (I, pp. 143-150) explains how this misapprehension happens. It says that a person, while meditating sometimes conceives of

(i) the object of meditation (e.g. *paṭhavikasina*, *āpokasina*, *nilakasina*, *pītakasina*) as identical with himself i.e., the object of meditation is he and he is the object of meditation. It is like identifying (*advayam*) the flame (of a burning lamp) with its colour (*yā acci so vaṇṇo, yo vaṇṇo sā acci ti*);

(ii) the khandhas as belonging to the self (*attā rūpena rūpavā*) just as some say that a tree and its shadow are two separate entities and that one belongs to the other (*rukko imāya chāyāya chāyavā*);

(iii) the khandhas as existing in the self (*attani rūpaṃ passati*) just as one would say that flower and smell are separate and the smell is in the flower (*ayaṃ gandho imasmiṃ pupphe* etc.);

(iv) the khandhas as the container of the self as a casket is of a jewel.

(i) attā is the same as rūpa, or vedanā, or saññā or saṅkhārā, or viññāṇa (*rūpaṃ* etc. *attato samanupassati*)

(ii) attā is possessed of rūpa etc.¹ (*rūpavantaṃ* etc. *attānaṃ samanupassati*)

(iii) in attā there is rūpa etc. (*attani rūpaṃ* etc. *samanupassati*)

(iv) attā is in rūpa etc. (*rūpasmim* etc. *attānaṃ samanupassati*)²

It appears from the discourse in the *Milindapañha*,³ that among the five khandhas, *viññāṇa* was more often identified with *attā* or *jīva* than the rest, but no such distinction is noticeable in the Nikāyas. As a consequence of the identification of *attā* with one of the components of a being, by the non-Buddhists, the texts aver that it can be classified like the beings into three types⁴ thus:

(1) *attā* of beings of the lower worlds, viz., from Avīci to Paranimmita is gross (*olārika*).⁵

(2) *attā* of beings of the worlds from Paṭhamajhānabhūmi to Akaniṭṭhabrahmaloka is *manomaya*,⁶ i.e., material but very subtle like the mind, and

1 *rūpa* etc.=the five 'khandhas, viz. rūpa, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārā and viññāṇa.

2 In the *M. Vr.*, p. 432 and elsewhere it is shown that the misapprehension happens in five ways, the fifth being that the *Attā* is something different from the *skandhas*; the first four being the same as stated above.

3 *Milindapañha*, p. 86.

4 *Digha*, I, p. 195; see also the commentary on *Poṭṭhapādasutta*.

5 *Olārika*=Rūpi cātummahābhūtiko kabalīṅkārahāra-bhakkho.

6 *Manomaya*=Rūpi manomayo sabbaṅga-paccaṅgi ahinindriyo.

(3) *attā* of beings of the worlds from Ākāśānañcāyatana-brahmaloka to Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-brahmaloka is *arūpa*¹ (*non-material*).

According to the Buddhists, *attā* does not exist, it is only a word of common usage² and does not correspond to any real entity, hence no question should arise as to its existence, not to speak of its identification with one of the *khandhas*.

The *Milindapañha* raises the question whether *attā* is something different from the *khandhas* and whether it is an active agent living within the body and acting through the organs of sense. This is refuted by Nāgasena by the argument that as its activity ceases when the organs of sense cease to work, so it cannot be said to have a separate and independent existence of its own.³

The Pāli texts refuse to admit the existence of anything in a being besides the five *khandhas*. Life (*jīva*), according to them, is dependent on *āyu* (span of life), *usmā* (heat) and *viññāṇa* (vital principle) just as the sound of a conch-shell has no existence of its own, but is dependent on the blower, his exertion, and the wind blown into it.⁴

In his works, Nāgārjuna also takes up the same position as indicated in the Pāli texts, and proceeds in his own way to show that *ātman* is not the same as one of the *skandhas* nor has it a separate and independent existence of its own apart from the *skandhas*. The stanzas on the point in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*⁵ run thus:—

1 *Arūpa*=*Ārūpi saññāmayo*.

2 *Digba*, I, p. 202: *lokaśāmaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohāraloka-paññattiyo*; cf. *M. Vṛ.*, p. 345: *nāmamātrakam evātmānam*.

3 *Milindapañha*, pp. 55, 86.

4 *Digba*, II, p. 338.

5 See *M. Vṛ.*, p. 434.

स्कन्धेष्वत्मा विद्यते नैव चामो
 सन्ति स्कन्धा आत्मनीतीह यस्मात् ।
 सत्यन्वत्वे स्यादियं कल्पना वै
 तच्चान्यत्वं नास्त्यतः कल्पनेषा ॥

[The soul is not in the skandhas, nor are the skandhas in the soul; had they (soul and skandhas) been separate, then one holding the other could have been imagined; but as there is no separateness between the soul and the skandhas, the statement that one holds the other is pure imagination (i.e. false).]

इष्टो नात्मा रूपवान्नास्ति यस्माद्
 आत्मा वत्त्वार्थोपयोगो हि नातः ।
 भेदे गोमान रूपवानप्यभेदे
 तत्त्वान्वात्वेऽरूपतो नात्मनः स्तः ॥

[As the soul is not made of rūpa (matter),¹ its existence cannot be admitted, and for the same reason, it cannot be said that the soul possesses attributes of its own (*vattvārthopayoga*). If the soul and rūpa be regarded as separate, then the relation between the soul and rūpa would be like the cowherd and his cows, and if they are regarded as not separate (*abhedā*), the soul would be made of rūpa, hence neither identity (*tattva*)² nor difference (*anyatva*) of the soul and the skandhas can be established.]

All the controversies about *attā* whether in the Pāli texts or in the works of Nāgārjuna rest on the fact that the constituents of a being, if analysed, cannot be shown to have

¹ *Rūpa* here also is not form but matter. It is referring to the skandhas in general by a concrete instance. The translations given here are in the light of their Tibetan renderings. See *Madhyamakāvatāra* (Tibetan ed.), p. 265; *M. V.*, p. 435 fn. 1.

² See *M. V.*, p. 439: *tattva*=*ekatva*.

anything called soul, apart from the five skandhas, which include, as they do, all the elements that compose a being.

Two lines of argument

The Buddhists therefore take to two lines of argument, viz., that the soul should either be *identical with* one or more or all of the skandhas, or be *wholly different from* the skandhas, the stock Pāli expression for this is *taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ* or *aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ*. The Pāli texts assert without giving sufficient reasons, that both the above propositions are wrong (*micchādiṭṭhi*), while Nāgārjuna has recourse to his usual line of reasoning, viz., *reductio ad absurdum* to show that it is absurd to suppose a relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas. We shall state here concisely Nāgārjuna's arguments:

What is the *Ātman*—the basis of the sense of I-ness (*Ko'yam*) *ātmā nāmēti yo'haṅkāra-viśayaḥ*? It should be either the skandhas themselves (*skandhasvabhāva*) or something apart from the skandhas (*skandhavyatirikta*). That is, the relation between the soul and the skandhas should be either one of identity (*ekatva*) or difference (*anyatva*). Both these positions according to Nāgārjuna, are untenable on the ground:

आत्मा स्कन्धा यदि भवेदायव्यावभाग्मवेत् ।

स्कन्धेभ्योऽन्यो यदि भवेद्वेदस्कन्धलक्षणः ॥

[If *ātman* be the same as the skandhas, it would be subject to origin and destruction, again if it be different from the

1 In the case of *anyatva* again, the question of the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra ādheya*) arises, viz., whether *Ātman* is in the skandhas or the skandhas are in the *Ātman*. See *ante*, p. 84; also *Muyut.*, p. 208.

skandhas it would be without the characteristics appertaining to the skandhas (*phun. poḥi mtshan. ŋid med. par bgyur*).]¹

Hence, it is not possible to establish any relation of identity or difference between the soul and the skandhas.

(i) *Identification of the Soul with the Skandhas how faulty?*

The following are some of the *untenable* positions that would arise by the identification of ātman with the skandhas:—

(a) ātman, which had no existence before, comes into being, so it becomes an object constituted (*kṛtaka*) and hence impermanent, but ātman is regarded by the opponents as unconstituted (*akṛtaka*) and permanent;

(b) ātman requires a creator but a creator of ātman, apart from the ātmā itself, is not known. If the ātman be conceived as the creator of itself, then the contingency arises that the world has a beginning and that a being which did not exist before can appear, and so ātman becomes constituted (*kṛtaka*);²

(c) ātman originates without any cause (*sambhūto vāpya-betukah*). If it be said that ātman had no existence before and there was no creator, and then if its present existence be admitted, it would be admitting origination of an object without cause, but this is not permissible;³

(d) ātman has momentary origination and destruction like the skandhas or upādāna-skandhas, but that is not acceptable;⁴

1 *M. Vṛ.*, p. 340.

2 *M. Vṛ.*, p. 581.

3 *M. Vṛ.*, p. 581.

4 Further, at the moment just preceding Nirvāṇa, the destruction and origination of ātmā would take place according to the doctrine of momentary existence (*kṣanikavāda*). If the agent has been destroyed, who is it that enjoys the fruit? The contingency that arises is that one acts and another enjoys the fruits.

(e) upādāna (the material cause) and upādātṛ (the agent) become one. Upādāna requires an agent in order that it may be given a shape. If the agent be the same as upādāna, then it would lead to the oneness (*aikyam*) of the agent and the thing produced by the agent, e.g. between the feller of the tree and the tree, the potter and the pot, the fire and the firewood; but this is not admissible;¹

(f) ātman is many like the skandhas;

(g) there is no contradistinction (*vaiparītyam*) between the characteristics of matter (*dravya*) and those of ātman;

(h) ātman is extinct (*uccheda*) in nirvāṇa.

Thus, it follows that it is futile to establish between the ātman and the skandhas a relation of identity (*ekattva*) or difference (*anyatva*), or to give ātman the attributes of permanency (*nityatva*) or impermanency (*anityatva*). To say that ātman is permanent (*nitya*) or impermanent (*anitya*) would make one either a Sāśvatavādin or an Ucchedavādin, both of which views are condemned in the Buddhist texts in unequivocal terms. Therefore, ātman should not be identified with the skandhas (*upādāna-skandhas*).

(ii) *Distinguishing the Soul from the Skandhas how faulty?*

Having asserted that ātman cannot be identified with the skandhas, Nāgārjuna takes up the counterproposition, viz., whether ātman is different from the skandhas (*skandha-vyatiriktaḥ*), and shows the absurdities to which this would again lead:

(a) If ātman be different from the skandhas, then it must not have the characteristics of the dependently originating

¹ *M. Vr.*, p. 576.

skandhas, viz., origin, continuity and destruction (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga-lakṣaṇa*). As these characteristics are absent in ātman, being different from the skandhas, and as it is said to be not dependently originated, therefore it must be admitted that it is non-existing like the sky-flower, for no definition can be offered of such ātman. It can only be pointed out as the basis of the sense of I-ness.

(b) Again each of the five skandhas possesses some characteristics of their own, e.g. rūpa possesses the characteristic of taking forms (*rūpaṇa*),¹ vedanā and saṃjñā that of ascertaining the cause of direct perception (*anubhavanimittodgrahaṇa*) and vijñāna of having detailed knowledge of objects. If ātman be distinguished from the skandhas as vijñāna is done from rūpa, then it should have some characteristics of its own, e.g., it would be something like mind (*citta*) as distinguished from matter (*rūpa*). If its special characteristics be denied, it is meaningless to say that it has existence as something different from the skandhas.

It may be contended that the non-Buddhists attribute to ātman some characteristics which are different from those of the skandhas, viz., that ātman is not an agent, but an enjoyer of fruits, attributeless and inactive; it is only when it takes something of the world (*prakṛti*) as support then only its distinctions are known.²

Nāgārjuna's conclusion

Nāgārjuna is not prepared to accept the contention of the non-Buddhists that a perfectly pure ātman exists without the skandhas, on the ground that any analysis of the constituents of a being does not furnish us with any proof about its inde-

1 *M. Vr.*, p. 343 n; cf. *ruppanalakkhaṇaṃ rūpaṃ*; rūpa, the object and instrument of nirūpaṇa.

2 *M. Vr.*, p. 344.

pendent existence. It has, according to N., for its basis a mere notion, to which the non-Buddhists have attributed existence and qualities.

So he says that the characteristics, which the non-Buddhists, attribute to ātman, are not based on the actual conception of the form of ātman (*na svarūpata ātmanamupalabhya*). They do not understand the real basis of the notion of ātman; it is a mere term. Though they cannot establish anything, yet, out of fear, they recede from even the conventional truth and become entangled in pure conjectures, and being thus deluded, they conceive of an ātman and attribute to it some characteristics. Nāgārjuna then quotes a few verses giving his own idea of the ātman. He says: Just as on account of a mirror, an image, which is not real, is seen, so also on account of the skandhas, the notion of I-ness, which is unreal, arises.¹ As without a mirror, an image is not seen, so without the conglomeration of elements (skandhas), the notion of I-ness does not arise.²

The topic of *anattā* forms the subject-matter of Buddha's second discourse to his five comrades (*Vin.* I, pp. 13-14) and constitutes the keynote of Buddhism. In this discourse, when Buddha denied the existence of *attā*, i.e., of any permanent substance apart from the *khandhas*, he cannot be expected to solve the 'indeterminable' (*avyākata*) problems, as all of them hinge on nature and existence of *attā*.

1 The simile is: I=Image on a mirror; skandhas=mirror.

2 *M. V.*, p. 345:

यथादर्शमुपादाय समुखप्रतिबिम्बकं । दृश्यते नाम तद्यैव न किञ्चिदपि तत्त्वतः ॥
अहंकारशया सन्मानुपादायोपलभ्यते । न च कश्चित् तत्त्वेन समुखप्रतिबिम्बवत् ॥
यथादर्शननादाय समुखप्रतिबिम्बकं । न दृश्यते तथा सन्माननादायाहमिदमपि ॥

These verses served to remove the *avidyā* of Ānanda and made him an Arhat.


CHAPTER VIII

APPEARANCE OF BUDDHA

Far away from the din and bustle of the chief cities of Rājagṛha and Śrāvastī, Kauśāmbī and Ujjeni appeared in a rather secluded place on the borders of Nepal (Himavantapasse, *Digha*, I, 92) amidst the hills at Kapilavastu¹ the lonely figure of Siddhārtha Gautama, the only son of the chieftain of the Śākya clan—a clan too proud of their birth and zealous about their purity of descent.² This gifted son of the Śākyas in accordance

¹ A place subject to the authority of the king of Kosala. See *Jātaka*, IV, 145; *Mahāvastu*, II, p. 199.

² They are often criticised as marrying their own sisters for maintaining the purity of blood. See *Jātaka*, V, 413; *Digha* I, p. 92; *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 351; Beal, *Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha*, p. 22. *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 348; Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 23. *Mahāvamsa*, II, 16-24 gives the following lineage:



with the traditional custom acquired the arts that behoved the sons of the nobility of the clans, and secured for him the due recognition as a prince of physical valour and prowess. He was given in marriage to the daughter of another chieftain of the same clan. He lived with her a few years of ease and luxury and had a son named Rāhula. During the adolescence period of Siddhārtha, the Śākyaas, it seems, were passing through peaceful times, living on their own agricultural produce, the troubles having been encountered by them a few years later after the retirement of Siddhārtha.¹ It is not unoften the case in India or elsewhere that all the luxuries of the world cannot bring peace of mind to a few, the giants among men, who feel an inward impulse to cast away to winds the things that give pleasure to the average mind and hanker after the unknown and the unknowable. Prince Siddhārtha was one of these few. He preferred to eschew his dear wife and newly born babe, his kingly pomp and power to embrace the lonely life of a recluse, living on fruits or the gifts of charitably disposed persons. In spite of all the remonstrances and reasonings of his father's messengers, he refused to return to home life.² The tradition says that he took to this course when he was only twentynine, and for six years he roamed about, sitting at the feet of one teacher or another,

1 We have accounts of two of their feuds. One was with the Koliyas, for the right of drawing water from the river Rohiṇī. In this feud Buddha intervened and brought about an amicable settlement (*Jātaka*, V, 413). The other was with Viḍuḍabha, who practically exterminated the Śākyaas for giving the slave-girl Vāsabhakkhattiyā, his mother, in marriage to his father king Pasenadi of Kosala and for insulting him when he paid his first visit to Kapilavatthu (*Jātaka*, IV, 145 f.).

2 For details, see Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-8.

and imbibing from them all that he could gather. It is said, that he left the palace at the dead of night, crossed the territories of the Śākya, the Koliyas and the Mallas and reached the Anuvaineya town of the Maineyas at dawn.¹ He visited the hermitages of a Śākyan Brāhmaṇi, of a female ascetic Padmā also a Brāhmaṇi, of Brahmarṣi Raivata, and of Rājaka, son of Daṭṭma a *daṇḍika*.² Then he reached the city of Vaiśālī, in the suburb of which was situated the hermitage of Arāḍa Kālāma (= Pāli Ārāḍa Kālāma). He joined the band of disciples whose number was three hundred at the time and within a short time, by the application of his strong will (*chanda*), energy (*vīrya*), self-recollectedness (*smṛti*), meditation (*samādhi*) and intellection (*prajñā*), he attained the *ākiñcanyāyatana* stage, which, in the Buddhist books, is placed in the Arūpaloka and counted as the last but one (i.e. seventh) *samāpatti* leading to *Nirvāṇa*.³ In this stage also he was unable to visualize the Truth—the Reality, the end of misery. He then left Vaiśālī, came to Rājagṛha and stopped all alone at the Pāṇḍava hill. On the following morning donning on his yellow robe and taking his bowl, he entered Rājagṛha by the Tapoda gate for begging alms. Here at his residence on the Pāṇḍava hill, he was met by his old friend king Bimbisāra, who in age was senior to Gautama by five years.⁴ Politely rejecting the offer of Bimbisāra of sharing his kingdom with him, the

1 *Mahāvastu*, II, p. 195 f. mentions only the hermitage of Vaśiṣṭha; *Lalita Vistara*, p. 225: बोधिसत्त्वोऽतिक्रम्य शाक्यान्तिक्रम्य क्रौञ्चान्तिक्रम्य मज्झान्तिक्रम्य मनुष्यैर्निवे निगमे षट्सु योजनेषु तत्र बोधिसत्त्वस्य रात्रिप्रभातोऽभूत् ।

2 *Lalita Vistara*, p. 238.

3 *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 238-9; according to Arāḍa, physical and mental discipline lead to *ākiñcanyāyatana* stage which is identical with *Nirvāṇa*. See Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

4 Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 177 f.; *Mahāvamsa*, II, 26.

ascetic Gautama paid a visit to the Rudraka Rāmaputra's hermitage in the outskirts of Rājagṛha.¹ On enquiry he learnt that Rudraka could rise to the eighth samāpatti, *Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*, the one higher than that reached by Arāḍa Kālāma, but it was still an attainment confined to the constituted world² (*arūpa*) and not transcendental (*lokottara*) leading to peace and rest, the end of misery, the ultimate Nirvāṇa. Impressed by his extraordinary ability in attaining the *Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* stage within a comparatively short time and little exertion, five Brāhmaṇa followers of Rudraka preferred to follow Gautama. With them he went to Gayā and stopped at the Gayāśirṣa hill.³ While dwelling here it struck him that as with two pieces of wet wood one cannot produce fire however briskly he may rub them, so also with mind saturated with *kāma* (desires) one cannot realize the highest truth however severe he may be in self-mortifications.⁴ On self-examination he found that his mind was free from *kāma*. He then proceeded to Uruvilva-Senāpatigrāma, and was much pleased at the sight of the river Nairāñjana with water reaching the edge of the banks covered by shrubs and trees and used as a pasture for the cattle. He observed that he was born at a time when the five kinds of wrong views (*pañcakaṣāya*)⁵ were prevalent. The people of his time were obsessed with the notion of

1 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 243.

2 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 244. संस्कृतानां साधवनां सीपादानां ध्यानसमाधिना पत्तीनां दोषः-

3 In the *Lalita Vistara* (pp. 248 ff.) a full account is given of his rigorous ascetic practices, cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, pp. 77 ff. The comparison will also show the relation between the Pāli and Sanskrit versions of the Tripiṭaka.

4 Cf. Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

5 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 248. See *Aspects*, p. 70: "Śākyamuni came into existence when one of the five *Kaṣāyas* (*Kalpakaṣāya*, *sattvak*; *kleśak*.,

the existence of soul, believed in the attainment of purity by means of physical tortures, restriction of food, utterance of mantras, or salutation of the gods and other sacred objects, and sought for heaven in the next life by ritualistic practices, and so forth. With a view to convince the world that the severest ascetic practices were of no avail, he for six years went through all the unthinkable physical tortures known as *duṣkaracaryās*¹ of the Bodhisattva. He then decided to take food and make his body strong in order to be able to practise the dhyānas, of which he had already a foretaste while he was only a boy,² and which he believed would lead him to Nirvāṇa. For changing his method, he was deserted by his five Brāhmaṇa followers who went away to Benares to continue their rigorous ascetic practices. He accepted the food offered by Sujātā and took his seat under the Bodhi tree to try his own method. He entered into the dhyānas one by one, rising to the fourth³ when he acquired the six supernatural powers,⁴ the knowledge of the destruction of his impurities (*āsravakṣayajñāna*), of the causal chain leading to birth and misery in this world,⁵ and of the four *āryasatyas*.⁶ By a momentary *dr̥ṣṭik.*, *āyuk.*) or the sixty-two wrong views like *nityam astiti nāstiti tathāsti nāstī* prevailed."

1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 81, 246; *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 133; *Milindapañha*, p. 284.

2 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 263: यदहं पितृव्याने...स बोधिरिति । Cf. *Mahāvastu*, II, p. 144.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 343. For the four dhyānas, see *infra*.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 344-5. For the abhijñās, see *infra*.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 346-350. For details of the Pratityasamutpāda, see *infra*.

6 See *Aspects*, p. 206. The four *āryasatyas* are expanded thus in the *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 348-9:

(i) आसवः आसवसमुदयः, आसवनिरोधः, आसवनिरोधप्रमाणो प्रतिपत्
[आसव = काम, भव, अविद्या, इति]

flash of the light of knowledge (*ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā*),¹ he realised the Bodhi. The thirst for wordly objects, wrong views, impurities, hindrances, self-conceit were all dispelled in him and he now fully realised the sameness of all things (*dbarmatatthātā*),² the limit of existences (*bhūtakoti*),³ the universe (*dbarmadhātu*) as also its beings, some of which proceeding along the right path (*samyaktvaniyata*), some along the wrong (*mithyātvaniyata*) and some still wavering between right and wrong (*aniyata*).⁴ Being established in the *Tathāgatagarbha*—the seat of all Tathāgatas, he opened the gates to the haven of *Nirvāṇa*, the city of *Sarvajñatā* (omniscience) for all those who were still in fetters of ignorance and impurities. He became a lotus grown in the tank of knowledge, unaffected by the eight *lokadharmas*.⁵ He was filled with compassion which helped the rapid growth of the seeds of *kuśalamūlas*, the sprouts of *śraddhā* (faith) and lastly he became the distributor of the fruits of *vimukti* (emancipation).⁶

(ii) अविद्या, अविद्यासमुदयः, अविद्यानिरोधः, अविद्यानिरोधगामिनी प्रतिपत्

(iii) संस्काराः, संस्कारसमुदयः, संस्कारनिरोधः, संस्कारनिरोधगामिनी प्रतिपत्

and so on with the other items of the formula of the law of causation, and lastly

(iv) मरुतं, मरुतसमुदयः, मरुतनिरोधः, मरुतनिरोधगामिनी प्रतिपत् ।

From the above, it is evident that the āryasatya indicate the four aspects of a thing, viz., the thing, its origin, its decay and the way to its decay, i.e., दुःखं, दुःखसमुदयः, दुःखनिरोधः, दुःखनिरोधगामिनी प्रतिपत् ।

1 Cf. *Asia Major*, II.

2 & 3 These are terms common in Mahāyānism and rarely found in Hinayāna texts.

4 *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 351, 400; cf. *Laṅkāvatāra*.

5 The eight are *lābho alābho yaso ayaso paṣaṃsā nindā sukhaṃ dukkhaṃ*.

6 *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 351-2.

After achieving his object, for seven days he entered into the *Prītyābhāravayūha-samādbhi*,¹ enjoying the bliss of Nirvāṇa. In the second week he walked to and fro, cogitating over all the worlds (*trisāhasramahāsāhasralokadhātu*), in the third, he fixed his gaze on the Bodhi tree, thinking all the while that he had put an end to the beginningless birth, old age and death, and in the fourth he walked again to and fro, this time his object of thought being the area between the eastern and the western ocean,² the fifth week, a week of great cold and wind, he spent in the palace of Mucilinda Nāga, the sixth at the foot of Nyagrodha tree of Ajapāla, and the seventh at the foot of Tārāyaṇa tree, when he came across the two traders of Uttarāpatha,³ Trapusa and Bhallika and made them his first lay disciples.⁴

¹ *Lal. Vis.*, p. 370.

² *Ibid.*, p. 377.

³ In the *Mahāvastu*, (III, pp. 303, 310, 313) it is stated that they were travelling with a caravan along the trade-route from Dakṣiṇāpatha to Ukkala a town of Uttarāpatha in the kingdom of Gandhāra.

Uttarāpathe Ukkalaṃ nāmādbhiṣṭhānaṃ.....Tebhi dāni yathā Keśasthāli nāma adhiṣṭhāno tabhiṃ keśa-stūpaṃ kārāpitaṃ. Bālukkho nāma nagaraṃ tabhiṃ nakha-stūpaṃ kārāpitaṃ.....Trapusabhallikānāṃ Śilukha nāma nigama āvāsītānāṃ.....adyāpi Gandhāra-rūpe adhiṣṭhānaṃ Śilānāmena jñāyati. Cf. Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

Their conversion at Uruvela was later on commemorated by the erection of stūpas in their native villages in Gandhāra.

There has been a great difference of opinion with regard to the identification of Ukkala and the birth-place of Trapusa and Bhallika. Though the phonetic similarity between Utkala (Orissa) and Ukkala is very great and the identification of Ukkala with Orissa is alluring, yet in view of the evidence supplied by the *Mahāvastu* and the *Lalitavistara* and by Yuan Chwang, Ukkala should be identified with a place in Gandhāra. Yuan Chwang (Watters, I, pp. 111-113) noticed the remains of two of the stūpas mentioned above in the course of his journey from Balkh to Bamian.

⁴ *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 392, 395; Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 241 f.

He was now deliberating within himself whether it would be proper for him to preach a doctrine which was so deep and subtle, inexpressible, unconstituted, signless and tranquil, beyond the range of the organs of sense, or of words and discussions, unsuited for giving or taking or communicating, and realisable only by the wise within himself, and whether it would not be on his part a sheer waste of energy to attempt to preach such a doctrine to the uninitiated.¹ In the Pāli and some of the Sanskrit texts² attempt has been made to explain this unwillingness to preach the doctrine on the part of Buddha as due to the want of suitable men able to comprehend his teaching, and that it was only when Brahmā pointed out there were some whose eyes of knowledge were covered by slight impurities, that Buddha changed his mind and decided to preach the new Truth. This explanation seems to us to be more or less gratuitous, for it is not probable that Buddha who became a *sarvajña* (omniscient) could have required Brahmā's intervention for ascertaining that there were some suitable hearers. The plausible explanation is that the truth visualised by Buddha is beyond concept (*avyākṛta*), and as such it could not be imparted to others through words. It is for this reason that we read often in the Pāli books that Buddha advised people to follow the path chalked out by him leading to Nirvāṇa and not to ask him for an exposition of the truth which is *avyākṛta*.³ Lastly, when he decided to preach the doctrine, he determined that he would speak about the Path only and not about what is Nirvāṇa or the highest Truth. For explaining his Path too, he sought

1 *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 380-1.

2 See *Aspects*, pp. 70-1.

3 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 431: Na h'etaṃ Māluṅkyaputta atthasaṃhi-taṃ n'ādi brahmacariyikaṃ, na nibbidāya.....na nibbānāya saṃvattati, tasmā taṃ mayā abyākataṃ. Kiñ ca Māluṅkyaputta mayā byākataṃ: Idaṃ dukkhaṃ ti, etc.

for people who were of *samyaktvaniyatarāṣi* i.e. who were possessed of such merits as would lead them to the realisation of the Truth.¹ Scanning the world for such persons, he found out that of the persons who could quickly comprehend his truth, his two teachers, Arāḍa and Rudraka, were dead, and his five companions of asceticism were then dwelling at Rṣipatana-mṛgadāya² on the outskirts of Benares. For imparting his teaching to his quondam companions he started for Benares, meeting on his way the Ājīvaka ascetic, Upaka. He stopped at Gayā in the house of Sudarśana Nāgarāja, and then crossing Rohitavastu, Uruvilva, Aṇḍā, Sārathipura,³ reached the banks of the Ganges. On the refusal of the ferryman to take him across the river without *tarpaṇya* (ferry-hire),⁴ he flew over it and reached the other shore, and arrived at Benares. He approached the five ascetics, who, in spite of their plan not to show him any respect, yielded to his sublime look and ultimately listened to his discourses. He delivered his first discourse known as *Dbarmacakra*, in which he referred to the two extreme practices, followed hitherto, viz., the

1 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 400, also p. 351; *Kośa*, ch. VI; cf. *Asia Major* (Vasumitra's Treatise), II, pp. 27, 40, 45, 50. This relates to the various gotras, see *Aspects*, etc. pp. 84-87.

2 Mod. Sarnāth.

3 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 406. In the *Mahāvastu* (III, pp. 324-329), the tradition is as follows: Leaving Uruvilva, he passed through Gayā, Aparagayā and reached Vāśālā where he was invited to a meal by a *bubhūka* Brāhmaṇa to whom he pointed out as to what makes a true Brāhmaṇa and tried to convert him to Buddhism. Thence he passed through Cundadvilam and Sārathipura, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares.

4 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 407. It is recorded here that Bimbisāra, on hearing of this event, exempted all recluses from the payment of ferry-hire. See also Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

life of ease and that of extreme asceticism, the former probably referring to the life led by Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas who lived in towns and villages and performed elaborate sacrifices, and the latter to that of the ascetics living in the forests and given to severe self-mortifications.¹ He then explained the four Āryasatyas, or the four-fold method of examination of the things of the world,² by means of which, he said he was able to comprehend the causal genesis of things, consisting of three sections and twelve terms.³ It was this causal genesis that convinced him of the impermanent nature of things, and of the non-existence of a doer or a feeler, in other words, the non-existence of a self (*ātma* = *pudgala*) or of a transmigrator (*saṅkramaka*),⁴ and of action, good or bad. He found out that *tṛṣṇā* (desire) was the root of sufferings, and *aṣṭāṅgikamārga* the means to their cessation. He traced the origin of *avidyā* to careless mental constructions (*saṅkalpajanitena ayonisena bhavate avidyā*). Further, he was convinced that *skāndhas*, *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s do not make a Buddha and that *avidyā* owes its origin to mental constructions (*vikalpa*) on the cessation of which it disappears and along with it all forms of existence. As he had found out this without the help of a teacher he was a *Svayambhū* (self-awakened). On hearing this discourse, Ājñātakaundīnya, spiritually the most advanced of the five, realised that everything

1 For a picture of which, see *Majjhima*, I, pp. 77 ff.

2 See, for details, my *Aspects*, etc., p. 206.

3 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 418: *मे एषु चतुषायैसत्त्वेषु योनिमो मनसि कुर्वती एवं विपरिवर्तं द्वादशाकारं ज्ञानदर्शनमुत्पद्यते*। cf. *Vinaya*, I, p. 11 in which the words *yoniso manasi kurvato* have been dropped, making the idea a bit hazy (*imesu catūsu ariyasaccesu evam tiparivattam dvādaśākāraṃ* etc.).

4 *Lal. Vis.*, p. 420.

including the three *ratnas*, Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha or the Brahmaloḥa were mere relative words, and had no existence in reality.¹

In the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (I, pp. 13-14),² this discourse is followed by another known as the *Anattasutta*, in which each of the five *skandhas* has been pointed out as devoid of a self (*anattā*) and as such they are not subject to the will of the self. Further, they are also impermanent (*anicca*) and as such they are sources of grief (*dukkha*). The conclusion drawn from this discourse is that everything is devoid of self (*pudgalaśūnya*) and one who knows this is said to attain Nirvāṇa.

In the *Lalitavistara*, the *skandhas* are spoken of as devoid of self incidentally, but there is no separate discourse on it as is found in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. In the *Lalitavistara*, however, there is an additional section dealing with the Mahāyānic interpretation of the *Dharmacakra*. It is introduced by Maitreya Bodhisattva³ to whom the *Dharmacakra* is explained as the teaching which establishes the oneness of all objects and the absence of any concept, positive or negative, as well as the absence of the origin of so-called things of the world.

1 In the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, I, pp. 11-12, Koṇḍañña is said to have been the first to obtain the *dharmacakkhu*.

2 See also *Samyutta*, III, p. 66. *Mahāvastu*, III, pp. 337 ff.

3 *Lal. Vis.*, pp. 422 ff.

4 In the *Abhinīṣkramaṇa-sūtra* (Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-386) the life-story is continued further, and includes the following topics:—Conversion of Yaśa and his friends, Buddha's visit to Śrāvastī, stories of the conversion of Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra, Mahākātyāyana of Avanti, Sobhiya of Takṣaśīlā, the three Kassapas, Bimbisāra, Mahākāśyapa, Mahāprajāpati, Bhadrakā, Sāriputra and Mudgalaputra, Udāyi, Upālī, Rāhula, Nanda, Ānanda and other Śākyan youths. All these topics are given also in the *Mahāvastu* but in a scattered form.

CHAPTER IX

CAUSES OF THE SPREAD OF BUDDHISM

Before we take up the study of the history of the spread of Buddhism during the first two centuries of its existence, it is worth while to make an analysis of the probable causes and circumstances that led to the propagation of Buddhism inspite of the deep-rooted existence of Brāhmanism and the brisk activities of the non-brāhmanic teachers:

(i) *Time of the advent of Buddhism*

The rise of Buddhism took place at an opportune time when not only India with her brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic teachers but also Greece, Persia and China were experiencing a stir in religious matters through the advent of Socrates with his distinguished pupils and contemporary philosophers in Greece, of Zoroaster in Persia, and of Lao-tse and Confucius in China. In India the elaboration of the brāhmanic sacrifices accompanied with the killing of hundreds of victims had grown into a highly complex system of ritualism, and there also appeared the brāhmanic thinkers who began to question whether, after all, the offerings to the gods, with their laborious construction of altars and collection of numberless requisites, recitations of *mantras*, chanting of hymns, expiation of errors in the rituals, really achieved the objects for which they were performed? The sacrifices, if rightly performed, were believed as able to secure for the performers not only wealth, health, long life and strength, the good will and grace of the gods in this world, and happiness

in the next, but also final beatitude or emancipation. But there were the dubious who began to question within themselves whether there was not the chance of this belief being wrongly based. Side by side with the elaborate rituals performed by the householders, for celebrating the sacrifices there were provisions for shortened forms of them, as also of mere cogitation of the Supreme, unaccompanied with any rituals, e.g., for the *Vānaprasthas* and the *Yatis*. If these latter were right in the pursuit of the course prescribed for them, could not a similar course suited to the masses, but devoid of, or accompanied only, with very simple rituals, be prescribed for the house-holders? Similar views, more or less developed and opposed to the *karmakāṇḍa* of the Brāhmaṇas and specially to the cruel slaying of animals in the sacrifices, were already in the air before Buddha arose to preach his doctrines.¹ Brāhmanism allowed various shades of philosophic and religious views to grow up within its fold without taking objection to their existence within its limits. But the key to the reception of this toleration lay in the fact that the dissentient view, side by side with its opposition to one or more of the brāhmanic doctrines, showed its allegiance to one or more of the ultimate fundamental tenets of brāhmanism such as the admission of sanctity of the *Vedas*, belief in their being revealed books, worship of any of the brāhmanic gods as such, recognition of the *Varṇāśramas* and submission to the authority of the brāhmaṇas. But there was a limit to the degree to which the heresy of its views could be carried by a brāhmanic sect as such. This limit was crossed by Buddha, who stood up as a rock to stop the flow of the religion in order to direct the faiths of the people along the channels of his own.

¹ See *ante*, p. 13; Barua, *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 193-4.

He preached that religious truths lay not in the sacrifices, not in the Vedic works which prescribed these sacrifices, not in the worship of the many deities of brāhmanic pantheon, not in the observance of the caste-rules, not in the magical practices of the *Atharva Veda*, not in the extreme forms of self-mortifications, and not, in short, in the many other pet beliefs and practices (the *śilabbataparāmāsa*)¹ that came as corollaries to an allegiance to the bases of brāhmanic faiths, but in self-culture 'culminating in *arhatship*' which constitutes the key-stone of Buddhism.²

(ii) *Character and Personality of the Founder
and his Disciples*

The commanding personality of Buddha, his self-sacrifice, the strength of his character, his spiritual attainments, his super-sensual vision, and the occasional manifestations of miraculous powers served in a great degree to convince the people of the greatness of his religion and made them attach importance to it. Prof. Keith would attribute the vast success of Buddhism not so much to the merits of the religion as to the personality of the founder. He says that "the founder of Buddhism must rank as

1 One of the fundamental conditions for becoming a *sotāpanna* is to give up the belief in the efficacy of rituals, the other two being the eschewing of *sakkāyadiṭṭhi* (the heresy of individuality) and *vicikicchā* (doubt as opposed to firm faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha).

2 Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 29. "For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself in this world, during this life, without any the least reference to the God, or to gods, either great or small.

one of the most commanding personalities ever produced by the eastern world."¹

In view of the predominance of the Kṣattriyas in the eastern lands by virtue of wealth and acquisition of learning which made them powerful enough to carry on reactionary movements as against the existing conditions of things as settled or desired by the Brāhmaṇas, it is probable that the Kṣattriya origin of Śākya Siṃha brought strength to his religious propaganda by virtue of this mere affinity of origin between him and the Kṣattriyas of the place. To assert that this element was altogether absent in the forces which made them cluster under his religious flag would be perhaps going too far. But it should always be borne in mind that the innate strength and attraction of Buddha's personality and the doctrines preached by him were so great that it put into shade the force of this element.

The character and personality of Buddha's immediate disciples such as Yaśa, Uruvela-Kassapa, Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, Mahākaccāyana, Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, Ānanda were equally powerful forces for the propagation of religion. Their excellences are mentioned sometimes by Buddha himself and sometimes by their brother monks. Sāriputta is described as excelling all in wisdom, self-control, and virtue, well-composed in his inner self, dwelling in the highest planes of thought, expert in the knowledge of doctrines and possessing capacity for preaching persuasively.² Moggallāna was valiant, self-controlled and possessed of super-normal powers and

¹ Keith's *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 147.

² *Ang. Nik.*, I, p. 24 f.; Cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Brethren*, pp. 69, 388, 402 & 390 f.n.

able to raise the disciples to the highest stages of moral and spiritual progress;¹ *Mahākassapa* was the foremost ascetic, self-sacrificing and loving to dwell remote from men; *Mahākaccāyana* was a great expositor of dhamma² while *Puṇṇa Mantāniputta* was an appealing preacher; *Ānanda* was the foremost of bhikkhus in erudition, morally watchful, steadfast, versed in the sacred lore, and eloquent.³ The qualities mentioned were present in more than ordinary degree in the character of the monks, besides the qualities requisite for a monk. The monks were all at one in their zeal for the propagation of the religion, in the strength of which they had unswerving belief. The earnestness with which the first generation of Buddha's disciples performed their duties can be best described by comparing it to the zeal with which the Christian apostles did their share of work by practising and spreading the doctrines promulgated by Christ.

The Buddhist leaders in the generation following the immediate disciples of Buddha included likewise prominent characters who might well take their place by the side of his immediate disciples. The names of monks who took a prominent part in the deliberations of the church organization and maintained discipline, moral or otherwise, are many, but the biographical details of only a few of them are found in the Buddhist literature. Among these may be mentioned *Siggava* whose perseverance in the cause of the conversion of non-Buddhists to Buddhism is found in the description where he is said to have daily visited, with ultimate success, the house of a Brāhmaṇa Moggali to persuade his son with teachings and arguments to embrace the

1 *Ang. Nik.*, I, p. 24 f. Cf. Mrs. Rhys Davids, *op. cit.*, p. 390 f.n.

2 *Psalms of the Brethren*, pp. 386, 387.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 352, 353.

religion;¹ *Sambhūta Sānavāsika* whose zeal in the maintenance of the orthodox system carried him in spite of his old age to Vesālī to suppress the heresies of the Vajjian monks. *Revata* was vastly learned and free from *āsava*s while *Yasa* was highly energetic in the work of consolidating the Buddhist doctrines for which the second council was convened, and also in eliminating the evils that the Vajjians were trying to introduce into the church organization by modifying its rules;² *Udena* was able to convert *Ghoṭamukha Brāhmaṇa* after the death of Buddha and have an *upaṭṭhānasālā* built at Pāṭaliputra by him;³ *Moggaliputta* (or *Upagupta* according to the Sanskrit tradition) was highly intelligent and by the charm of his character and personality could make *Aśoka* accept him as his spiritual preceptor and help the Buddhist organization by building monasteries and *stūpas* in several places and give donations for the maintenance of the monks and the spread of Buddhism.

(ii) *Patronage of Kings and Clans*

It is an undeniable fact that no religion can prosper however excellent may be its teachings without the support of the ruling powers and nobility of the time. Christianity would not have been what it is now without the intervention of emperors like Constantine.

In the 5th century B.C. there was no paramount sovereignty in Northern India. It was divided into a large number of independent states. Of these, the four monarchies of Magadha, Kosala, Vatsa, and Avanti rose into importance and fought with

1 Cf. *Mahāvamsa*, ch. V., pp. 41-3: A similar story occurs in the *Milindapañha* (p. 8 ff.) regarding the conversion of Nāgasena.

2 *Mahāvamsa*, ch. IV.

3 *Majjh. Nik.*, II, p. 163.

one another for the conquest of places in the possession of the smaller states. The number of preachers of various religions, working in all these domains, was large, and the more prominent among them vied with one another for gaining the support of one or other of the several kings. There are passages in the Buddhist scriptures hinting that Buddha was anxious to enlist the sympathy and patronage of kings, clans, and noblemen in support of his religion. The story of the conversion of Malla Roja, a nobleman, shows explicitly the anxiety felt by Buddha on this score. When Buddha was entering the city of the Mallas, Malla Roja went to welcome him, not out of reverence but for avoiding the liability of paying a fine laid down by the Mallas for those who refused to welcome Buddha. When he came near Buddha, he spoke out to Ānanda his real feeling at which the latter became sorrowful and requested Buddha to work upon the mind of Malla Roja in such a way as to make him one of his ardent adherents, because he was a distinguished nobleman whose influence and example would go a great way towards making Buddhism popular in the locality. Buddha agreed and overcame the indifferent attitude of Malla Roja by exercising the feeling of love (*mettā*), whereby he was won over to the doctrine.¹ Though we do not come across any express passage showing that Buddha is acting with a similar motive in connection with any of the royal personages, there are several indications in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* that Buddha wanted to comply with the wishes of the rulers and noblemen as far as his doctrinal principles permitted. His direction to his disciples to fix the day of commencement of the *vassāvāsa* in compliance with the wishes of Bimbisāra on a particular occasion points to the same inference.²

1 *Vinaya, Mahāvagga*, VI, 36, 1-4.

2 *Ibid.*, III, 4.

The first king met by Buddha after his enlightenment was Bimbisāra who accorded him a very warm welcome, placed at Buddha's disposal his pleasure-garden and asked the headmen of the villages in his domain to listen to Buddha's discourses. It was most probably for Bimbisāra that Buddha gained a very wide popularity in Magadha.¹ The king was bent so much upon the welfare of the *saṅgha* that he issued the decree that none must do any harm to the Sākyaputtiya Samaṇas² and on many occasions he advised Buddha to frame rules for the welfare of the *saṅgha*. Some of these rules are, for example, not to give ordination to those who were in royal service, as the kings who were not in favour of the faith might harass the *saṅgha* on that ground;³ to hold religious assemblies on the 8th, 14th and 15th day of each month like the other religious orders for the benefit of the *upāsakas*.⁴

Pasenadi of Kosala was also a great benefactor of the *saṅgha*, but he does not seem to have given his unqualified support like Bimbisāra. Though he supported many Brāhmaṇa teachers, yet his attention to the welfare of Buddha and his *saṅgha* was not less than that shown to those teachers. His anxiety to make a suitable gift to Ānanda,⁵ his joy at the conversion of the robber Aṅgulimāla who was given immunity for his past misdeeds and was promised a supply of the requisites for a monk;⁶ his earnest desire to marry a Sākya princess and his ultimate marriage with Vāsabhakhattiyā to regain the confidence of the monks lost through inattentions to them;⁷ his expression of pride at the fact that he was of the same age with Buddha and

1 *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 449.

3 *Ibid.*, I, 40, 4.


5 *Majjh. Nik.*, II, p. 116.

7 Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, I, p. 91.

2 *Vinaya*, I, 42, 1.

4 *Ibid.*, II, 124.

6 *Ibid.*, II, p. 101, 3.



belonged to the same caste and province with him¹ amply show his love for the religion and his desire to be counted as one of its well-wishers and supporters. In the *Nikāyas* it is stated that he became a lay-devotee and an ardent admirer of Buddha.² The bas-relief depicting him as proceeding to meet Buddha shows that he was respected by the Buddhists of the 2nd or 3rd century B.C. as a patron of the religion.

It is doubtful how far Buddha was successful in winning over the other two kings, Pajjota of Avanti and Udena of Kosambī. The references to these kings in the Buddhist scriptures are few and far between. It is said that king Pajjota once sent Mahākaccāyana to welcome Buddha to his dominion, but Buddha, thinking his purpose would be better served by Mahākaccāyana himself preaching the doctrine, did not accede to the king's request. The king was satisfied with Mahākaccāyana's exposition of the Law and became an ardent follower of the religion.³ The *Samyutta Nikāya*⁴ and the Tibetan translation of the *Vinaya*⁵ state that king Udena of Kosambī became a convert to Buddhism. The *Dhammapadattibhāṣā* gives in detail the occasion of king Udena's conversion. He was much impressed by the piety of one of his queens Sāmāvatī who had been an upāsikā of Buddha and at whose request the king became a convert to the religion and made generous gifts.⁶ Evidence is not strong that these two kings actively aided the spread of Buddhism but yet it is a great gain that they did not actively

1 *Majjhima*, II, p. 124.

2 *Sam. Nik.*, I, p. 70; *Ang. Nik.*, V, pp. 65 ff. see also *Divyāvadāna*, p. 154.

3 *Psalm of the Brethren*, pp. 238-9.

4 *Sam. Nik.*, IV, p. 113.

5 *Rockhill's Life of the Buddha*, p. 74.

6 *Burlingame's Buddhist Legends*, I, p. 84.

oppose its propagation. The mere tolerance of the activities of the Buddhist preachers within their kingdoms should be taken as a favourable circumstance in the spread of the religion.

Buddha was successful in making a large number of converts from among the nobles, ministers, bankers and wealthy citizens. That the enlistment of the supports of *Anāthapiṇḍika*, *Viśākhā*, *Sīha*, *Abhayarājakumāra*, *Jīvaka*, *Yasa*, *Ambapālī*, *Nandaka*, etc., furthered the cause of Buddhism to a very great extent needs hardly any comment.

Last but not the least was the support obtained by Buddha from the various clans of the period. In spite of the fact that Mahāvīra had already been in the field and obtained a footing among the clans, Buddha was fairly successful in his missionary activities.

It was not difficult for Buddha to win over the *Sākya*s because he himself belonged to the clan. Anuruddha, Kimbila, Bhagu, Ānanda, Devadatta, Nanda, Upālī and many other *Sākyas* joined the order at Buddha's request. Under the leadership of Mahāpajāpati Gotamī,¹ many *Sākyan* ladies also followed the example of the *Sākyan* youths and joined the order leading to the growth of the order of nuns.

Next to the *Sākyas*, the *Licchavis* and the *Mallas* came under the influence of Buddha, who paid three visits to Vesālī, the city of the *Licchavis*, and by his preachings brought home to them the charm of Buddhism. He converted many distinguished members of the clan and obtained from them gifts of *cetiya*s.² His work among the *Mallas* was also successful. It was perhaps as a token of favour to the faithful *Mallas* that Buddha selected Kusinārā, an *upavana* within their country, as a suitable place for his *mahāparinibbāna*.³

1 *Majjh. Nik.*, I, p. 462; *S.B.E.*, XIX, pp. 226-227.

2 *Digha*, II, p. 102.

3 *Ibid.*, II, p. 169.

Buddha's missionary activity among the B h a g g a s and the K o l i y a s was not so successful as among the previously stated clans. Buddha visited three nigamas of the Koliyas, and Ānanda one, but there is a remarkable paucity in the number of the converts mentioned as hailing from those places.¹ Still less successful was Buddha's religious mission to the Bhaggas. The only place that was visited by Buddha was the Bhesakalāvana deer-park near Sumsumāragiri and the persons won over were Nakula's parents and Bodhirājakumāra.²

We do not hear of other clans coming under the influence of Buddhism except in the statement of the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta* that the B u l i s of Allakappa and the M o r i y a s of Pipphalivana along with the clans already mentioned claimed Buddha's relics for erecting stūpas in their respective countries.

Thus we see that Buddhism owed much of its expansion to Buddha's ability in securing sympathy and patronage of kings, nobles, and clans, who in many cases had already been supporting other religions. Though later in the field, Buddhism could supplant at times the other religions, ultimately monopolising the sympathy and support of some of the magnates.

(iii) *Services of Female Devotees*

The part played by women in the spread of Buddhism cannot be ignored or brushed aside as of little importance. On many occasions it was through their influence that whole families were converted to Buddhism. Visākhā and Ambapālī, for instance, rendered signal services to the *saṅgha* by their munificent gifts and the former's work was more valuable because she be-

1 Kakkarapaṭṭaṃ, Haliddavāsanaṃ, Uttaraṃ, and Sāpugaṇi.

2 *Majjh. Nik.*, II, p. 91.

came the means of conversion of all the members of her father-in-law's family from Jainism to Buddhism. Anāthapiṇḍika's daughter made it possible through her exertions to establish a centre of Buddhism in Aṅga through the conversion of the whole of her father-in-law's family.¹ The conversion of king Udena was effected through one of her queens named Sāmāvatī.² It was with the help of the Brāhmaṇa girls of Sākya family married at Bhādrāmukha that Buddha could convert Maṇḍaka gaḥapati.³ Instances like this can be multiplied to show that ladies helped a good deal in the propagation of Buddhism.

The formation of the order of nuns was highly appreciated by the womenfolk generally, while at the same time it furthered the cause of Buddhism to a great extent. Not only did it afford relief to many a woman in her knawing miseries but it also recognised the dignified position in which the women had claim to be placed along with the men through the implication that they were as much eligible to the making of efforts for spiritual emancipation as the males. Those of the nuns who could enter into the mysteries of the religion naturally felt an inclination to initiate others into the same mysteries and offer them a permanent solace in their lives. They like the bhikkhus visited the householders and through their easy access to the ladies of the houses had greater opportunities of working upon their impressionable minds and enlisting them either as lay-devotees or nuns. Conversions of this nature were frequent and there are examples in the *Therīgāthā* of women becoming nuns through the exertions of the advanced bhikkhunīs. The bhikkhunīs thus carried

1 Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 37-38.

2 Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, I, p. 84.

3 *Divyāvadāna*, p. 128.

the light of the new religion from house to house and helped the spread of Buddhism far and wide.

(iv) *Proselytizing*

Conversion by the evangelical method marks out Buddhism as making a radical departure from the traditionary lines on which the Indian religions brought new adherents into their fold. The ways in which brāhmanism extended the boundaries of its domain are peculiar to itself. Its method of enlisting new recruits are in consonance with the caste-system, its spirit of exclusiveness specially in religious matters and its power of slowly adapting itself to the change effected by forces from within or without. The process followed by it consisted in absorbing the new recruits into the brāhmanic society by attracting them slowly and imperceptibly to adopt more or less the social customs and practices approved by the Brāhmaṇas and thus occupy a place within an existing caste or sub-caste, or form a new sub-caste, as the case may be. The alteration of the religious views is left to follow the social absorption that gradually sets in. The radical departure made by the Buddhists from the traditional method was responsible for the rapid way in which Buddhism spread not only in India but also in the countries outside. The very first resolution made by Buddha after the attainment of the *summum bonum* was to become a religious preacher and save mankind from worldly cares and miseries. He went to Sarnath to convert the five Brāhmaṇas, after whom he made many more converts. He formed them into a band of missionaries, of whom he was the leader. In the *Vinaya* we find Buddha speaking thus to his followers who then numbered only sixtyone: "Go, ye now, O Bhikkhus, and wander, for the gain of the many, for the welfare of the many, out of compassion for the world. Let not two of you go the

same way. Preach the doctrine which is glorious in the beginning, middle, and end, in the spirit and in the letter; proclaim a consummate, perfect, and pure life of holiness. There are beings whose mental eyes are covered by scarcely any dust, but if the doctrine is not preached to them, they cannot attain salvation. They will understand the doctrine. And I will go also, O Bhikkhus, to Uruvela-senā-nigama in order to preach the doctrine."¹ Buddha passed from one country to another preaching the *dharmma* which is heard by the house-holders who being convinced of its excellence retired from the world leaving their possessions great or small.² This example was followed ardently by his disciples: Sāriputta was considered the fittest person after him to roll the wheel of law;³ Moggalliputta, to preach the religion to the denizens of hell, gods and spirits of heaven; Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, to carry on the work among the rough people of Sunāparantaka;⁴ Piṇḍola-Bhāradvāja, the chief of the *sīhanādikānam*, to remove doubts regarding the Buddhist path or fruit.⁵ This shows how the disciples fulfilled their Master's desire. The Master was satisfied with their activities as indicated by his departure from the mortal world, which, as said by him to Māra, was conditional on 'his seeing that his disciples had been sufficiently large in

1 *Mahāvagga*, I, pp. 20, 21 (translated in the *S. B. E.*, vol. XIII, pp. 112, 113; *Sam. Nik.*, I, pp. 105-6; Bhadrakalpāvadāna in Dr. R. L. Mitra's *Nepalese Buddhist Literature*, p. 43).

2 *Majjh. Nik.*, I, p. 179. This is one of the many passages which constantly recur in the *Nikāyas*.

3 *Ang. Nik.*, I, 13, 7; *Milindapañha*, p. 362.

4 *Majjh. Nik.*, III, p. 268; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 39; *Mahāvastu*, I, p. 245.

5 *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 111.

number and able to refute the doctrines of their adversaries, and that his religion was well and widely preached.¹

Conversion of non-Buddhists to Buddhism was regarded as a part of the duty of the monks. To attain *Nirvāṇa* and without at the same time giving others the benefit of its realization by taking to the right course has about it a taint of selfishness however slight. The means by which the highest can be known and tasted ought not to be the secret of the select few or of an individual. It should be given a wide publicity in order that all men from the highest to the meanest may have the opportunity of exercising judgment and take to the way leading to *Nirvāṇa*. Animated by the feeling of love and compassion, Buddha and his disciples preached broadcast the truths of their religion in order that the groping humanity may know that there are saving truths which can be attained by particular ways of regulating life and thought. It was from this point of view of looking at proselytizing that the Buddhists drew their stimulus for activities in this direction, and we find the Hīnayānists and, in a greater measure, the Mahāyānists exercising their best energies for the propagation of their faith for the diffusion of general well-being and the alleviation of miseries incidental to human existence.

The art of proselytizing was highly developed by the Mahāyānists who led by their Bodhisattva ideal dedicated their lives to the propagation of the faith. There are in the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*² and almost all other Mahāyāna texts, expressions revealing the earnestness which animated the disciples for propagating the religion. Towards the end of a treatise, the Bodhisattvas utter: "When the Tathāgata has become wholly extinct,

1 *Digha*, II, p. 106; Rockhill's *Life of the Buddha*, p. 34.

2 See Hoernle's *Manuscript Remains etc.*, p. 155.

we, O Lord, want to go in ten directions and persuade all beings to write, read, think over, and proclaim this *dharmaparyāya* by the power of the Lord." The history of Buddhist faith both in its earlier and later phases reveals the fact that the Buddhist monks gave their best energies to the propagation of the religion and thus acted up to the wishes of the founder of the religion. The despatch of missionaries to various countries both within and abroad during the reign of Aśoka, the successful attempt of the Buddhist monks to colonise Central Asia during the reign of Kaniṣka, and the perilous journey and voyages undertaken to China, Tibet, Cambodia, Java and the Malay Archipelago by the monks in the later history of Buddhism amply show to what a great extent the Master's bidding was carried out.

(v) *Paribbājakas and their Change of Faith*

The *paribbājakas* and the members of the various contemporary religious orders offered a very fruitful field for the recruitment of converts to Buddhism. Embracing of the religion of the victor by the vanquished in a debate was a general practice and this proved an effective means of spreading Buddhism, because Buddha himself as well as many Buddhist preachers were powerful disputants. It is a peculiar feature of the time that members of many of the religious orders attached more importance to belief based on reasoning than to blind faith, and pursuant to this state of things, the vanquished in a disputation left his religious belief as soon as it was brought home to him in a public debate that there was a flaw in the chain of reasoning upon which his belief was based, while no such flaw could be pointed out in the reasoning upon which the belief of the victor was founded. No stigma attached to the relinquishment of a

religious belief by reason of defeat in a controversy or by a change in faith brought about in other ways. It was not so in later times when the ceremonial and social exterior of religion almost ceased to have a living connection with the inner conviction of an individual. At the time of which we are speaking, many students after finishing their education used to wander about in the various parts of India as *paribbājakas* in order to learn the various religious doctrines and gain mastery over the art of disputation.¹ They were at liberty to embrace any religion that appealed to them most as the vehicle of ultimate truths. In spite of the parents' objection, we read of many instances of young Brāhmaṇas and Kṣattriyas joining the Buddhist order. It was this state of things that helped Buddha and his band of preachers a good deal in the spread of the religion. The conversion of the followers of Sañjaya counting among them Sāriputta and Mogga-llāna, the Jaṭilas, Pokkharasādi, Sakuludāyī, Mahākassapa the Acela, Caṅki, Esukāri, Ghoṭamukha, Vekhanassa, Saccaka, and a host of others signifies a good record of Buddha's success in conversion among the *paribbājakas* and the religious orders both brāhmanical and non-brāhmanical. Dhammika-upāsaka was right in saying that the disputing *tittbiyas*, Ājīvikas, Nigaṇṭhas, many of whom were aged, submitted to the captivating power of Buddha's exposition of his religion.² The influx of converts from the aforesaid classes was so great that Buddha had to introduce a bar to a ready ingress of undesirable men into the order

1 *Majjh. Nik.*, II, p. 148. Assalāyana, a master of brāhmanical lore, was asked whether he had wandered 'about as a *paribbājaka* (to complete his education) "*Caritaṃ kho pana bhotā Assalāyanena paribbājakaṃ; ma bhavaṃ Assalāyano ayuddhaparāṇitaṃ parājayāmi.*" See also Barua's *Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy*, p. 192.

2 *Sutta-nipāta*, p. 67.

by laying down that those who belonged to a religious order must pass a period of probation for four months.

(vi) *Catholicity*

Buddhism had in it a large element of catholic spirit which appealed to even the members of other religions. To attack another religion as a whole was never sanctioned by Buddhism.¹ Buddha had to recruit his converts from other religions; he never disparaged any particular religion to which any of them might have belonged, though of course, he showed at times that particular doctrines were wrong and unworthy of being followed. He held the view that the Buddhists should make gifts to the deserving members of all other religious orders and not to the Buddhists alone.² He permitted a Jaina house-holder after his conversion to Buddhism to continue his charity to the Jaina monks winning thereby the admiration of the members of other sects.³ In the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁴ it is pointed out that an ascetic though an Ājīvika but being a *kammavādin* would be reborn in heaven. The Brāhmaṇas who led a truly moral life were highly respected by the Buddhists. The spirit of toleration was no doubt a prevailing feature of the religious life of India and it was particularly so among the followers of Buddha, the teacher of *mettā* and *karuṇā*.

(vii) *Occult powers*

The last factor but not the least was the resort to occult powers to bring conviction home to the minds of the

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 523: *na ca saddhamma-okkasanā na para-dhamma-vambhanā*. See also *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 27.

2 *Āṅguttara*, III, 57.1.

3 *Vinaya*, VI, 32; *Āṅguttara*, IV, p. 185.

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 483.

unconvinced and make them converts. In writing of the spread of a religion, or the life of a founder of a religion, scholars, as a rule, leave this factor out of account, as it is not looked upon as in keeping with the standpoint of the present-day material sciences. It may be said that if once the possession and use of the occult powers be admitted and believed, there will be no criterion by which to sift out the actual expression of the occult powers from the fiction with which the credulous writers would in course of time mix them up, and in consequence, the grossest absurdities will have credence. But apart from the question as to which of the exhibitions of such powers are to be believed and which to be disbelieved, the point that has to be settled is whether it is reasonable to leave altogether out of account a factor without which there would certainly be left a gap in the aggregate of causes that are responsible for the degree and range of influence of a particular religion at a particular time. We often notice in the account of the life of the founder of a religion or its branch that mere appeals to the intellect and reason often fail to convince a person of the truth of a statement or the power of the arguer to lead to the path that takes one to the *summum bonum* of human life. Argumentators, however powerful, are often found to cause bitterness of feeling unless they are aided by other factors including the one under discussion. An exemplary character, a persuasive tongue, acuteness of intelligence, self-abnegation and other elements that make a strong and imposing personality are not sufficient to produce the results that were actually achieved by the founders of religions like Christ, Buddha, Muhammad, and others. A single leper healed by the mere touch of Christ, the power of vision restored to a single blind man are more effective in the spread of a religion than numberless victories in disputations. In the missionary career of Buddha

and of his disciples we meet with many cases where arguments failed to achieve the desired ends, and ultimately, resort was taken to occult powers. Buddha utilized his occult powers (*pāṭibhāriya*) in three ways, viz. *iddhis* (the *ṛddhis* of the Hindu *Yogaśāstras*) which impressed his audience with awe at the sight of physical manifestation of powers ostensibly in transgression of the natural laws; *ādesanā* or the exhibition of power of thought-reading; and *anusāsani* or the warning to a person to give up his discursive or evil thoughts revealed to Buddha through thought-reading.¹ He foresaw the abuses incidental to the cultivation and use of such powers by his disciples, for many of them might be in a lower plane of spiritual culture and utilize them for selfish ends. To avoid such abuses, he strictly enjoined his disciples not to display such powers before the householders.²

There are several other causes which helped the propagation of the religion but as these have been dealt with in other connections in this work, they are left out here, e.g. internal strength of the organisation of the Buddhist order,³ unorthodoxy of the people in and around Magadha,⁴ persuasive methods employed in making converts,⁵ avoidance of metaphysical problems in the teachings,⁶ adoption of popular dialects as the medium of instruction,⁷ and above all the intrinsic merits of the religion.

1 *Ang. Nik.*, I, p. 276. *Digh. Nik.*, I, pp. 212-214.

2 *Vinaya*, II, p. 112; *na bhikkhave gihinam uttarimanussa-dhammam iddhipāṭibhāriyam dassetabbam*.

3 See *infra*.

4 See Ch. I.

5 See Ch. X.

6 See *ante*, pp. 44 ff.

7 See *infra*.

CHAPTER X

METHOD OF PREACHING AND TEACHING

The expansion of Buddhism was due to several causes, some of which have been dealt with in the previous chapter. The discriminating method of preaching adopted by Buddha combined with dialectics, more stress on ethics than on philosophy, the spirit of good will and love, adoption of popular dialects as the medium of instruction, and the individual care taken of the disciples went also a great way towards the success of the religion.

Four ways of exposition

Buddha, it is said, adopted the following four ways for removing the doubts of those who approached him to learn the truth:—

- (i) *Paṭipucchāvākyākaraṇīya*;
- (ii) *Ekamsavyākaraṇīya*;
- (iii) *Vibhajjavākyākaraṇīya*; and
- (iv) *Tthapanīya*.

In the first method, the doubts of the interlocutor are ascertained at the outset by putting suitable questions and then removed by appropriate answers; in the second, a direct reply is given to an enquirer without entering into a discussion with him; in the third, answers are given separately to the different aspects of the question;¹ and in the fourth, it is pointed out that as the question is untenable, no reply will be given.²

¹ *Majjhima*, II, p. 197.

² *Digha*, I, pp. 187 ff.; III, p. 229.

Buddha insisted that his disciples should be very discriminating in adopting one of these methods¹ for delivering their discourses.

Gradual course

For the propagation of his teachings, Buddha directed his disciples to conform to the following rules:

A good preacher should

(a) In ordinary discourses before householders make them gradual i.e. commence with *dānakatham*, *śīlakatham*, etc.

(b) Observe sequence (*pariyāyadassāvī*) in the details composing a theme.²

(c) Use words of compassion (*anuddayatam paṭicca katham*).

(d) Avoid irrelevant matters (*nāmisantaram katham*).

(e) Make his speeches free from caustic remarks against others.³

For imparting instructions to householders he directed his disciples to be cautious in not giving out the fundamental principles of Buddhism all at once as that would scare them away. To them only the exoteric side of the teaching should be explained first, that is, the elementary tenets, and practices of Buddhism suitable to householders. To those who intend to take them up should be asked to follow at first the tenets and practices that are suitable to their yet undisciplined and undeveloped powers, and then gradually the difficult ones should be placed before them by stages. To a householder, a Buddhist

1 Cf. *Majjhima*, III, p. 208: Samiddhinā moghapurisenā Potali-puttassa paribbājakassa vibhajja byākaraṇiyo pañho ekamseva byākato ti.

2 For the gradual course of training in Buddhism (*imasmiṃ dhammavinaye anupubbasiṅkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā*) see *Majjh. Nik.*, III, pp. 2-4.

3 *Āṅuttara*, III, pp. 184, 196.

monk can preach at first the *dānakathaṃ sīlakathaṃ saggakathaṃ kāmānaṃ ādīnaṃ okāraṃ saṃkilesaṃ nekkhamme ānisaṃsaṃ* (the discourse on alms-giving, moral precepts, the heavens, the danger, corruption and impurity of desire and the blessings of retirement) and when he perceives that his mind has been sufficiently prepared by hearing the discourses, he can preach the higher teachings, viz., *dukkhaṃ samudayaṃ nirodhaṃ maggaṃ* (suffering, origin of suffering, removal of suffering and way to the removal of suffering).¹ These discourses have an appealing force which moves the hearts of the people irrespective of their creeds. The higher and deeper truths of Buddhism were gradually imparted and explained to the initiated or rather to the *sotāpannas*. Thus the Buddhists from the lowest grade to the highest did not feel embarrassed by the weight of doctrines and practices too difficult for their yet limited understanding or their undeveloped powers of fortitude and devotion. In order to create a good impression on the minds of the householders, the bhikkhus were enjoined to be sympathetic to the woes and troubles of their listeners and at the same time they were asked not to indulge in talks which might be regarded as worldly and ill-befitting a recluse.

Study of mental leanings

Before delivering a discourse Buddha tried to form an idea of the leaning of the persons by putting to them questions on religious matters or answering the questions that he allowed them to put to himself. In this way he used to select a subject most suited to the occasion and agreeable to the persons

¹ *Dīgha*, I, p. 148; *Vinaya*, I, 7, 5-6; VI, 36, 5. Oldenberg's *Buddha* (Hoey's translation), p. 186.

composing the audience and delivered a discourse on same. Similes, parables, fables very often drawn from experiences of every day life were interspersed with his speeches along with pithy verses to make his arguments sweet and effective.¹ He attached great importance to the art of preaching and tried to impress upon the minds of his disciples the sense of its importance. The particular features by which his speeches were rendered so very impressive were, first because he utilized his higher knowledge (*abhiññā*), by which he could find out the persons who would benefit by his discourses on a particular day; secondly because the selection of the subjects of his discourses was the result of a correct diagnosis (*sanidāna*) of the mentality of the listeners.²

(iii) Disputation

Many are of opinion that Buddha himself avoided entering into discussions with others, and discouraged those of his disciples who entered into discussions on religious matters in the course of their preaching and wandering. Such opinion is not wholly correct. There are passages in the Buddhist scriptures which lend colour to the aforesaid view. To cite one or two such passages: He is said to have declared that his dhamma is not to be grasped by mere logic (*atakkāvacara*)³ and he condemned the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas who took to hair-splitting disputations saying, 'Issue has been joined against you, you are defeated, set to work to clear your views, disentangle yourself if you can' (*āropito te vādo, niggahīto 'si. Cara vādappamokkhāya, nibbe-*

1 Oldenberg, *Buddha* (Hocy's transl.), pp. 185-193.

2 *Divyāvadāna*, pp. 96, 124 "*Āśayānuśayaṃ veditvādbhūtaṃ prakṛtiṃ ca jñātvā tādṛśi dharmadeśanā kṛtā.*"

3 *Dīgh. Nik.*, I, p. 12 (*Dial. of Buddha*, vol. II, p. 26).

thehi vā sace pabosīti).¹ From such passages, it is not right to draw the conclusion that Buddha condemned or prohibited the holding of all disputations on religious matters.

It should also be kept in mind that the state of the country at the time of Buddha was not such as could permit a missionary to keep clear of disputation. One of the essential works of a preacher was to convince his audience, and this was hardly possible if argumentation was not given a wide berth. Of this time, accounts are available of brāhmaṇa and non-brāhmaṇa heads of religions, wandering about over the whole of eastern India, sometimes with a large band of disciples, and holding disputations with the heads of the rival sects to assert their influence and increase their following. There were the *paribbājakas* who wandered about with their minds open for the reception of religious light wherever available. The lay people also liked to hear disputations as indicated by their setting up of *kutūhala-sālās* (halls for people in quest of truths) or *paribbājakārāmas* in different places where the wandering teachers might reside and hold controversies with convenience in the midst of a large gathering. The people of a locality felt proud if a good many religious teachers visited their *kutūhala-sālās* or *paribbājakārāmas*.² References are available in plenty in the Buddhist works showing that it was often stated at the disputations that the defeated teacher with his followers relinquished his own doctrines and embraced those of the winner. These defeats in disputations were a fruitful source for the enlisting of converts to the many doctrines and religions that prevailed in the country

¹ *Dīgh. Nik.*, I. p. 8 (*Dial. of Buddha*, vol. II, p. 15).

² *Saṃ. Nik.*, II, p. 32; V, p. 115; *Majjh. Nik.*, II, pp. 1, 2, 99. *Divyāvadāna*, p. 143.

at the time, and the teachers vied and struggled with one another for securing the largest following. The discussions of the rival sects indicate that they had to be well-grounded not only in the rules by which the disputation was guided and the argumentation was rendered free from fallacies, but also in the doctrines of the various opponents who had to be faced, over and above their own school or tenets and practices with their philosophical bases, if any. Buddha is described in several places in the Buddhist works as a master of the tenets and practices of the heretical sects. A large number of his disciples was recruited either as the result of defeats suffered by the opponents or from among the followers of the brāhmanic and the heretical teachers convinced of the superiority of the doctrines propounded by him. His discussions with Soṇadaṇḍa, Kūṭadanta, Upāli, Sakuludāyi, Vekhanassa, Assalāyana and a host of others are instances in which he argued out his own views and convinced his adversaries at the end. The victories thus gained in large numbers in disputations elicited the remark from Dīghatapassi, a Jaina monk to the effect that Gautama was a sorcerer who by the force of his art drew the people of other sects into his own net.¹ The lists of his disciples who were convinced and won over to Buddhism from their own beliefs and practices is a large one, from which the names of the following may be mentioned: Mahākoṭṭhita, Piṇḍola Bharadvāja, Mahākaccāyana, for instance, were masters of the three Vedas and perfect in all the accomplishments of a Brāhmaṇa; Sāriputta and Moggallāna were the disciples of Sañjaya; the Kassapas were the leaders of the Jāṭilas; Abhayarājakumāra was a distinguished disciple of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta.

¹ *Majjh. Nik.*, I, p. 375; *Ang. Nik.*, II, p. 190. (*Gotamo māyāvi, āvaṭṭanīm māyaṃ jānāti yāya aññatitthiyānaṃ sāvaka āvaṭṭetisi*).

To be a successful disputant, one had to be equipped with all the outfit of specious arguments (*kūṭatarka*) to meet those opponents who made a free use of them whenever needed. It is clear from Buddha's injunctions to the bhikkhus, that he wanted them to use their power of argumentation in the service of truth and truth alone, and not to take to sophistry of their own accord. But a preacher ignorant of the wiles of a specious arguer and unable to use counter-wiles for self-defence would certainly be a weak disputant. It was for this reason perhaps that we see Buddha applying such a method with men who came to argue with crooked intention, or took to crooked ways of disputation. This is seen in the *Ambaṭṭha Sutta*¹ where Buddha in order to silence Ambaṭṭha, who claimed the superiority of Brāhmaṇas over all by birth and stated that the Sākyaas were of servile origin, related the fictitious account of the origin of the Sākyaas and Kaṇhāyanas showing that the latter were the descendants of a *dāsiputta* (son of a slave-girl) of the former. The object of the use of the story was to put it as a stunner to Ambaṭṭha exposing his low origin.

Medium of Instruction

For the proper appreciation of his teaching, Buddha insisted that the medium of instruction should be the popular dialect of a province. His injunction "*anuṇāmi bhikkhave sakāya nirut-tiyā buddhavacanam pariāpunitum*"² has been the subject of a good deal of controversy, but the last word, we think, has been said by Winternitz,³ who interprets it thus: "I allow you,

1 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 92, 95.

2 *Cullavagga*, V, 33.

3 See his *History of Indian Literature*, II, (Eng. transl.), Appendix, pp. 601-3.

O monk, to learn the word of Buddha each in own language," and this the late professor corroborates by another passage of the *Majjhima Nikāya*¹ in which it is pointed out that undue importance should not be attached to the dialect of a particular *janapada*, i.e., a monk should be accommodating to dialectical variations, and not insist upon the use of a particular word, e.g., *pāti* instead of *sarāvaṃ* or *dbāropam*. Buddha's preference for provincial languages is also responsible for the growth of *piṭakas* in later days in different languages, the existence of which is no longer a matter of doubt. Buddha made a radical departure from the ancient Indian custom of recording the scriptures in a particular language, and this can well be pointed out as one of the causes of the success of Buddhism.

Individual Training

We have already mentioned that Buddha studied the mental leanings of a person before he delivered a discourse. This was particularly evident in the training of his disciples. He constantly watched their conduct and their mode of performance of spiritual practices, studied their character and predilections, and corrected their weaknesses by suitable advice, admonitions and courses of disciplinary practices.

In the *Rāhulovādasutta*, Buddha is seen instructing Rāhula how in deed, word, and thought one can make himself pure by *paccāvekkhana* (examination and introspection), because he observed that Rāhula was lacking in self-control. When, however, he made some progress in self-control, he was led gradually to realise the *anicca-bhāva* (impermanence)

¹ *Majjhima*, III, pp. 234-5, 237: *janapadaniruttiṃ nābhini-veseyya*.

and *dukkha-bhāva* (miseries inherent in the nature) of all worldly things and the fact that the four *dhātus* or five *khandhas* collectively or separately do not constitute the *attā* (ego).¹

Nanda, another of his disciples, could not check his anxieties for food and raiment, for which he was taken to task by the Teacher. In due course the check put upon him helped him to control his senses so much that he became the chief of those who had control over their senses (*indriyesu guttadvārānam aggo*).²

Anuruddha could not, owing to slackness of exertion, attain *cittavimutti* though he had advanced much through his diligence in the path of meditation. This slackness which was clogging his way was removed by Buddha's guidance supplemented by the personal care taken of him by Sāriputta.³

The weakness of Kimbila lay similarly in his inability to muster up sufficient mental concentration through in-breathing and out-breathing. This was detected by Buddha and removed by his advice with special reference to the processes which he could not follow in a perfect way.⁴

Sāriputta and Moggallāna were already advanced spiritually before they joined the Saṅgha, hence the training imparted to them was of a higher order. Sāriputta was asked to meditate on *suññatā*, i.e., to look upon all things as devoid of substance and to practice self-introspection in order to remove from his mind the usual hindrances to *vimutti* and

1 *Āṅguttara*, II, pp. 164-5; *Samyutta*, III, p. 136; IV, pp. 105-7; *Majjhima*, I, pp. 414ff.; III, pp. 277-80.

2 *Samyutta*, II, p. 281; *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 26; IV, p. 166.

3 *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 282; IV, pp. 228 ff.

4 *Samyutta*, V, pp. 322-325.

acquire the qualities leading to perfection.¹ Sāriputta, it is said, took only a fortnight to attain *arhat*hood, which stage he reached while listening to a discourse on the origin and decay of *vedanā* delivered by Buddha to Dīghanakha paribbājaka.² Moggallāna was given the *dhātus* (elements composing a being) as his subject (*kammaṭṭhāna*) for meditation. While meditating, he became slack in his zeal and so he was taken to task by Buddha. He soon removed his sloth and torpor, became diligent and attained perfection.³

The case of Ānanda is interesting. In spite of his insatiable love of knowledge by which he rose to be the chief of the *bhussutas* (the learned), and in spite of the great care that was bestowed upon him by Buddha for his spiritual culture, he could not attain arhathood during the life-time of Buddha, the reason being that he could not divest himself of his great attachment to Buddha, not as the founder of a religion but as a master to whom he was related as a servitor. This attachment proved a clog to his practice of the doctrine of detachment from the world, the corner-stone of Buddha's teachings. Buddha used to admonish Ānanda for his inability to get rid of this attachment because therein lay the cause of his failure to attain the state of mind required for *arhat*hood. In the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* we find Buddha expostulating with Ānanda for shedding tears when Buddha expressed his desire to leave this world.⁴ So long as Buddha lived, Ānanda could not rise above the stage of *sotāpanna*. He was a *bhussuta* on account of his inordinate desire for knowledge as evidenced by the frequent questions that

1 *Majjhima*, III, pp. 294ff.

2 *Ibid.*, I, p. 500-1.

3 *Manorathapūraṇi*, I, p. 161; *Anguttara*, IV, p. 85.

4 *Dīgha*, II, pp. 142-144.

are said to have been put by him to Buddha, e.g., about the correctness of Pūraṇa Kassapa's divisions of mankind, Sāriputta's exposition of the origin of *dukkha* (suffering) from *phassa* (contact), the theory of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), the sense of the terms *nirodha*, *loka*, *suñña*, *vedanā*, *iddhi*, *ānāpānasati* and so forth.¹

The training imparted to Devadatta by Buddha was on lines that were calculated as suitable to his peculiar mental tendencies. This disciple made some progress in *yoga* attaining ability to perform some miracles. Buddha detected his predilection for gain and fame through the exercise of his power to perform miracles by which he had won over Ajātasattu to his side. With a view to remove this love for gain and fame, he delivered to him discourses calculated to remove this weakness; but so deep-rooted had been this tendency that he continued on his way to ruin, turning deaf ear to his master's warnings.²

The instances can be multiplied but those that have been cited are enough to show how the great teacher used to see through the mental composition of the disciples whom he had occasion to train personally studying their tendencies and mental weaknesses as clearly as if they were reflected on a mirror. This accounts for his great success as a spiritual trainer.

1 *Aṅguttara*, III, pp. 383 ff.; *Samyutta*, II, pp. 34-37; VI, p. 167.

2 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 192 ff.; *Mahāvagga*, vii, 2 ff.

CHAPTER XI

SPREAD OF BUDDHISM

There is a traditional account of the *vassas* spent by Buddha at different places. On the basis of this account Prof. Kern and Dr. Thomas have furnished us with an account of the spread of Buddhism.¹ It appears to my mind to be far from satisfactory, and so in this chapter I propose to bring together the facts scattered in the *Nikāyas*, which throw light on the propagation of Buddhism during the period of Buddha's ministration. On scanning the names of places in the *Nikāyas*, it appears that Sāvattthi was the scene of the largest number of discourses, the next place in importance being Rājagaha. Vesāli and Kapilavattu may be counted as the third and fourth localities of importance though the number of discourses delivered at these places is comparatively much less. At the other centres very few discourses have been delivered. Another noteworthy feature that may be noticed in this connection is that the discourses delivered at Rājagaha and other centres of Magadha have in view mainly the followers of non-brāhmanical sects, the paribbājakas,

1 Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 4; Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, ch. viii. According to the tradition, the places where Buddha stayed each *vassā* are:—1st Benares, 2nd-4th Rājagaha, 5th Vesāli, 6th Mankula Hill, 7th Tāvatisa heaven, 8th Bhagga near Sumsumāra Hill, 9th Kosambi, 10th Pāṇḍeyyaka-wood, 11th Brahmin village of Nālā, 12th Verañja, 13th Cāliya hill, 14th Sāvattthi, 15th Kapilavattu, 16th Ālavi, 17th Rājagaha, 18th Cāliya hill, 19th Rājagaha. Thereafter he stayed permanently at Sāvattthi.

and the members of the order but very rarely the brāhmaṇas while the discourses delivered at Sāvatti and other centres within Kosala were meant more for the brāhmaṇas than for the non-brāhmaṇas. This will be apparent as we proceed with the story of conversions made at each of the various centres.

KĀSĪ

KĀSĪ is counted as one of the sixteen *mahājanapadas*. It was an independent kingdom in the pre-Buddha days but later on it was annexed to Magadha by Ajātasattu. Benares was its chief city and flourished not only as an emporium of trade and commerce but also as a centre of brāhmanic culture. The frequent mention of the place in the *Jātakas* is indicative of its great importance in those days. The Isipattana or Ṛṣipattana has been immortalized in the Buddhist literature as a resort of a large number of ṛṣis in ancient times, and so the selection of the locality by Buddha for his first discourse was quite in a line with its sacred tradition.

Buddha's ministration commenced with the conversion of two foreign traders Trapusa and Bhalika who were travelling with a caravan along the trade-route from Dakkhiṇāpatha to Ukkala a town in the kingdom of Gandhāra. Their conversion at Uruvela was later on commemorated by the erection of *stūpas* in their native villages in Gandhāra.¹ Buddha after enlighten-

1 *Mahāvastu* (Senart), vol. III, pp. 303, 310, 313: *Uttarāpatha Ukkalam nāmādbhiṣṭhānam.....Tebhi dāni yathā Kelaṣṭhālī nāma adhiṣṭhāno tabim kela-stūpaṃ kārāpitaṃ. Bālukkho nāma nagaram tabim nakbastūpaṃ kārāpitaṃ.....Trapusabhallikānāṃ Śilukṣa nāma nigama āvāsītānāṃ.....adyāpi Gandhāra-rājye adhiṣṭhānam Śilānāmena jñāyati.* There has been a great difference of opinion with regard to the identification of Ukkala and the birth-place of Trapusa and

ment turned his thoughts first to his comrades in asceticism then residing at Isipatana near Benares. He started from Uruvela and passed through Gayā, Aparagayā and reached Vāśālā where he was invited to a meal by a *bubunika* brāhmaṇa to whom he pointed out as to what made a true brāhmaṇa and tried to convert him to Buddhism. Thence he passed through Cundavīlaṃ and Sārathipura, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares.¹ Here at Isipatana he visited his five comrades who would not accept Buddha's arguments regarding the futility of extreme self-mortifications in taking them to their spiritual goal. Their conviction had to be slowly overcome by Buddha through teachings from day to day impressing upon their minds the impermanence of all worldly things. They were enjoined to live as recluses, practising *jhānas* and self-control.² It was for them that he delivered his famous discourse, the *Dhammacakkha-pavattana* which is believed to have embodied truths found by Buddha under the Bodhi tree. It explains the *majjhimā paṭi-padā* or in other words, perfection in the *śīlas*, practice of control over *citta* which included *dhyāna*, and attainment of *paññā* or true knowledge. The other discourse delivered to them was *Anattasutta* showing the essencelessness of the five *khandhas*. The result of the discourses, of course, was the conversion of the five brāhmaṇas, and their admission into the Saṅgha.

Bhallika. Though the phonetic similarity between Utkala (Orissa) and Ukkala is very great and the identification of Ukkala with Orissa is alluring, yet in view of the evidence supplied by the *Mahāvastu* and supported by Yuan Chwang, Ukkala should be identified with a place in Gandhāra. Yuan Chwang noticed the remains of two of the stūpas mentioned above in the course of his journey from Balkh to Bamian (Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, I, pp. 111-113).

1 *Mahāvastu*, III, pp. 324-329; *Lalitavistara*, p. 406.

2 *Majjh. Nik.*, I, pp. 173-175; *Saṃ. Nik.*, III, p. 66.

Buddha accompanied by the five new bhikkhus passed from Isipatana to Benares and met there Yasa; a rich setṭhi's son, who was getting sick of the luxuries of worldly life and hankered after a life of peace and rest. It was in this state of mind that he came across Buddha under a Nigrodha tree on the bank of the river Varāṇā, and listened to a discourse on the merits of giving alms, observing precepts and enjoying thereby a heavenly life as also on the evils suffered by one haunted with desires. He then listened to the higher discourses dealing with the four truths¹ and was soon convinced of their excellence. He embraced Buddhism and became a *bhikkhu* while his parents became *upāsakas*.

Yasa then introduced to Buddha his four friends Vimala, Subāhu, Puṇṇaji and Gayampati who were also sons of rich setṭhis, and fifty other friends. All were admitted into the Saṅgha by Buddha by the simple formulae of "*ehi bhikkhu*."² We are not aware of any other converts made by Buddha at the time though it is evident that several others of Benares joined the order subsequently.

Benares, rather Isipatana, was a favourite resort of many distinguished disciples like Anuruddha, Mahākoṭṭhita, Moggallāna, Mahākaccāyana, and Sāriputta. According to the traditional chronology of Buddha's *vassāvāsa*, it is said that he passed the first *vassā* at Isipatana and passed through it the second time after the twelfth *vassā* on his way from Verañja to Vesālī.³

1 The word in which he expressed dissatisfaction are *upaddutaṃ vo upasaṭṭhaṃ*. *Vinaya*, I, p. 15-16.

2 See *Infra*.

3 *Samantapāsādikā*, I, p. 201; Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 36; *JRAS.*, 1891.

The delivery of Buddha's first discourse on *Dhammacakka*¹ brought the place into prominence, and clothed it with a sacred memory, ranking it as one of the sacred places of pilgrimage for a Buddhist.² Several discourses in the *Samyutta* and *Anguttara Nikāyas* are associated with this place. These deal, among other topics, with *avijjā*, *saddhā*, *kāyakamma*, *vacīkamma*, *manokamma*, *ariyasacca* and *aṭṭhaṅgikamagga*.³

Besides Isipatana, there were two other resorts of Buddhist monks at Kiṭṭāgiri⁴ and Khemiyambavana.⁵ Buddha visited Kiṭṭāgiri and remonstrated there with Assaji and Punabbasu for taking food at night (*vikālabhojana*). The discourse at Khemiyambavana was delivered by bhikkhu Udena sometime after the parinirvāṇa of Buddha. This discourse, it is said, impressed Ghoṭamukha brāhmaṇa so much that he not only became a *upāsaka* but promised to the Saṅgha a share of the daily allowance of 500 kaḥāpaṇas received by him from the king of Aṅga. As the bhikkhus were not permitted to accept gold and silver, it was arranged that the money would be utilised in building a monastery at Pāṭaliputta.

The subsequent history of Benares as a seat of the different sects of Buddhism⁶ is highly interesting and will be dealt with later on in another volume.

MAGADHA

MAGADHA became the scene of Buddha's missionary activity after Kāśī. It was one of the most prosperous provinces

1 *Vinaya*, I, p. 10-11.

2 *Digha*, II, p. 141.

3 See *Samyutta*, I, p. 105-6; V, pp. 407, 429; *Anguttara*, I, pp. 110 ff., 279; III, pp. 320, 392, 399.

4 *Majjhima*, I, p. 473.

5 *Ibid.*, II, p. 157.

6 See Sahani, *Report on the Excavations at Sarnath*.

during the reign of Bimbisāra, who had under his sway, as the tradition goes, as many as 80,000 villages.¹ Its capital Rājagaha attained importance not only as a commercial centre but also as a rendezvous of religious and intellectual men of diverse views. In the pre-Buddha days, Magadha was looked down by the brāhmaṇas as a country unfit for sacrificial fire, and as such unsuitable for habitation of orthodox brāhmaṇas of noble and pure descent. On account of the absence of orthodox brāhmaṇas, non-brāhmanic views found there a free scope for expression and so it is said that Magadha seethed with sophistic discussions and that *drṣṭikaṣāya* was there. The *Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala suttantas* delivered at Rājagaha amply testify to the fact that there was no end of brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic views prevalent in Magadha, and that the six *tittbiyas*² also selected this province as their field of work. Side by side with the *tittbiyas*, there were the brāhmanical teachers like Rudraka Rāmaputra and Kūṭadanta. The former had an āśrama where Buddha lived for sometime before the attainment of *bodhi* while the latter enjoyed the income of a village granted to him by Bimbisāra,³ performed sacrifices on grand scales, killing hundreds of animal victims. There were a few other brāhmanic teachers who taught that supernatural powers, heavenly happiness and *mokṣa* could be obtained through rigorous asceticism.⁴

Brāhmaṇas of Magadha

It is noteworthy that the discourses delivered in the towns and villages of Magadha are meant mostly for the paribbājakas and the non-brāhmanical sects or the Buddhist disciples. The

1 *Vinaya*, I, p. 29.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 47 f.; *Majjhima*, II, p. 2 f. 3 *Dīgha*, I, 127 f.

4 See *Buddhist India*, pp. 140-6; Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 188 f.

few brāhmaṇas who came into touch with Buddha or his disciples could not be converted. Vassakāra¹ and Gopaka-Moggallāna,² the brāhmaṇa ministers of Magadha, and Dhānañjani brāhmaṇa³ were admonished without any effect. The only notable converts made among the brāhmaṇas of Magadha were Kūṭadanta of village K h ā n u m a t a and Kasibharadvāja of village E k a n ā l ā.⁴ In the brāhmaṇa village of P a ñ c a s ā l ā, it is said that Buddha could not obtain a single spoonful of rice.⁵ In the brāhmaṇagāma of A m b a s a ṇ ḍ ā, in the neighbourhood of Rājagaha, is laid the scene of *Sakkapañhasutta*⁶ but nothing is mentioned about any converts made there. There are passages, e.g., in the *Sutta-nipāta*, and *Samyutta-nikāya*⁷ showing that brāhmaṇas resented Buddha's attitude towards the aged members and his claim of superiority over them. These few references to the brāhmaṇas of Magadha indicate that their number must have been few, and that Buddha was not very successful in his missionary work among them.

Non-Brāhmanical Sects

It has already been mentioned that the six *tittbiyas* chose Magadha and Vesāli as their fields of work. The number of paribbājakas wandering about within Magadha was also fairly large, and so the largest number of converts were made by Buddha from among the non-brāhmaṇas.

1 *Dīgha*, II, p. 72.

2 *Majjhima*, III, p. 15; *Aṅguttara*, II, pp. 172-3, 179, 180.

3 *Samyutta*, I, pp. 160.

4 *Dīgha*, I, p. 117; *Samyutta*, I, p. 172-3, *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 13.

5 *Samyutta*, I, p. 114.

6 *Dīgha*, II, p. 263; see B. C. Law, *Geog. of E. Buddhism*, p. 42.

7 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 50; *Samyutta*, II, p. 22.

Saṅjaya Belatṭhaputta, the centre of whose activities was at Rājagaha, was the first non-brāhmanic religious teacher to feel the power of the religion preached by Buddha for within a very short time he saw that half of his following had been won over to Buddha's side. It was Assaji, one of the first five disciples of Buddha, who commenced the missionary work by converting Sāriputta, the principal disciple of Saṅjaya, to Buddhism, and Sāriputta in his turn followed him up until half of his quondam fellow disciples including Moggallāna embraced Buddhism. This event together with the previous conversions made by Buddha and his followers created in Magadha a sensation which evoked that Buddha converted 1000 Jāṭilas, 250 followers of Saṅjaya, and the sons of distinguished Magadhan families, thereby making the families sonless and the wives husbandless, and there was no knowing who might be taken in next.¹

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was a formidable rival of Buddha, and as he was at work earlier than Buddha, he made a fair progress in the spread of his religion in Magadha and the neighbouring states. It appears from the accounts of conversions to Buddhism that Buddha could not win over to his side many followers of Nātaputta. But he stole a march upon Nātaputta by enlisting among his *upāsakas* Bimbisāra and Ajātasattu who had been lay-supporters of Nātaputta.²

¹ *Vinaya*, I, pp. 39-44.

² The Jaina *āgamas* claim Bimbisāra and Ajātasattu as Jains while the Buddhist *piṭakas* declare them as Buddhists. Neither the Jaina nor the Buddhist literature admits that they were supporters of the religions at different times or at the same time in different degrees. The facts of the lives of the two emperors, however, point to the inference that Bimbisāra supported Jainism when it appeared on the field but inclined decidedly towards Buddhism when it asserted itself

There was at Kāśī on the side of Isigili mountain in Rājagaha a large number of Jaina ascetics who were undergoing severe self-mortifications to eradicate their past sins and to attain *mukti*. Buddha failed to convince them of the inefficacies of such mortifications and of their faith being based on wrong views.¹ But this was not the case with Upāligahapati and Abhayarājakumāra.² Upāli was convinced that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta was wrong in putting more stress on *kāyakamma* (= *daṇḍa*) than on *manokamma* while Abhayarājakumāra failed to establish that Buddha was lacking in *anukampā* (compassion) by citing the instance of Devadatta. Both became lay-devotees of Buddha. Dīghatapassī, the Jaina monk, though convinced like Upāli, did not change his faith.³ Asibandhakaputta, a *gāmaṇī*, was also convinced of Buddha's viewpoint that killing, stealing and such other crimes do not always lead the sinners to hell as Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta teaches and that these sins can be counteracted by repentance and knowledge.⁴ A few other converts were made from among the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta at Vesālī and Kapilavatthu.⁵

There are no specific instances of converts having been made from among the followers of other non-brāhmanical teachers ex-

as a rival of Jainism. Ajātasattu was a supporter of Devadatta who initiated a sect holding views similar to Jainism so far as its discipline was concerned. Abhayarājakumāra, a Jaina, expostulated with Buddha for condemning Devadatta. This shows that Devadatta had Jaina sympathies and Ajātasattu by supporting him shows the nature of his religious views. He, however, was converted to Buddhism a year before Buddha's demise. (*Infra*, p. 156; Smith's *Early History of India*, p. 33).

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 380.

2 *Ibid.*, I, p. 395. See Barua, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 374.

4 *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 317 ff.

5 See *Infra*.

cept that of Acela Kassapa. Upaka, an ājīvika, was impressed by the saintly appearance of Buddha, but did not accept him as his teacher. On several occasions, the doctrines of Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Pakudha Kaccāyana and Ajita Kesakambalin were discussed and criticised,¹ and on one occasion it is mentioned that if an ājīvika be a *kammavādin*, he would go to heaven.² It seems that these teachers had no following at the time of Buddha, and that their doctrines had mere academic interest and were not actually practised. Acela Kassapa is described as an *aññatitthiya-pubba* but it is not expressly mentioned as to which sect he belonged. He joined the order and became ultimately an arhat.³

Paribbājakas of Magadha

In Magadha there were two classes of paribbājakas: (i) Brāhmanical and (ii) Non-brāhmanical (*aññatitthiya*).⁴ Buddha recruited his converts mostly from the latter class. Of the prominent paribbājakas who came into contact with the Teacher while he was staying in Magadha, the following may be mentioned: Nigrodha, Dīghanakha, Potaliputta, Anugāra (or Annabhara), Varadhara, Sakuludāyi, Moliyasīvaka, Upaka, Maṇḍikāputta, Sutavā, Sāmandaka and Susīma.

Buddha met Nigrodha who was then dwelling at Udumbarika hermitage of the paribbājakas near Rājagaha and explained to him how the ascetic practices did not always conduce

¹ See above ch. IV.

² *Majjhima*, I, p. 483.

³ *Samyutta*, II, pp. 21-22; IV, 300-2.

⁴ B. C. Law, *Buddhist Studies*, p. 89. In his paper on *Gautama Buddha and the Paribbājakas*, Dr. Law has given a summary of all the discourses that Buddha or his disciples delivered for the benefit of the paribbājakas.

to purity. It will be interesting to observe that Buddha was trying to impress upon Nigrodha who had ājīvika leanings that his discourse on the ascetic practices including *cātuyāmasaṃvara*¹ was not meant to win him over to this saṅgha and but just to impress upon him the distinction between *kusala* and *akusala*.² Nigrodha was silenced but it seems that he did not change his faith. *Dīghanakkha*, a relative of Sāriputta, listened to a discourse on *vedanā* and was soon convinced of the excellence of Buddha's teaching and became a bhikkhu.³ *Potaliputta* had a talk with Samiddhi, a young bhikkhu, about the Buddhist doctrine of *kamma*, and was not satisfied with the exposition as Samiddhi gave the answer without sufficient caution and analysis.⁴ *Anugāra*, *Varadhara*, *Sakuludāyī*⁵ and other noted paribbājakas were staying at Moranivāpa hermitage and discussing among themselves on one occasion about lack of regard for the teacher found among the followers of the six *tittthiyas* and on another occasion about the omniscience and perfection of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta, and such other topics. Buddha explained his doctrines in detail and was able to convince Sakuludāyī of their excellence, ultimately making him an upāsaka. Sakuludāyī's followers did not like that their leader should become a bhikkhu but they did not object to his becoming an upāsaka. *Moliyasīvaka* met Buddha at Rājagaha on two occasions⁶ and had discussions regarding his

1 See above, ch. IV.

2 *Digba*, III, pp. 55-7.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 501. The sutta is named *Dighanakkha-sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya* and *Vedanāpariggaha* in the commentary. See *Buddhist Legends*, I, p. 203.

4 *Majjhima*, III, p. 208-9.

5 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 1-22; 29-39; *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 176.

6 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 356-7; *Saṃyutta*, IV, p. 230-1.

teaching as producing its fruit directly (*sandiṭṭhiko dhammo*) and the Buddhist theory of *kamma*. He became satisfied with Buddha's explanations and expressed his desire to become an upāsaka. *Susīma* at the request of his lay-followers studied Buddhism and ultimately became a bhikkhu.¹ *Sutavā* and *Sajjha*² listened to the merits of an arhat appreciatingly but did not therefore become upāsakas, so also was the paribbājaka *Sāmaṇḍaka*,³ who met Sāriputta at Nālakagāma and listened to a talk on the cause of *sukha* and *dukkha*. *Sarabha*,⁴ and *Upaka*⁵ were the two paribbājakas reprov- ed by Buddha and Ajātasattu respectively. The former was a renegade from Buddhism and spoke ill of the religion while the latter had the audacity to challenge Buddha in disputation. It will be observed from the above accounts that one or two pari- bbājakas became fully ordained bhikkhus, and the rest only expressed their appreciation of the religion by becoming lay-devotees.

Lay-Devotees of Magadha

The brāhmaṇas and the paribbājakas dealt with above became mostly lay-devotees and rarely ordained bhikkhus. The largest enlistment of lay-devotees took place when Buddha visited Rājagaha in the second year of his missionary career. At the instance of Bimbisāra, the chiefs of the eighteen Śreṇis of his dominion and his officials expressed their faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. The names of only a few lay-devotees

1 *Samyutta*, II, pp. 119-128; IV, pp. 230-1.

2 *Aṅguttara*, IV, pp. 369; 371 f.

3 *Ibid.*, V, p. 120-2.

4 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 185-188.

5 *Ibid.*, II, p. 182.

of Magadha have come down to us through the discourses in the *Nikāyas*. They may be classified thus:

1. *Gāmaṇīs*—Talapuṭa naṭagāmaṇī (*Sam.* iv, p. 306); Yodhājīvagāmaṇī (*Sam.* iv, p. 308); Assārohagāmaṇī (*Sam.* iv, p. 310); Mañicūlakagāmaṇī (*Sam.* iv, p. 325); Rāsiyagāmaṇī (*Sam.* iv, p. 340); etc.

2. *Setṭhis & Gahapatis*—Jotikā (*Sam.* v, p. 344); Māna-dinna (*Sam.* v, 178); Sirivaddha (*Sam.* v, pp. 176-7); Saṇḍa-gahapatiputta (*Sam.* iv, p. 113; *Ang.* iii, 48; iv, 113); Dārūkama-mika gahapati of Nāḍika (*Ang.* iii, p. 391); Belaṭṭha Kaccāna, a sugar merchant of Andhakavinda (*Vin.* i, p. 224); Pukkusāti kulaputta (*Majjh.* iii, p. 237); Dighāvu upāsaka (*Sam.* v, p. 244); Jīvaka; Anāthapiṇḍika and his setṭhi friend; etc.

3. *Jaina disciples*—Asibandhakaputta gāmaṇī, Upāli, Abhayarājakumāra (see *ante*, p. 143).

4. *Brāhmaṇas*—Kasibharadvāja brāhmaṇa of Ekanālā; Dhānañjani brāhmaṇa (see *ante*, p. 141).

5. *Ladies*—Sārī brāhmaṇī and paribbājikā, mother of Sāriputta of Nālakagāma; Dhānañjani a brāhmaṇī (*Sam.* i, p. 160); Velukaṇṭakī Nandamātā of Dakkhiṇāgiri (*Ang.* ii, p. 236; iv, p. 63); Cundī rājakumārī (*Ang.* iii, p. 35); etc.

6. *Kings & Princes*—Bimbisāra, Ajātasattu, Muṇḍa (*Ang.* ii, p. 57), Jayasena-rājakumāra (*Majjhima.* iii, pp. 128, 138), later on he became a bhikkhu (see *Psalm of the Brethren*, p. 369).

Important Sites in Magadha

Among the scenes of Buddha's activity within Magadha the following may be mentioned: (i) Gayā, (ii), Uruvela, (iii) Rājagaha, (iv) Nālandā, (v) Pāṭaliputta, (vi) Ekanālā, (vii) Andhakavinda, (viii) Kallavālamuttagāma, (ix) Mātulā.

(i) Gayā & (ii) Uruvela

Gayā arrests our attention first for it was the birth-place of the religion which became almost pan-Asiatic in later times. Buddha on his way from Benares to Uruvela, a suburb of Gayā, came across in a forest the thirty Bhaddavaggiya youths, who were seeking pleasures and enjoyments. These youths, according to the tradition, were related to the king of Kosala. On listening to the discourses of Buddha on *dāna*, *śīla*, etc. and on the four truths, they became bhikkhus and, it is said, they later on dwelt at Pāṭheyya, a country situated to the west of Kosala.¹ He then stopped at Uruvela, a stronghold of the Jāṭilas. As these ascetics were very difficult to be weaned from the cults in which they had placed implicit faith, it is said that Buddha was put to the necessity of exhibiting miraculous powers to soften their minds in his favour. After preparing his ground in this way, he tried to explain to them the efficacy of following the truth that he had discovered. This explanation shook the foundation of their beliefs to a great extent, though of course, their minds required to be worked up a little further before they could be fully converted.² They accompanied Buddha to Gayāsīsa where he delivered the discourse *Ādittapariyāya* (Fire Sermon) intended to explain to the Jāṭilas that the *summum bonum* which they wanted to attain through fire-worship could be had not through fire-worship but by the extinction of fires of *rāga*, *dosa*, and *moha* kindled by the action of the sense-organs by coming into contact with the objects

1 Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 188; *S.B.E.*, XVII, p. 146 n; *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 420; *Psalms of the Brethren*, p. 284; *Mahāvagga*, i. 14.

2 *Vinaya*, I, pp. 34, 35.

of those senses. The Jāṭilas after hearing this discourse gave up their cults and joined the order as bhikkhus.

(iii) R ā j a g a h a

The importance of Rājagaha from the point of view of missionary work was very great. It was a great resort of religious teachers and wanderers (*paribbājakas*) who used to come to the city usually in the company of the traders who supplied them with food and raiment in their journey from distant places. The city was moreover situated at the junction of several trade-routes facilitating communication and transit of messages to and from distant places. This made it extremely important for the propagation of the truths that Buddha wanted to preach broadcast. Over and above these, the city provided other advantages, valuable for a religious organizer, viz. of entering into disputations with the religious and asserting the superiority of the religion by defeating them; of setting on a sound footing the organization by which the bhikkhus could pursue the ideals, secure from cares for the bare needs of life; and of establishing suitable hermitages for the monks in the caves of the surrounding hills so convenient for deep thinking and the pursuit of *yoga*.

On the occasion of Buddha's first visit to Rājagaha in the second year after enlightenment, he stayed at Laṭṭhivana, five miles from the town. It was here that Bimbisāra with his ministers, courtiers, and village-headmen came to meet him. Buddha's youthful appearance led them to think that he was a disciple of the hoary-headed Uruvelakassapa who had been the leader of the Jāṭilas, and accompanied Buddha to Laṭṭhivana. But Uruvelakassapa's homage to Buddha in their presence belied their impression. The youthful Buddha with his sonorous voice

explained the first principles of Buddhism, the *anicca* (transitoriness) and *anāttā* (essencelessness) of the five *khandhas* (constituents of being), and brought home to the mind of the king and his attendants that the religion preached by Buddha had excellences, by virtue of which it could lay claim of superiority to other religions of the time.¹

After enlisting Bimbisāra and his *gāmaṇīs* and courtiers as lay-devotees and fixing Veluvana for his own residence, Buddha made attempts to carry on further his missionary work. Sāriputta and Moggallāna were the first to be converted at Rājagaha with their companions the two hundred and fifty disciples of Sañjaya. He converted several *paribbājakas* and householders, an account of which has been given above.

Hermitages in and around Rājagaha

The hills around Rājagaha had several hermitages which are important in the history of the spread of Buddhism. They were as follows:—

(i) The highest of the hills, the *Gijjhakūṭa-pabbata*,² (Vulture's Peak) was a favourite resort of Buddha. In the first few years after enlightenment, he spent his time frequently at this place with some of his distinguished disciples, viz. Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, Anuruddha, Puṇṇa Mantāniputta, Upāli, Ānanda, and Devadatta, delivering discourses and imparting to them necessary training for their spiritual progress and missionary works.³ To facilitate communication with Buddha

¹ *Mahāvagga*, xxii. 1-2; *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 441; Cf. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 42-3; Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 146.

² For its identification see *Archæological Survey Report*, 1905-6; Cunningham identifies it with Śailagiri (*Anc. Geo.* p. 466).

³ See above, p. 133 f.

and his disciples, it is said that Bimbisāra made a road from the foot to the top of the hill.¹ The peak was the scene of the nefarious attempts of Devadatta supported by Ajātasattu to kill Buddha for not putting him in charge of a body of monks. Besides the hermitages on the Vultures' Peak, there were ten other cave-dwellings of bhikkhus on the hills surrounding Rājagaha² viz.,

(ii) *Corapapāta* (the precipice whence robbers were flung to death);³

(iii) *Isigilipasse Kālasilā* (the black rock by the side of the Rṣigiri);⁴

(iv) *Vebhārapasse Sattapaṇṇiguhā* (where the first Buddhist synod was held);

(v) *Sītavana Sappasondikapabbhāra* or the cave situated in a hill infested with snakes near the crematorium called Sītavana which Buddha used to visit with his disciples for passing some time at the place as a part of the spiritual training of his disciples.⁵ From the nature of this hermitage it would appear that it was

1 Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 151.

2 *Digbā*, II, pp. 116, 263, *Vinaya*, II, p. 76; see D. N. Sen, *Rājagṛha in the Buddhist Scriptures in the Report of the Second Oriental Conference*, pp. 613-624 and *Sites in Rajgir in the J.B.O.R.S.*, vol. IV; B. C. Law, *Memoirs, Arch. Sur. of India*.

3 Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 155. The Chinese pilgrims refer to the cases of religious suicide committed here, said to have been approved by Buddha. Cf. *Sam. Nik.*, III, pp. 119-124; IV, pp. 55-60; V, p. 320.

4 The name Rṣi-giri was transformed into Isi-gīli which was supposed to have been derived from the fact that the hill devoured (*gīla*=to devour) the ascetics i.e. those ascetics who entered it never returned, so congenial the place was to them (*Majjh. Nik.*, III, pp. 68 ff.).

5 *Divyāvadāna*, p. 268.

specially suited to those monks who took up the *sosānika-dhutaṅga* i.e. practising *samādhi* on a cremation-ground for their spiritual uplift;

(vi) *Gomata-kandara*,

(vii) *Tinduka* (the cave deriving its name from the Tinduka trees '*Diospyrus Embryopetris*');
 (viii) *Tapoda-kandara* (*Tapoda* = hot spring);

(ix) *Tapodārāma*;¹

(x) *Indasālagubhā*² where Buddha delivered the Sakka-pañhasutta (No. 21) of the *Dīgha Nikāya*;

(xi) *Pippali-gubhā* named after Pippali mānava, the former name of Mahākassapa, who used to stay here.³

These cave-dwellings could not provide sufficient accommodation for all the monks staying at Rājagaha. For this reason as also out of love for solitude, many monks dwelt in *arañña-kūṭikas* (forest-huts) in the jungles on the hills.⁴ Dabba Mallaputta was entrusted with the charge of grouping the monks according to their subjects of study or methods of spiritual discipline, and of allotting to them suitable residences.

After the acceptance of the Veluvana,⁵ and the sanction of vihāras as suitable residences for monks, the lay-devotees commenced building *vihāras* for monks. Three such *vihāras* in the suburbs of Rājagaha are often mentioned in the Buddhist scriptures viz., Veluvana, Jīvaka-ambavana, and Maddakucchi miga-

1 Hot springs still exist there, see *Arch. Sur. Rep.* 1904-5.

2 Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 173.

3 *Manorathapūraṇi*, I, p. 175; *Psalm of the Brethren*, p. 363.

4 *Majjhima*, III, p. 217; *Jātakas*, III, pp. 33, 71; V, p. 176.

5 For a description of the Veluvana monastery, see Mr. D. N. Sen, *op. cit.*

dāya. The first *vihāra* was presented by Bimbisāra on the occasion of Buddha's first entrance into Rājagaha, the second by Jīvaka in the twentieth *vassa* of Buddha's ministry, and the third very probably by a Madda prince when Mahākappina was ordained as a monk.¹

(iv) Nālandā

At Buddha's time Nālandā was a small but prosperous village situated at a distance of a *yojana* from Rājagaha.² The usual residence of the monks was at the monastery *Pāvārika-ambavana*. There was another monastery midway between Rājagaha and Nālandā called *Ambalaṭṭhikā* where Rāhula stayed at times.³ From the nature of the discourses delivered there and from the particulars of the persons with whom Buddha entered into disputations, it appears that Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had there a firm footing.⁴ Most of the discourses were intended to refute the doctrines of the Jaina faith, the disputants being Dīghatāpassī, Upālī, Abhayarājakumāra, and Asibandhakaputta-gāmaṇī. From the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* also, we learn that Nālandā was the meeting place of Mahāvīra with Gosāla.

(v) Pāṭaliputta

Pāṭaligāma was only a village which Buddha visited with his disciples in the last days of his life. The laity of the place

1 Mahākappina's wife was a Madda princess. See *Vin.* I, p. 105; Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, II, pp. 169-176.

2 *Sum. Vil.*, p. 35; *Majjhima*, I, p. 377; *Dīgha*, I, p. 211. It is stated in Yuan Chwang's *Records* and *Mahāvastu* that Nālandā was the birth-place of Sāriputta, but in fact his birth-place was Nālaka which was an unimportant village near Nālandā.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 414.

4 *Ibid.*, I, pp. 379, 392 ff.; *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 110, 317, 323; *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 56.

invited Buddha and his disciples who on their arrival at the place were accommodated in a rest house probably known later on as the *Kukkūṣa-ārāma*. It was at this time that Sunīdha and Vassakāra two ministers of Ajātasattu were fortifying Pāṭaligāma as a defence against the Vajjians. This fortified village afterwards rose to be Pāṭaliputta, the capital of Magadha and a great emporium.¹ Out of respect for Buddha, the two ministers named the gate through which Buddha passed and the ferry ghat whence he departed as *Gotama-dvāra* and *Gotama-tittha*. Near Pāṭaliputta, there were two villages called Koṭigāma and Nādikā where Buddha stopped in his last journey. It was at Koṭigāma that Ambapālī came to invite Buddha to Vesālī.² Buddha passed from Koṭigāma to Nādikā where he had many faithful monks and nuns, male and female lay-devotees, some of whom died before his visit to the place,³ hence the discourses that he delivered here were all concerning the *marāṇa-sati*.⁴

(vi) Ekanālā

In the 11th year of Buddha's ministration, he visited the brāhmaṇa village Ekanālā and stayed at Dakkhiṇāgiri.⁵ He converted here the two brāhmaṇas Kasi-Bharadvāja⁶ and Sampūrṇa⁷. A distinguished female lay-devotee Velukaṇṭakī Nanda-

1 *Mahāvagga*, VI, p. 28; *Dīgha*, II, p. 85.

2 *Vinaya*, I, p. 231.

3 *Dīgha*, II, pp. 91-92.

4 *Āṅguttara*, III, pp. 303 ff; 391.

5 There was another vihāra of this name at Vedisā. See B. C. Law, *Geog. of E. Buddhism*, pp. 26, 43, 46.

6 *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 12 ff.; *Saṃ. Nik.*, I, pp. 172-3.

7 R. L. Mitra's *Nepalese Buddhist Literature*, p. 18.

mātā lived here.¹ It was at this place that Buddha formed his idea of the way in which the *cīvaras* (robes of the bhikkhus) should be made out of pieces of cloth stitched together like the rectangular pieces of land tilled by different persons in the rice-fields near the village.

(vii) *A n d h a k a v i n d a* &

(viii) *K a l l a v ā l a m u t t a g ā m a*

These two villages near Rājagaha, though not so well-known, had monasteries where Buddha stayed at times. At Andhakavinda we find him instructing some newly ordained bhikkhus and converting Belattha Kaccāna, a sugar-merchant of the place. Mahākassapa while here had once to ford a stream to attend a Pātimokkha assembly at Rājagaha. After this incident the Vinaya rule was instituted that a bhikkhu need not cross a stream, as wherever it exists, it should be made a boundary of the jurisdiction of a monastery. Kallavālamutta-gāma is important on account of its association with Moggallāna who underwent there his first course of training.

Buddha's last activities in Magadha

In the closing years of Buddha's life in Magadha took place two notable conversions viz., of Ajātasattu and Jīvaka. Ajātasattu became king in the 72nd year of Buddha's life and continued his patronage to Devadatta who with Kokālika, Kaṭamoratissaka, Khaṇḍadeviyāputta Samuddadatta and Thullanandā bhikkhu² as the foremost disciples started a sect intended to be a rival to Buddhism. The cause of his influence with a few people is

¹ *Āṅguttara*, IV, pp. 63 ff.

² *Vinaya*, III, p. 171; IV, pp. 66, 335.

attributed to his power of working miracles attained through *jhāna* under the direction of Buddha at Sukarakhata in Gijjhakūṭa.¹ He collected about 500 disciples and established a centre at Gayāsīsa where a monastery was built for him by Ajātasattu.² A point of difference between the religious doctrines preached by him and those by Buddha lay in his bias to rigorous life that appealed so much to the people at large, but which Buddha left to the option of his disciples for adoption or rejection. Ajātasattu, who was used as a tool by Devadatta for the execution of his purposes, felt remorse when he was advanced in age for helping Devadatta in his evil designs as he gradually became impressed with the decided superiority of Buddha to Devadatta in all directions. Jīvaka, who about this time returned to Rājagaha after completing his medical education at Takkhasilā and became so eminent a physician that his services were eagerly requisitioned by the ruling princes. He volunteered his services for the medical treatment of Buddha and his disciples and professed his firm faith in Buddhism. He was a medical adviser of Ajātasattu and thereby got opportunities of bringing home to his mind the greatness of Buddha and his teachings. The introduction to the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* relates how he brought about the interview between Buddha and the king, on which occasion the latter was converted by Buddha by means of a discourse on the secular and spiritual merits acquired by a bhikkhu by his joining the order. This conversion took place in the 79th year of Buddha's life i.e. just a year before his *parinibbāna*.

¹ Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 10 refers to it as 'Devadatta Samādhi cave.'

² *Jātaka*, I, pp. 67, 319.

KOSALA

The kingdom of KOSALA is next in importance to Magadha in the history of the spread of Buddhism. It is counted as one of the sixteen mahājanapadas and is included among the countries scanned by the Bodhisattva before his descent to the mortal world.¹ In Buddha's time it was ruled over by Pasenadi, and then by his son Viḍuḍabha. Politically and commercially Kosala stood on the same level as Magadha, containing, it is said, 80,000 villages. From the point of view of culture only, Kosala might be pointed out as more brāhmanic than Magadha. But as far as Buddhism is concerned, Kosala could not boast of as many monasteries and hermitages as could Magadha. At the same time, however, it must be admitted that it was at the capital of Kosala that Buddha spent the latter part of his career as a teacher,² delivered the largest number of discourses and framed the largest number of *Pātimokkha* rules;³ and it was here that the religion, which had passed its infancy in Magadha, developed into its full stature as found in the Nikāyas.

Though according to Oldenberg's theory,⁴ Kosala falls outside the limits within which orthodox brāhmanism flourished, the territory was in fact within the said limits containing, as it did, many brāhmaṇa settlements. Oldenberg based his opinion on two passages, one of the *Cullavagga* (xii. 2, 3) viz., "Buddhas are born in the *puratthima* janapadas," and the other of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (ii, p. 124) referring to Buddha as a Kosalaka. The word

1 See *Lalitavistara* (ed. R. L. Mitra), p. 22.

2 See *ante*, p. 135 n.; *J.R.A.S.*, 1891, p. 339; Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 356.

3 *Mahāvagga*, v, pp. 144-5. Cf. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, *sv.* Kosala.

4 Oldenberg's *Buddha*, Appendix I.

puratthima however does not imply *prācyā-deśa*. The passage contemplates only Kapilavatthu lying on the northern extremity of Kosala and not the whole of the territory; and moreover both the town and the territory lay on the west of Sadānirā, an early limit of Aryan colonization as mentioned in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*.¹ Hence, as a citizen of Kapilavatthu, which was included in the dominion of Kosala,² Buddha could well be called a Kosalaka, though for the matter of that he was not an inhabitant of *prācyā-deśa*.

Non-brāhmanical Teachers

At the time of the rise of Buddhism, Kosala was a brāhmanical country, and so the religion had to make its headway against a strong opposition. It was introduced into Kosala at the instance of Anāthapiṇḍika, who invited the Teacher to Sāvatti and presented to him the Jetavana-ārāma distinguished in later times as a great resort of bhikkhus, and placed at his disposal all the influence that he could command for the propagation of Buddhism in Kosala.

In spite of the efforts of Anāthapiṇḍika to give Buddhism a footing at Sāvatti, the heads of the local sects resented the intrusion of a new religion into the field. To counteract the opposition, Buddha sent to Sāvatti his best disciple Sāriputta entrusted with the ostensible work of supervising the construction of the Jetavana vihāra. Sāriputta was a past master in the art of disputation and had deep knowledge of the brāhmanic lore as well as that of the non-brāhmanic sects. He had to enter into disputation with many teachers, all of whom he was able

1 *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, I, 4. 1 quoted also in Oldenberg's *Buddha*, pp. 398, 399.

2 See *Infra*, p. 172.

to silence by dint of his able exposition of the Dhamma.¹ A ground was thus prepared for the advent of Buddhism at the time of Buddha's arrival at the place. King Pasenadi was also an admirer of the six *titthiyyas* and used to speak of them as distinguished teachers of schools and heads of orders, and revered by the wise (*saṅghino gaṇino gaṇācariyā ñātā yasassino titthakārā sādhusammata*) while of Buddha as young in age and fresh as a recluse (*daharo ceva jātiyā navo ca pabbajjāyāti*).² Migāra, the rich Setṭhi of Sāvatti, was a staunch adherent of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Sāvatti, according to the *Uvāsagadasao*, was the head-quarters of the Ājīvika sect which held its founder Makkhali Gosāla in high respect.³ Behind Jetavana there was a hermitage of the Ājīvikas.⁴ The influence established by this as well as by the other teachers was of long standing, and they tried to dissuade the people from listening to Buddha's preachings. All his teachings, they said, were but reflections of what they had taught.⁵ They made a combined effort to oust him from Kosala by persuading Pasenadi to hold a competition in the exhibition of their miraculous powers. They were however defeated in this competition and Buddha's reputation as a great religious seer was established. The name and influence of the six teachers began to wane after this event, while those of Buddha increased. Out of envy, they, it is said, went to the length of making the futile attempt of blackening Buddha's

1 *Sutta Nipāta* cy., II, pp. 538 f. Cf. Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, I, pp. 384, 394.

2 *Samyutta* I, p. 68; *Majjhima*, I, pp. 205, 400, 426.

3 Barua, *op. cit.*, pp. 298, 299, 300.

4 *Jātaka*, I, p. 493, see also II, p. 170.

5 *Majjhima*, I, p. 84.

character by setting on him two courtezans Ciñcā and Sundarī.¹ Buddha laid bare before the public the weak points in their doctrines and thus gradually sapped the foundation of their influence in the place. During this period, Buddha at times instructed his disciples in the ways in which to meet the arguments advanced by their opponents of the six non-brāhmanical sects and trained them to make clear expositions of the rational principles on which Buddhism was based.² In his discourse to Visākhā, he explained what is *Nigaṇṭhopasatha* and how it fell short of a real *uposatha*.³

Brāhmaṇas of Kosala

The opposition put forth by the six teachers and their disciples to the progress of Buddha's mission was not so strong as that of the orthodox brāhmaṇas and brāhmanical teachers, who could hardly tolerate a teacher who had raised the standard of revolt against them.⁴ To some of the orthodox brāhmaṇas, even the sight of the shaven-headed Buddha at the time of performance of sacrifices was considered ominous. The sight of Buddha at some distance was a cause for consternation to Aggika-Bharadvāja who cried out to stop the further progress of the Preacher towards the place where he was performing a sacrifice: "*Tatre'eva muṇḍaka tatr'eva samaṇaka, tatr'eva vasalaka tiṭṭhābhi*" [(Stay) there, O Shaveling (stay) there, O Samaṇaka (wretched samaṇa) (stay) there, O Vasalaka (outcast)].⁵ The adverse opinions held by the brāhmaṇas generally about him have found

1 Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 33, 37; Watters, *Yuan Chwang*, I, pp. 389, 392.

2 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 64 ff.

3 *Anguttara*, I, p. 205.

4 *Sutta Nipāta*, pp. 50 ff.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 21 (translated in S. B. E. vol. X, p. 20).

expression in many places in the Nikāyas in passages like the following,—“Who are these shavelings, sham friars, menial black fellows, the offscouring of our kinsmen's heels.”¹ They even sneered at the idea of Buddha coming ‘to converse with brāhmaṇas versed in the threefold Vedic lore.’² We find it mentioned that a brāhmaṇa was offended with a brāhmaṇa lady with Buddhist leanings for uttering in his presence the formula of salutation to Buddha and cursed her for doing so.³ The nature of the opposition encountered by Buddha in the place accounts for many of the topics on which discourses were delivered by him or discussions were carried on with the local brāhmaṇas e.g. the origin of the caste-system and the purpose it served; inefficacy of sacrifices; absurdity of solving the indeterminate problems like the existence or non-existence of soul; permanence and impermanence of the world; falling off of the brāhmaṇas from the ancient brāhmanic ideal; the truth underlying the belief in spiritual sanctification by bathing in the rivers; dependence of the gods of the brāhmanic pantheon on the law of *karma*, and so forth.

Buddha by his power of disputation and knowledge of the brāhmanic lore brought home to the brāhmaṇas the truths that he was preaching. As soon as they saw the hollowness of their beliefs or the unsoundness of their philosophy, they with their characteristic love of truth embraced the religion which was placed before their eyes with all its charm. Some of them continued as laymen declaring their faith in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha while others went further and became bhikkhus. Rich and influential brāhmaṇa householders like Jānussoṇi,⁴ Aggika-Bharad-

1 *Digha*, I, p. 103.

3 *Majjhima*, II, p. 210.

2 *Ibid.*, I, p. 81 ff.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 175.

vāja,¹ and Dhānañjani² professed themselves as life-long upāsakas of Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. Intelligent and learned as they were, they naturally presented difficulty to Buddha in having them converted but once convinced of the truth of Buddha's doctrines, they proved to be his staunch adherents.

The distinct achievement of Buddha in this brāhmanic country is the conversion of some of the distinguished brāhmaṇa teachers (*mahāsālas*) who lived on grants of villages made by kings and were held in high respect by the people of the locality. In spite of their high positions as orthodox brāhmaṇa teachers, and regardless of the advice and importunities of their disciples and admirers, the renowned *mahāsālas* Pokkharasādi of Ukkakṣhā,³ Lohicca of Sālāvātikā,⁴ and Caṇki of Opasāda took refuge in Buddha and promised to be his followers up to the end of their lives (*ajjatangge paṇupetaṃ saraṇaṃ gataṃ*). So great became Buddha's fame in Kosala that the sixteen disciples of Bāvari came from as far a place as the bank of the Godāvarī to join the order.⁵ On listening to a discourse, Uggatasarīra brāhmaṇa of Sāvattihī released his sacrificial victims and expressed his devotion to Buddha.⁶

The *Nikāyas* mention only those names of brāhmaṇa converts with whom Buddha or his disciples had conversation or disputation. The names show that a pretty large number of

1 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 21.

2 *Majjhima*, II, p. 209.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 87; see also *infra*, p. 169.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 224.

5 *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 192 ff. Bāvari was once the *purohita* of king Mahākosala and his son Pasenadi. He retired to the bank of the Godāvarī where a hermitage was built for him by Pasenadi.

6 *Anguttara*, IV, p. 45.

brāhmaṇas of various ranks in life were converted, as for instance, the Brāhmaṇagahapatis of Sālā,¹ Kapaṭhikamānava of Opasāda,² Brāhmaṇas of Nagaravinda,³ Manasākata,⁴ Venāgapura,⁵ Icchānāṅgala,⁶ Daṇḍakappa,⁷ Jānuṣṣoṇi, Sundarīkabharadvāja, Piṅgalakoccha, Assalāyana, Esukārī, Subha, Saṅgara, Tikaṇṇa, Saṅgārava, Dhānañjani of Caṇḍalakappa⁸ and a host of other brāhmaṇas of Sāvatti.⁹

Paribbājakas of Kosala

Like other countries, Kosala had also many *paribbājakāraṃas*¹⁰ the most frequented of which was the one provided by queen Mallikā at Sāvatti.¹¹ Buddha and his disciples, and even sometimes, his lay-disciples¹² visited these āraṃas, eagerly heard the views of these paribbājakas, and expressed their disapproval of those views if they thought it necessary to do so. There were also occasions when the *paribbājakas* approached Buddha for removing their doubts. As the result of these interviews we hear of paribbājakas like Vekhanassa¹³

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 285.

2 *Ibid.*, II, p. 164.

3 *Ibid.*, III, p. 290.

4 *Digba*, I, p. 235.

5 *Anguttara*, III, p. 30.

6 *Ibid.*, III, p. 30.

7 *Ibid.*, III, p. 402.

8 *Majjhima*, II, p. 209.

9 See *Majjhima*, I, pp. 39, 175, 205; II, pp. 147, 177, 208, 209; *Digba*, III, p. 81; *Saṃyutta*, I, pp. 177 ff.; *Anguttara*, I, pp. 158 ff.

10 *Anguttara*, IV, p. 378; V, p. 48 "aṇṇatittbiyānaṃ paribbājakānaṃ āraṃa"

11 *Majjhima*, II, p. 22 "Samayappavādaḥ tindukāciro ekasālako Mallikāya āraṃa"

12 *Ibid.*, II, p. 23.

13 *Ibid.*, II, p. 40. He was the founder of a brāhmanical paribbājaka order.

and P o ṭ ṭ h ā p a d a¹ becoming lay-devotees of Buddha. The former had a talk with him on *parama-uṇṇa*, *kāmaguṇa*, and lack of knowledge about the ultimates among certain teachers, while the latter discussed with him several topics, e.g. perception (*saññā*) and its cessation (*nirodha*), distinction between perception (*saññā*) and knowledge (*ñāṇa*), different soul-theories and so forth. Channo did not find much difference between his views and those of Ānanda regarding the removal of *rāga*, *dosa* and *moha*.² The high estimation in which Buddha was held by some of the *paribbājakas* is evident from the reply given by Pilotika to Jānussoni's query about Buddha's erudition, "Whom am I to judge of the knowledge of Samana Gotama, who am I to be able to praise him; he is the praised of the praiseworthy, the best of gods, of men; whoever approaches him for disputation whether he be a *brāhmaṇa*, *khattiya*, *gahapati* or *samaṇa-paṇḍita*, he comes back satisfied with the exposition of his dhamma."³ From these remarks it need not be supposed that Buddha had an unqualified success among the *paribbājakas* as there were many members of the class who would never recognise the excellences of the religion.

King Pasenadi

Buddha resided here for twentyone *vassas* in addition to many visits paid to it at other times, so king Pasenadi got many opportunities of meeting him and holding with him conversation on religious topics. From the references to Pasenadi in the *Nikāyas*, it is evident that the king was a follower of the *brāhma-*

1 *Digha*, I, p. 178. See also *Buddhist Studies*, pp. 101, 108-9.

2 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 215.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 175.

nic religion, had the brāhmaṇa Bāvari as his first *purohita*, and celebrated sacrifices involving slaughter of hundreds of animal victims.¹ One of his queens Mallikā, and his two sisters Somā and Sakulā, were devotees of Buddha.² Queen Mallikā was once addressed by Buddha regarding the qualities which distinguish one woman from another³ while Princess Sumanā listened to a sermon on the merit of making gifts.⁴ It was probably through the influence of these ladies combined with the occasional instructions from Buddha that the mind of the king was gradually softened towards Buddhism. Later on he declared himself a lay-devotee of Buddha and showed signs of his devotion by occasional gifts to the members of the Order. On the death of Queen Mallikā he repaired to Buddha for words of consolation.⁵ In the latter part of his life he expressed his highest admiration (*dbammanvaya*) for Buddha and his Saṅgha.⁶

Lay-devotees of Kosala

Though the infant religion could not at first secure patronage from the king, it did from Anāṭhapiṇḍika a great magnate and the High Treasurer of the realm. His valuable advice combined with pecuniary help made it possible for the religion to strike its root deep into the soil of Kosala. It was he who organised the delivery of a few discourses by Buddha to lay-people regarding the duties of house-holders and the place occupied by them under his religion. It was these discourses that served as a guide to the house-holders in the performance of their duties as lay-Buddhists.⁷ Thus it was through the

1 *Samyutta*, I, pp. 75-6; *Sutta Nipāta*, p. 192.

2 *Majjhima*, II, pp. 108, 125-6.

4 *Ibid.*, III, p. 32.

6 *Majjhima*, II, p. 120.

3 *Anguttara*, II, p. 202.

5 *Ibid.*, III, p. 57.

7 *Anguttara*, V, p. 1.

efforts of Anāthapiṇḍika that a place was assigned by Buddha to the lay-Buddhists in the framework of his religion.

The lay-devotee, who as a supporter of Buddhism ranked next to Anāthapiṇḍika in importance, was *V i s ā k h ā*, daughter of a *seṭṭhi* of Sāketa, and wife of the son of a rich *seṭṭhi* of Sāvatti. She persuaded her father-in-law Migāra and other members of the family to give up their faith in the doctrines of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and adopt those of Buddha. Her anxiety for the comforts of the monks and nuns had become proverbial.¹ She built the Pubbārāma monastery where Buddha resided for six *vassas*. It was at her instance that many of the *Vinaya* rules for both the *bhikkhus* and *bhikkhunīs* were framed. Several discourses were delivered by Buddha and his disciples for her benefit.

A few other noteworthy lay-converts of Kosala whose names may be mentioned in this connection are Gaṇaka Moggallāna,² Pañcakaṇṇa ṭhapati,³ Isidatta and Purāṇa ṭhapati⁴ who were all high state-officials; Sālha, grandson of Migāra, and Rohaṇa, grandson of Pekhuṇiya, who paid occasional visits to Pubbārāma and listened to discourses.⁵

Conversion of Aṅgulimāla

A notable incident connected with Buddha's missionary work in Kosala is the radical change brought about in the life of Aṅgulimāla who was so turbulent that even the king of the realm could not restrain him. He turned a *bhikkhu* and ultimately reached *arahatsip*. This conversion made a great impression upon the minds of the people of Kosala as also of the king,⁶ and helped greatly the propagation of the religion.

1 *Mahāvagga*, viii, 15. 7.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 396.

5 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 193.

2 *Majjhima*, III, p. 1.

4 *Ibid.*, II, p. 123.

6 *Majjhima*, II, p. 23.

Important Sites in Kosala

This sketch of the spread of Buddhism in Kosala would not be complete without a reference to at least some of the various centres established within the territory for facilitating the propagation of the religion and the pursuit of spiritual exercises by the bhikkhus.

Sāvatthi

The first city that rises in our minds is Sāvatthi which could boast of two of the richest monasteries in India at the time, viz., *Jetavana* of *Anāthapiṇḍika* and *Pubbārāma* *Migāramātupāsāda* of *Visākhā*.¹ With the fabulous wealth of *Anāthapiṇḍika*, the pleasure-garden of Prince Jeta was purchased, and on it was erected the magnificent monastery called *Jetavanavihāra* or *Jetārāma* replete with all kinds of rooms required for the well-being of a Saṅgha.²

In the building and the ceremony of dedication of *Jetārāma*, Prince Jeta, King Pasenadi and several rich setṭhis took part along with *Anāthapiṇḍika*. Buddha, it is said, spent as many as nineteen *vassas* at Jetavana, delivering eight hundred and forty-four suttas,³ and formulating the major portion of the Vinaya code. The other monastery which could vie with Jetavana is *Pubbārāma* where Buddha passed six *vassas*, and it is said that while staying at Jetavana, Buddha often passed the day or night at *Pubbārāma*. This monastery was built by *Visākhā* and named after his father-in-law *Migāra* and herself who was fondly called *Migāramātā*. The erection of *Pubbārāma*, it is said, was made under the supervision of *Moggallāna*,

1 This was situated outside the eastern gate of Sāvatthi.

2 See *Infra*.

3 *Malalasekera, Dict. of Pali Proper Names*, pp. 965, 1127.

but it seems that the name of Moggallāna has been drawn in by way of a parallel to Sāriputta who supervised the erection of Jetavana.¹ It was situated six to seven miles to the north-east of Jetavana and could accommodate a large number of monks and nuns in its numerous chambers while it afforded facilities for deep meditation in its secluded cells. On account of the amenities of monk-life available here, it was a favourite resort of Buddha and his disciples.

Aṇḍavana, another monastery situated at a short distance to the north-west of Jetavana Vihāra, ranks next to Pubbārāma in the provision of facilities to monks and nuns for meditation and spiritual exercises. It has been specially mentioned in the *Samyutta-nikāya* as a resort of nuns of Āḷavi (a suburb of Sāvatti), who, seeking solitude, used to come to this monastery.

Rājakārāma was the fourth monastery built opposite to Jetavana by king Pasenadi. Several sermons of the *Samyutta-nikāya* were delivered here.²

Sāketā

Sāketa was the town next in importance to Sāvatti, and was situated at a distance of seven leagues from Sāvatti. It was founded by Visākhā's father, Dhanañjaya, a rich setṭhi. There were on its outskirts three monasteries, known as Añjanavana, Kālākārāma and Tikaṇṭakivana. Añjanavana was originally a deer-park of the kings of Kosala. Here Buddha met the paribbājaka Kuṇḍaliya³ and delivered a discourse on

1 Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, p. 628.

2 *Samyutta*, V, pp. 60 ff.; *Majjhima*, III, p. 271.

3 *Samyutta*, V, p. 73.

the restraint of sense-organs, *satipaṭṭhāna* and *bojjhaṅga*. Kāḷākārama was built by Kāḷaka who gave up his faith in Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and became a Buddhist. Buddha delivered here a discourse on his *omniscience*.¹ Tikāṇṭakivāna was a grove near Sāketa. Here Sāriputta, Moggallāna and Anuruddha had a talk regarding the qualities which make a *sekha* (one aspiring for Arhatthood)² while Buddha delivered here a discourse on the removal of misconceptions.³

Āḷavi

Āḷavi stood on the way from Sāvatti to Rājagaha,⁴ at a distance of thirty *yojanas* from Sāvatti. Buddha passed here the sixteenth *vassa* at the *Aggālava* shrine, which was originally a pre-Buddhist place of worship, and later on converted into a Buddhist hermitage. Vaṅgīsa, a distinguished monk, used to live at this place.⁵ At Āḷavi, *Gomaggā Simsāpavana* was another hermitage where was delivered the *Pāyāsi-sutta*.⁶ It was the residence of Kumāra Kassapa, and was located to the north of Setavyā, near which was Ukkatthā.

Ukkatthā

Ukkatthā is better known as the village given by Pāsenadi to Pokkharasādī as *brahmadeyya*. Here at Subhagavana Buddha delivered his famous discourse, the *Mūlapariyāyasutta*,⁷ in

1 *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 25.

2 *Samyutta*, V, p. 175.

3 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 169.

4 *Vinaya*, II, pp. 170-5: Sāvatti Kīṭāgiri-Āḷavi.

5 *Sutta Nipāta*, 59 f.; *Samyutta*, i, 185-6, 187.

6 *Dīgha*, II, 316.

7 *Majjhima*, I, p. 1.

which he explained what he really meant by *anatta* and *nibbāna*. The same idea is further developed in the *Brāhmanimantaka-sutta*,¹ in which, however *viññāṇa* is described as infinite.² In this hermitage there was provision for the residence of both monk and nuns.

Kesaputta of the Kālāmas

Though as a tribe the Kālāmas of Kesaputta, a town of Kosala, were not very prominent, but in the history of Buddhism, their place is not insignificant, because Ārāḍa, a Kālāma, was a teacher of Siddhattha while Bharāṇḍu, another Kālāma, was not only a co-disciple of Siddhattha but offered him shelter at his *āśrama* at Kapilavatthu.³ A group of suttas in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* is located here.⁴

Among other sites of Kosala, where Buddha stopped and delivered discourses, the names of the following may be mentioned; Pañkadhā; Ekasālā; Nalakapāna; and Veludvārā.⁵

THE SAKYAS

Though the kingdom of the Sakyas falls within the limits of Kosala,⁶ the Sakyas were politically independent and formed a separate entity from the social standpoint with customs and practi-

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 329.

2 *Viññāṇam anidassanam anantaṃ sabbato pabbam*. Cf. *Kevaddha sutta* in *Digha*. I, p. 211 f.

3 See *Infra*, p. 171.

4 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 188 f.

5 See Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, sv.

6 *Aṅguttara*, I, p. 276. *Sutta Nipāta* (V, 422) describes it as "Kosalesu nīketino" while the *Mahāvastu* (II, p. 199) says it was "Kosalesu nivāsito." Cf. *Digha*, III, p. 83.

ces peculiar to themselves. They were followers of the brāhmanic religion and did not at first look with favour upon the idea of Buddha launching a new religion in direct opposition to the time-honoured ones. If we examine carefully the account of the reception accorded by the Sakyas to Buddha at the time of his visit to the land of his birth after enlightenment, it will be evident that there was a rift in the lute welcoming his arrival. The people forgot to provide food for the Teacher and his disciples on the first day, refused to give them alms on the following day when they went out for collection of alms, deputed only those Sakyas who were junior to Buddha to receive him.¹ Daṇḍapāṇi Sakka was not very much impressed by Buddha's doctrine which taught complete severance from *kāma*, and went away shaking his head.² Mahānāma was unable to find out at Kapilavatthu a suitable lodging for Buddha even for one night and had to request his quondam fellow-disciple Bharaṇḍu-Kālāma to accommodate him in his *āśrama*.³ Ānanda did not include Kapilavatthu among the countries where Buddhist lay-devotees lived in large numbers.⁴ These reveal the feeling entertained by the Sakyans at the time towards Buddha and his religion. The situation was so dismal that Buddha had to have recourse to miracles for bringing the Sakyas under control. Ultimately he made a few converts from among the Sakyas, some of whom came to be counted among the leading disciples of Buddha, e.g., Anuruddha, Ānanda, Bhaddiya, Kimbila, Bhagu, Devadatta and Upāli.⁵

1 Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 198 f.; Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, III, p. 2 f.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 108-9.

3 *Anguttara*, I, p. 276-7.

4 See *ante*, p. 4.

5 See *ante*, pp. 103-8.

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta among the Sakyas

Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta had been among the Sakyas some time before Buddha and secured some followers. Mahānāma, a relation of Buddha, had Jaina leanings. To bring him round, Buddha delivered to him a discourse on the uselessness of the severe forms of self-mortification practised by the Jaina ascetics.¹ The result of this discourse upon Mahānāma's mind has not been mentioned anywhere. He, however, appears as an interlocutor² in many discourses, but nowhere does he appear as giving up his faith to adopt Buddhism.

The nature of the topics dealt with in the discourses delivered by Buddha at Devadaha suggests the inference that there were at the place a few followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta. Daṇḍapāṇi could be counted among them while Devadatta was in favour of the rigorous discipline of the Jainas. There is no reference to the conversion of any of these Jainas to Buddhism. Moggallāna who was with Buddha at the time succeeded however in converting Vappa, a Sakyan Jaina to Buddhism.³

Kapilavatthu

While at Rājagaha Buddha was repeatedly invited by Suddhodana and at last induced by his play-mate Kāludāyi to go to Kapilavatthu. He stopped at *Nigrodhārāma* on the outskirts of Kapilavatthu. To welcome him, Suddhodana started with his retinue but on hearing the description of his dress and of his followers, he returned to his capital, sad and dejected.

1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 91-95.

2 *Anguttara*, I, p. 219; III, p. 286; IV, p. 220; *Majjhima*, I, pp. 91, 354.

3 *Anguttara*, II, p. 196 ff.

Some of the disciples wanted to meet Suddhodana in order to convince him of the greatness of Buddha; the selection fell on Kāludāyi who agreed to take upon himself the task with great hesitation. Kāludāyi appeared before Suddhodana and his courtiers miraculously from the sky and thus made an impression on their minds about his greatness. After this incident, Suddhodana decided to welcome Buddha and started for the purpose along with his guilds and artisans, merchants and officers, setṭhis and brāhmaṇas. The Sakyas however were in a dilemma, whether to show respects to Buddha or not. This situation was anticipated by Buddha and was avoided by the show of a miracle.¹ After this encounter of Buddha with Suddhodana, the work of propagation of the religion was carried on vigorously, ending in the conversion of a few Sakyan youths and ladies including Nanda and Rāhula, and Mahāpajāpati and Yasodharā. Buddha paid a few more visits to Kapilavatthu, not taking into account the stories of his intervention in the quarrels that the Sakyas had with the Koliyas and with Prince Viḍuḍabha. On one occasion he consecrated their new Santhāgāra, while on another he converted Kāligodhā, a Sakyan lady.² Two Sakyans Kāla-Khemaka and Ghaṭṭāya, it is said, provided *vihāras* for the monks in the Nigrodhārāma.³ After all Kapilavatthu in spite of its poor response to the call of Buddha received its due honour as the *jātibhūmi*⁴ of the Teacher and came to be counted as one of the sacred places of pilgrimage, and a place fit for the deposit of a portion of the relics.

1 *Mahāvastu*, iii, pp. 101 ff.

2 *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 396.

3 *Majjhima*, III, pp. 109-110.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 145.

Other Sites in the Sakya territory

Besides Kapilavatthu, there were within the Sakya territory a few other places which were visited by Buddha. These were Cātumā, Sāmagāma, Khomadussa, Medalumpa, Naṅgara, and Devadaha. At Cātumā Buddha was once so much displeased with the Saṅgha on account of its members making noise that he asked them to leave the place. The Sakyas intervened but failed to persuade Buddha to withdraw his order. They listened to a discourse on the duties of monks regarding the bare necessities of life.¹ While at Sāmagāma he heard of the demise of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta and of the dissension among his followers. This caused some apprehension in his mind regarding the well-being of his own Saṅgha after his demise and led him to deliver the discourse on the ways of settling disputes (*adbikaraṇa-samatha*).² Medalumpa (or Ulumpa) and Naṅgara were two other Sakyan villages, three leagues apart, that were visited by the Teacher. It was at the former village that Buddha delivered the *Dhammacetiya-sutta* for the benefit of Pasenadi.³ At Khomadussa Buddha was able to convince a number of brāhmaṇas of the excellence of his teaching;⁴ while at Devadaha he delivered a large number of discourses. Devadaha was a Sakyan town next in importance to Kapilavatthu, and was the home of Māyā and Pajāpati. Near it was the Lumbini garden. It was a centre of the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputtas. In the *Devadaha-sutta* the *Kamma* theory of the Nigaṇṭhas is discussed followed by an exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of *Kamma*.⁵ In the *Samyutta-nikāya*, Devadaha is made the scene of a few discourses on the six senses.⁶

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 456 f.

2 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 243 ff.

3 *Ibid.*, II, p. 118-119 fn.

4 *Samyutta*, I, p. 182.

5 *Majjhima*, II, p. 214 f.

6 *Samyutta*, IV, p. 124 f.

THE LICCHAVIS

In ancient India of Buddha's time, the Licchavis were one of the powerful tribes, living at the foot of the Himalayas. They formed a part of the Vajjian confederacy and had a republican form of government. They used to meet together very often in the *saṅhāgāra*, to discuss and transact their business, political, social and even religious. They had their seat of government at Vesāli, which has been made in the *Nikāyas* the scene of a few important discourses.

Brāhmanism

Though the territory of the Licchavis was outside the limits of the brāhmanic middle-country, yet brāhmanism was there the prevailing religion. Belief in the brāhmanic pantheon and the ceremonial worship of deities were all current among them. It may be that some of the deities representing *Yakkhas* and other spirits were the relics of their ancient belief. A brāhmaṇa named Kāraṇapāli used to perform the religious functions of the Licchavis (*Licchaviṇaṃ kammantaṃ kareti*). There is also a reference to another brāhmaṇa named Piṅgiyāni receiving cloths from the Licchavi youths as a token of their respect for him.¹ There were a good many shrines on the outskirts of Vesāli and the regular worship of the images of the deities enshrined in them was carried on by the Licchavis.² Again the fact that the Licchavis worshipped many gods and goddesses of the brāhmanic pantheon at the time when

¹ *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 236.

² The shrines around Vesāli, according to Buddhaghosa, were originally Yakkha-shrines but later on converted into Buddhist monasteries or Cetiya. See Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, pp. 780, 942. *Digha*, II, p. 102; Mallas also had such shrines e.g. *Makutabandhana*.

their country was being ravaged by famine and pestilence shows that the Licchavis were imbued to a large extent with the spirit of brāhmanism.

Jainism

When Buddha came among the Licchavis, Jainism had already run through a career of about 250 years from the time of Pārśvanātha and had among its adherents many of the Licchavis.

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta, the reformer of Jainism, belonged to a distinguished family of the Nāṭa clan with wide influence in the land of the Licchavis. There are accounts of a few adherents of Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta either disputing with Buddha or coming into contact with him or his followers in the course of their missionary work. Saccaka, who as a disputant was held in high respect by the Licchavis, sustained a defeat in a religious disputation with Buddha. It is not clear whether he became a Buddhist convert as the result of the defeat.¹ Abhaya and Paṇḍitakumāraka enquired of Ānanda about the means of destruction of *dukkha* as pointed out by Buddha and were not satisfied with the answer.² On another occasion the former approached Buddha with the question whether *ogha* (flood of passions etc.) could be overcome either by moral purity or severe penance, to which Buddha replied in the negative and said that it was only by controlling mind, body and speech that a person could save himself from *ogha*.³

The most notable conversion made by Buddha among the Jaina laity was that of Siha who was a military official of the Licchavis and had a great influence in the country. In spite of

¹ *Majjhima*, I, pp. 236, 250.

² *Āṅguttara*, I, pp. 220-222.

³ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 200-202.

Nigaṇṭha Nāṭaputta's dissuasion, he met Buddha, and impressed by his discourses on *dāna*, became an *upāsaka*. The weaning of Siha from the Jaina faith gave a rude shock to Nāṭaputta's followers who out of jealousy circulated the false report that Siha had killed animals for feeding Buddha and the bhikkhus.¹

Vesālī

In the fifth *vassa*, Buddha was invited by the people of Vesālī to visit the place for removing the pestilence ravaging the city. Buddha in response to the invitation, extended by Mahālī, a Licchavi friend of Bimbisāra, visited the place and stayed there for a short time. The end of the pestilence synchronized with his stay there and was believed to have been due to the beneficent power of the Teacher who made efforts to drive away the epidemic by uttering the *Ratana Sutta*. The incident went far to prepare the minds of the people to follow the lead of the wonder-worker in the religion. Buddha visited Vesālī many times subsequently.

In spite of active oppositions of the Jainas, Buddha continued his work of conversion in right earnest. The high encomiums showered on Buddha by the Licchavis at a meeting of their assembly, the feeling of wonder expressed by Mahānāma at the sudden change of the Licchavi youths under Buddha's influence,² and the desire of Oṭṭhaddha Licchavi with a large retinue to listen to Buddha's discourses,³ show that Buddha could create a favourable impression on the minds of the local people and achieve some success in his missionary activities. As a mark of their devotion to Buddha they dedicated to him not only the

1 *Mahāvagga*, vi. 31. 12.

2 B. C. Law, *Kṣattriya Clans in Buddhist India*, pp. 88, 89.

3 *Dīgha*, I, p. 151.

Mahāvana Kūṭāgārasālā but also a large number of *Cetiya*s which were also highly appreciated by him as places for meditation.¹ Of these *Cetiya*s, the one at *Gosiṅgasālavana* was particularly liked by him and his chief disciples *Sāriputta* and *Moggallāna* who passed there many a day in meditation.² The conversions made by Buddha among the Licchavis were not commensurate with the acts of generosity mentioned above, as the cases of conversion mentioned in the *Nikāyas* are not many. *Ānanda*'s exclusion of *Vesāli* from the list of places where the lay-devotees lived in large numbers also point to the same conclusion.³ The names of *Mahāli*, *Mahānāma*, *Ugga-Gahapati*, *Nandaka* the minister, *Piṅgiyāni brāhmaṇa* and a few others are mentioned as converts to Buddhism. *Oṭṭhaddha* Licchavi and *Bhaggava paribbājaka* were much impressed by the teachings of Buddha but they did not adopt the religion. On account of the attachment of *Sunakkhatta* Licchaviputta to other beliefs and practices, Buddha had to be disappointed in him. He joined the order as a *bhikkhu* and remained as such for about three years. He expected to see the exhibition of Buddha's miraculous powers and to have from him the solution of some of the indeterminable problems, all of which Buddha deliberately avoided on principle. This exasperated *Sunakkhatta* who left the order and commenced speaking ill of it broadcast. This disparagement by *Sunakkhatta* became the topic of many discussions between Buddha and the Licchavis to whom he explained his position by stating that the benefits of the religion

1 *Dīgha*, II, p. 102: "*Ramaṇiṃ Ānanda Vesāli, ramaṇiyaṃ Udenaṃ cetiyaṃ, ramaṇiyaṃ Gotamakaṃ cetiyaṃ, r. Bahuputtam c., r. Sārandamaṃ c., r. Cāpalaṃ c.*"

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 212; *Āṅguttara*, V, pp. 133-4.

3 *Dīgha*, II, p. 169.

could not be derived by one who had attachment to other teachers and their doctrines and practices.¹

Buddha passed through Vesāli in the course of his last tour. The only notable conversion made on this occasion was that of the famous courtesan Ambapālī who gave away her Ambavana to the Buddhist saṅgha. It was while dwelling at Cāpala Cetiya situated on the outskirts of Vesāli that Buddha resolved to end his mortal existence in three months.

Sanction of the order of nuns

One of the most important events in the history of Buddhism that transpired at Vesāli was that Buddha gave here his consent to the formation of the order of nuns at the importunities of Ānanda and Mahāpajāpati Gotamī. The latter had already advanced a little as a lay-devotee in the path of sanctification at the time of conversion of Rāhula and Nanda. It was after the death of king Suddhodana that she in the fulness of her grief resolved to embrace the life of a recluse. She formed a band of recluses by bringing together a few ladies who had been bent on retirement from the world for some reason or other. With them she travelled under great physical stress and strain from Kapilavatthu to Vesāli where Buddha was staying and obtained his consent to the formation of the order of nuns by agreeing to comply with the eight ordinances laid down at the time by Buddha for the bhikkhunīs.² She made a steady progress in spiritual culture under the guidance of Buddha and soon attained the highest stage of sanctification.

1 *Digha*, I, pp. 150 ff; III, pp. 2 ff.

2 *Anguttara*, IV, p. 274; see *Infra*.

THE VIDEHAS

In the legend of the *Satapatha-Brahmaṇa* referred to above, Videgha Mādhava is said to be the first coloniser of the land of the Videhas across the river Sadānīrā. This river was its western limit while Kauśikī was the eastern; on its north were the Himalayas and the Ganges on the south. In the pre-Buddha days it became an important centre of brāhmanic culture on account of Janaka's enthusiasm for, and patronage of, learning and spiritual culture which converted his court into an important meeting-place of learned men specially from the western countries of Kosala and Kuru-Pañcāla.¹ At the time of Buddha the Videhas formed a part of the Vajjian confederacy. In the *Mahāgovinda-sutta*, Mithilā, the capital of the Videhas, is mentioned as one of the seven kingdoms of Northern India. It was given to Mahāgovinda, who was a believer in the Brahmā cult. Ajātasattu was often called Vedehiputta² while Ānanda Vedehamuni. This may be due to the fact that their mothers hailed from the land of the Videhas.³ The *Makhādeva* and *Mahājanaka Jātakas* and the *Brahmāyu Sutta*⁴ testify to the prevalence of brāhmanism in Videha at the time of Buddha. The *Nikāyas* are silent as to Buddha's missionary work in the place and the volume of opposition met by him there in the propagation of his religion. It is only in the *Majjhima Nikāya* that we find that he stayed at Makhādeva-ambavana of Mithilā and converted on a certain occasion Brahmāyu a distinguished and an old brāhmaṇa teacher, who was awe-inspired by the *mahāpurusalakkhaṇas* on Buddha's body.

1 *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, III; Oldenberg's *Buddha*, p. 398.

2 Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 63 but for the Pāli tradition see *Sumaṅgala Vilāsinī*, I, p. 139.

3 *Apādāna Comy.*, p. 106. 4 *Majjhima*, II, pp. 74 ff., 133 ff.

THE BHAGGAS

The Bhaggas formed another tribe of the Vajjian confederacy. The fact that Bodhirājakumāra, son of king Udena, resided there in a palace of his, indicates some close political relation of this tribe with Kosambī. Buddha spent the eighth *vassa* among the Bhaggas at Sumsumāragiri. He succeeded in converting three distinguished inhabitants of the Bhagga country, namely Nakulapitā, Nakulamātā and Bodhirājakumāra. There might have been other converts but their names do not appear in the *Nikāyas*. Buddha and his chief disciple Moggallāna visited this place on two or three occasions and stayed at *Sumsumāragiri Bhesakalāvana-migadāya*. Buddha delivered a few discourses, at the instance of Nakulapitā and Nakulamātā, two of his most favourite lay-disciples, detailing the duties of house-holders.¹ The discourses delivered here by Moggallāna relate to the means of overcoming passions (*māraṭṭaṇṇiya*).² It was while Buddha was residing in this country that Bodhirājakumāra requested Buddha to stay in his newly built palace Kokanada for a day in order to sanctify it by his presence, and give him the opportunity of formally taking refuge in Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha.³

THE KOLIYAS

The Koliyas of Rāmagāma and Devadaha were also one of the republican clans living at the foot of the Himalayas, close to the settlement of the Sakyas. They attained prominence in the Buddhist texts on account of the relation that they had with

¹ *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 61; III, p. 295. IV, pp. 85, 268; *Samyutta*, IV, p. 116.

² *Majjhima*, I, pp. 95, 332.

³ *Ibid.*, II, p. 91.

Buddha through his mother and wife. The first visit paid by Buddha to this country was from Vesāli in the fifth year of his ministry when a fight became imminent between the Sakyas and the Koliyas over the right of drawing water from a stream.¹ It was when the armies of the two clans were arrayed in the battle-field that Buddha intervened and brought about an amicable settlement by his thoughtful and pacifying discourses. Many members of both the clans were struck by Buddha's greatness and were moved so much by his teachings that they retired from the world to become bhikkhus. Of those who were converted to Buddhism at this place, the names of Puṇṇa-govatika and Seniya-kukkuravatika of H a l i d d a v a s a n a should be mentioned, as they were typical brāhmanic ascetics believing in the efficacy of severe penances.² Kakudha Koliyaputta became a *saddhivibhārika* (novice) of Moggallāna,³ while Suppāvasā Koliyadhītā was praised by Buddha as an *upāsikā* who was the best of the *paṇṭadāyikā* (givers of sweet food).⁴ Pāṭaliyagāmaṇi of U t t a r a became a lay-devotee after he was convinced of the excellences of Buddhism by a pretty long discourse dealing with the various contemporary doctrines.⁵ Suppāvasā, wife of the Licchavi Mahāli, another *upāsikā*, was a great benefactress of the Saṅgha. She lived at S a j j a n e l a⁶ which was visited by Buddha on more than one occasion. The Koliyas of Rāmagāma obtained a share of Buddha's relics and erected a stūpa on the same.

1 See *ante*, p. 93-4; Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, III, pp. 70ff.; *Jātakas*, V, pp. 412-413; Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, pp. 317-20.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 387.

3 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 122.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 26; II, p. 62.

5 *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 340-358.

6 *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 62.

THE MALLAS

The Mallas were another republican tribe of the same type as the Licchavis. They were divided into two groups, one having their capital at Pāvā and the other at Kusinārā. Pāvā attained prominence as an important centre of the Jains and also as the scene of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta's death, while Kusinārā became immortalised in the Buddhist tradition by Buddha's selection of the place as the suitable site for his *parinibbāna*. It is counted as one of the four places of pilgrimage of the Buddhists. At the time of Buddha however it was a small village as has been described by Ānanda.¹

The mandate issued by the Assembly of the Mallas of Kusinārā that persons not according welcome to Buddha would be fined 500 *kabāpaṇas* shows that there was among the Mallas a party opposed to Buddha and his religion. Malla Roja belonged to this party but on coming into contact with Buddha, he could not resist turning an *upāsaka*.² Of the two well-known converts from this clan, one was Dabba Mallaputta, the distributor of food and assigner of residences to the monks at Rājagaha, while the other was Cunda kammāraputta of Pāvā who by serving to Buddha his last meal became a prominent figure in the Buddhist literature.³

Kusinārā is the scene of two important discourses delivered by Buddha. One of them explained to Tapassu gahapati the great charm inhering in the spiritual exercises practised by a monk, by virtue of which they could spurn the pleasures of worldly life.⁴ It was the attraction of this happiness in the life of a monk that persuaded even youngmen to turn recluses.

1 See *Dīgha*, II, p. 146.

2 *Mahāvagga*, pp. 247, 248.

3 *Dīgha*, II, pp. 126-8.

4 *Āṅguttara*, V, p. 263.

Buddha explained the successive stages by which the highest spiritual culture could be reached through this life of meditation and discipline. The other discourse explained that Buddha came out as a preacher not from any selfish motive but for the spiritual uplift of men who had by previous *karma* an innate aspiration for the attainment of deliverance from the worldly miseries and required some assistance and guidance for the achievement of their object.¹

Pāvā was also the scene of an important discourse called *Saṅgīti-sutta*² delivered by Sāriputta. It summarises in the *Aṅguttara* style the essentials of the Buddhist doctrines. It was while dwelling at Pāvā that Buddha heard of the dissension among the followers of Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.³ The Mallas of Pāvā had their notable hall Ubbhataka consecrated by Buddha. They received a portion of Buddha's relics and erected a stūpa on the same.

ANĠA

In the Buddhist texts Anġa is compounded with Magadha as Kāsi with Kosala. On the basis of the Buddhist tradition it is now generally accepted as a historical fact that Anġa became subject to Magadha as much as Kāsi to Kosala in the 6th or 5th century B.C. The fight between the kings of Anġa and Magadha is graphically described in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* of the Sarvāstivādins⁴ with the ultimate victory of Bimbisāra, the king of Magadha. Culturally there was little difference between Anġa and Magadha, for, it was as much non-brāhmanic as Magadha. In the Vedic literature it is condemned as a country unfit for

1 *Majjhima* II, pp. 238-243.

2 *Dīgha*, III, p. 207 f.

3 *Dīgha*, III, p. 117; *Majjhima*, II, p. 243.

4 See *IHQ.*, 1938, p. 212-3; *Jātaka*, IV, p. 454.

sacrifices and bad enough to be a place whither the fevers should be driven away from the *Brahmaṇṣi-deśa*.¹ Brāhmanism, therefore, was not wholly absent from Aṅga for there were brāhmaṇa teachers, names of two of whom are preserved in the Buddhist texts. Its capital Campā was one of the important centres of Buddhism and a large portion of the province was included within the Buddhist *majjhima-deśa*, the eastern limit of which was Kajaṅgala, situated 66 miles to the east of Campā.²

Brāhmanism

The brāhmaṇa teachers mentioned in the Nikāyas are Sonadaṇḍa of Campā³ and Pārāsāriya of Kajaṅgala.⁴ Sonadaṇḍa maintained three hundred students with a permanent source of income granted to him by Bimbisāra. There were at Campā many brāhmaṇa gahapatis who respected Sonadaṇḍa and resented his visit to Buddha, but they changed their mind on hearing that Bimbisāra, Pasenadi and Pokkharasādi had already become lay-devotees of Buddha. Sonadaṇḍa argued with Buddha about the qualities that make a brāhmaṇa and was ultimately silenced by him. The brāhmaṇa gahapatis accompanying Sonadaṇḍa were not all very respectful to Buddha, for there were among them some who just announced their name and *gotta* and did not show him the usual courtesies.⁵ After the disputation, Sonadaṇḍa expressed his faith in Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha. At Kajaṅgala lived the Pārāsāriya brāhmaṇa, one of whose disciples (*antevāsī*) was Uttara. Buddha had a talk with

1 *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, I, 4, 1; *Atharva Veda*, V, 22, 14.

2 For identification, see Cunningham's *Ancient Geography* (2nd ed.), pp. xliii, 548, 723; *IRAS.*, 1904.

3 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 111 ff.

4 *Majjhima*, III, p. 298.

5 *Dīgha*, I, p. 118.

Uttara about his teacher's views on the control of sense-organs, and this he made an occasion for imparting a discourse to Ānanda on the methods of *indriyabbāvanā*.¹ Buddha's missionary activities within Aṅga seem to have been limited, and there was also not much of opposition to the propagation of the new religion. On more than one occasion Buddha had been to Aṅga and dwelt at C a m p ā, Ā p a n a, A s s a p u r a, and K a j a ṅ g a l a.

C a m p ā

Campā said to have been built by Mahāgovinda,² was the capital of Aṅga. There was in it a famous lake named after its queen called Gaggarāpokkharāṇī, on the banks of which the paribbājakas³ as also Buddha with his disciples resided from time to time. Conversion of Sonadaṇḍa brāhmaṇa took place here as also of several other householders,⁴ of whom the names of Pessa-hatthārohaputta and Vajjiyamāhita are specially mentioned. Pessa was a great admirer of the spiritual exercises and though a householder tried to practise the *satipaṭṭhānas*,⁵ while Vajjiya was praised by Buddha for his insight into the Buddhist dhamma, enabling him to silence those paribbājakas who spoke ill of Buddha in his presence.⁶ The only notable bhikkhu of Campā known to us is Soṇa Koḷivisa, who was the son of Usabhasettḥi.⁷

1 *Majjhima*, III, p. 298.

2 *Digba*, II, p. 235.

3 *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 189; *Majjhima*, I, p. 339.

4 *Campeyyakā upāsakā*, *Kajaṅgalā upāsakā*, see *Majjhima*, III, p. 298; *Āṅguttara*, IV, p. 59.

5 *Majjhima*, I, p. 340: *kāyānupassanā vedanānupassanā cittānupassanā* and *dhammānupassanā*.

6 *Āṅguttara*, V, pp. 189-192.

7 *Psalm of the Brethren*, p. 135; *Mahāvagga*, v, 1: it was on

Buddha came across a few paribbājakas at Campā. Names of two only have come down to us. One is Uttiya paribbājaka¹ who tried to elicit from Buddha answers to the indeterminable problems but as usual failed in his effort, and the other is Kandaraka,² who merely expressed his admiration for Buddha but did not discuss any doctrine with him.

A s s a p u r a

Buddha visited Assapura in Aṅga but no mention is made of having converted any person there. He delivered the two *Assapurāsuttas*,³ in both of which he discussed what made a true *Samāṇa* and gave his own programme of mental and physical disciplinary practices for becoming a *Samāṇa*.

Ā p a n a

Āpana is described in the *Majjhima Nikāya*⁴ as *Āṅguttara-pāṇam nigamo* and in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*⁵ as *Āṅgānam nigamo*. At Āpana Buddha converted a distinguished householder called Potaliya by explaining to him the ethical principles of Buddhism and asserting that Buddha's teaching went beyond *vohāra* (usage).⁶ Three other discourses were delivered here, dealing with faith (*saddhā*), desires (*kāmaguṇa*), meditation (*jhānas*), etc.⁷

account of the very delicate feet of the bhikkhu Soṇa Koḷivisa that the rule of using shoes by the bhikkhus came to be introduced.

1 *Āṅguttara*, V, p. 193.

2 *Majjhima*, II, p. 339.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 271 f., 281 f.

4 *Ibid.*, I, p. 359.

5 *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 225.

6 *Majjhima*, I, p. 359 f.

7 *Majjhima*, I, p. 447; *Suttanipāta*, p. 102 f.; *Saṃyutta*, V, p. 225.

K a j a ṅ g a l a

Kajaṅgala, the easternmost limit of the Buddhist *majjhima-desa*, was visited by Buddha on one or two occasions.¹ The conversion of Uttara mānava described above took place here. There were also a few lay-devotees and a bhikkhuṇī called Kajaṅgalā.²

KOSAMBI

The country of the Vatsas, one of the four monarchies of ancient India, lay to the south of Kosala and was ruled by King Udena, who had his capital at Kosambi. In Buddha's time Kosambi was one of the chief cities ranking in importance next to Rājagaha and Sāvattihī. It was one of the main stopping places on the trade-routes between Rājagaha or Sāvattihī and Ujjetihī or Māhissati. Buddha spent here his ninth *vassa* and the tenth in a neighbouring forest called Pārileyyaka, whither he retired in disgust at the quarrel between the two groups of bhikkhus described as the *Dhammadharas* and the *Vinayadharas*.³ Kosambi is the only city within the country of the Vatsas, which is mentioned in the Nikāyas. In this city there were three hermitages called *Ghositārāma*, *Pāvārika-ambavana* and *Kukkuṭārāma* built by the three seṭṭhis, viz., Ghosaka, Pāvāriya and Kukkuṭa, of whom Ghosaka was the lord treasurer of the realm. The hermitages were located a league apart on the main road. The three seṭṭhis once went to Sāvattihī on business. On listening to the discourses of Buddha they became his admirers

1 It is mentioned in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (V, pp. 89, 168, 169) that the easternmost place visited by Buddha in the course of his missionary tour was Setaka, a nigama of Suhma in Rāḍha.

2 *Majjhima*, III, p. 298.

3 *Mahāvagga*, x; *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*, I, p. 44 f.

and invited him to their native country.¹ Of the hermitages, Ghositārāma was the one most frequented by Buddha and his disciples. It was while Buddha was staying in this Ārāma that the paribbājakas Maṇḍissa and Jāliya met him and tried to elicit from him an answer to the question whether the soul is identical with, or different from, the body but failed to do so.² In the *Kosambaka* and *Upakkilesa suttas*³ Buddha referred to the lack of concord among monks and the ways of avoiding it as also on the various *upakkilesas* (mental impurities). On this occasion he also framed a number of *Vinaya* rules to avert the chances of future discord within the Saṅgha. There are a few discourses ascribed to Ānanda, which, it seems, were delivered at Kosambi by him after Buddha's death, when, according to the tradition, the meeting also took place between him and King Udena. While staying at Ghositārāma, Ānanda met Sandaka paribbājaka with his large following and gave him a discourse dealing with the doctrines of the six *Tittthiyas*⁴, concluding it by an exposition of Buddha's teaching, and ultimately converting him though much against the will of his followers. On another occasion Ānanda addressed the two brāhmaṇas Uṇṇābha and Bhaddaji, the former on the cessation of all mental states including *virīya* and *citta* in the mind of an arhat,⁵ and the latter on the cessation of *āsava*s.⁶

King Udena and others

King Udena was not at first very friendly to the new religion. He married Ghosaka's daughter, Sāmāvatī, who as also her father were ardent devotees of Buddha. He afterwards married

1 *Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*, I, p. 203 f.

2 *Dīgha*, I, p. 159.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 320; III, p. 152.

4 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 513-24.

5 *Samyutta*, V, p. 273.

6 *Aṅguttara*, III, p. 202.

Vāsuladattā and the queen of beauty, Māgandiyā, daughter of Māgandiyā of the Kuru country. Māgandiyā was envious of Sāmāvatī and intrigued to bring about her ruin. This she managed to do by convincing the king, who was opposed to Buddhism, by proving Sāmāvatī's great devotion for Buddha. King Udena later on found out his mistake and became repentant.¹ There were two other occasions when the king showed his resentment at the gifts made by the ladies of his palace to Ānanda and Piṇḍola Bharadvāja but it is said that he later on changed his mind and acquiesced in the gifts.² Among the adherents of Buddha, Khujjatarā, the attending maiden of queen Sāmāvatī, is praised in the Nikāyas as the one of the best of *upāsikās* and the bhikkhu Piṇḍola Bharadvāja as the chief of *sīhanādikās* (lion-roarers). Piṇḍola, it is said, was the son of the royal chaplain. He later on converted king Udena to Buddhism.³

CETI OR CEDI

The country of the Cedis to the west of Kosala lay, it seems, beyond the pale of Buddhism during Buddha's lifetime. *Sahajātī*, a place in Cedi, attained some prominence as a centre of Buddhism after the death of Buddha. In the *Āṅguttara* and *Samyutta Nikāyas*⁴ we come across the name of this place as the scene of some of the discourses delivered by the bhikkhu Mahācunda and as the resort of many bhikkhus.*

1 *Buddhist India*, p. 36; Burlingame, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 277 ff.; Yuan Chwang, I, p. 369; *Divyāvadāna*, p. 529; *Malalasekera, op. cit.*, p. 612.

2 *Mahāvagga*, II, p. 291; *Suttanipāta Comy.*, p. 514-5.

3 *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 110 f.; *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 25; *Samyutta*, V, p. 224; *Psalm of the Brethren*, pp. 110-111.

4 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 335; V, pp. 41, 157; *Samyutta*, V, p. 436.

* Here ends the story of the propagation of Buddhism in the *Majjhima-desa*. In the countries called *Paccantima-janapada*, the place

WESTERN & NORTHERN INDIA

Although the countries in western and northern India were not visited by Buddha, Buddhism made a fair progress there and played an important rôle in the later history of Buddhism. During Buddha's life-time, however, it could count among its adherents people from the western countries such as *V e r a ñ j a*, *A v a n t i*, *S u n ā p a r ā n t a* and from among the *K' u r u s* and the *M a d d a s*.

V e r a ñ j a

The westernmost point reached by Buddha in his peregrinations was *V e r a ñ j a* a place near *Madhurā* in the twelfth *vassa*. When Buddha was at *Sāvattthi*, some brāhmaṇas of Buddhism is nonetheless important. A close study of the *Nikāyas* shows that Buddha did travel outside the limits of Buddhist *majjhima-desa* as far west as *Verañja*, *Madhurā* and as far north as the country of the *Kurus*. Many disciples of Buddha hailed from *paccantima-janapada* or border countries. The reason why the designation *paccantima-desa* was applied to places like *Saṃkassa* and *Ujjeni* is to be found in the fact that they formed the border-land of the *majjhima-desa* of the Buddhists. The rules of discipline framed by Buddha were meant generally for the monks residing within the *majjhima-desa*, boundaries of which are given in the *Vinaya*, *Pāṭheyya*, *Saṃkassa*, *Avanti*, *Gandhāra* etc. were outside the boundaries. Buddha himself relaxed some of the rules of discipline in regard to the monks of those places in view of the physical conditions under which they lived. This relaxation of the rules shows that Buddha had to take note of the convenience and needs of the monks of the distant regions indicated by the expression *paccantima-janapada*. A century after Buddha's *parinibbāṇa*, *Avanti* and *Pāṭheyya* rose to be important centres of Buddhism, so much so that the presence of monks from these distant places was regarded as indispensable at the meetings held for settling points of dispute raised by the *Vajjian* monks of *Vesāli*. See Vol. II of this work.

Verañja used to go there. They had a talk with him about the fruits of good and evil *kamma*.¹ On one occasion Buddha was invited by the Verañja brāhmaṇas to go to their native country. Buddha accepted their invitation at the outset of the twelfth *vassa*.² On his way from Madhurā to Verañja (*antarā ca Madhuraṃ antarā ca Verañjāṃ*) he delivered a discourse on what makes an ideal husband and wife,³ to the house-holders, who were on their way from Verañja to Madhurā. Buddha and his bhikkhus, however, had a bitter experience at Verañja. It was during their residence there that a famine broke out and the bhikkhus were put to a great difficulty in procuring their daily food. They were neglected by the people of the locality and would have starved but for the charity of some horse-dealers of the northern country who stopped there in the midst of their journey and supplied them with steamed grain in *pattha* measures.⁴ Buddha took up his residence at *Nālerupucimanda-mūla* where a Verañja brāhmaṇa came and questioned him about the reason of his not showing marks of respect to the aged brāhmaṇas. To this question Buddha made a suitable reply justifying his behaviour and converted the brāhmaṇa to Buddhism.⁵ At the very same place he had a talk with Pahārada Asurinda regarding the eight excellences of his *dhamma* and *vinaya*.⁶ He left Verañja at the end of the *vassa*

1 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 290-291.

2 Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, II, p. 193; Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 36; *JRAS.*, 1891.

3 *Āṅguttara*, II, p. 57.

4 *Vinaya*, III, p. 6; Burlingame's *Buddhist Legends*, II, p. 193.

5 *Āṅguttara*, IV, p. 172; *Mahāvagga*, iii, pp. 2 ff.

6 *Āṅguttara*, IV, pp. 197 ff.

and accompanied by Ānanda passed through Soreyya, Saṅkassa, Kaṇṇakujja, Payāgapatiṭṭhānam, crossed the Ganges and reached Benares.¹ He met here Mahākaccāyana for the first time and by converting him paved the way for the establishment of a centre of Buddhism in Avantī.

Avantī

Avantī was one of the sixteen *janapadas* of the Buddhist texts. It was ruled over by King Pajjota who had his capital at Ujjeni. In the *Mahāgovindasutta*, Māhissati is described as the capital of Avantī. Perhaps it was the ancient capital. Buddhism was introduced into Avantī by Mahākaccāyana who was one of the most distinguished apostles of the Buddhist faith and made a substantial contribution to its prosperity. He was the son of the royal priest of King (Caṇḍa) Pajjota and the nephew of ṛṣi Asita (or Kāladevala) the great seer of the Vindhyaśāla who paid his homage to Siddhārtha when a child. It was at Asita's advice that the young ascetic Nālaka (former name of Mahākaccāyana) came to Benares to pay a visit to Buddha and being very much impressed by the unsurpassed erudition of the Teacher, became a Buddhist monk along with his companions.² This group of bhikkhus with Mahākaccāyana as their head returned to their native country and founded monasteries there at *Kururagbarapapātapabbata* and *Makkarakāṭa*. Of the notable converts made here, names of Puṇṇa, Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa of Aparānta, Isidatta caravan guide of Velugāma, Kaṇḍarāyaṇa and Lohicca brāhmaṇas

¹ *Vinaya*, III, p. 11. (From Benares, Buddha went to Vesālī where he spent his 13th vassa).

² *Mahāvastu*, II, p. 30; III, p. 382; *Romantic History of Buddha* (translated from the Chinese *Abhiniskramaṇa Sūtra*) by S. Beal, p. 276; *Sutta Nipāta* (P.T.S.), Nālaka Sutta, vs. 696 ff.

may be mentioned.¹ In the *Thera* and *Theri-gāthā*, we come across the names of a few other monks and nuns of Avantī whose psalms have been preserved in the collection.² In the *Majjhima Nikāya* we read of the conversion of king Madhura Avanti-putta by Mahākaccāyana by delivering the famous discourse on caste-system some time after Buddha's demise.³ The conversion of king Caṇḍa Pajjota by Mahākaccāyana is narrated in the *Theragāthā* but there is no reference to it in the *Nikāyas*.

A remarkable feature of the activities of Mahākaccāyana is that he as an expositor was engaged more in giving detailed expositions of Buddha's enigmatic sayings than delivering independent discourses of his own. People used to come to him for solving their doubts in regard to utterances of Buddha: Kālī upāsikā requested him to explain a stanza from *Kumāripāṇha*⁴ of the *Sutta Nipāta* (i, p. 126), the Hālidikāni gahapati from the *Māgandiyapaṇha* of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* and *Sakkapaṇha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*Sutta* No. 21) and so forth.⁵

It was under the guidance of Mahākaccāyana helped by Soṇa Kuṭikaṇṇa that Buddhism inspite of adverse circumstances⁶ gradually obtained a footing in Avantī. Though the country was situated at a long distance from Magadha, yet on account of its facilities of communication with the ports of Western India and the principal cities of Magadha and Kosala it became an important centre of Buddhism.

1 *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 68; *Samyutta*, IV, pp. 117, 288.

2 *Psalms of the Brethern*, pp. 41, 42, 107, 149, 292. *Psalms of the Sisters*, pp. 30, 31.

3 *Majjhima*, II, pp. 83 ff.

4 *Āṅguttara*, V, pp. 46 ff.

5 *Samyutta*, III, pp. 12, 13; IV, p. 115.

6 *Āṅguttara*, III, p. 246.

The centre of Buddhism in Avantī, it seems, laid special stress on the ascetic practices allowed by the Buddhist code for which it is remarked in the *Vinaya* that the bhikkhus of Avantī were followers of *dhūtavāda* precepts.¹

Sunāparānta

The notable figure of Sunāparānta is Puṇṇa who belonged to Suppāraka, a port of Sunāparānta. His firm resolution to propagate Buddhism inspite of adverse circumstances was commended by Buddha, who on account of this sturdiness in the cause of the religion considered him the fittest person to be entrusted with the work of preaching there his religion.² In the *Majjhima Nikāya*³ it is stated that Puṇṇa was able to secure 500 upāsikās in that place before he attained nibbāna.

THE KURUS

The farthest place in the north visited by Buddha in the course of his missionary tour was that of the Kuru—the ancient home of the highest brāhmanic culture. Buddha delivered two important discourses in the brāhmanic villages called K a m m a s s a d h a m m a and T h u l l a k o ṭ ṭ h i t a. The association of the country with these two discourses has made it memorable in the annals on the spread of Buddhism. These discourses are the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and the *Mahānidāna Suttanta*.⁴ The first deals with the principles of the Buddhist system of meditation and teaches how a person can reach a very high stage of sanctification by the simple process of constant *satipaṭṭhāna* (*smṛti-upasthāna*) without having recourse to the more arduous

1 *Cullavagga*, II, p. 299.

2 *Ante*, p. 51-2.

3 *Majjhima*, III, p. 269.

4 *Majjhima*, I, pp. 55 ff; *Digha*, II, pp. 55 ff., 290 ff.

methods prescribed in the *yoga-śāstras*. The second discourse explains the ten-fold¹ chain of causation (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) leading to misery or salvation. A few other discourses relating to the means of cessation of *dukkha*, worthlessness of sensual pleasures, the eight *vimokkhas*, etc. were also delivered at the place.²

It appears from the *Raṭṭhapāla* and *Māgandiya suttas* that some of the brāhmaṇas of the Kuru country held Buddha in great esteem and resorted to him to listen to his teachings. So great was Bharadvājagotta brāhmaṇa's respect for Buddha that he used to offer a seat to him in his sacrificial hall in the face of protest by Māgandiya paribbājaka.³ Raṭṭhapāla, a member of the most respectable brāhmaṇa family of Thullakoṭṭhita, approached Buddha along with a large number of brāhmaṇa gahapatis to listen to his discourses. Raṭṭhapāla was so much impressed that he at once made up his mind to become a bhikkhu. He had some difficulty in having the consent of his parents to his ordination but ultimately he succeeded and became a bhikkhu. After the attainment of *arhat*hood, he paid a visit to the land of his birth and made a great impression upon the mind of the Kuru king by giving an exposition of some of the principles of Buddhism.⁴ The *Nikāyas* do not mention any other convert of the Kuru country except Māgandiya paribbājaka who was at first so very averse to Buddhism.⁵

1 In the chain the usual first two links are omitted, and *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa* are made co-existent instead of the latter being caused by the former. Cf. *Samyutta*, II, pp. 92-93; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 94.

2 *Samyutta*, II, p. 107; *Anguttara*, V, pp. 29 ff.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 502.

4 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 65-72.

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 512. See also, *ante*, p. 190.

THE MADDAS

Buddha had also among his disciples the people of the more distant Madda country, the notable of them being the bhikkhu Mahākappina and the two bhikkhunis Khemā and Bhaddā Kapilāni. Buddha converted Khemā, the queen of Bimbisāra, in the seventh year of his missionary career after the institution of the order of nuns at Vesālī. She attained the highest stage of sanctification and was designated by Buddha as the chief of the highly wise nuns (*mahāpaññā*).¹ Her fame spread all over Magadha and Kosala as *paṇḍitā*, *viyattā*, *medhāvinī*, *bhussutā*, *cittakatthī*, *kalyāṇapaṭibbānā* (wise, experienced, intelligent, erudite, charming in her talks, and correct in her accents).² She satisfied Pasenadi of Kosala by her expositions of indeterminable problems.³ The conversion of Khemā contributed to the popularity of the Buddhist order of nuns but also made easy the path of the spread of Buddhism in Sāgala, the capital of the Maddas,⁴ sprung as she was from the royal dynasty of the Madda country. Besides Khemā the two other notable converts, who hailed from the Madda country, were Mahākappina of the royal family of Kukkuṭavati, mentioned by Buddha as the chief of the *bhikkhu ovādakā*⁵ (admonisher of bhikkhus) and Bhaddā Kapilāni of the Sāgala brāhmaṇa families and wife of Mahākassapa, referred to by Buddha as the foremost of the nuns who attained the knowledge of their previous births (*pubbenivāsa-anussarantī*).⁶

1 *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 25; *Manorathapūraṇi*, I, p. 345.

2 *Saṃyutta*, IV, p. 375.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 375-80.

4 Cunningham's *Ancient Geography*, (2nd ed.), pp. 206 ff., 686.

5 *Manorathapūraṇi*, I, pp. 318-324.

6 *Ibid.*, pp. 375-6; *Psalm of the Sisters*, pp. 47-49.

CHAPTER XII

THE MIDDLE PATH

In chapters II-V, we have discussed the religious beliefs of the pre-Buddhistic days and the criticism that Buddha made of the same; in the present and subsequent chapters we propose to review the ethics and doctrines as promulgated by the great Teacher. It is said that the topic of Buddha's first religious discourse, the *Dhammacakkappavattanasutta*,¹ was the Middle Path (*majjhima paṭipadā*), which was so called because it kept itself clear of the two extremes, one being the life of worldly pleasures, perhaps pointing to the life led by the brāhmaṇas who believed in the efficacy of sacrifices and rituals, and the other being the life of austere asceticism resorted to by the non-brāhmaṇic orders like the Jainas and the Ājīvikas. In the 5th century B.C. when Buddha appeared on the scene, both forms of belief, viz., attainment of the *summum bonum* either by householders through sacrificial rituals or by ascetics through self-mortifications took a strong hold of the people's minds. In the *Āṅguttara-nikāya*² the former is called *āgāḷhā paṭipadā* and the latter *nijjāṃhā paṭipadā*. To combat these two beliefs Buddha enunciated his *majjhima paṭipadā* consisting of the practice of

1 See Ch. VIII, p. 101-2; Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 87; *Saṃyutta*, V, 420; *Lal. Vis.*, p. 540; *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 330, *Vinaya*, I, p. 11.

2 *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 295: *āgāḷhā*=natthi kāmesu doso so kāmesu pāṭavyataṃ āpajjati; *nijjāṃhā*=anekavihiṭaṃ kāyassa ātāpanaparitāpanānuyogaṃ anuyutto viharati.

the eight-fold path and the comprehension of the four truths. The *majjhimā paṭipadā* is also explained philosophically as the teaching which establishes the hollowness of the extreme assertions about the ultimates like *asti* and *nāsti*, *śāśvata* and *aśāśvata*, *anta* and *ananta*.¹

For the present we shall leave aside the philosophical interpretation and go into the details of its ethical aspect. For the convenience of readers, the *majjhimā-paṭipadā* is explained in original Pāli in a tabular form in the chart annexed hereto.

According to the traditional method of exposition, the whole of the Buddhist discipline as shown in the chart is divided into three sections, which in English phraseology may be put as physical, mental and intellectual, in Pāli *sīla*, *citta* (or *samādhī*) and *paññā*. If the suttas of the *Dīgha* and *Majjhima Nikāyas* be carefully scanned, it will be noticed that the compilers had always kept this division at the back of their minds.²

I. Sīla

In every religion and not in Buddhism alone, the first demand that is made of the followers is observance of moral precepts (*sīlas*), that is, restraint in physical actions including speech. It is ordinarily known in India as *brahmacarya*.

According to the Buddhists, *sīla* consists of *sammā vācā*, *sammā kammanā* and *sammā ājīva*, the three of the eight divisions of the Path leading to Nibbāna. These three terms

¹ See above, Ch. V; cf. *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 51.

² In the *Brahmajāla-sutta* only the first, while in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* the first and second have been exhaustively treated, the third being dismissed only with a para on the comprehension of the *ariyasaccas* (*Dīgha*, I, p. 84).

practically include the whole code of moral laws that are prescribed for the conduct of the Buddhist monks.¹ In the *Vibhaṅga* (pp. 235-6) and the *Majjhima Nikāya* (III, pp. 251 ff.) these are detailed as follows:

Sammā-vācā = refraining from speaking falsehood, malicious words, harsh and frivolous talk;

Sammā-kammanta = refraining from killing, stealing, and misconduct; and

Sammā-ājīva = refraining from earning livelihood by improper means, i.e. arts and crafts of laymen. Some of these are:² astrological or astronomical forecasts, interpretation of dreams and omens, use of magical spells, determination of the nature of men, animal and things by their signs, acting as go-betweens between kings, taking part in marriage ceremonies, giving medicines and so forth.

II. Citta

Next to physical, the discipline that is expected of the followers of a religion is mental, which is generally known as *dhyaṇa* (= Pāli *jhāna*) and *saṃādhi*. In Buddhism, mental discipline does not necessarily imply only concentration of mind, as will be evident from the three terms that have been used in speaking of it in the formulae of the eightfold path, *viz.*,

Sammā-vāyāma = exertion to remove the existing evil thoughts, to keep the mind free from being polluted by fresh evil thoughts, and to preserve and increase the good thoughts;

1 For detailed treatment, see *Infra*, Ch. XIII. Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 301:

Silakkhandha = *sammā vācā*, *kammanto* and *ājīva*

Samādhikkhandha = *sammā samādhi*

Paññākkhandha = *sammā dīṭṭhi* and *saṅkappa*.

2 *Dīgha*, I, pp. 67-9.

I. A TABULAR EXPOSITION OF THE MAJJHIMĀ PAṬIPADĀ

A. Sila ¹	(1) Sammā-vācā (Proper words)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) musāvadā veramaṇi (ii) piṣuṇāya vācāya v. (iii) pharusāya vācāya v. (iv) samphappalāpā v.
	(2) Sammā-kammanta (Proper action)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) adinnādanā veramaṇi (ii) pāṇātipātā v. (iii) kāmesu micchācārā v. (iv) abrahmacariyā v.
	(3) Sammā-ājīva (Proper means of livelihood)	
B. Citta (= Samādhi)	(1) Sammā-vāyāma (Proper exertion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) exertion (vāyāma) for anuppannānam akusalānam anuppādāya (ii) " " uppannānam akusalānam pahānāya (iii) " " anuppannānam kusalānam upādāya (iv) " " uppannānam kusalānam vepullāya
	(2) Sammā-sati (Mindfulness in the right way)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) kāya kāyānupassī viharati (ii) vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati (iii) citte cittānupassī viharati (iv) dhamme dhammānupassī viharati
	(3) Sammā-samādhi (Proper meditation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) savitakkam savicāram vivekajam pītisukam paṭhamajjhānam (ii) avitakkam avicāram samādhijam pītisukam duttiyajjhānam² (iii) pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako satimā sukhavihārī ti tatiyajjhānam (iv) adukkham asukham upekkhāsati-pārisuddhim catutthajjhānam
C. Paññā ³ [See Table II for further details.]	(1) Sammā-saṃkappa ⁴ (Right resolutions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) nekkhammā-saṃkappa (ii) avyāpāda-s. (iii) avihimsā-s.
	(2) Sammā-diṭṭhi (Right view)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) dukkhe ñāṇam, i.e., saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhe ñāṇam (ii) dukkhasamudaye ñāṇam i.e., tanhāya <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) kāma-tanhāya (ii) bhava- " } (iii) vibhava " } ñāṇam (iii) dukkha-nirodhe ñāṇam i.e., nibbāne ñāṇam (iv) dukkha-nirodha-gāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇam, i.e., aṭṭhaṅgikamagge ñāṇam

¹ The *Attakathā* on the Rathavināsa-sutta (II, p. 158) and *Vism.*, p. 443, 678 f. amplify the above three items, called in them *visuddhis* thus:

- I Sila-visuddhi
 - (i) appicchā-kathā
 - (ii) santuṭṭhi-kathā
 - (iii) asamsagga-kathā
 - (iv) sila-kathā
- II Citta-visuddhi
 - (i) paviveka-kathā
 - (ii) viriyārambha-kathā
 - (iii) samādhi-kathā
- III Paññā-visuddhi
 - (i) diṭṭhi-visuddhi = nāmarūpā-yathāvadassanaṃ
 - (ii) kaṅkhā-vitarana-visuddhi = nāmarūpassa paccayapariggahaṇam
 - (iii) maggāmaggañānadassana-visuddhi = nātapariññā, tiranāpariññā and pahānapariññā also pañcakkhandhā aniccādivasena sammāsanaṃ etc.
 - (iv) paṭipadā-ñānadassanavisuddhi = muñcitu-kamyatā-ñāṇam
 - (v) ñānadassanavisuddhi
- IV Vimutti (i.e. ariyaphalam)
- V Vimuttiñānadassana (ekūnavasatividham paccavekkhaṇañāṇam)

² In the *Dhammasaṅgani*, p. 33-34, as also in the *Vism.*, p. 169 it has been shown that some scholiasts split up the second *jhāna* into two thus:—

- (a) avitakkam vicāramattaṃ samādhijam pītisukham
- (b) avitakkam avicāram

³ The division into three sections is given according to the *Majjhima*, I, p. 301 quoted in *Vism.* p. 514 but I would prefer to include sammā-saṃkappa within *Citta* (or *Samādhi*). In the *Abhidhammaśāstra-vyākhyā* (p. 44), samyag-dṛṣṭi, samyak-saṃkalpa and samyak-vyāyāma are included in Prajñā-skandha.

⁴ For detailed exposition, see chapters XIII-XV.

II. A TABULAR EXPOSITION OF PAÑÑĀ

Paññā or ñāṇam (knowledge)¹

- (i) in 5 *upādānakkhandhas* (five constituents of a being), viz.
 rūpa (material parts of a body);
 vedanā (feeling—good, bad and indifferent);
 saññā (perception— do);
 saṅkhārā (impressions— do);
 viññāṇa (= citta = mano = detailed knowledge) see *Abbi.*

Kośa, I. p. 149.

- (ii) in 12 *āyatana*s, (six organs of sense and their objects), viz.,
 cakkhu (eye) and rūpa (object)
 sota (ear) and sadda (sound)
 ghāṇa (nose) and gandha (smell)
 jivhā (tongue) and rasa (taste)
 kāya (body) and phoṭṭhabba (contactual objects)
 mano (mind) and dhamma (everything, material and non-material).

- (iii) in 18 *dhātus* (elements upholding a body) viz.,
 cakkhu, rūpa and cakkhaviññāṇa (eyes, object and perception acquired through eyes)
 sota, sadda and sotaviññāṇa (ears, sound, and perception acquired through ears)
 ghāṇa, gandha and ghānaviññāṇa
 jivhā, rasa and jivhāviññāṇa
 kāya, phoṭṭhabba and kāyaviññāṇa
 mano, dhamma and manoviññāṇa } (to be translated as above).

- (iv) in 22 *indriyas* (faculties latent in a being) (Cf. *Abbi. Kośa*, I, 48—transl., p. 101).

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) cakkhu (eye) | (14) upekkhā (neither pleasant nor unpleasant) |
| (2) sota (ear) | (15) saddhā (self-confidence) |
| (3) ghāṇa (nose) | (16) viriya (energy) |
| (4) jivhā (tongue) | (17) sati (watchfulness) |
| (5) kāya (body) | (18) samādhi (concentration of mind) |
| (6) mano (mind) | (19) paññā (knowledge) |
| (7) itthi (femininity) | (20) anaññātārāṇassāmiti (determination to know what is unknown) |
| (8) purusa (masculinity) | (21) aññā (determination to know) |
| (9) jivita (vitality, āyu) | (22) aññātāvi (determination to know the highest). |
| (10) sukha (pleasing physically) | |
| (11) dukkha (displeasing physically) | |
| (12) somanassa (i.e. cetasaikam sukham, see <i>Vibhaṅga</i> , p. 85, pleasing mentally) | |
| (13) domanassa (displeasing mentally) | |

- (v) in *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, i.e. *taṇhāya ñāṇam*.

Past life	{	avijjā: (ignorance of the Truth)
	{	saṅkhārā: (mental impressions)
Present life	{	viññāṇa: (consciousness)
	{	nāmarūpa: (mental and physical constituents)
	{	saḷāyatana: (six organs of sense and their objects)
	{	phassa: (contact)
	{	vedanā: (feeling, good, bad or indifferent)
	{	taṇhā: (desire)
Future life	{	upādāna: (stronger desire, clinging)
	{	bhava: (desire for existence)
	{	jāti: (birth)
	{	jarāmaraṇa, etc. (old age, death, etc.)

1 For detailed exposition, see chapter XV

Sammā-sati = mindfulness of all that is happening within the body and mind including feelings, and observant of the things of the world, and at the same time suppressing covetousness (*abhiññā*) and avoiding mental depression (*domanassa*); and

Sammā-samādhi = various forms of meditation as recommended in the Buddhist texts.¹

III. P a ñ ñ ā

The third, the intellectual discipline, is denoted by the terms *sammā-saṅkappa* and *sammā-diṭṭhi*. The term *sammā-saṅkappa* means the will to renounce the world, to refrain from bearing ill-will and causing injury to beings while *sammā-diṭṭhi* means the view propounded by Buddha about the nature of the things of the world and the ultimate.

From the above, it is evident that for physical and mental disciplines, Buddhism drew up only a scheme of its own for the use of its followers from among the various moral and meditational practices prevalent in India, and hence there was nothing particularly Buddhistic in them. It is in the third, *paññā* or *prajñā* i.e. *sammā-diṭṭhi* that Buddhism offered its own solution of the highest riddle of the universe and wanted its followers to comprehend its new view-point.

By intellectual discipline it means popularly the comprehension of the four *ariyasaccas*,² but actually, it means realisation of the fact that the *khandhas*, *dhātus*, *āyatanas* etc. are devoid of any real substance (*anattā*).³ According to the *Visuddhimagga*⁴ *śīlavissuddhi* (moral purification) and *cittavissuddhi* (perfection in mental exercises) form the two legs of Buddhism, its body being

1 For detailed treatment, see *Infra*, Ch. XIV.

2 *Digba*, I, p. 84.

3 See *Ante*, Ch. VII.

4 *Vism.*, pp. 433, 515.

the *ditṭhivisuddhi* (the true or the Buddhist view about the nature of the Reality. For attaining *ditṭhivisuddhi* one must comprehend the nature of

- (i) *khandhas* (constituents of a being),
- (ii) *āyatana*s (organs of sense and their spheres),
- (iii) *indriya*s (faculties), and
- (iv) the characteristics of the four *dhātus* (spheres of existence), the true meaning of the *ariyasaccas* (truths), and *paṭiccasamuppāda* (the theory of causation).¹

In the *Mahāsakuludāyisutta* (*Majjhima*, II, pp. 9-22), there is almost a comprehensive scheme of the Buddhist doctrine in its three divisions. First there is the reference to the *Sīla*-practices the severer form of which,² though approved by Buddha, has been pointed out as optional; it is followed by an exposition of the four *ariyasaccas*, which comprehend in a popular form the Buddhist philosophical teaching (*paññā*), and then by an enumeration of the thirty-seven *bodhipakkhiyas*, the eight *vimokkhas*, the eight *abhibhāyatanas*, ten *kasinas*, four *jhānas*, and the six *abhiññās*, in short, all that is denoted by *citta* or *samādhi*.

1 For detailed treatment, see *Infra*, Ch. XV.

2 Appāhāra, paṃsukūlika, lukhacivaradhara, piṇḍapātika, sapadānacāri, rukkhāmūlika, abbhokāsika, āraññika and pantasenāsana. Cf. the *Dhutaṅgas*, *Infra*, pp. 206 ff.

CHAPTER XIII

THE MORAL PRECEPTS

Observance of *sīlas* or moral precepts, as has been already shown, forms the first step in the spiritual progress of a person. The *sīlas* can be generally classified under three heads, *kāyika* (physical), *vācasika* (verbal) and *mānasika* (mental). In several *suttas* of the *Suttapiṭaka*, the *sīlas* have been treated from different standpoints and hardly admit of enumeration within a small compass. By way of illustration we may refer to the very first *sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* for a list of *sīlas* which are classified there under *cūla* (minor), *majjhima* (medium) and *mahā* (major). In the *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 10-16), Buddhaghosa has attempted to generalise them in the answer to the question: *katividhaṃ sīlaṃ*. For the monks and nuns is prescribed a number of moral duties, some of which are codified in the *Bhikkhu-pātimokkha* and *Bhikkhunī-pātimokkha*, while for the unordained novices (*sāmaṇeras*) are prescribed the well-known ten *sīlas*,¹ of which the first five only are meant for all lay-devotees

1 The ten *sīlas* or *sikkhāpadas* are:

- (i) Pāṇātipātā veramaṇi.
- (ii) Adinnādānā veramaṇi.
- (iii) Abrahmacariyā or kāmesu micchācarā veramaṇi.
- (iv) Musāvadā veramaṇi.
- (v) Surāmerayamajjapamādatṭhānā veramaṇi.
- (vi) Vikālabhojanā veramaṇi.
- (vii) Naccagītavāditavisukadassanā veramaṇi.
- (viii) Mālāgandhavilepana-dhāraṇa-mañḍana-vibhūsaṇaṭṭhānā veramaṇi.

(upāsakas and upāsikās), the more faithful among them, however, being permitted to observe the first eight *sīlas* on the uposatha days, with the option of observing all the ten *sīlas*. These five or eight *sīlas* are called by Buddhaghosa¹ *gabaṭṭhasīlas* (precepts meant for householders).

The *Pātimokkha*² is the accepted code of moral duties for the monks and nuns, and the declaration of non-transgression of any of the rules contained in it on the fortnightly uposatha days is regarded as sufficient for making a monk or nun morally pure. Apart from the *Pātimokkha* rules, there are hundreds of other rules which the monks and nuns are expected to observe. In short, every monk or nun is required to be ideally pure as far as the moral precepts are concerned.

Broadly speaking, the moral duties of a bhikkhu can be divided into the following five sub-sections:³

(i) *Pātimokkhasamvarasīla*

First, a monk is required to be well-restrained according to the 227 disciplinary rules of the *Pātimokkha* (see *infra*, ch. xvii). He should also be discreet in his conduct and movements, i.e. he must not commit any wrong either bodily or verbally in carrying on the affairs of his daily life (*ācāra*), or by frequenting places (*gocara*) unfit for a Buddhist recluse. He must always be afraid of the commission of the slightest offence (*anumattesu vajjesu bhayadassāvī*) and in general be observant of all the moral precepts (*samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu*).⁴

(ix) Uccāsayana-mahā-ayanā veramaṇi.

(x) Jāta-rūpara-jataggahanā veramaṇi. (See *Vinaya*, I, pp. 83-4; II, p. 258).

¹ *Vism.*, p. 15.

² See *Infra*, Ch. XVII.

³ *Attbasālini*, p. 168 omits the fifth, the *dhutaṅga*.

⁴ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 246-8.

(ii) *Indriyasamvarasīla*

Next to the observance of the general moral laws and *Pātimokkha* rules, it is enjoined that a monk must be so restrained in his organs of sense that although these may be functioning as usual the mind of the *bhikkhu* will not be swayed by the characteristics or the qualities, whether good or bad, of the things seen, heard, smelt, felt or tasted.¹

(iii) *Ājīvapārisuddhisīla*

The common Pāli expression for propriety in food as found in the *Piṭakas* is *bhojane mattaññu*, i.e. a *bhikkhu* should exercise sufficient self-restraint with regard to his food. He must always remember that he takes food not for making his body good-looking but just for its maintenance in order to be able to fulfil his mission. His food will be of such a nature that he must not develop a taste for new sensations (*vedanā*) and at the same time get rid of the old ones.²

In the *Pātimokkha-sutta*, there is a number of restrictions imposed on a monk for the manner in which he should take food, and a series of instructions concerning the right ways of collecting his food, but even all those instructions cannot naturally be exhaustive, so Buddhaghosa says that a *bhikkhu* must avoid committing offence relating to *ājīva* but not falling within the scope of the *Pātimokkha* rules, e.g. a *bhikkhu* may, by talks or signs or direct or indirect hints, persuade the believing laity to offer gifts of food, dress or other requisites to himself, or may take recourse to the various means enumerated in the *Brahmajālasutta* not befitting a Buddhist monk.³

¹ *Vibhaṅga*, p. 248.

² *Ibid.*, p. 249.

³ *Visuddhimagga*, p. 23-4.

(iv) *Paccayasannissitasīla*

After dealing with the likely transgressions that a monk may commit in course of his daily life, Buddhaghosa dilates on what should be the aims and objects of monks in wearing robes, accepting alms for food, using seats and beds, or seeking medicaments. In short, he means that the whole attention of the monk should be fixed on his goal and remain unmindful of his worldly necessities except so far as these are required to keep him up for reaching the goal.

(v) *Dhutaṅgas or Ascetic Practices*

Buddhaghosa, after thus dealing with the *sīlas* in a general way, passes on to the *dhutaṅgas*, the thirteen rigorous practices permitted to some monks. It will be apparent from what has been said above that according to the Buddhists, purity is more mental than physical, and hence, in Buddhist ethics emphasis has been laid more on mental than on physical discipline.¹ The monks, as a rule, were not required to undergo unnecessary physical discomforts except what was necessary for concentration of mind, i.e., a little food and cloth with a bare bed, seat, medicaments and a resting place. The restrictions which were observed by them in these matters are detailed in the *Pātimokkha* and other parts of the *Vinaya*. In the earliest stage of Buddhism, when the monks used to live as hermits in caves and forests, i.e. before the practice of living in monasteries came

1 In the *Majjhima* (I, p. 238) it is stated that the ascetic practices do not even lead to *kāyabbhāvanā* (physical discipline) not to speak of *cittabbhāvanā* (mental discipline). Success in the ascetic practices, it is remarked (vide *Digha*, III, pp. 42-45), sometimes leads to joy, self-praise, lack of diligence and love of gain, fame and honour.

into vogue, four *nissayas* (conditions) were prescribed for them. These were,—

1. *piṇḍiyālopa-bhojanam* (to take food received as alms)
2. *paṃsukūlacīvaram* (to use robes made of rags collected from dust heap)
3. *rukḅhamūlasenāsanam* (to sit and lie at the foot of a tree) and
4. *pūtimuttabbhesajjam* (to use excrements and urine as medicines).

In the *Sutta-Nipāta* and other earlier books of the *Piṭakas*, practice of a rigorous hermit life has been extolled, but with the introduction of monastic life, the rigorousness was gradually relaxed, and a good illustration of this fact is furnished by the *Mahāvagga* itself.¹

From the rules in the *Pātimokkha* it is apparent that the earliest form of *nissayas* was already superseded, at the time of its compilation, by the *atirekalābha*, but in any case there must have been all along a section of monks who were in favour of the observance of rigorous practices in the Buddhist monastic life, and this section was perhaps responsible for the introduction of the *dhutaṅgas*.

In the four *Nikāyas* and also in the *Vinaya Piṭaka* there is no mention of the term *dhutaṅgas* not to speak of its inclusion in the list of *sīlas*. Some of the *dhutaṅga*-practices, such as *sapadānacārī*, *piṇḍapātiko*, *paṃsukūliko*, *rukḅhamūliko*, *abbhokāsiko*, *ārañṇiko*, *pantasenāsano* are mentioned incidentally in the *Nikāyas*² and *Vinaya*³ but it is also stated that Buddha himself did not practise them in his own life while some of his disciples did.⁴ It is therefore evident that the *dhutaṅgas* were

1 See *Infra*, Ch. XVI.

2 See *Majjhima*, I, 30; II, pp. 6-9

3 *Vinaya*, II, p. 215.

4 *Majjhima*, II, p. 9 ff.

not recognised in early Buddhism as a group of practices or at least as subsidiary practices compulsory for the Buddhist monks. It may be contended by some that Mahākassapa is referred to in the *Samyutta* and the *Āṅguttara Nikāyas*¹ as the foremost of the dhūtavādins, hence the dhutaṅga practices were in vogue but as against it we may point out that had it been so, the thirteen dhutaṅgas would have found a place in the last section of the *Āṅguttara*, if not, in the *Dasuttarasuttanta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.² The interpretation given in the *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 80-81) deserves also attention. According to it, a bhikkhu need not practise the dhutaṅgas in his own life but for that reason he is not debarred from being a dhūtavādin, i.e., an advocate or preacher of the dhutaṅgas. It may be that Mahākassapa like Buddha was only a *dhūtavādī* and did not observe the *dhutaṅgas*. The silence of the *Nikāyas* and the *Vinaya* is a distinct evidence of its later growth, or at least its later recognition by the Theravāda sect.

In this connection it is worth while to refer to one of the causes of dispute between Buddha and his cousin Devadatta. The latter wanted to make some rigorous practices compulsory on the monks of the Saṅgha, to which, however, Buddha was opposed. The practices were,

1 *Samyutta*, II, p. 156; *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 23.

2 In the *IHQ.*, (vol. XIII). Dr. Bapat points out that in the *Nikāyas*, āraññika, piṇḍapātika, paṃsukūlika and tecivarika are mentioned while in the *Niddesa* (p. 188), there are other four, viz., sapadānacārika, khalupacchābhattika, nesajjika and yathāsanthatika. In the *Milindapañha* the number is brought to thirteen. In the *Mahāvīyutpatti*, sapadānacārika and pattapiṇḍika are omitted and nāmatika is added. Cf. Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 75-76; Childers, *Pāli Dictionary*, p. 310.

- | | | | | |
|----|---------|-----------|--------------|----------------------------|
| 1. | bhikkhū | yāvajīvaṃ | āraññakā | assu |
| 2. | " | " | piṇḍapātikā | " |
| 3. | " | " | paṃsukūlikā | " |
| 4. | " | " | rukhamūlikā | " |
| 5. | " | " | macchamaṃsaṃ | na khādeyyuṃ. ¹ |

Though the Pāli tradition has nothing but condemnation for Devadatta's actions, it is apparent that Devadatta was not without some followers and influence, and that his disciplinary principles were not wholly brushed aside by the monks. The adoption of the dhutaṅgas by the Pāli school and the prohibition of eating fish and flesh by the Mahāyānists give the palm to Devadatta. The earliest reference to dhutaṅgas and their excellence is found in the *Milindapañha* (pp. 351-355) and their full exposition in the *Visuddhimagga* (pp. 59-83). The thirteen dhutaṅgas are:—

1. *paṃsukūlikaṅgaṃ* = to wear robes made of rags collected from dust heaps of streets, cemeteries, etc.;
2. *tecīvarikaṅgaṃ* = to have not more than three robes, i.e. one each of saṅghāṭi, uttarāsaṅga and antaravāsaka and even for washing or colouring one must manage with these three only;
3. *piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ* = to eat food collected by begging only from door to door, and avoid any of the fourteen kinds of food-offerings permitted in the Vinaya;²

1 Buddha permitted *rukhamūlasenāsana* for eight months and the eating of fish and meat under three restrictions, viz., *adiṭṭham*, *asutam* and *aparisaṅkitam*. See *Vinaya*, II, p. 197 also *Jātaka*, I, p. 34. Cf. the Mahāyānic restrictions about meat-eating in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, ch. viii. See also Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, pp. 134 ff.

2 The fourteen kinds are,—saṅghabhaddam, uddesabh., niman-tanabh., salākabh., pakkhikam, uposathikam, paṭipādikaṃ, āgantukabh., gāmikabh., gilānabh., gilānuppatṭhākabh., vihārabh., dhūrabh., vārabh.

4. *sapadānacārīkaṅgaṃ* = to beg food from house to house consecutively and without any omission;¹
5. *ekāsanikaṅgaṃ* = to take meal at one sitting, i.e., if one is required to stand up or move to show respect to his teacher or do some other work, he cannot resume his seat and take his food again;
6. *pattapīṇḍikaṅgaṃ* = to possess only one bowl and not a second and to take all kinds of food thrown into it, be they tasteful or not;
7. *khalupacchābbhattikaṅgaṃ* = not to take any food after finishing or signifying intention of finishing one's meal, even if any be offered (cf. *Pācittiya*, 35);
8. *ārāṇṇikaṅgaṃ* = to dwell only in forests and not on the outskirts of towns or villages, and the forests must be sufficiently far from any locality;
9. *rukḥhamūlikaṅgaṃ* = to live in a place without any shed and under a tree, and the tree must not be one of the boundary marks of a parish, or one within the compound of a monastery or *cetiya* (sanctuary), or one bearing fruits and so forth.
10. *abbhokāsikaṅgaṃ* = to live in an open space, i.e., neither under a shed nor under a tree, but one with this vow as well as the previous one is permitted to take shelter in a covered place if it be raining, provided he does not run for any shelter to avoid being drenched;
11. *soṣānikaṅgaṃ* = to live in a cemetery. Buddhaghosa in explaining what is a suitable cemetery says that it must not be one used by the people of a village but one left unused for at least twelve years, but from the other

¹ Mahākassapa is said to have been the foremost in this dhutaṅga, see *Vism.*, p. 68.

conditions mentioned by Buddhaghosa (see *Vism.*, p. 77) it seems that he had in mind not a quite unfrequented cemetery;

12. *yathāsanthatikaṅgaṃ* = to use whatever bed or seat is allotted to one without questioning or suggesting an alternative; and
13. *nesajjikaṅgaṃ* = to spend nights sitting and not lying; of the three *yāmas*, one may be spent in walking (*caṅkamaṇa*).

In practising the dhutaṅgas one may be very severe (*ukkaṭṭha*), moderately severe (*majjhima*) or moderate (*mudaka*). A bhikkhu may or may not observe all the thirteen dhutaṅgas, and if he practises the severer of them, it follows that he is not required to practise the less severe, e.g. an *abbhokāsika* need not bother about *rukhamūlikaṅga* or *yathāsanthatikaṅga*; a *sapa-dānacārika* must necessarily be a *piṇḍapātika*, and an *ekāsika* can easily be a *pattapiṇḍika* or *khalupacchābhaddika*. A bhikkhuṇī is permitted to practise only eight dhutaṅgas, i.e. they are debarred from being *ārañṇika*, *khalupacchābhaddika*, *abbhokāsika*, *rukhamūlika* and *sosānika*. A sāmaṇera can practise twelve dhutaṅgas, i.e. omitting *tecivarikaṅgaṃ*, similarly a sāmaṇerī can practise seven omitting the *tecivarikaṅgaṃ*. For the male and female lay-devotees, only two of the dhutaṅgas are prescribed, viz., *ekāsikaṅgaṃ* and *pattapiṇḍikaṅgaṃ*.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BUDDHIST MEDITATION

The second course of spiritual exercises prescribed for a monk is for attaining complete control over the mind (*citta*). In verse after verse in the *Dhammapada* and in passages after passages in the *Nikāyas* the difficulty of controlling the fickle *citta* has been dilated upon, and at the same time it has been emphasised that the only means of attaining *Nibbāna* is by curbing the *citta*, i.e., withdrawing it from all that is attractive in the world and directing it to the highest goal. There are endless *upakkilesas* like *rāga*, *dosa*, *moha* which never permit the *citta* to rest at peace, and the various meditational practices prescribed in the Buddhist texts have for their first object the steadying of the mind so as not to be affected by the weal and woes of the world. It is only with a steady mind that one is capable of comprehending the essential oneness or sameness and vastness of the beings of the universe—the *Nirvāṇa* of the Mahāyānic schools of Buddhist philosophy.

It is almost an axiomatic truth that control over mind is attained through meditational exercises.¹

1 Buddhaghosa has often used the two words *citta* and *saṁādhi* synonymously. He gives the etymological meaning of *saṁādhi* thus:

"*Samādhānatthena saṁādhi, ekārammaṇe citta-cetasikānaṃ samaṇṇa sammā ca ādhāraṇ ṭhapanan ti vuttaṇ hoti.*" (*Vism.*, p. 84.) *Samādhi* means firmly placing; the act of putting or placing the mind and mental functions evenly and properly on one object is *saṁādhi*.

There is a graduated course in these meditational exercises, and this course ranges from the most elementary form of *saṁādhi*, i.e. simple fixation of mind on a black or white circular spot to the most subtle when the meditator loses wholly his consciousness and sensation and reaches a state which is almost akin to the state of death (*saññāvedayitanirodha*).¹

Buddhaghosa, in order to bring out the various characteristic features of a *saṁādhi*, adopted the *aṅguttara* method of numerical classification, which is as follows:—

(A) *Samādhis* of two kinds:

1. *upacāra-samādhi* and *appanā-samādhi*. While attempting concentration of mind, *upacāra* is said to be that mental state which immediately precedes the fixation of the mind on a certain point; the fixation is *appanā* (Sans. *arpaṇa*). It may be described also as the preparatory attempts for developing complete concentration of mind, i.e., *appanā*;
2. (a) *lokiya* (when the *saṁādhi* is with *kusalacitta*) and *lokuttara* (when the *saṁādhi* is with *ariyamagga*);
 (b) *sappītika* (with joy) and *nippītika* (without joy);
 (c) *sukhasahagata* (associated with a happy state of mind) and *upekkhāsahagata* (associated with an equable state of mind).

(B) *Samādhis* of three kinds:

3. (a) *hīna* (lower), *majjhima* (middle), and *paṇīta* (higher);
 (b) *avitakka-savicāra* (with discursive and discriminatory thoughts), *avitakka-vicāramatta* (without dis-

¹ See *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 158-61.

cursive thoughts but with discrimination), and *avitakka-avicāra* (without discursive and discriminatory thoughts);

(c) *pīti-sahagata* (with joy), *sukha-sahagata* (with happy state of mind), and *upekkhā-sahagata* (with equanimity of mind);

(d) *paritta* (small) (while in *upacāra-bhūmi*), *mahaggata* (large) (while in *rūpāvacara-kusala* and *arūpāvacara-kusala bhūmis*) and *appamāṇa* (measureless) (while *ariyamagga-sampayutta*).

(C) *Samādhis* of four kinds:

4. (a) *dukkhāpaṭipado dandābbhiñño*, *dukkhāpaṭipado khippābbhiñño*, *sukhāpaṭipado dandābbhiñño*, and *sukhāpaṭipado khippābbhiñño*.

[*Paṭipada* is that part of mental exercise which is necessary for collecting one's thoughts and reaching the *upacāra* stage, and *abhiññā* refers to the next course of exercises which lead to *appanā* (i.e. fixing mind upon one point).

Dukkha here means 'with difficulty' as opposed to *sukha* 'with ease'; similarly *dandā* means 'slow' as opposed to *khippā* 'quick'.]

(b) *paritto parittārammaṇo* (not of a high order with limited basis of meditation), *paritto appamāṇārammaṇo* (not of a high order but with unlimited basis of meditation), *appamāṇo parittārammaṇo* (unlimited but with a limited basis of meditation), *appamāṇo appamāṇārammaṇo* (unlimited with unlimited basis of meditation);

(c) *vitakka* (discursive thoughts), *vicāra* (discriminatory thoughts), *pīti* (joy), and *sukha* (happy state of

mind)—four combinations of any two or more of these;

- (d) *bhānabbāgiya* (belonging to a lower category), *ṭhiti-bbāgiyo* (belonging to steadying category), *visesa-bbāgiyo* (belonging to a higher category), and *nibbedhabbāgiyo* (belonging to the highest);
- (e) *kāmāvacaro* (belonging to the sensuous sphere), *rūpāvacaro* (belonging to the sphere of material forms), *arūpāvacaro* (belonging to the sphere of non-material forms), and *apariyāpanno* (belonging to the highest);
- (f) *chanda-samādhi* i.e. concentration (by means of strong will), *virīya-samādhi* (by means of energy), *citta-samādhi* (by means of mind-control) and *vimamsā-samādhi* (by means of examination).¹

The above classification helps us only to comprehend the various mental states accompanying the different kinds of meditation but it does not tell us anything about the graduated course to be followed by an adept for passing from the lowest to the highest *samādhi*. So Buddhaghosa goes into minute details of the processes which induce *samādhi* and it will now be our object to consider them in due order as follows:

- (i) ten *Palibodhas* or hindrances to the practice of *samādhis*,
- (ii) forty *kammaṭṭhānas* or the objects of meditation,
- (iii) *kalyāṇamitta kammaṭṭhānadāyaka* or the spiritual preceptor,
- (iv) the candidate, and
- (v) the successive steps in meditation.

1 See also *Majjhima*, II, p. 11.

(1) THE TEN PALIBODHAS

The obstructions to one practising meditation may be of a varied nature.¹ Buddhaghosa puts them in a nutshell thus:

*Āvāso ca kulaṃ lābho gaṇo kammañ ca pañcamam
addhānaṃ nāti ābādho gantho iddhi ti te dasā ti.*

These ten, Buddhaghosa explains, act as hindrances not to all but only to those who has got mental weaknesses as pointed out below :

- (i) *Āvāsa* or dwelling places of monks. This affects those monks who take interest in the construction of monasteries, stūpas, and so forth.
- (ii) *Kula* or family. It affects those who care more for the welfare of his relatives or of the families of his lay-devotees than that of his own spiritual gain.
- (iii) *Lābha* or gain of food and clothes. It sometimes becomes a source of distraction to the monks of repute, for greater demand is made upon their time by people for the privilege of giving them food and clothes, and not unoften these demands are created by his fellow-brethren who take advantage of his company and receive gifts along with him.
- (iv) *Gaṇa* or members of the congregation. There are some monks whose time is taken up in teaching the texts of the Sutta or Abhidhamma piṭakas and hardly find time to be alone and practise meditations.
- (v) *Kamma* or works. Buddhaghosa takes it to mean *navakamma* (construction or repair of buildings). He says that much of a monk's time who supervises

See *Milindapañha*, pp. 365-399. Cf. *Pātañjala*, I, 30:
व्याधिरुत्थानसंशयप्रमादादलस्यविरतिभानिदर्शनालम्भनिकलानवस्थितत्वादि चित्तविच्छेदाश्लेषेऽन-
रागाः ।

the building works is taken up in calculating wages of labourers or the works done or to be done.

- (vi) *Addhāna* or wayfaring. There are occasions when a monk has got to go to a place to give ordination to a person or to procure any requisite. By leaving it undone, he tries to gain concentration of mind but fails to do so.
- (vii) *Ñāti* or relatives including in this case the teachers, disciples or fellow-brethren of the church. Sickness of any of the *ñātis* is a source of distraction to some monks.
- (viii) *Ābādha* or one's own sickness which requires medicine to be cured.
- (ix) *Gantha* or scriptures. Some are so absorbed in studying the scriptures that they do not find time or feel inclined to practise meditation.
- (x) *Iddhi* or miraculous powers. These are attained as one advances in meditation but their use causes hindrance to the development of insight (*vipassanā*) and so these also are treated as one of the palibodhas.¹

There are some other palibodhas enumerated by Buddhaghosa, for instance, long hairs and nails which should be trimmed off; old robes which should be repaired; discoloured robes which should be dyed; unclean bowls which should be cleansed and weak beds which should be strengthened.

(ii) THE FORTY KAMMATTHĀNAS

The subjects of meditation are hardly possible of enumeration though traditionally they are said to be forty in number.

¹ *Vism.*, p. 122.

The selection of the subject, as has been shown above, was left to the Kalyāṇamitta who was to choose a subject which, he thought, would be the most suitable for his disciple, no matter whether it was included in the traditional list or not. As, for instance, one of the very common subjects of meditation found in the Nikāya is *aniccasaññā* to destroy the sense of I-ness (*asmimāna*),¹ but it is not included in the traditional list.

The forty subjects are:—

1. Ten Kasiṇas
2. Ten Asubhas
3. Ten Anussatis
4. Four Brahmavihāras
5. Four Āruppas
6. One Saññā and
7. One Vavatthāna.

Ten Kasiṇas

The word 'Kasiṇa' is very probably a Prākṛt form of the Sanskrit word 'Kṛtsna' meaning 'entire'. In the Buddhist meditational practices the term is applied to those subjects of meditation, which occupy the 'entire' mind, and as such does not give scope to the rising of any other thought.²

I. The first of the Kasiṇas in the list is *Paṭhavīkasiṇa*, i.e. when earth is taken as an object of meditation. To induce concentration of mind, a beginner is generally asked to fix his attention on a piece of earth which may or may not be specially

¹ See *Infra*, p. 237, fn. 3.

² Cf. Childers, sv. Kasiṇo. Rhys Davids translates it by the words 'Predominant Ideas' (see *Yogāvacāra's Manual*, p. viii) and Maung Tin by 'Devise' (see *Path of Purity*, II, p. 138).

prepared for him (*kata* or *akata*), i.e. he may choose a circular-shaped or square-shaped piece of earth when it is called *kata* (prepared) or he may choose, say, a ploughed field when it is called *akata* (unprepared). In the former case particular attention should be given to the fact that the earth must be without any colour as it is likely to divert attention from the earth to its *lakkaṇas*, e.g. colour. It is, however, recommended that the earth should be of reddish-brown colour like that of dawn, and taken, if possible, from the bed of the Ganges. In a secluded place the adept is to take his seat and try to concentrate his mind on the *paṭhavī*-*kaṣiṇa*, cogitating all the while the evils of *kāma*, the solace in overcoming it and the fact that great saints had obtained emancipation by means of such *dhyānas*, repeating constantly the term *paṭhavī* or any of its synonyms, *māhī*, *medinī*, *bbūmi*, *vasudhā*, or *vasundharā*. The adept is to try to see with his eyes shut the image of the *paṭhavī* inwardly with as vividness and distinctness as he was doing with his eyes open. As soon as this is accomplished, the *uggabanimittam* is said to have come to stay (*jātam*).¹ He can now go back to his usual place of residence, and cogitate on the *nimitta* acquired by him.² By doing so, he gradually gets rid of the five *nīvaraṇas* (or hindrances to religious life),³ and the impurities (*kilesas*).⁴ By this first attempt

1 *Vism.*, p. 125.

2 He is now advised to use shoes to avoid wasting time in washing his feet and also a walking stick. *Vism.*, p. 125.

3 *Viz.*, *kāmacchanda* (strong desire), *vyāpāda* (hatred), *thinamiddha* (idleness), *uddhaccakukkucca* (arrogance) and *vicikicchā* (doubts).

4 The *kilesas* are ten in number, viz., *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha*, *māna*, *diṭṭhi*, *vicikicchā*, *thinaṃ*, *uddhaccaṃ*, *ahirikā*, *anottapaṃ*. The first four and *uddhaccaṃ* are enumerated when the *kilesas* are calculated to be five in number.

at concentration (*upacārasamādhi*), his mind becomes concentrated, and there appears in the mind the *paṭibhāganimitta*, i.e. the image of the object of meditation (*uggabanimitta*) but now it is much clearer and brighter than the *uggabanimitta* and without the *kaṣiṇadosa* which remains in *uggabanimitta*. Then commences really the course of meditational practices commencing with *upacāra*, *appanā* and ending with *catukka* or *pañcaka-jhāna*.¹

II. The second is *Āpo-kaṣiṇa*, i.e. when the object of meditation is water. It may be any natural or existing expanse of water as that of a tank or a lake or even of the sea, or clear rain water collected in a vessel before it has reached the earth. The vessel must be full and placed in a quiet secluded corner of the monastery. As in the case of *paṭhavī*, the colour-question must be avoided, i.e. the *lakkhaṇa* of water must not divert the attention of the adept, and the concentration should be induced in the same way as has been explained in the case of *paṭhavī*, uttering in this case the word 'āpo' or its synonyms *ambu*, *udakam*, *vāri*, *salilam*, etc.² Gradually the *uggaha* and *paṭibhāga* *nimittas* appear and the adept proceeds along the course of meditation.

III. The third is *Tejokaṣiṇa*, i.e. when the object of meditation is fire. It may be the flame of a lamp, fire in an oven, or a jungle-fire. The fire may also be specially prepared; in that case, some faggots are to be collected and a pile made of them near a tree and then it should be set on fire. A suitable screen with a hole about four fingers wide is to be placed between the fire and the adept. The adept now is to look at the fire without minding the faggots or the smoke or its colour, even its

¹ See for details *Infra*, pp. 243 ff.; cf. *Comp. of Phil.*, pp. 54-5.

² *Vism.*, p. 170.

heat. He should utter the word 'tejo' or any of its synonyms and acquire the uggaha and paṭibhāga nimittas as detailed above.

IV. The fourth is *Vāyokasīṇa*, i.e. when the object of meditation is wind. It may be seen or felt. In the former case, the adept observes the swaying or shaking of the sugarcane tops or bamboo tops or hair-tips, and in the latter he feels by his body the rush of wind through a hole in a wall or through a window. He realises that it is wind which is moving the tops of sugarcane, etc. or striking his body, and then as described above he is to utter the word 'vāyu' or its synonyms and gradually develop the two nimittas and induce the jhānas.

V. The fifth is *Nilakasīṇa*, i.e., when the object of meditation is blue colour. It may be of flowers, a piece of cloth or a blue gem. It may be specially prepared by filling a basket up to the brim with blue flowers in such a way so that the pollens or stalk may not be seen. The basket should be covered by a piece of blue cloth in such a way that the mouth of the basket is to appear like the surface of a drum. It should be surrounded by a band of a different colour. Then he is to concentrate his mind on the blue colour avoiding the other lakkhaṇas of the flowers and develop the uggaha and paṭibhāga nimittas.

VI-VIII. The sixth, seventh and eighth are *Pitakasīṇa*, *Lobitakasīṇa* and *Odātakasīṇa*, i.e. when the objects of meditation are yellow, red and white respectively. The kasīṇas are to be prepared as detailed above like the *Nilakasīṇa* and the process is the same for developing the nimittas and jhānas.

IX. The ninth is *Āloka-kasīṇa*, i.e. when the object of meditation is a spot of light. The sun's or the moon's rays, if received through a chink in the walls, or windows or through an opening in a thick foilage, form a circular spot of light on the earth. The adept fixes his attention on it and utters 'obhāso

obhāso', 'āloko āloko'. The spot of light may also be obtained artificially by putting a lamp within a jar having a hole in its side. As said before, the adept by concentrating his mind on the spot of light develops the nimittas and jhānas.¹

X. The tenth is *Paricchinna-kāsa-kasiṇa*, i.e. when the object of meditation is limited space. The openings in a wall or a window may well be selected as *paricchinna-ākāsa*, or an opening may be made, say, four fingers wide in a well-covered pavilion or in a sheet of leather. The adept is to fix his attention on the opening and utter 'ākāso ākāso' and develop gradually the nimittas and jhānas.²

In conclusion, Buddhaghosa speaks of the various miraculous powers acquired by an adept successfully practising the above ten *kasiṇas*.³

Ten Asubbas

The ten *asubha* (unpleasant) objects of meditation refer to the ten states through which an uncared for corpse passes before it is completely destroyed. They are,—

- (i) *uddhumātakam* or swollen corpse;
- (ii) *vinīlakam*, i.e., when the colour of the corpse has become blue;
- (iii) *vipubbakam* or the corpse full of pus;
- (iv) *vicchiddakam* or the corpse with limbs torn asunder (e.g. dead bodies of thieves);
- (v) *vikkhāyitam*, i.e., when the corpse has been mangled by dogs and jackles;
- (vi) *vikkhittam* or the corpse with dismembered limbs;
- (vii) *batavikkhittam* or the corpse with its limbs partly destroyed and partly scattered;

1 *Vism.*, pp. 174-5. 2 *Ibid.*, pp. 175-7. 3 *Ibid.*, p. 175.

- (viii) *lobitakam* or the corpse covered here and there with blood (e.g. of a soldier in a battle field);
- (ix) *puluvakam* or the corpse full of worms;
- (x) *aṭṭhikam* or the skeleton.

After enumerating these ten unpleasant objects of meditation, Buddhaghosa deals with the following:

- (i) safety of the place where a corpse is found;
- (ii) how he should behave or what he should ponder over while going to or coming from the place of meditation;
- (iii) sex of the corpse and its suitability;
- (iv) advantages of leaving instructions with the teacher and fellow-brethren about the place selected by him for meditation;
- (v) the path and direction to be chosen;
- (vi) the nature of the noticeable objects around the place where the corpse is found;
- (vii) the six characteristics of the corpse to be observed by him, viz., colour, sex, position, direction and size of the corpse, as also joints, apertures, depth of eye sockets etc., thickness, and a general view of the corpse.

The meditator, as in the case of *paṭhavī*, tries to convert the corpse into a concept (*paṭibhāga*), and then as usual gets rid of the five *nīvaraṇas*,¹ and induce the ecstasies by gradually doing away with *vitakka* and *vicāra*, *pīti* and *sukha*.²

Six Anussatis

The two previous lists of Kammaṭṭhānas speak of actual objects upon which the adept concentrates his mind, gradually

¹ See above, p. 219, fn. 3.

² *Vism.*, p. 189.

converting them into concepts. The present list speaks of pure cogitation of the merits (*guṇas*)¹ of (i) Buddha, (ii) Dhamma and (iii) Saṅgha, as also of (iv) *sīlas* (observance of precepts), (v) *cāga* (making gifts) and (vi) *devatā* (ways and means by which one is reborn in the realm of the gods). Such cogitation leads to

1 In the *Visuddhimagga*, the merits (*guṇas*) of each of these have been quoted from the Piṭaka. These are as follows:

- (i) Buddhānussati—Iti pi so Bhagavā araham sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadamma-sārathi satthā devamanussānaṃ Buddho Bhagavā ti.
- (ii) Dhammānussati—svākkhāto Bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko chipassiko opāyiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi ti.
- (iii) Saṅghānussati—supaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho ujup. b. s., nāyap. bi. s., sāmicip. b. s., yad-idam cattāri purisa-yugāni aṭṭhapurisapuggalā esa bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho āhuneyyo pāhuneyyo dakkhiṇeyyo, añjalikaraṇiyo anuttaraṃ puñña-khettaṃ lokassa ti.
- (iv) Sīlānussati—aho vata me sīlāni akhaṇḍāni acchiddāni asabalāni akammāsāni bhujissāni viññūpasatthāni aparāmaṭṭhāni samādhisaṃvattanikāni ti.
- (v) Cāgānussati—Lābhā vata me, suladdhaṃ vata me, yo'haṃ maccheramalapariyuṭṭhitāya pajāya vigatamalamaccherena cetasā viharāmi, muttacāgo payatapāṇi vossaggarato yāca-yogo dānasamvibhāgarato ti.
- (vi) Devatānussati—Santi devā Cātumahārājikā, santi devā Tāvatisā, Yāmā, Tusitā, Nimmānaratino, Paranimittavasavattino, santi devā Brahmakāyikā, santi devā tat'uttariṃ; yathārūpāya saddhāya samannāgatā tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayhaṃ pi tathārūpā saddhā saṃvijjati; yathārūpena silena.....yathārūpena sutena.....yathārūpena cāgena.....yathārūpāya paññāya samannāgatā tā devatā ito cutā tattha uppannā mayhaṃ pi tathārūpā paññā saṃvijjati ti.

quietude of the mind (*cittam pasīdati*) and destroys the five *nīvaraṇas*,¹ produces great joy and ultimately induces *vipassanā* (insight) leading to arhathood.

Other Anussatis

Besides the six *anussatis* mentioned above, there are three other *anussatis* called (i) *marāṇa-sati*, (ii) *ānāpāna-sati*, and (iii) *upāsamānussati*. Unlike the first twenty *kammaṭṭhānas*, these are matters of cogitation and not external objects to be converted into concepts.

The practice of *marāṇa-sati* implies that the adept after having seen a corpse is to ponder over the fact that he is also subject to that inevitable death and by doing so he rouses his mindfulness of death, mental agitation and also knowledge relating to it. This leads to the destruction of the *nīvaraṇas*² and induction of the *jhānas*. Buddhaghosa gives detailed direction about the instances of death to be selected by the meditator.³

The practice of *kāyagatā-sati* means that the adept is to ponder over the fact that this body from head to foot is full of many impure things and that there are in it hair, nails, spleen, intestines, etc. The most popular way of taking up this *kammaṭṭhāna* is to repeat the list of things contained in the body hundreds or thousands of times either loudly or mentally and thereby induce concentration of mind. Buddhaghosa then gives many other directions about the best way of practising *kāyagatā-sati*, and treats in detail the various contents of the body,—a treatment which may well bear comparison to a modern anatomical study.³

1 See above, p. 219, fn. 3.

2 *Vism.*, pp. 230 ff.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 243 ff.; 250 ff.

The second is *Ānāpānasati*. Inducing meditation by the process of controlling breath is very widely known and is, in fact, adopted by all religions which advocates concentration of mind. It corresponds partly to the *Prāṇāyāma* as described in the Brāhmaṇic Tantras and Purāṇas and the *Yogaśāstras*, in which *pūraka* (inhaling), *kumbhaka* (stoppage of breath) and *recaka* (exhaling) form the three essential factors.¹ In the Buddhist meditational practices it is given an important place and forms one of the chief subject-matters of discourse under the heading *Satipaṭṭhāna*. In the *Yogāvacara's Manual*, it is given the first place among the various meditational exercises.

Those, who choose breath-control as their *Kammaṭṭhāna*, are required to go to a forest or to a secluded spot, sever his thoughts from the outside world and direct his attention to his own inhalation and exhalation and thus gradually develop *upacāra* and *appanā*.² He should sit cross-legged, keeping his body erect. Then he is to exhale (*assāso*) and inhale (*passāso*), observing the time it takes for full inhalation and full exhalation, watching also when exhalation or inhalation starts (*ādi*), reaches the middle (*majjha*) and the end (*pariyosāna*). In exhalation the breath starts from naval (*nābhi*), passes through heart (*hṛdaya*) and reaches the nosepip (*nāsikaggama*),³ and in inhalation the process is just in the reverse direction. The mind follows the

1 Cf. *Majjhima*, I, p. 243-4; *Pātañjala*, I, 34, 49.

2 *Vism.*, p. 269.

3 Not *nābhikaggam*. See *Vism.*, p. 280. In the *Sandhyā-upāsana* of the Brāhmaṇas, the three points are *nābhi*, *hṛdaya* and *lalāṭa*, the first being the seat of *Brahmā*, the second of *Keśava* and the third of *Sambhu*. Cf. *Pātañjalabhāṣya*, I, 34: कौश्वस्य वायोर्नासिकापुटान्ता प्रयत्नविशेषात् वसन प्रच्छेदनम्, विचारार्थं प्राणायामः, ताम्बा वा मनसः स्थितिं सम्पादयेत् ।

course of the breath consciously. It is only by long practice that an adept is able to keep himself aware of all the three stages of in-breathing and out-breathing.¹ Such observation and control of the breath lead to stoppage of all bodily movements (*passambhayaṃ kāyasaṅkhāraṃ*).²

The artificial aids³ taken by an adept for ānāpānasati are mainly (i) *ganaṇā*, i.e. counting, which is not to exceed ten; (ii) *anubandhanā*, i.e. following the course in its three stages, viz., beginning, middle and end; and (iii) *phusanā* i.e. watching the points of contact, *nābhi*, *hadaya* and *nāsikaggamaṃ*.⁴ By these aids the adept soon acquires the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* (concept) and develops *appanā* (or *ṭhapanā*, fixation of the mind) and in some cases the body of the adept becomes so light as to rise up in the air.⁵ At this stage the external inhalation and exhalation cease but there are internal inhalation and exhalation, to which then the adept's mind is directed. The subject of meditation may be either *assāsa* or *passāsa*, or *nimitta* (after-image) of either.⁶

By meditating upon the *nimitta* without *vaṇṇa* and *lakkhaṇa* (characteristics) one destroys the five *nīvaraṇas* and develops the *jhānas*.⁷

The last of this *anussatis* is *Upasamānussati* or cogitation of Nibbāna. The adept as usual is to retire to a lonely place and think of the fact that the absence of attachment (*virāga*) is the best of all dhammas constituted and unconstituted. He thereby develops concentration of mind and the *jhānas*.

1 Cf. *Paṭisambhīdā-magga*, I, p. 177.

2 *Vism.*, pp. 274-7.

3 Cf. *Pātañjalabbhāṣya*, I, 50.

4 *Vism.*, p. 278.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 282-3. Cf. *Pātañjalabbhāṣya*, I, 34.

6 *Vism.*, p. 285.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 286.

Four Brahmavihāras

The four Brahmavihāras are *mettā*, *karuṇā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā*.¹ These are so called because they make the minds of the adepts pure like those of Brahma-kāyikā gods and after death they are reborn in the highest plane.²

i. The adept desirous of practising *mettā-bhāvanā* should take his seat in a secluded place after he has finished his meal and realise the evils of *dosa-citta* (mind full of hatred) and merits of *khanti* (forbearance), for, by *mettā-bhāvanā* *dosa* is removed and *khanti* developed.

The first step in *mettā-bhāvanā* is to select the person upon whom the adept is to cast a friendly eye but at the same time keeping his mind free from *rāga* and such other feelings. After pointing out the various difficulties in selecting the person, it is suggested that *mettā*-feeling should be first exercised in connection with one's own self, i.e. wish for one's own good and then in connection with his spiritual preceptor and so forth wishing him all happiness. In this way he is first to develop *appanā* and then gradually extend his range, including ultimately his enemies, after having completely destroyed his *paṭigha*, if any. He is to extend his range from the inmates of his own *āvāsa* to those of another and so on, to nine or ten *āvāsas*, and then to the inhabitants of a village, town and so forth up to a *cakka-vāla*.³ The next step for him is to break down the line of demarcation (*sīmāsambheda*) between any two persons, i.e. his feeling of love towards himself, his friends, his enemies or neutrals should be absolutely without any distinction. As for

1 Cf. *Pāṭaṅjala*, III, 23, and *Bhāṣya*, I, 33: तत्र सर्वप्राणिषु सुखसन्धोपाप-
मन्त्रेषु मैत्री भावयेत्, दुःखितेषु करुणा, पुण्यात्मकेषु मुदिता, अपुण्यात्मकेषु उपेक्षा । एवमस्य
भावयतः शुद्धी भवेत् उपजायते । ततश्च चित्तं प्रसीदति, प्रसन्नमेवायं स्थितिपदं लभते ॥

2 *Vism.*, p. 320.

3 *Ibid.*

instance, if a man wants to kill his enemy, he must not say that the life of his enemy be spared and his be taken instead; it will not then be *sīmā-asambheda*. To him there should be no distinction between himself and his enemy and it is this state of mind that mettā-bhāvanā is expected to create. As soon as *sīmā-asambheda* is developed, he has the necessary nimitta, upacāra and appanā and soon acquires the four jhānas.¹

In the Nikāyas, the usual statement is that the adept exercises the mettā-feelings towards all beings in all the directions one after another. This is possible only after the adept has gone through the procedure described above.

ii. In *karuṇā-bhāvanā* also the adept is to choose a suitable object of compassion, e.g., an indigent person begging for alms or a criminal when being taken to the place of punishment and so forth. In this way he is to extend his range for compassion, including ultimately his enemies, after removing paṭigha, if any. Like mettā-bhāvanā, he is to practise *sīmā-asambheda* and gradually develop nimitta, upacāra, appanā and the jhānas.

iii. In *muditā-bhāvanā* the adept is to have a feeling of joy at another's happiness (*muditā*). The best to start with is a close friend (*atippiyasabāyako*) of the adept and then other persons may be selected and ultimately his enemy. The remaining process is the same as that of mettā-bhāvanā.

iv. *Upekkhā-bhāvanā* is generally taken up by an adept who has practised the previous three bhāvanās and acquired the jhānas. In the jhānas too, there are the feelings of pīti and virāga, which, being akin to *anunaya* (fondness) and *paṭigha* (hatred), have to be eschewed in *upekkhā-bhāvanā*.

¹ *Vism.*, p. 307.

In practising upekkhā-bhāvanā it is suggested that the person to be selected for the exercise of the feeling of equanimity should be a neutral one and then a friend and then an enemy. Like mettā-bhāvanā, in upekkhā too, the *sīmā-asambheda* is to be practised, developing ultimately the jhānas.

Four Ārūppas or Samāpattis

The Kammatthānas that we have so far dealt with were meant to induce the jhānas up to the fourth, which keep the mind of the adept within the limits of *Rūpaloka*. The subjects of meditation that we propose to treat now induce the higher jhānas from the fifth to the eighth, usually called *Samāpattis*, and carry the mind of the adept to the region of *Ārūpaloka*.

1. The first subject of meditation of the Ārūppas is *ākāśānañcāyatana* (= ananta-ākāśāyatana). It starts with ākāśa-kasiṇa as dealt with above¹ with the difference that *ākāśa* in this case is unlimited extending over the whole *cakkavāḷa*. So long the conception of ākāśa is associated with cakkavāḷa, though it is unlimited, the adept does not go beyond the Rūpaloka. The adept is to think constantly of ananta-ākāśa, but without any kasiṇa, i.e. without any reference to the ākāśa as extending over a cakkavāḷa or so forth. In short, his mind is to be severed from all conceptions of objects (*sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatik-kamā*),² and hence without the possibility of *nānatta-saññā* (sense of distinction). By constantly meditating over this nimitta, he destroys the *nīvaraṇas*,³ develops mindfulness (*satī*) and concentrates his mind through upacāra,⁴ and attains the fifth jhāna.

1 See above, p. 222.

2 Rūpasaññā=Paṭigha-saññā, because by the *paṭighāta* (contract) of object and eye arises the *rūpasaññā*. See *Vism.*, p. 329.

3 See above, p. 219, fn. 3.

4 *Vism.*, p. 328.

2. The second subject of meditation of the Ārūppas is *viññāṇānañcāyatana* (= *ananta-viññāṇāyatana*). This is closely connected with the previous subject of meditation and at the same time a step in advance. In the *ākāsānañcāyatana* meditation, the adept's mind is not without some notion of sphere (*desa*). This is considered as faulty and the adept seeks to withdraw his mind from the sense of sphere and confines his attention to *viññāṇa* (consciousness)¹ of *ananta-ākāsa* and cogitates of *ananta-viññāṇa* only and develops as usual the jhānas, reaching the sixth.

3. The third subject of meditation of the Ārūppas is *ākiñcaññāyatana* (= *n'atthi kiñci iti āyatana* or *nā'ssa kiñcanan ti akiñcanam*. *Akiñcanassa bhāvo ākiñcaññam*). In this case the adept withdraws his mind from the consciousness (*viññāṇa*) of *ananta-ākāsa*, and cogitates on voidness or absence of *viññāṇa* and everything else (*n'atthi n'atthi ti vā suññam suññan ti vā vivittam vivittan ti vā*). By such cogitation, his mind realises the non-existence of *viññāṇa* and thus gradually develops the seventh jhāna, the jhāna of nothingness.

4. The fourth subject of meditation of the Ārūppas is said to be *n'evasaññā-nāsaññāyatana*, but in fact, the mental state of *n'evasaññānāsaññā* is derived by cogitation of *ākiñcaññāyatana*, i.e. *abhāva* of *viññāṇa* as explained above. In the seventh jhāna, the meditator gradually gets rid of *saññā* (perception) of the four khandhas (*rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṅkhārā* and *viññāṇa*), but retains a *saññā* (perception) of extreme subtlety—the residuum of *saṅkhārā*. He cannot perceive ordinary things but he is not absolutely without perception. Hence the mental state of

1 *Pavatta-viññāṇa* = the consciousness that has arisen in the adept's mind by concentrating his mind on *ananta-ākāsa*.

the meditator in the eighth jhāna is without perception of ordinary things (*n'evasaññā*) but not without the subtlest perception (*na + asaññā*).

The last two Kammatthānas

The last two Kammatthānas are (i) *ābāre paṭikūlasaññā-bhāvanā* and (ii) *catudhātu-vavatthānassa bhāvanā*.

1. *Ābāre paṭikūla-saññā* or disgust for food. The adept is to ponder over the evils connected with food. The evils may be of many kinds, e.g., botheration of going out for alms and seeking for it; performing the preliminaries when taking food; the unclean stomach which receives the food, undigestibility of food and so forth. By meditating over these evils, he gets rid of desire for food and gradually of all desires (*taṇhā*). He feels no attachment for his body, and thus attains the *summa bonum* in this life.¹

2. *Catudhātu-vavatthāna*, or determination of the four elements of the body. The adept, taking up this Kammatthāna, examines the contents of his body under the four heads: *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyu*. He takes into consideration one by one his skin, flesh, sinews, marrow, kidneys, bones etc.,² and examines their functions and then looks upon them as nothing but one of the four elements, and as such they are mere material objects (*acetana*), indeterminable (*avyākata*), substanceless (*suññā*), non-sentient (*nissatto*) and so forth. Such examination and cogitation make the adept realise the voidness (*suññatam*) of his self and so of the world. He can no longer perceive the existence of different beings. As soon as he develops this mental state, he attains the highest knowledge.³

1 *Vism.*, pp. 341-7.

2 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 358-67.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 347-70.

(iii) KALYĀNAMITTA

A monk, anxious to take up a subject for meditation, must, at the first place, choose a competent spiritual preceptor (*kalyāṇamitta*). He should try to find out one who has mastered the fourth and fifth *jhānas* and has thereby developed insight (*vipassanā*) into the truths of the universe, and has, in fact, become an Arhat, by destroying all the impurities (*āsavas*). Failing to get hold of such persons, he should seek for the next best in the descending scale,¹ thus:

- (i) an *anāgāmi*;
- (ii) a *sakadāgāmi*;
- (iii) a *sotāpanna*;
- (iv) a *puṭhujjana* who practises the *jhānas*;
- (v-vii) a master of three or two or one *piṭaka*;
- (viii) a master of one *nikāya* with its *aṭṭhakathā*, and lastly, (ix) a *lajjī* (a man of self-restraint).

If the candidate finds a suitable preceptor in the monastery where he lives, so far so good; if not, he should proceed to the place where he may find his preceptor. On his way to, as also on his arrival at, his destination he must not be failing in the duties prescribed in the *Vinaya* (ii. 223) for an *antevāsika*, and he should reverentially and discreetly approach his preceptor, and apprise him of his intention of taking up a subject of meditation.

(iv) THE CANDIDATE

The candidate should offer himself to his spiritual preceptor, saying that he is resolved to carry out his commands, and even, if necessary, he would not hesitate to throw himself down a cliff or stop his respiration to death if his *kalyāṇamitta* wanted him

¹ *Vism.*, pp. 98 ff.

to do so. A candidate with such resolution is not afraid of fearful lonely forests and readily listens to the admonitions of his preceptor.¹

He must possess the requisite *ajjbāsaya* (intention), viz., aversion to *lobha*, *dosa* and *moha* as well as to *gharāvāsa* (household life), *saṅganikā* (society) and *sabbabHAVAGATI* (all forms of existence in the world).² He should have *adbimutti* i.e. ardent desire for *saṁādhi* and ultimately for *Nibbāna*.

When he approaches his preceptor for a *Kammaṭṭhāna*, he is to answer the questions, which will be put by his preceptor in order to ascertain the *Kammaṭṭhāna* that would suit him best. He is to receive his instructions and then ponder over them carefully.³

Anurūpa-Vihāra

The suitability of the place of meditation should also be taken into consideration. The candidate preferably should dwell with his preceptor in the same monastery. Failing same, he should find out a suitable place not far from the abode of his preceptor, for he is to see him occasionally in order to correct himself about the practice of a *Kammaṭṭhāna*. Buddhaghosa enumerates eighteen kinds of places⁴ unsuitable for meditational purposes. The suitable place for meditation must fulfil the following conditions:

1 *Vism.*, pp. 115-6.

2 The opposites of these respectively are *alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha*, *nekkhamma*, *paṇivēka*, and *nissaraṇa*. See *Vism.*, p. 116.

3 *Vism.*, p. 117.

4 *Vism.*, pp. 118-122. The eighteen places are:

Mahāvāsaṃ navāvāsaṃ jarāvāsaṃ ca panthanam,
Soṇḍim paṇṇaṃ ca, phalaṃ patthitaṃ eva ca
Nagaraṃ dāruṇā khettaṃ, visabhāgena paṭṭanaṃ
Paccantasimāsappāyaṃ, yattha mitto na labhati.

- (a) not far nor too close,
- (b) easy of access,¹
- (c) not crowded by day,
- (d) quiet at night, and
- (e) not exposed to mosquitoes, or serpents, wind or sun.

About the suitability of the time for meditation, it is recommended that it should be after the monk has returned from his begging round and taken his mid-day meal.²

The Candidate's Mental States

The first and foremost duty of the Kalyāṇamitta (spiritual preceptor) is to study the mental leanings of the candidate before he can prescribe his subject of meditation. It may be incidentally remarked that unless the Kalyāṇamitta is an Arhat or at least an Anāgāmi or Sakadāgāmi, he cannot be expected to have acquired the higher powers (*abhiññā*) of knowing others' minds (*paracittañāṇa*) or one's previous births (*pubbenivāsānussatīñāṇa*) which are indispensable for ascertaining properly the mental leanings of the candidate. For practical purposes, it is suggested that the spiritual preceptor should ascertain the leanings of the candidate by asking him what he likes and dislikes.³ A person's leanings should be ascertained by observing closely his movements (*iriyāpatha*), actions (*kicca*), food (*bhojana*), ways of looking at things (*dassana*),⁴ and lastly the qualities peculiar to him. Buddhaghosa⁵ classifies the mental leanings of individuals under six heads, viz., (i) *rāga* (attachment), (ii) *dosa* (hatred), (iii) *moha* (delusion), (iv) *saddhā* (faith), (v) *buddhi* (intelligence) and (vi) *vitakka* (discursive thoughts).

1 *Vism.*, p. 122. 2 *Ibid.*, p. 123.

4 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 104 ff.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

5 *Vism.*, pp. 101 ff.

Class (i) has for its characteristics more of deceitfulness, pride, evil desires, ambition, discontentedness, lasciviousness, fickleness etc.; class (ii) has more of anger, hypocrisy, envy, and miserliness etc.; class (iii) has more of idleness, doubts, obstinacy, etc.; class (iv) i.e. those with *saddhā* have the characteristics of being given more to charity, desire of seeing holy persons and hearing religious discourses, has joy, solitude, credulousness etc.; class (v) has amiability, friendship, moderation in food, mindfulness, watchfulness, emotion and exertion etc.; and class (vi) has propensity for discussion, love for frequenting societies, lack of keenness in application for good objects, unsteadiness, fondness for moving about etc.

The above is only a very general classification, for Buddhaghosa points out the possibility of further analysis of mental leanings, e.g., those with *rāga* like evil deeds while those with *saddhā* like moral precepts and so forth; hence there is a commonness between these two classes, i.e. both have a strong feeling or earnestness for evil in one case and for good in the other.

In this way, all the six classes admit of further analysis and a closer discrimination should be made for the prescription of the subjects of meditation.

Another interesting explanation is offered by Buddhaghosa regarding the first three classes. He says that a person's nature may be ascertained by knowing his previous lives, e.g., those who performed good deeds through *rāga* and were as a result born in *sagga* have in their present life proneness to *rāga*, while those who in their previous lives injured others in various ways and were as a result born in the hells or *nāga* worlds develop in this existence a leaning towards *dosa*; similarly those, who were in their previous lives given to drinking and did not care for learning have more of *moha* (delusion). Buddhaghosa gives another

interesting explanation of these three classes of persons.¹ He says that those with *moha* have in their body more of the two elements, earth and water, while those with *dosa* have more of fire and air, and those with *rāga* have all the four elements in due proportion.

Further information is furnished by him about the kind of spot to be chosen for a candidate with a particular leaning, what should be the nature of his dress, bowl, begging places, food-givers, food, postures (*iriyāpatthas*), and the colour of his subjects of meditation.²

A selection is suggested from among the forty *kammatthānas* (subjects of meditation) according to the different mental leanings thus:³

MENTAL LEANINGS

KAMMATTHĀNAS

- For *rāgacarita*, the ten asubhas (unpleasant objects) and *kāyagatā sati* (mindfulness about body);
 „ *dosacarita*, the four brahmavihāras and four colours (*vaṇṇakasiṇāni*);
 „ *mohacarita* and *vitakkacarita*, only *ānāpāna-sati* (mindfulness about inhaling and exhaling);
 „ *saddhācarita*, the six kinds of *anussati* (see above, p. 224);
 „ *buddhicarita*, *marāṇasati*, *upasaṃnussati*, *catudhātuvavatthāna* and *āhāre paṭikūlasaṇṇā*.

¹ *Vism.*, p. 103.

² See for details *Vism.*, pp. 108 ff.

³ *Vism.*, p. 114; *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, pp. 41-2. Cf. *Udāna*,

iv. 1:

asubhā	bhāvetabbā	rāgassa	pahānāya
mettā	„	vyāpādassa	„
ānāpānasati	„	vitakka-upacchedāya	
aniccasaṇṇā	„	asmimānassa	samugghātāya.

It is not possible to deal comprehensively with all the mental states in any treatise, but the above exposition makes it clear that the choice of the subjects of meditation was given a very important place in the code of Buddhist meditational practices. Buddhaghosa, however, admits that there is neither any original treatise (Pāli) nor any commentary (aṭṭhakathā) which deals with the mental leanings of a candidate and what has been said above is gleaned by him from the oral instructions of teachers.¹

The Preliminaries

In the *Visuddhimagga*, a few details are lacking about the preliminaries that a candidate has to go through before he commences his meditational exercises. These are to be found in the *Yogāvacāra's Manual* (edited by Dr. Rhys Davids in P.T.S. Series).

The candidate first salutes the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha by uttering the usual formulæ with the belief that this not only makes him meritorious but also removes many of the hindrances to meditation.²

Then he prays for happiness for all beings including his friends and relatives and at the same time wishes that Māra be kept away from him so that he may succeed in his mission.

He then utters the formulæ of confession, praying that he may be absolved of all sins that he may have committed knowingly or unknowingly.

¹ *Vism.*, p. 107.

² *Icevāṃ accanta namassaneyyaṃ,
Namassamāno ratanattayaṃ yaṃ
Puññābhisandaṃ vipulaṃ aladdhaṃ
Tassānubhāvena hatantarāyo.*

Yogāvacāra's Manual, p. 3.

He now promises to abide by the teachings of the omniscient Gotama and prays for *uggaha-nimitta*, *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, *upacāra-vidhi*, and *appanā-samādhī*.¹ To infuse confidence into his mind he thinks of those of Buddha's disciples, who had before him followed this path and succeeded in attaining their object, and resolves that he will likewise with the help of his teacher, succeed in reaching the goal, Nibbāna.

He now sits cross-legged keeping his body erect and fixes his mind on the subject of meditation (*Kammaṭṭhāna*).²

(v) THE SUCCESSIVE STEPS IN MEDITATION

I. *Upacāra*

We have spoken of the various objects of meditation on which the adept fixes his attention, trying all the while to convert it into a concept as clear and distinct as the object he sees with open eyes. The first attempts that he makes at fixation of his mind on the *nimitta* (i.e. *parikkamma-nimitta*) are called *parikkamma-bhāvanā*.³ When the adept has been able to see the object in his own mind as vividly as he has been doing with eyes open, he is said to have acquired the *uggaha-nimitta*.⁴ The attempts that are now being made by the adept to make the concept not only clearer and brighter than the actual object as seen by his physical eyes but free from the *lakkaṇas* (characteristics) of colour, form, size, etc., which are regarded as *Kasiṇa-dosas* are known as

1 See *Infra*.

2 The *Yogāvacāra's Manual* does not treat the subject systematically as has been wrongly supposed by Dr. Rhys Davids. It contains just an enumeration, like all other Buddhist texts, of the different mental states and objects of meditation, connected with the four *jhānas*.

3 *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, p. 42.

4 *Vism.*, p. 125.

upacāra-bhāvanā.¹ Even at this stage the mind of the adept cannot be steady in concentration; it is like a child unable to stand though making attempts to stand on his legs. The brighter concept, which he now possesses though intermittently, is called *paṭibhāga-nimitta*.² It is exceedingly difficult to make the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* steady and this is not possible for an adept so long he is in the *upacāra* stage. He will now have to exert to pass from *upacāra* to *appanā*. He has got to be very particular about the selection of his *āvāsa* (dwelling place), *gocara* (places from which to collect alms), *bhassa* (improper talks), *puggala* (associates), *bhojana* (food), *utu* (seasonal food), and *iriyāpathas* (postures in which he should pass his time).³

II. *Appanā*

The stage next to *upacāra* is *appanā* in which the adept's power of concentration becomes strong and steady; and the mind is likened to a grown up man able to stand on his legs as long as he likes. In the *appanā* stage, the adept can fix his attention on the subject of meditation one whole day or one whole night.⁴ It is not possible to maintain the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* for any length of time unless the adept reaches the *appanā* stage. It sometimes happens that the adept becomes over-energetic and thereby gets excited and fails to attain the firmness of *appanā* state. As a reaction to it, sometimes it so happens that he gets dejected, his energy slackens and his mind drifts to slothfulness. It is therefore advised that the adept should neither be over-energetic nor slack in directing his mind towards the *nimitta*. It is by main-

1 *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, p. 42.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 127-8.

2 *Vism.*, p. 125.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 126.

taining the balance of mental energy that an adept easily obtains *appanā*.¹

¹ See *Vism.*, p. 137. The ten ways and means for passing from the *upacāra* to the *appanā* stage are enumerated as follows:

1. Cleanliness in regard to body and clothing.
2. Equipose (*samabbhāva*) of the faculties of confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*virīya*), memory (*sati*), concentration (*samādhi*) and intellect (*paññā*).
3. Proficiency in acquiring the nimitta (object of meditation) and in maintaining it.
4. Avoidance of mental slackness. This is to be done not by *passaddhi*, *samādhi* and *upekkhā sambojjhaṅgas*, but by *dhammavicaya*, *virīya* and *pīti-sambojjhaṅgas*. The *dhammavicaya sambojjhaṅga* helps the adept to choose those dhammas which put in him more and more of energy (i.e. *ārambha*, *nikkama* and *parakkama*). He develops *virīya sambojjhaṅga* by remembering the fact that it is by being energetic persons have become great and that he can also be like them if he applies his energy and dismisses his slothfulness. The third is *pīti sambojjhaṅga* which the adept can develop by practising the *anussatis* (see p. 224) and by associating with gentle persons to the exclusion of the vulgar and by reflecting on Suttantas which produce serene pleasure (*pasāda*). These three *sambojjhaṅgas* help the adept to make his mind strong and energetic when necessary and protect his mind from becoming weak. Buddhaghosa enumerates the various ways and means by which these *sambojjhaṅgas* are to be developed.
5. Not allowing the mind to get excited (*suddhata*). This is done not by the *dhammavicaya*, *virīya* and *pīti sambojjhaṅgas* but by *passaddhi* (tranquility), *samādhi* (calm) and *upekkhā* (equanimity) *sambojjhaṅgas*. Buddhaghosa enumerates the various ways and means, by which these three *sambojjhaṅgas* are developed (*Vism.*, p. 134).
6. Toning the mind. Sometimes the adept gets disheartened by failing to acquire the desired object viz., knowledge or

For the attainment of *appanā* state the adept stops his *bhavaṅga* thoughts and concentrates his mind on the object of meditation, which then becomes an object of mental reflection (*manodvārāvajjam*). It is followed by the seven thought-moments (*sattakkhattum javanam javati*). It is in the fourth or the fifth moment that the *appanā* state of mind is developed.¹ It happens in a moment (*ekacittakkhaṇika*). Immediately after *appanā*, i.e. in the sixth or seventh moment, reappear the usual currents of thought (*bhavaṅgacitta*). The *appanā* state therefore refers to a certain mental development which the adept acquires in course of meditational practices. One who has developed that state is able to keep up the *paṭibhāga-nimitta* for a certain length of time and becomes fit for practising the *jhānas*. He is a *gotrabhū*.² By repeatedly meditating over the *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, he can induce the *paṭhamajjhāna*.³

III. The First Trance

The conditions precedent to the attainment of the first trance are:

1. Dissociation from *vatthukāma*⁴ and *kilesakāma*,⁵ the former referring to attractive things of the world and quietude. To get over such depression of mind, he is advised to remember things which would move his mind (*samuegavattbhūti*), for enumeration, see *Vism.*, p. 135.
7. Looking upon the mind with equanimity.
8. & 9. Avoidance of persons not engaged in meditation and association with persons engaged in meditation; and
10. Strong desire for concentration of mind.

1 *Vism.*, pp. 137-8; *Abbi. S.*, p. 17-18.

2 *Vism.*, pp. 138-139; *Attasālini*, pp. 164 ff.

3 *Abbi. S.*, pp. 42-43: Tato paraṃ tam eva paṭibhāgamittam upacārasamādhiṇā samasevantassa rūpāvacara-paṭhamajjhānam appeti.

4 *vivicc'eva kāmehi*.

5 *vivicca akusalehi dhammehi*.

the latter to mental impurities like chanda, rāga, or the five nīvaraṇas.¹

2. Directing (*abbhiniropaṇa*) the mind to the object of meditation.² It is compared to the spreading of wings when the bird is about to fly up (*abbhiniropaṇa*).
3. Roaming of the mind on the object of meditation.³ It is compared to the turning round of the bees on the top of a lotus (*anuppabandhana*).⁴
4. Derivation of mental and physical joy (*pīṇaṇa*) through the removal of nīvaraṇas and its enjoyment (*anubrūhana*).⁵ and lastly,
5. Full concentration of mind (*ekaggatā*).⁶

The first trance, in short, is composed of five āṅgas, viz., *vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīṭi*, *sukha* and *cīttekaggatā*, and leads to (i) *paṭipadā-visuddhi*, or removal of the hindrances (*kāma* and *akusala-dhamma*), (ii) *upekkhānubrūhana* or development of equanimity on account of the mind becoming pure, calm and concentrated on the subject, and (iii) *sāmpaṃsaṇā* or mental

1 See p. 219 fn. 3.

2 Which is *avitakka*.

3 Which is *avicāra*.

4 In the *Dukanīpātattībhakabā* (see *Vism.*, p. 142), the simile given of *vitakka* and *vicāra* is as follows:

The bird's act of flying by resting on its wings in the air is compared to the adept's placing the mind on the object of meditation (*vitakka*) while its actual flying by moving its wings is compared to the adept's thoughts going deep into the object of meditation (*vicāra*).

Another simile of *vitakka* and *vicāra* is as follows: firm grasping of a dirty bowl by one hand is *vitakka*, while the act of cleansing it by the other hand is *vicāra*.

5 *Vivekaṇaṃ pītisukhaṃ: itthārammaṇapaṭilābbhatutthi pīti, paṭilāddharasānubhavanam sukham*. For distinction between *pīti* and *sukha* see *Vism.*, p. 145.

6 When it is said "*paṭhamam jhānam upasampajja viharati*."

thrill obtained by bringing into being the mental states as described above and by making all the faculties (*indriyas*) perform one function.

The adept, who has once obtained the first trance, should repeat it, and for the sake of doing it, he should choose the same food, place of residence, companions, etc. as he had when he first developed it. He should be very careful about the hindrances which may spoil his attained fruit. He should now try to enlarge the *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, i.e. if his *paṭibhāga-nimitta* be that of a small piece of land, it should be increased gradually to that of a village, a town, a province, a kingdom, the world and so on. He should also constantly practise *āvajjana* (adverting to trance), *samāpajjana* (entering into trance), *adbhūta* (maintaining the trance), *utthāna* (rising from the trance) and *paccavekkhaṇa* (introspection).¹

IV. The Second Trance

The psychological conditions relating to the second trance are indicated as follows:

1. Cessation of *vitakka* and *vicāra*,² which are matters of the first trance. In the second trance, the object of meditation takes a firm hold of the mind (*aṅgapātubhāva*), and the physical sensations are no longer external, gross (*olārika*) but purely internal, subtle.
2. Attainment of inward calmness and concentration of thoughts on one object (free from *vitakka* and *vicāra*).³

1 *Vism.*, p. 154; *Attbas.*, p. 169 ff.

2 *Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamo*.

3 *ajjhataṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvam*. In the *Vibhaṅga*, "ajjhataṃ" is explained as "self-realised" (*paccattam*=skt. *pratyātma*). Cf. *Attbas.*, p. 169.

The calmness (*sampasādanam*) is attained by the development of faith (*saddhā*). In the first trance, *saddhā* is present, but it does not produce complete calmness on account of the presence of *vitakka* and *vicāra*. In the second trance, *saddhā* becomes stronger, tranquillizes the mind completely, ending in complete concentration of thoughts.

3. Total removal of *vitakka* and *vicāra*.¹ On account of complete concentration of mind, the *indriyas* remain impervious to both inward and outward sensations and as such there is not the remote possibility of the appearance of *vitakka* and *vicāra*.
4. Derivation of joy (*pīti*) through concentration of mind (*samādhijā*) and its enjoyment (*sukha*),² and
5. Full concentration of mind (*cittakaggatā*).

Like the first trance, the adept should repeat the second trance. He gradually realises that *pīti* also is a source of disturbance to mental tranquillity and he should now get rid of it in order to reach the third trance.

V. The Third Trance

The conditions for inducing the third trance are that the adept should be (i) *upekkhako*, (ii) *satimā*, and (iii) *sukha-vibārī*.

(i) By *upekkhako*, it is meant that the mind of the adept should be unaffected either by joy (*pīti*) or disgust (*virāga*),³ i.e., his mind must not be perturbed by thoughts of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anattā* and at the same time it should be passive (*anābhoga*) and inactive (*avyāpāra*);

1 avitakkam avicāram.

2 samādhijam pītisukham.

3 pītiyā ca virāgā upekkhako. For ten forms of *upekkhā*, see *Vism.*, p. 160; *Atthas.*, p. 172.

(ii) By *satimā*, it is meant that the adept should closely observe what is passing within and outside his mind and body and at the same time be cognizant of the various mental conditions concomitant to the second trance without any delusion (*asam-moha*). These two factors *sati* and *sampajāno* are required in *upacāra* and *appanā*; so the reason shown for mentioning it in connection with the third trance is that *sati* and *sampajāno* are necessary in this case also for keeping the mind away from *pīti* and *sukha* acquired by the adept in the preceding trance.

(iii) By *sukhavibhāṇī*, it is meant that though the adept's mind is unaffected by *sukha* while in meditation, his body is pervaded by a feeling of ease which he realises only after he has arisen from the trance.¹

Constant practice of this meditation makes the adept firm in this trance and he can now proceed to the fourth.

VI. The Fourth Trance

In the fourth trance, no new mental factors are acquired or got rid of by the adept. This trance is more or less the resultant of the first three. The mental states described in connection with this trance are as follows:

- (i) free from physical pain or happiness (*sukhassa ca pahanā dukkhassa ca pahanā*);
- (ii) free from mental pain or happiness (*somanassadomanassānam atthaṅgamā*);

[These two states are acquired by the adept in the first stage (*upacāra*) of meditation;² only *somanassa* is completely eradicated in developing the fourth jhāna].

¹ Sukhañ ca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti.

² For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 166-7; *Authas.*, p. 177.

- (iii) *adukkhamasukham*, i.e., the adept must get rid of *rāga* and *dosa*,¹ as the former is the source of *sukha* and the latter of *dukkha*.
- (iv) *upekkhā satipārisuddhiṃ* i.e., memory and other mental states reach the purest state through *upekkhā*. In this trance when all the obstructing factors to higher meditation have subsided, *sati* and other factors conducive to the fourth trance becomes pure and serene.

It should be noted that all these four trances² are induced by meditating on the various *Kammaṭṭhānas* detailed above. In every trance, the adept has to take up the *Kammaṭṭhānas*, say, *paṭhavī*, induce *upacāra* and *appanā*, and then if he has previously acquired the first, he easily develops it and passes on to the second. Similarly, in the case of the third and fourth also, the adept has to induce *upacāra* and *appanā* with *paṭhavī*, pass through the first and second and reach the third or fourth.

There are four higher trances called *Samāpattis*. These trances are induced by the cogitation of the four *āruppas* (see above p. 230).

After the fourth *jhāna*, the adept attains *cetovimutti*.³

1 See *ante* pp. 235-8: mental states of candidates for meditation.

2 By splitting up the second trance into two, four trances are sometimes spoken of as five in number. See *Vism.*, p. 169.

3 *Atthas.*, p. 177.

CHAPTER XV

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

The third step of the *Majjhimā-paṭipadā* is the acquisition of knowledge (*paññā*), in other words, *sammādiṭṭhi* or the true view of the worldly objects. According to the Buddhists, the true view is that the five *khandhas*, which constitute the world, are without any substance (*anatta*), subject to decay (*anicca*) and so instead of being a source of happiness are really causes of grief (*dukkha*). This view of the constituted world can be developed after a long course of physical and mental discipline dealt with in the previous two chapters and a close study of the Nikāyas, which offer an analysis of the constituents and prove that these have only a fleeting existence, and that also in the eyes of a person whose vision is blurred. The aim of the Nikāya literature, therefore, is to clear up the blurred vision of its students. As it is not feasible as well as desirable to place the highest (*paramattha*) truth all at once before the eyes of a beginner, it starts with an analysis and examination of the things (*dukkha* = *pañcupādānakkhandhā*) around him, how they originate (*samudaya*) and suffer decay (*nirodha*), and the ways and means (*magga*) by which their complete decay can be effected.¹ Of these four processes,² the first two are concerned with objects which are not real in the highest sense, so these two should be treated as conventional (*sammuti* = *saṃvṛti*) truths, and for this

1 For the traditional exposition of the *ariyasaccas* see *Infra*.

2 See *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

reason, in the *Abhidharmakośa*,¹ these two are called *samala-prajñā* (not immaculate knowledge). The other two, *nirodha* and *magga*, are *amala-prajñā* (immaculate knowledge) inasmuch as these are related to the highest (*paramattha*) truth. The process of intellectual culture in Buddhism, therefore, consists in realising the highest truth, *nirodha*, through the comprehension of the conventional truths, *dukkha* and *samudaya*. By the former are meant the (i) *khaṇḍhas*, (ii) *dhātus*, (iii) *āyatana*s, (iv) *indriya*s, and (v) *ariya*saccas, and by the latter (vi) the theory of causation, *paṭicca-samuppāda*.

(i) *Khaṇḍhas*

The whole universe, according to Buddhism, is dichotomised into *saṃskṛta* (constituted) or *lokiya dhātu* and *asaṃskṛta* (unconstituted) or *lokuttara dhātu*.² The former includes the whole world of animate and inanimate objects and the latter *Ākāśa* (space) and *Nirvāṇa*, which is sub-divided into two as *Pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and *Apratisaṃkhyānirodha*.

Saṃskṛta-dhātu

The world of beings and inanimate objects are described as *saṃskṛta* on account of their being constituted of some elements. These elements are usually put under two heads: *nāma* and *rūpa*, *nāma* denoting the non-material or mental states of a being while *rūpa* the material parts only. All inanimate objects therefore are included in the term *rūpa*. *Nāma* is analysed into four states known as *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), *saṅkhārā* (impressions produced through *karma*) and *viññāṇa* (knowledge derived through the organs of sense). The four subdivisions of *nāma* with the fifth the *rūpa* are termed *Pañcakkhandha*. It

¹ *Kośasthāna*, VII, 2.

² See *Infra*, p. 259.

follows from this that according to the early Buddhists every being is a composite of the five *khandhas* (or groups of elements), each *khandha* comprising a particular group of elements, without a sixth the *Puggala* or *Attā* (= soul).

The traditional interpretation of the five *khandhas* (*skandhas*) as given in the *Dhammasaṅgāṇī* (Bk. II), *Vibhaṅga*, Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa* is as follows:

Rūpakkhandha denotes the four elements: earth (*paṭhavi*), water (*āpo*), fire (*tejo*) and air (*vāyu*), including all that is formed out of these four.¹ It comprises all the material objects whether of the past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, near or distant, good or bad. By past *rūpa* is meant the matter that has undergone change; by future, the matter which will come into existence; and by the present, the matter which is existing at the present moment. By internal *rūpa* are meant the flesh, bone and such other constituents of one's body made out of the four *mahābbūtas*; and by external, the same of bodies other than one's own. By gross and near *rūpa* are meant the six organs of sense with the sense-objects² while by subtle and distant *rūpa*, the masculinity (*purisindriya*) and femininity (*itthindriya*), vitality (*jīvitindriya*: as water is to the lotus, so is vitality to the *rūpa*),³ the seat of mental faculties (*hadaya*), the faculty of intimation by means of physical and vocal signs (*kāyaviññatti* and *vaciviññatti*), the space within and circumscribing the body (*ākāśadhātu*), the qualities⁴ which make

1 *Db. S.* 584: *Cattāro ca mahābbūtā catunnañ ca mahābbūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ—idaṃ vuccati sabbam rūpaṃ.*

2 *Vism.*, p. 444: *cakkhu, sotam, ghānam, jvā, kāyo, rūpaṃ, saddo, gandho, and raso.* 3 See *Infra*, p. 260.

4 *Vism.*, p. 444: *rūpassa labutā, mudutā, kammaññatā, upacayo, santati, jaratā, atid aniceatā.*

the body light soft and supple, growing and decaying, and nutritive food (*kabalīṅkāro ābhāro*). The good and bad *rūpa* indicate only the good or bad nature of the sense-objects.

Vedanākkhandha connotes all that which one feels (*vedayitalakkhaṇam*).¹ Though it is by nature one, it is usually treated under three aspects: *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad), and *avyākata* (indifferent) and sometimes under five aspects, viz., *sukham* and *dukkham* when the object of contact is pleasant and unpleasant, *somanassam* and *domanassam* when the object of thought is pleasant and unpleasant, and lastly *upekkhā* when the object does not produce good or bad feeling.

*Viññāṇakkhandha*² refers to that faculty by which a being becomes aware of things (*viñāṇa-lakkhaṇa*), *viññāṇa* is a synonym of *citta* or *mano*.³ Though it is of one nature, it is usually treated as of three kinds, *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad) and *avyākata* (indifferent). Each of these three kinds of *Viññāṇa* again is subdivided in the Abhidhamma works according to the four spheres in which the world or mental states are divided viz., *kāmāvacara*, *rūpāvacara*, *arūpāvacara* and *lokuttara*.⁴ In the *Kāmāvacara* sphere, *kusalaviññāṇa* is analysed into eight kinds, according as it is associated with, or dissociated from, *nāṇa*

1 In the *Vibhaṅga*, *vedanā* and other khandhas have been explained like *rūpa* as *atīta*, *anāgata* and *paccuppanna*, *ajjhata* and *babiddhā*, *olārika* and *sukkhuma*, *bīna* and *pañita*, *dūra* and *santika*, but this has been omitted in the *Vism.*, pp. 472-6.

2 Though in the usual enumeration of khandhas, *viññāṇa* is put last, it has been treated as the third, in accordance with the arrangement of the *Vism.*, p. 477-8, the reason being that, is the most important and subtlest of the khandhas and the interpretation of all other mental khandhas follow this more or less.

3 *Vism.*, 452; *Samyutta*, II, 94; see also *Ante*, p. 24-5.

4 See *IHQ.*, XV: The Dhamma-saṅgaṇi.

(knowledge), and *saṅkhāra* (persuasion by others, e.g. in offering gifts). In the *Rūpāvacara* it is of five kinds in accordance with the mental states developed by a meditator as he rises gradually from the first to the fourth form of meditation (*jhāna*). In the *Arūpāvacara* it is, as before, of four kinds, as the meditator rises from the fifth to the eighth *jhāna* called *arūppas*. And in the *Lokuttara*, it is said to be of four kinds as a person is in one of the four *maggas*, viz.: *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi*, *anāgāmi* and *arahatta*.¹ In all *kusalaviññāṇa* is of twenty-one kinds.


It should be remembered that these twenty-one *kusalaviññāṇas* do not belong to the good mental states of an average man. These refer only to the mental states of an individual who is following the Buddhist principles of gradual purification and whose mind rises by stages to the *Arūpāvacara* and ultimately to the *Lokuttara* region.

In the same way *Akusalaviññāṇa* is explained. As a person who has practised the first form of meditation, not to speak of the higher ones, cannot have *akusalaviññāṇa*; it is said that *akusalaviññāṇa* is confined to the *Kāma*vacara sphere only, and so from the standpoint of spheres (*avacaras*) it is of one kind only. It is of three kinds according to its source, viz., *lobha* (avarice), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion). Each of them again is further subdivided into twelve in accordance with its combination with one or more of the following: *lobha* with or without *somanassa*, *upekkhā*, *diṭṭhi* (non-Buddhist beliefs) and *saṅkhāra* (instigation by others); *dosa* with *domanassa*, *paṭigha* (revenge) and *saṅkhāra* (instigation); and *moha* with *upekkhā* and *vicikicchā* (doubts).

The *Avyākata-viññāṇa* has so many subdivisions that it will be easier to comprehend it in a tabular form thus: ²

¹ See above, pp. 241 ff.

² *Vism.*, pp. 454 ff.



The *abhetukaṃ kusalavipākam avyākata-viññāṇam* is of eight kinds, viz., the six *viññāṇas* derived through the six organs of sense (including *mano*). The function of these *viññāṇas* is to make the object just known. Besides these six *viññāṇas*, there is the receiving faculty called *mano dbātu*, located in the heart (*hadayavatthu*). Its function is to cognize the objects. As it is associated either with equanimity (*upekkhā*), or joy (*somanassa*) it is said to be of two kinds. All these are further subdivided as shown in the above Table.

The *sabetukaṃ kusalavipākam avyākata-viññāṇam* is also of eight kinds. It is similar to the previously said *abhetuka-viññāṇa*, the only difference being that it is always associated with *alobhādivipāka*.¹

The *Rūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *rūpāvacara-kusaladhamma* is of five kinds. It occurs to those who are meditating (*samāpattivasena*)² and progressing along the path. It is manifest in reconception, life-continuum and death.

The *Arūpāvacara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *arūpāvacara-kusala* is of four kinds and should be interpreted as above.

The *Lokuttara-avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇam* like the *lokuttara-vipāka* is of four kinds, i.e., connected with the four kinds of mental states of four *maggas* (see above p. 252).

In all, the subdivisions of the *avyākata-vipāka-viññāṇas* of the four spheres (*avacaras*) amount to thirty-six.

The *Kiriya-viññāṇa*, as indicated in the above Table, is subdivided according to the three spheres (*avacaras*) and then the *Kāmāvacara* into *abhetuka* and *sabetuka*, which are subdivided

1 *alobhādi*=*alobha*, *adosa*, *amoha* and so forth; *vipāka*=result or resultant consciousness (see Transl. of the *Vism.*, p. 531).

2 *Vism.*, Transl., p. 532, by way of right attainment. See above, p. 252.

into eleven kinds, and as before, the *Rūpāvacara* and *Arūpāvacara* into nine, thus making in all twenty kinds.

The sum total of *viññāṇas* stands thus:

Kusalaviññāṇa	21
Akusalaviññāṇa	12
Vipākaviññāṇa	36
Kiriya-viññāṇa	20
				89

All these 89 *viññāṇas* act in 14 ways, viz., through re-conception (*paṭisandhi*), life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*), reviving (*āvajjana*), seeing (*dassana*), hearing (*śavana*), smelling (*gbāyana*), tasting (*sāyana*), touching (*phusana*), receiving (*sampañicchana*), examining (*santīraṇa*), deciding (*voṭṭhapana*), extending (*javana*),¹ registering (*tad-ārammaṇa*) and death (*cuti*).²

Of the fourteen ways in which *viññāṇa* functions, as stated above, it is the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* that causes re-birth. It is said in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (I, 122; II, 67, 103) that only when *viññāṇa* obtains a footing (*paṭiṭṭhā*) on something (*ārammaṇa*), then only there is the possibility of the birth of a being, and not otherwise, and the moment the *viññāṇa* ceases (*cuti*), one is regarded as dead.³ During the span of life limited by the two *viññāṇas*, *paṭisandhi* and *cuti*, the remaining twelve *viññāṇas* function. Immediately after the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* has done its

1 Cf. *Atthas.* p. 270: ubhosu tīresu kedārapūraṇaṃ viya javanaṃ.

2 These are functions of *mano-dhātu* which is treated as the sixth organ of sense.

3 Cf. *Samyutta*, III, p. 143:

*Āyu usmā viññāṇaṃ, ca yadā kāyaṃ jhantimāṃ
apaviddho tadā seti, paṇabbattam acetanaṃ.*

part, i.e., having given the form of birth according to kamma, appears the *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*, which is the resultant of one's actions (*kammasa vipākabbūtam*). The *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* however becomes inactive when the organs of sense grow strong enough to function in their respective spheres. Then those six *indriya-viññāṇas* (i.e. including *mano-dhātu*) function and give rise to the *āhetuka-kiriya-manoviññāṇa-dhātu*, making *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* (sub-consciousness) passive. The *kiriya-manoviññāṇadhātu* is nothing but mind (*mano = citta*), the function of which is to revive (*āvajjana*) the objects seen, sounds heard and so forth, and to make the organs of sense function and function again. The function of mind then is to receive things communicated to it through the organs of sense; it becomes good or bad according as the things communicated through the organs of sense are pleasant or unpleasant. When the mind ceases to function, *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* renews its activity, ceasing at death when it is followed by *cuti-viññāṇa*, which in its turn gives rise to *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*. In this way the continuity of *citta* is maintained, and the cycle of existence is continued.¹ It should be

† This exposition of *viññāṇa* is based on the *Vism.*, pp. 452-460; Transl. *Path of Purity*, III, pp. 527 ff. See also *Atthas.*, pp. 266, 269-270. In the *Atthas.* the position of *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa* has been explained by a simile which is as follows: 'The course of a flowing river, if turned, by an obstruction, towards a channel (*mahāmātikā*), the water not only flows through it but floods over the two sides of the channel, and then by whatever narrow ways it finds, it moves towards the main river.

The flowing river = *bhavaṅga-viññāṇa*.

The obstruction turning the course of the river = *kiriya-manodhātu* (mind = *citta*)

The channel = *vitthucittapavatti* (mind functioning through the six organs of sense)

noted that the existence of *bhavaṅgaviññāṇa* or subconsciousness is not explicitly stated anywhere in the Sutta or Abhidhamma Piṭaka, though it is given prominence in the works of later expositors, like Anuruddha and Buddhaghosa.

Saññākkhandha refers to all those characteristics which make a thing known. Though it is by nature of one kind, it is, like the *vedanākkhandha* (see above, p. 251), treated as of three kinds viz., *kusala* (good), *akusala* (bad) and *avyākata* (indifferent), according as it is associated with *viññāṇa*, good, bad or indifferent. There cannot be any *viññāṇa* without *saññā* (perception), hence it has as many subdivisions as *viññāṇa* (see above). Its function is (i) to make a thing known through its characteristics, as a piece of wood is known to a carpenter; (ii) to make the characteristics engage the attention of persons, as an elephant felt by the blind; and (iii) to draw attention to the immediate function of an object, as animals know their supplier of grains as the food-giver.

Saṅkhārākkhandha. It denotes that aspect of mental states (*cetanā*),¹ the main characteristics of which is to bring together (*rāsikaraṇa*) two or more mental activities. It has the virtue of putting forward the mind into action,² and engaging it in the immediate object, and has for its proximate cause the three other khandhas, viz., *vedanā*, *saññā* and *viññāṇa*. Apparently, then,

The flooding over two sides = *javana*

Falling into the main river = *bhavaṅgotaranam*.

1 In the *Vibhaṅga* (p. 7), *saṅkhāra* is equated to *cetanā*, the *cetanā* which arises out of contact of the organs of sense with their objects, as does *vedanā*, *saññā* or *viññāṇa*.

2 In the *Expositor* (p. 540 fn. 4), it has been pointed out that the commentator on the *Vism.*, has explained *āyūhana* by *rāsikaraṇa*. This, I think, is a slip on the part of the commentator, for in the text *āyūhana* is mentioned as the second characteristic, *rāsikaraṇa* being the first.

saṅkhārā means the resultant mental states—the accumulated effect of the three other khandhas or mental functions. These three khandhas do not set the mind into action but leave it to *saṅkhārā* to do so. Like the other mental khandhas, it has also been sub-divided in various ways.

Buddhaghosa concludes his exposition of khandhas by the remark that the people are prone to regard the body as one single thing and mistakenly apprehend it as a self and that it is only to warn them against this misapprehension that the Teacher spoke of the khandhas. The khandhas are to be looked upon as bubbles and tempting mirage. These are nothing but a mass of evanescent objects as substanceless as the trunk of a plantain tree.¹ Buddhaghosa offers also an explanation for the order (*kama*) in which the khandhas are enumerated. *Rūpa*, he says, is mentioned first because it is easily comprehensible to an average man. As this *rūpa* (matter, object and thing) gives rise to a feeling good, bad, or indifferent, so *vedanā* is treated as the second khandha. As this *vedanā* (feeling) that directs one's attention to the form and nature of the source of the feeling and thus engenders *saññā* (perception), so *saññā* is placed next. After *saññā*, happens the accumulation of mental states, hence *saṅkhārā* is treated as the fourth. Though *viññāṇa* precedes *saṅkhārā* it is mentioned last as it is the most important of the four mental khandhas, forming, as it does, the basis of *vedanā*.²

(ii) D h ā t u s

The term *dhātu* carries a very wide meaning in the Buddhist literature. When the *dhātu* is said to be constituted (*saṃskata*),

¹ *Vism.*, pp. 477-480.

² *Vism.*, p. 477: Yaṃ vedayati taṃ sañjānāti ti evaṃ vedanā-visayassa ākāragāhikaṃ saññāṃ; saññāvasena abhisāṅkhārake saṅkhāre; tesam vedanādinam nissayam adhipatibhūtaṃ ca nesaṃ viññāṇan ti.

it means all the beings and things of the world, e.g., the three spheres of existence, Kāma, Rūpa and Arūpa; the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*) and the things formed out of these elements; the sense-organs, their objects (*āyatana*s), as also their perceptions; the material and non-material constituents (*khandhas*). The *Bahudhātuka-sutta*¹ states that for attaining *nibbāna*, one must be proficient in the dhātus (*dhātukusalo*), and then enumerates besides the above the following as dhātus: mental and physical pain and pleasure, equanimity, ignorance, desire, renunciation, hatred, and absence of hatred, as also Ākāsa and Nibbāna or Nirodha but the last two are called unconstituted (*asaṃkhata*) dhātus.

Though the term *dhātu* has a very wide significance, it is applied at the present instance to the six sense-organs, their objects and the six perceptions derived through them, i.e., *cakkhu*, *rūpa* and *cakkhuvīññāṇa*; *sota*, *sadda* and *sotaviññāṇa* and so forth counting in all the eighteen dhātus. Etymologically *dhātu* means those elements which *uphold* a being. In this sense *cakkhu* is a *dhātu* and so also are the other sense-organs. The sense-organs are also *indriyas*² inasmuch these act as predominating factors in perceiving objects; again these are also *āyatana*s inasmuch as these exert (*āyatanti*, *utthabanti*, *ghaṭanti*, *vāyamanti*)³ to perceive an object.

(iii) Āyatana

*Āyatana*s include both the sense-organs and their objects, the former being distinguished as internal (*ajjhattika*) and the latter as external (*bāhira*), counting twelve in all.⁴ The function

1 *Majjhima*, III, p. 216.

3 *Vism.*, p. 481.

2 See *Infra*.

4 See Table facing, p. 249.

of the *āyatanas* is not only to develop the perceptions (*viññāṇa*) but also to entangle a being in *saṃsāra* (repeated existences). With the exception of *mano*, all the eleven *āyatanas* belong to *rūpakkebandha*¹ while *mano* alone belongs to *viññāṇakkebandha*. *Mano* therefore like *viññāṇa* can be subdivided into 89 states.² The scope of the five organs of sense is limited to their respective objects while the scope of *mano* is almost unlimited, extending over not only all the other sense-organs and their objects but also over all mental states, denoted in Pāli by the word *dhamma*.

The Buddhist texts, in conclusion, point out though so much attention has been paid to the analysis of *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, one must not forget that these have neither any beginning nor any end, these do not come from anywhere nor go to anywhere; these are in reality substanceless (*nirīha*) and functionless (*avyāpāra*).³

(iv) I n d r i y a s

Besides the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*, a being requires the twenty-two *indriyas* (predominating mental factors) for its existence.⁴ The six sense-organs as has been mentioned above are *indriyas* inasmuch as these are predominating factors in a person's appearance, protection, knowledge and distinctiveness.⁵ The seventh and eighth *indriyas* are masculinity (*purisa*) and femininity (*itthi*) as these are predominating factors in sex-distinction. The ninth *indriya* is vitality (*jīvita*) which sustains the body. The five mental states, *sukha*, *dukkha*, *somanassa*, *domanassa* and

1 *Dhātukathā*, pp. 2, 117; see above, p. 250.

2 See above, p. 255; *Vism.*, p. 483.

3 *Vism.*, p. 484.

4 *Abbidharmakośavyākhyā*, (C.O. Series), pt. ii, p. 1: आधिपत्यव्यवस्थेति । तस्मादिन्द्रियमिन्द्रियशब्दस्य उपात्तमिति नैव हेतुः ।

5 *Ibid.*, Intro.

upekkhā,¹ which accompany the *jīvitindriya* are also treated as predominating states in the Buddhist psychology inasmuch as these serve to entangle beings in worldly affairs.² The next group of five mental states, viz., self-confidence (*saddhā*), energy (*viriya*), watchfulness (*sati*), concentration of mind (*samādhī*) and exertion for knowledge (*paññā*) are also treated as *indriyas* inasmuch as these serve to disentangle beings from worldly desires and help them to attain Nibbāna. The last three *indriyas* are (i) the determination to know what is unknown (*anaññātā + ñassāmī*), (ii) determination to know the highest truth (*aññā*), and (iii) determination to realise what has been attained by the previous two *indriyas* (*aññātāvī*). The first of this group acts as the predominating factor in removing wrong views and putting the adept on the right course of exercises for realising the truth while the second in helping the adept to realise the fruits of the exercises, removal of the *anusāyas* (inclinations for worldly attainments) and development of insight into the truth; the third acts as the predominating factor in attaining knowledge of the cessation of rebirth (*kṣayaajñāna*) and the attainment of Nibbāna in this life.³

Though so much has been said about the *indriyas*, Buddhaghosa in conclusion observes that these do not exist in the highest sense.⁴

(v) A r i y a s a c c a s

It has been already pointed out that by *sammā-diṭṭhi* the early Buddhists meant the comprehension of the four truths,

- 1 Sukha and dukkha=physical pleasure and pain.
Somanassa and domanassa=mental pleasure and pain.
Upekkhā=equanimity.

- 2 *Ak.-vyākhyā*, II, Intro. 3 *Ibid.*, p. 11. 4 *Vism.*, p. 526.

dukkha, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*.¹ These can be expressed in several ways, of which the following appear to be a fair generalisation; *pavatti* (origin), *nivatti* (cessation), and *tad ubbhayabettu* (causes of the above mentioned two); *ālaya* (desires), *ālayāramatā* (attachment to desires), *ālayasamugghātā* (uprooting of desires), and *ālayasamugghātupāya* (means of uprooting of desires);² *akusalaṃ* (evil), *akusalamūlaṃ* (source of evils), *kusalaṃ* (good), *kusalamūlaṃ* (source of goodness);³ *idaṃ* (this = *dukkha*), *hīnaṃ* (low = *dukkhasamudaya*), *paṇītaṃ* (excellent = *dukkhanirodha*), *imassa saññāgatassa nissaraṇaṃ* (getting rid of the misconceptions = *dukkhanirodhagāmini-paṭipadā*).⁴ These various modes of expressions show that the early Buddhists did not mean that the four truths should be confined to the four terms: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*. But as these terms are widely and frequently used, their traditional interpretations are given below:

- (1) *Dukkha*: Birth is *dukkha*, so are old age, death, grief, lamentation due to the death of friends and relatives, etc.; physical and mental pain; meeting uncongenial persons; separation from dear ones; disappointment in obtaining the desired objects. In short, the congregation of five *khandhas* is *dukkha* as it is always accompanied by pain, being subject to change, and ultimately decay.⁵

1 See above, p. 248; *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 206-7.

2 *Vism.*, p. 497.

3 *Majjhima*, I, p. 46.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

5 Cf. *Digba*, II, p. 306; *Majjhima*, III, p. 249 f., *Vibhaṅga*, p. 99, *Vism.*, p. 498. See *Vism.*, p. 499 for seven kinds of *dukkha*: *dukkha-dukkha*, *vipariṇāmadukkhā*, *saṅkhārādukkhā*, *paṭicchannādukkhā*, *appaṭicchanna-dukkhā*, *pariyāyādukkhā*, *nippariyāya-dukkhā*. Cf. *Kośas-tbāna*, V.

- (2) *Samudaya*: It is attributed to *taṇhā* (desires, thirst) which may be for (i) worldly objects, (ii) repeated existence or (iii) dissolution of bodies.¹
- (3) *Nirodha*: It is the cessation of *samudaya*, complete detachment from *taṇhā* (desire), relinquishment of all worldly objects and desires for their possession. It is tranquil, beyond death, signless and free from all characteristics. It is not non-existent like the horns of a hare as it can be realised if the right means be adopted. It is, however, not a fruition of the right means as it exists for ever, only its realisation is effected by the right means. It is eternally existing but not like atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, for, atoms, according to the early Buddhists, are also caused. It is unborn (*ajātam*), unoriginated (*abhūtam*), uncreated (*akātam*) and unconstituted.² It is called *sa-upādisesa* when one who has removed all impurities and realised the truth but still retains the remnants of his past *upadhi*, e.g., an arhat before he lays down his mortal frame. It is called *anupādisesa* when the arhat lays down his body for ever and never takes re-birth.
- (4) *Magga*: It is the eight-fold path leading to the cessation of grief as explained above (pp. 199 ff).

The effects of insight into each of the four truths (i) *dukkha* (ii) *samudaya* (iii) *nirodha* and (iv) *magga* leads to the removal of the following beliefs respectively:

1 *Kāma*, *bhava* and *vibhava taṇhā*. See *Dīgha*, II, p. 305.

2 *Itivuttaka*, p. 37; *Udaṇa*, p. 80 cf. *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, pp. 172 f.

eternal atoms (*aṇu-paramāṇu*). It shows that the things of the world have only a dependent origination and hence are impermanent and sources of misery, and that there is nothing except Nibbāna and Ākāśa that is not originated by cause and condition. This law has been utilised to show that all that is caused and conditioned are without any substance. It explains the fixed unchangeable and this-conditioned (*idappaccayata*) nature of things and as such it is a key to the eternal truth. The moment a being realises the truth of this law, he sees the reality (*yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati, yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati*).¹ All the Buddhist texts, whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, identify this law with Buddha and Dhamma.² It was this solution of the truth that appealed to the philosophical mind of Sāriputta and led to his conversion to Buddhism.³

"Many scholars, who have dealt with this formula, have attempted to elicit from it Buddha's theory of the origin of a being and some of them have actually drawn parallels between the links of the formula and the causal series of the Sāṃkhya.⁴ It is noteworthy that such attempts were also made in Buddhaghosa's time. Buddhaghosa has, however, pointed out that *avijjā*, the first link of the chain, must not be regarded as similar to *prakṛti* (*prakṛti*) of the Pakativādins (Sāṃkhya) because *avijjā* is neither uncaused (*akāraṇam*) nor is it the primary cause (*mūlakāraṇam*) of the world. It owes its origin to impurities (*āsavas*). The reason adduced by Buddhaghosa for its being made the first link in the chain is that Buddha used '*avijjā*' or '*bhava-taṇhā*' for commencing (*śisabbāvaṃ*) his discourses on topics

1 *Majjhima*, I, p. 191.

2 *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 51.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 208-9.

4 See Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 46 f.; for other refs., see Poussin, *Theories des douze causes*, p. vii, fn. 2.

which by their nature are without any beginning or end (*vaṭṭa-kathā* or *anamatagga*).¹ It is apparent therefore that *avijjā* need not necessarily be the first link in the chain of causation but that it is one of the terms found suitable by the author of the formula to begin the chain. It could as well be commenced by *bhavataṇhā*.² In the *Samyutta Nikāya*,³ the formula starts with *āhāra* as the first link. Hence, we see that the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is not meant to be an explanation of the origin of the world but just a chain of instances to illustrate the law of *idappaccayatā* (this-conditioned nature, *i.e.*, dependent origination) of things. Those scholars, who expected to find in it a key to the origin of the world, have been disappointed and have condemned it as illogical and incongruous. The author of the formula could not anticipate that his arrangement of the illustrations in a series would give rise to confusion."⁴ The chain was not meant to demonstrate a line of evolution. All that is intended to demonstrate is that any two links are related to each other in one or more of the twentyfour ways (*paccayas*), for which the usual general expression is "*imasmim sati idaṃ hoti*" (this being so that happens). There are in the *Paṭṭhāna* twentyfour such relations,⁵ viz., *hetu* (root-cause), *ārammaṇa* (basis, objective cause), *anantara* (immediate c.), *samanantara* (concomitant c.), *sahajāta* (co-existent c.), *añña-mañña* (interdependent c.), *nissaya* (supporting cause as earth to

1 *Vism.*, p. 525.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 525: *purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati avijjāya (or bhavataṇhāya), ito pubbe avijjā (or bhavataṇhā) nāhosi atha pacchā sambhavi ti. Evaṃ c'etaṃ bhikkhave, vuccati, atha ca pana paññāyati idappaccayā avijjā (or bhavataṇhā).* Cf. *Samyutta*, II, p. 178; III, p. 149.

3 *Samyutta*, II, pp. 101-3, *Mahāniddeśa*, I, pp. 25-6.

4 *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 208-9.

5 Cf. *Vism.*, p. 532; translation, p. 635; Intro. to *Paṭṭhāna* (P.T.S.).

tree), *upanissaya* (immediately effective cause), *purejāta* (preceding c.), *pacchajāta* (succeeding c.), *āsevana* (cause which requires repetition, e.g. study), *kamma* (previous actions), *vipāka* (fruition of previous actions), *ābāra* (sustenance), *indriya* (predominating factors), *jhāna* (meditation), *magga* (the eight-fold path), *sampayutta* (associated cause), *vippayutta* (dissociated cause), *atthi* (present cause), *natthi* (non-present cause), *vigata* (absent cause) and *avigata* (non-absent cause). It is in one or more of these relations that the two consecutive links are related to each other, e.g., *viññāṇa* is related to *nāmarūpa* as *aññamañña*; *jāti* is related to *jarā-marāṇa* as *purejāta* and *upanissaya*, and so forth. The law implies that any two links should be taken up for consideration for realising the *idappaccayatā* of worldly things.

Buddhaghosa observes that by *samuppāda* is not meant origin (*uppāda*), pure and simple. It is not also the doctrine of nothingness (*natthitā*). It negatives the doctrines of *sassata* and *uccheda*.¹ By the word *paṭicca* is meant that a thing originates not by itself (*ekekato*) nor without a cause (*nāpi abhetuto*); it originates by depending on certain other things (*paccayasāmaggiṃ paṭicca*) as a fruition (*phalavohārena*). By the compound word *paṭiccasamuppāda* is meant that a cause leads to an effect (*patimukhaṃ ito = gato*) unalterably, and the cause and effect are not separable from each other; cause and effect are mutually dependent and which mutual dependence is unalterably fixed.

The twelve terms composing the law of causation are explained thus:

(1) *Avijjā* or lack of true knowledge

The etymological meaning of the word *avijjā* is that it makes a person learn what should be unlearned and unlearn what

1 See above, pp. 39, 41.

should be learnt. It debars a person from taking a true view of worldly things. It makes a person see happiness in misery, good in evil, and *vice versa*, regard the unreals as reals, make differentiation where no differentiation exists, and so forth. The usual meaning attributed to it in the *Nikāyas* is non-comprehension of the *ariyasaccas*¹ while in the *Abbidhamma*, it is non-comprehension of *pubbanta* and *aparanta*, *sassata* and *uccheda*,² and of *idappaccayatā*.³ *Avijjā* screens the truth, and it is by the removal of *avijjā* that the *vijjā* or truth (i.e. *Nibbāna*) flashes before the eyes of an adept.

(2) *Sanṅkhārā* or thought-constructions, impressions

By the word *saṅkhārā* is meant the impressions or traces left in the mind by taking wrong view of things due to *avijjā*.⁴ On account of the lack of true knowledge, a person has the impression that desires conduce to happiness, that performance of sacrifices and practice of extreme austerities lead to liberation and so forth. The relation (*paccaya*) of *saṅkhārā* to *avijjā* may be one or more of the following four, viz., *ārammaṇa*, *adhipati*, *kamma*, and *upanissaya*. The impressions left on the mind by *avijjā* lead one to perform deeds which are (i) meritorious (*puñña*) such as gifts and observance of moral precepts, (ii) sinful (*apuñña*) such as killing and stealing, and (iii) neither meritorious nor sinful such as beliefs in *sassata* and *uccheda*. These three kinds of deeds may be (i) physical (*kāyika*), or verbal (*vācasika*) or mental (*mānasika*). Again, the impressions or thought cons-

1 See above, p. 263.

2 See above, pp. 49 ff.

3 See above, p. 266. Cf. *Dhammasaṅgani* § 1162.

4 This term *saṅkhārā* should be distinguished from the word *saṅkhārā* in phrases like *aniccā vata saṅkhārā*, where it means all that is constituted.

tructions (*saṅkhārā*) may be limited or unlimited, high or low, right or wrong, definite or indefinite. *Puññābhisāṅkhārā* cause rebirth in heavens, while *apuññābhisāṅkhārā* in hells and *āneñjābhisāṅkhārā* in the Arūpalokas.¹ The function of *saṅkhārā* is to produce the *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* (or *citta*) (the thought with which a being is reborn) and the mental states (*viññāṇas*) that follow the *paṭisandhi-citta*, which are all dependent on its previous deeds (*kammapaccaya*).²

(3) *Viññāṇa* or perception &

(4) *Nāma-rūpa* or mind and matter

The appearance of *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* marks the inception of the present life of a being. The very fact of a being's having a fresh existence implies that the being could not get rid of *avijjā* and its consequence *saṅkhārā* in its past life. An Arhat or Buddha only gets rid of the same and so does not have fresh *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa*. The *saṅkhārā* lead to the re-appearance of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, and the other *viññāṇas* immediately succeeding it, and it is around this *viññāṇa* that the other four khandhas cluster, forming a complete being with mind and matter.

Of these four khandhas, one is *rūpa* (matter) and the other three are *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* which along with *viññāṇa*, separately stated in the formula, are collectively called *nāma*. Buddhaghosa derives *nāma* from the root *nam*, to bend, and says *saññā*, *vedanā* and *saṅkhārā* are called *nāma* because they bend, direct the *viññāṇa* to the object (*ārammaṇa*). In the formula of twelve links, *viññāṇa* is made the paccaya of *nāma-rūpa*, but *nāma* also includes *viññāṇa*. In some enumerations,³ *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* are shown to be interdependent.

1 See above, p. 255-6. 2 *Vism.*, p. 558. 3 *Digha*, II, p. 56.

The reason for making *viññāṇa* an independent link is that *saṅkhārā* can be the *paccaya* (i.e. *kamma* and *upanissaya*) of *viññāṇa* only¹ and not of the other three khandhas or of *rūpa*. The *paṭisandhiviññāṇa* is of nineteen kinds.² *Viññāṇas*, which follow the *paṭisandhicitta* and *cuticitta*, are the five perceptions derived through the five sense-organs. Besides these five, there is the *mano-viññāṇa* which may be sub-divided into thirty-two kinds.³

Now the *viññāṇas*, which appear after *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*, gradually lead to *saññā* (perception), *vedanā* (feelings), and fresh *saṅkhārā* (thought-constructions), all of which become ultimately the *paccaya* of *rūpa* (matter).⁴ The relation of *nāma* to *rūpa* is one of the four *paccayas*, e.g. *sahajāta*, *aññamañña*, *nissaya* and *vipāka*.⁵ It is clearly stated in the *Vibhaṅga*⁶ that the sense-organs as also other matters in their subtlest state originate out of mind. This subtle *rūpa* is nourished by the food taken by the mother and shaped by the force of previous *karma*.

(5) *Salāyatana* or six sense-organs

Nāma-rūpa are mentioned as the *paccaya* of the six sense-organs. By *nāma* is meant here the three khandhas, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhārā*. By *rūpa* is taken the four great elements (*mahābhūtas*), the six objects (*vatthus*) viz., *rūpa*, *sadda*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *phoṭṭhabba* and *dhamma*, and vitality (*jīvita*). The above *rūpa* consisting of eleven elements takes its own course of

* 1 *Vism.*, p. 559-560. 2 For details, see *Vism.*, pp. 547 ff.

3 Cf. *Vism.*, p. 555-6; *kāmāvacarassa kusalassa katattā upacitattā vipākaṃ cakkuhviññāṇaṃ uppannaṃ hoti ti*. See *IHQ.*, vol. XV: The *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (analysed).

4 *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 144, 147: *nāmapaccayā chaṭṭhāyataṃ*.

5 *Vism.*, p. 561.

6 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 147.

evolution (*sa-santanti pariyāpannam*) and is related to *saḷāyatana* as *sabajāta*, *aññamaññā*, *nissaya*, *vippayutta*, *atthi* and *avigata*.¹ *Nāma* also have the above relations to the six sense-organs with the distinction that it is *sampayutta* and not *vippayutta paccaya* and it is also a *vipāka paccaya*.² But these two *nāma* and *rūpa* must come together to be a *paccaya* of the six sense-organs and not otherwise.³

(6) *Phassa or contact*

There are as many kinds of *phassa* (contact) as there are *āyatana*s, that is, six. *Phasso* appears as a result of the *āyatana*s taking their own course of evolution (*sakasantati-pariyāpannam*).⁴ The only point to be remembered is that *phasso* is put in the singular number as it is only one though there may be more than one sense-organ functioning, but one form of *phasso* is limited to one *āyatana*. The *āyatana*s are related to *phasso* in six or nine ways.⁵ The *phasso* can also be sub-divided like *viññāṇa* into thirty-two kinds.⁶

(7) *Vedanā or feeling*

There are as many feelings as there are doors, i.e., the sense-organs. *Vedanā* like *viññāṇa* may be sub-divided into 89 kinds.⁷ *Cakkhuppasāda*, etc., are related to feeling in eight ways.⁸

(8) *Taṇhā or thirst, desire*

There are as many kinds of thirst as there are sources i.e., the six objects of the sense-organs, viz., *rūpa-taṇhā*, *sadda-taṇhā* and

1 *Vism.*, p. 564.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 563.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 562.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 565.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 566.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 565.

7 See above, p. 255.

8 *Vism.*, p. 567.

so forth.¹ Each *taṇhā* may be of three kinds,² *kāma*, *bhava* and *vibhava*. When the *taṇhā* rouses a taste for the objects, *rūpa*, *sadda*, etc., it is called *kāma*. When it is associated with the belief that the world is eternally existing (*sassata*) and rouses an attachment (*rāga*) for future existence, it is called *bhava-taṇhā*. When it is associated with the belief that there is no after-life (*uccheda*), and one becomes regardless of this life, it is called *vibhava-taṇhā*.

(9) *Upādāna or strong attachment*

The previously mentioned *taṇhās* lead to *upādāna* and are related to it in seven or eight ways.³ There are four kinds of *upādāna*, *kāma*, *diṭṭhi*, *silabbata* and *attavāda*. *Kāmatanḥā* is the cause of *kāmuṇāpādāna*, which is the firm grasping of the object, it is thirst for objects not obtained and firmly holding the objects already obtained. *Diṭṭhūpādāna* is the firm adherence to wrong views, i.e., firm belief in the doctrine that there is no good effects of gifts or sacrifices, or belief in any one of the indeterminate problems: *sassata* or *uccheda*, *anta* or *ananta* etc.⁴ as true. *Silabbatupādāna* is the firm adherence to the belief that rituals or particular ascetic practices lead to liberation. *Attavādupādāna* is the firm belief in the existence of a soul, and in its identification with one of the five *khandhas*.⁵

(10) *Bhava or desire for existence*

It has two distinct meanings, one is existence according to one's past deeds, called *kammabhava*, and the other is the plane of existence wherein a being is reborn, called *uppattibhava*. The former is regulated by the three kinds of *saṅkhārā*, *puñña*, *apuñña* and *āneñja* in their two grades low and high. But

1 *Vibhaṅga*, p. 380. 2 See above, p. 263. 3 *Vism.*, p. 570-1.

4 See above, p. 45-6.

5 See above, p. 85.

saṅkhārā are not mentioned as the *paccaya* of *bhava*, so we are to ascertain how *upādāna* is the *paccaya* of *bhava*. Buddhaghosa points out that *kāmapādāna* leads to such actions which cause a being to be reborn in the *kāma* *bhava* and so it can be described as *kammabhava*. Other *upādānas* viz., *diṭṭhi*, *sīlabbata* and *attavāda* make a person adhere to wrong views, and influenced by those views he performs actions which lead to existences in *kāma* and other words, so in this sense, it can be called *kammabhava*. By *upattibhava* is meant the several planes of existence, such as *Kāma*, *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* *lokas*. Some of these may be *asaññā* (without perception) and some may be with *saññā* (perception) but so subtle that it is incapable of perceiving any object (*nevasaññā-nāsaññā*). *Uppattibhava* may also be classified according to the number of *khandhas*, a being may possess, e.g. *kāma*- or *rūpa*-*bhava* have five *khandhas* while *arūpa* and *nevasaññānāsaññā* have only four, *asaññābhava* has one.

(11) *Jāti* or birth

Jāti is controlled by *kammabhava* and not *upattibhava*. It is related to *bhava* in two ways, *kamma* and *upanissaya*. Birth is dependent on certain external circumstances, but assuming those as common in two beings, one notices differences between the two. This difference is due to the nature of *kamma*-*bhava*, in other words, deeds of past life, so it is said *kammaṃ satte vibhajati, yad idaṃ hīnapañītatāyā ti*.¹

(12) *Jarāmaraṇa-soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa* or old age, death, grief, lamentation, and sorrow

These are all due to *jāti* but the relation of these to *jāti* is only two, viz., *upanissaya* and *purejāta*.

¹ *Majjhima*, III, p. 203.

CHAPTER XVI

GROWTH OF THE SAṄGHA

Before and at the time of the appearance of Buddhism monasticism in the form it obtained among the Buddhists was unknown in India. There were brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic recluses who dwelt, or moved about, in groups,¹ and there were also in the forests and outskirts of towns or villages hermitages (*āśramas*) wherein lived not only those who had taken the third and fourth āśramas of life, viz., *vānaprastha* and *yati* but also life-long sannyāsins with their disciples including sometimes the members of their families, male and female, who had taken the vow of *brahmacarya*. In the *Nikāyas*,² we come across accounts referring to rich khattiyas and brāhmaṇas, who after having their head and moustache shaven, body unbesmeared with oil, and putting on deer-skins and using deer horns for scratching his body, took resort to hermitages newly built on the outskirt of the town, and dwelt there with wife and purohita, living on cow's milk. Leading such a life they performed also sacrifices, offering animal-victims and so forth. There were also āśramas of life-long sannyāsins like Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra. In these āśramas the Guru or the chief teacher not only acted as the spiritual head imparting esoteric and exoteric religious instructions but also regulated the daily life of the inmates according to the usages of brahmacārins.

1 See above, ch. III.

2 *Majjhima*, I, p. 343-4.

There is nothing on record to show that there existed in the pre-Buddhist days any code of disciplinary rules governing the life of a *brāhmacārin*. The earliest Dharmasūtras are those of Gautama, Baudhāyana and Āpastamba but their date cannot be put earlier than 600 B.C. even according to Prof. Kane.¹ There were sūtra-works of Saṅkha-Likhita and Paiṭhanasī from which quotations are given in the Dharmasūtras, but references to Ācāryas, the Vedas, the Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa, Taittirīya and other Āraṇyakas, as sources of much of the materials of the Dharmasūtras prove only that in the seventh century B.C. there did not exist any code for brahmacārins though there were usages for their guidance. In this connection we may refer to the Vekhanassas² a brāhmanical order referred to in the Nikāyas. Both Gautama and Baudhāyana speak of a *Vaikhānasa* or *Vikhānasa sūtra*, and in fact base the chapter on the duties of a recluse on some such work, for which later on the term *Vikhānasa* became a synonym for *vānaprastha*.³

Pāṇini speaks of a *Bhikṣu-sūtra* while Baudhāyana and Āpastamba use the term 'bhikṣu' instead of 'parivrājaka' and mention that bhikṣus lived at one place during the rainy season.⁴ Evidently the writers of dharma-sūtras had in mind, besides the brāhmaṇayatis who were also called bhikṣus, the Buddhist bhikṣus as also the parivrājakas whose number became fairly large in the 6th century B.C. These parivrājakas or wandering brahmacārins lived a form of communal life, but there is no evidence of their having any code. Their daily life, it seems, was regulated by their chief according to the traditional usage.⁵ In the

1 Kane, *History of the Dharmasāstra*, p. 19. 2. See ante., p. 33.

3 For *Vaikhānasa-dharma-praśna*, see Kane, *op. cit.*, pp. 105 ff.

4 Kane, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

5 See for details Vidhusekhara Sastri, *Pātimokkha*, Intro., pp. 21 ff.

*Anguttara Nikāya*¹ there are a few hints relating to dress, food, bed and seats of non-Buddhistic parivṛājakas, which are practically the same as detailed in a previous chapter.²

The Jainas may be pointed as the only pre-Buddhistic religious order which had a monastic system and a code, which has come down to us in the form of the *Ācāraṅga-sūtra*. This work contains rules adapted to the ethical principles of the Jainas. It is not improbable that the Buddhists formulated their rules partly on the lines of the Jainas, their Uposathas, Pajjusana, etc.

The Buddhists adopted more or less the general directions scattered in the brāhmanic and non-brāhmanic literatures for the *brahmacārins* and *sannyāsins* and it was after some years had passed when the number of followers had grown fairly large that Buddha thought of framing a code of disciplinary rules in keeping with the teaching promulgated by him i.e., the *majjhimā-paṭipadā* which kept clear of the two extreme forms of life, viz., that of a rigorous non-brāhmanic ascetic and that of an ease-loving householder. He laid more emphasis on the control of mind (*citta*) than on body (*kāya*) and speech (*vācā*),³ and so he formulated a code of rules which answered to his ideal. The life of a monk living in a monastery but practising meditation in a forest or cemetery was Buddha's ideal and so he directed that the monasteries should be located at a lonely spot outside but not very far from the limits of a town or a village so that the monks

Miss D. Bhagvat, *Early Buddhist Jurisprudence*, 1939, ch. I; Barua, *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 241.

¹ *Anguttara*, i, p. 240: aññatitthiyā paribbājakā paññāpentī cīvarapavivekaṃ, piṇḍapātapavivekaṃ and senāsana-pavivekaṃ.

² See *ante*, p. 18 re. ascetic practices.

³ In contrast to the Jainas who regarded *kāyadaṇḍa* as more important than *manodaṇḍa*. See *Majjhima*, I, p. 372.

might have little trouble in collecting their food and dress and other requisites from the towns people or village folk for the bare maintenance of the physical frame. The ideal monastery was a cave-dwelling in the hills around a town or village, vow of poverty was the rule, and alms was the sole support. Though magnificent Vihāras were built and all possible comforts compatible with a monk's life were provided, the bhikkhus were disciplined to look upon them with discern and utilise them just so far as was necessary to maintain their body. Abuses there must have been, as all bhikkhus were not imbued with the ideals of a bhikkhu life, and so the Buddhists could not help formulating a code to curb the recalcitrants. Once the code was started, it went on being revised and added on, and ultimately receiving the shape of a Piṭaka in five parts. Every aspect of a monk's life had to be dealt with, to wit, the probationary period and initiation, training under the Ācariya and Upajjhāya, daily life including food, dress and other articles of use, residence and the mode of residing in it, religious ceremonies like the *Uposatha*, *Vassāvāsa*, *Pavāraṇā*, and *Kaṭbina*, ecclesiastical procedure for punishment and absolution from guilt, dissensions in the Saṅgha and the methods of settling disputes among monks.¹ With the introduction of the initiation of women, another code came into existence to regulate

1 Cf. *Āṅguttara*, i, p. 99; iv, p. 144; pātimokkhaṃ, pātimokkhuddesā, pātimokkhaṭṭhapanam, pavaraṇā, pavaraṇā-ṭṭhapanam, tājjanīyakammaṃ, nissayak., pabbājaniyak., paṭisāraṇiyak., ukkhepaniyak., parivāsadanam, mūlāya paṭikassanam, mānattadānam, abbhānam, voṣāraṇiyam, nissāraṇiyam, upasampadā, ṇattik., ṇattidutiyak., ṇatticatutthak., sammukkhāvinayo, sativinayo, amūlḥhavinayo, paṭiññātakaraṇam yebbuyyasikā, tassapāpiyyasikā, tiṇavattḥārako. See also *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 231 ff. sādhiyam, diyaḍḍhasaṭam, sikkhāpadaṃ, anvaddhamāsaṃ uddesam āgacchati.

the life of the nuns. This code was more or less a supplement to the code of the monks, having some special rules for the conduct of the nuns.¹

Saṅgha: its beginning

Buddha started his mission as an eremetical teacher and had hardly any intention of forming a Saṅgha. The Vinaya tradition shows that the idea of a Saṅgha was thrust upon him, but once he had taken it up, he did his best to place it on as thorough a basis as possible. Every delinquency on the part of a bhikkhu reported to him had his immediate attention, and a rule was framed to avert its future repetition, and this was done with a view to, in the words of Buddha, *appasannānam va pasādāya pasannāṃ va bhiyyobbhāvāya* (to make the non-believers believing and the believers doubling their faith).

The story of his forming the first band of disciples is related thus in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*:²

Buddha's first converts were the five brahmins Aññāta-konḍañña, Vappa, Bhaddiya, Mahānāma and Assaji, his quondam companions.³ The words in which they sought admission into the order were simply "*labheyyāma mayā bhante bhagavato santike pabbajjāṃ, labheyyāma upasampadan ti.*" There was no formality, the only reply given by the Teacher was "*ettha bhikkhavo ti.*" The next batch of persons to accept his teaching was Yasa of Benares and his four friends Vimala, Subāhu, Puṇṇaji and Gavampati, and his fifty other friends, and the procedure for admission was the same as above. Now there were in all sixty disciples who were all arhats. Buddha then sent out the sixty arhats to as many places as they could reach,

1 See *Infra*, ch. XVIII.

2 *Vinaya*, I, 1-24.

3 See above, pp. 101-2, 137.

directing them not to go to one place even in twos.¹ He himself went to Uruvela Senā-nigamo.

The *Vinaya* is silent about the activities of the sixty arhats though it mentions the difficulties experienced by them in admitting persons into the order by having to present them before Buddha for the purpose of ordination.² It relates in detail how Buddha converted the thirty Bhaddavaggiya youths and the Jatila teachers, the three Kassapas with their disciples,³ and how one of the five brāhmaṇa ascetics, Assaji, was instrumental in bringing about the conversion of Sāriputta. The ordination so far effected was made by Buddha personally by uttering the two words: "*ehi bhikkhu*". Neither the *Vinaya* nor the *Nikāyas* continue the story of conversion any further, though they speak of stray converts made by Buddha from time to time, but a continuous story has been attempted in the later works like the *Buddhavaṃsa* and the *Aṭṭhakathās*.⁴ After the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, Buddha naturally turned his eyes to his homeland, Kapilavatthu. Here he permitted Rāhula to join the order and asked Sāriputta to give him the ordination. Among other Sākyas that joined the order were Nanda, Ānanda, Devadatta, Anuruddha, Bhaddiya, Bhagu, Kimbila and the barber Upāli.⁵ Most of these figured notably in the subsequent history of the religion and formed in fact the main props of the religion.

It will be observed that Rāhula was ordained by Sāriputta and not by Buddha, and that Sāriputta acted as Rāhula's *ācariya*. It was on this occasion that Buddha empowered his disciples to

¹ *Vinaya*, I, p. 19-20. Mr. S. Dutt interprets it differently in his *Early Buddhist Monachism*.

² *Vinaya*, I, p. 21-22.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-28.

⁴ See above, ch. XI. ⁵ Thomas, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 101 f.

confer ordination.¹ Buddha himself did not observe any rule for conferring ordination. After the conversion of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, he admitted into the Saṅgha a few others like Aṅgulimāla by the words "ehi bhikkhu."

It was while Buddha was staying at Kapilavatthu that he enlarged the rules of initiation, which were first introduced by him while he was staying at Rājagaha.²

The sixty disciples sent out by the Teacher for propagating his new teaching had hitherto no authority to confer ordination on desiring entrants and had to bring them from different parts of the country to the place where Buddha was staying at the time. This was sometimes found impracticable³ and led Buddha to delegate his power of ordination to his disciples who were however directed to observe certain rules. Several restrictions were also imposed to avoid unworthy persons getting into the Saṅgha. The rules and restrictions were generally as follows:—

Rules for Admission

i. A person seeking ordination was required to shave his hair and moustache,⁴ put on yellow robes, and after covering one shoulder only by the yellow robes, sit on his legs, salute the bhikkhus, and then with folded hands, utter the *tisarāṇa* formula.⁵

ii. After some time when the utterance of mere *tisarāṇa* formula was found inadequate, the system of *ñatti-catuttthakamma* was introduced.⁶ The procedure was that an entrant,

1 *Vinaya*, I, 54, 3.

2 *Ibid.*, I, 19, 28, 31 f.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 21-2.

4 Sanction of the Saṅgha was required for *bhaṇḍukamma*.—*Mv.*, I, 48, 2.

5 *Vinaya*, I, p. 21-2.

6 *Ibid.*, I, p. 55-6.

whose age must not be less than fifteen in case of *pabbajjā* and twenty in case of *upasampadā*, is to sit on his legs and ask for ordination in a set formulae (*kammavācā*)¹ before a chapter of at least ten fully ordained monks.² He must be presented to the chapter by his *upajjhāya*, or *ācariya*, a competent monk³ selected by him beforehand. He must also satisfy the monks present that he had complied with the preliminary conditions like taking parents' consent, shaving head and so forth. His intention to become a fully ordained monk is announced thrice (*natti-catuttha*) by the *upajjhāya* or *ācariya*. After the announcement, if there is none dissenting, the ordination is conferred. Immediately after the ordination the entrant is apprised of the four *nissayas*⁴ upon which he is to depend, viz., living on alms, using robes made out of rags, sleeping under trees, and taking urine and such other filthy things as medicine. These were however later on relaxed.⁵

After *pabbajjā* ceremony a *sāmaṇera* is asked to observe only the ten precepts⁶ and it was after *upasampadā* that a monk is asked to observe the four *pārājikās* and other rules of the *Pātimokkha*.⁷

Bars to Admission

Persons belonging to non-Buddhistic religious orders could only be admitted into the Saṅgha after they had gone through a probationary period (*parivāsa*) of four months and behaved

1 *Mahāvagga*, i, 29. 1; 49. 6; 51. 1.

2 *Ibid.*, i, 31. 2.

3 *Vinaya*, I, p. 57: *vyattena bhikkhunā paṭibaleṇa saṃgho nāpetabbo*. A bhikkhu is considered competent if he is proficient in *sīla*, *samādhi*, *paññā*, *vimutti* and *vimuttiñāṇa-dassana*. He must be a monk of ten years standing. See *Vinaya*, I, pp. 60-63.

4 Bhagvat, *Early Buddhist Jurisprudence*, pp. 68-71.

5 See *Infra*, pp. 285 ff. 6 *Mahāvagga*, i, 56. 7 *Ibid.*, i, 78.

themselves properly during the period.¹ Exceptions however were made, in the case of the Jāṭilas and the Sākyas, the former being believers in the effects of past deeds (*kammavādino kiriyavādino*) and the latter being kinsmen of the Teacher.²

Persons suffering from any of the five diseases, viz., leprosy (*kuṭṭham*), boils (*gaṇḍo*), dry leprosy (*kiḷāso*), consumption (*soso*), and fits (*apamāro*) were debarred from admission into the Saṅgha. Other persons who were excluded from admission into the Saṅgha were (a) *rājabbāṭo* (men in royal service), *dhajabaddho coro* (declared thieves), *kārābbedako coro* (jail-breaker), *likhitako coro*, (proclaimed robber), *kasābāṭo katadaṇḍakammo* (scourged offender), *lakkhaṇābāṭo* (branded thief), *ināyiko* (debtor), *dāso* (slave), a matricide, a parricide, an arhantacide, one who has violated a nun, one who has caused a schism, one who has shed Buddha's blood, a eunuch, a hermaphrodite, an animal in human form, one whose hand or feet or both have been severed and one who has furtively joined the Saṅgha.³

Nissayas

There were two ceremonies of ordination, the first made the desiring entrant a *sāmaṇera* by conferring *pabbajjā*, which literally means 'going out from home to homeless life' and the second known as *upasampadā* made the *sāmaṇera* a regular member of the order—a *bhikkhu*. A newly ordained *bhikkhu* was required to take *nissaya*, that is, he had to be dependent on a teacher, for training. The teacher should be a competent monk, whose duty was to make his ward observe and practise the Vinaya rules. Before the ceremony of ordination (*upasampadā*) could be performed, the monk must have training

1 *Mahāvagga*, i, 38. 1.

2 *Ibid.*, i, 38. 11.

3 *Ibid.*, i, 61. 1 to i, 71. 1.

for at least ten years and at the same time must prove himself fit and proper for membership of the *Saṅgha*.¹

The *pabbajjā* ceremony was not a formal affair. The utterance of *tisarāṇa* formula was all that was necessary. The *Samāṇa*, however, at the time of recruitment had to choose formally his *upajjbāya*,² as also an *ācariya*,³ both of whom must be learned, discreet and of ten years standing.

A *Samāṇa*'s first duty was to provide himself with an alms-bowl and robes,⁴ observe the ten precepts, and render all possible services to his teacher. As a general rule he must be respectful to all monks,⁵ and should never speak ill of Buddha, Dhamma and *Saṅgha* nor adhere to any false belief.⁶ He was taught not only the moral laws, conduct and demeanour, but was also initiated into the mysteries of Buddhist philosophy. There are elaborate rules⁷ regulating the mutual duties and obligations of a teacher (*upajjbāya*) and his disciple (*saddbivibārika*) as also the cessation of their relation. The relation of a teacher and a disciple should be that of a father and son and it is by mutual reverence, confidence and communion that one can prosper in the *dharmma* and *vinaya*.⁸ It is not clear what was

1 *Mv.*, i, 32. 1. In i, 53. 4 ff. the period is reduced to 5 years.

2 *Mv.*, i, 25. 7; i, 69. 1.

3 *Ibid.*, i, 32. 1.

4 *Mv.*, i, 69. 1; 32. 1.

5 *Ibid.*, i, 70. 1 & 5.

6 *Ibid.*, i, 60. 1.

7 For details see *Mv.*, i, 25-27; 32-35. *Cv.*, viii, 11-14.

8 *Mv.*, i, 25. 7; i, 32. 1: *evaṃ te aññaṃaññaṃ sagāravā sapatissā sabhāgavuttino viharantā imasmiṃ dhammavinaye vuḍḍhim, viruḥhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissanti*. Even if the *upajjbāya* deserves *parivāsa*, *mūlāya paṭikassanā* or any other disciplinary measure, it was the duty of the *saddbivibārika* to move the *Saṅgha* for correcting his teacher (*Mv.*, i, 25. 21).

the function of the *Ācariya*.¹ It may be that he gave the *nissayas*, prescribed the *kammattṭhānas* for meditation to his disciple (*ante-vāsika*), in short, trained him up in the esoteric practices, while the *upajjhāya* taught the three piṭakas and imparted the general instructions, in other words, the exoteric aspects of Buddhism. In the absence of the *upajjhāya*, the *ācariya* had also to perform the functions of an *upajjhāya*, and *vice versa*. In the *Mahāvagga* and *Cullavagga*, (viii. 13-14) the functions of an *ācariya* and *upajjhāya* are given in identical terms, and it is enjoined that in the absence of one, the other had to perform the functions of both.²

Residence and Articles of furniture

It has been mentioned above that for the residence of monks *rukkehamūlasenāsanam* (residence under trees) was the original rule, while a monastery (*vihāra*), a pinnacled house (*aḍḍhayoga*), a big building (*pāsāda*), an attic (*hammiya*) and a cave (*guhā*) were later on allowed as *attirekalābha*.³ It was at the instance of Bimbisāra that Buddha accepted the Veluvana-vihāra, and in consequence of which he sanctioned *ārāmas* for the dwelling of monks.⁴

The monks were still then dwelling at foots of trees, on hills, in grottoes and caves, in cemeteries, forests, open places, or on straw-heaps.⁵ The *seṭṭhis* of Rājagaha were the first to come forward to provide *vihāra*, *aḍḍhayoga*, *pāsāda*, *hammiya* and *guhā* for the monks.⁶ They built sixty *vihāras*, and dedicated the same to the use of members of the order of the four

1 See *SBE.*, XIII, p. 178-9 fn. I am indebted to my colleague Mr. G. D. De for a few suggestions here.

2 *Mv.*, i, 30. 4.

3 *Mv.*, i, 22. 18.

4 *Cv.*, vi, 1. 1.

5 *Mv.*, i. 2.

corners (*saṭṭhiṃ vihāre āgatānāgatassa cātuddissassa saṃghassa paṭiṭṭhāpebīti*). These had plastered walls, white-washed or coloured, and were provided with doors and windows, verandahs, boundary walls, etc.¹ The vihāras so far constructed were provided with the bare requirements of monks as shown above. It was Anāthapiṇḍika who built a monastery at Sāvatti with all its component parts, viz., dwelling rooms, cells, gate-chambers, service-halls, halls with fire-places, store-houses, closets, cloisters, rooms for walking exercises, wells, sheds for the well, bathing places, bath-rooms, tanks, pavilions (*vihāra, pariveṇa, koṭṭhaka, upaṭṭhānasālā, aggisālā, kappiyakuṭi, vaccakuṭi, caṅkama, caṅkamasālā, udapāna, udapānasālā, jantāghara, jantāgharasālā, pokkharanī, maṇḍapa*).²

The institution of *Caṅkamasālās*³ and *Jantāghara*⁴ was permitted at the instance of Jīvaka and elaborate directions are given for the construction of these. The directions for *jantāghara* were given mostly in connection with the provision of fire in the rooms and the methods of taking baths. For privies and urinating places there are similar directions, and in addition there are also some instructions regarding the use of bath-rooms and privies (*jantāghara-vattaṃ* and *vaccakuṭivattaṃ*).⁵ The *Kappiyakuṭi* also requires some justification because the monks were required to take the vow of poverty and were prohibited to store any food. This anomalous position has been met by

1 For details, see *Cv.*, vi, 2 & 3.

2 *Cullavagga*, vi, 4, 10; viii, 7, 4; *Mahāvagga*, iii, 5, 6. For the various kinds of rooms in a house for the use of a householder, see *Mv.*, iii, 5, 10; *SBE.*, vol. XX, p. 189; Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 122-3, 183.

3 *Cullavagga*, v, 14.

4 *Ibid.*, v, 14, 3; viii, 8.

5 *Ibid.*, v, 35; viii, 8, 10.

Buddha by recommending *kappiyabbumi* outside the boundary of the monastery.¹

In consonance with the leniency gradually shown by Buddha in the matter of residence suitable for the monks, great latitude was given also in regard to seats, beds, and other articles of furniture.² The monks were allowed to have as their seats or beds benches built against the walls, bedsteads with short removable legs, arm-chairs, sofas, cushioned chairs, carpets, pillows, bolsters stuffed with wool, cotton, grass etc. They were required to keep them clean, and there are also directions for cleaning the vihāra and articles of furniture.³

The monks were generally not allowed to use animal skins for seats or beds⁴ but exception was made in the case of monks living in Avatidakkhināpatha where the skins of *eḷaka*, *aḷa* and *miga* could be used for *atttharaṇas*.⁵

Sometimes difficulties were experienced in accommodating monks in monasteries, some of which were very small. Rules had to be framed for ascertaining the claim of priority, and in course, of time, office-bearers like *Senāsanapaññāpaka*⁶ had to be appointed to arrange for accommodating the incoming bhikkhus properly.

Dress of Monks

For the dress of monks, *pamsukūlacīvara* was the rule while linen, cotton, silk, woollen garments, coarse cloth, hempen

1 *Mahāvagga*, vi, 33; cf. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 184. See *Infra.*, p. 289.

2 In *Mv.*, v, 10. 5 the following *Uccāsayanamahāsayanāni* were prohibited: *āsandi pallaṅko goṇako cittakā paṭikā paṭalikā tūlikā vikatikā* and so forth.

3 *Cullavagga*, vii, 7. 4 *Mahāvagga*, v, 7. 10 5 *Ibid.*, v, 13. 3.

6 Other office-bearers relating to *Senāsana* were *Navakammika* and *Senāsanagāhāpaka* (*Cv.*, vi, 11. 2). See *Infra.*, p. 322.

(*khomam kappāsikam koseyyam kambalam sāṇam bhaṅgam*)¹ were extra concessions (*atirekalābha*). It was at the instance of Jīvaka Komārabhacca that Buddha permitted his followers to accept the robes (*cīvaras*) offered by laymen. These could be made of six kinds of materials mentioned above.² A monk was allowed only three garments (*cīvaras*), viz., *saṃghāṭi*, *uttarā-saṅgha* and *antarāvāsaka*.³ The *cīvaras* had to be made out of cut pieces of cloth so that when sewn together should look like cultivated fields.⁴ There are several rules relating to the dyeing of *cīvaras*, drying dyed cloths, division and distribution of the *cīvaras* among the recipients, and so forth. In division and distribution many difficulties cropped up, leading to the creation of office-bearers like *cīvarabbhājaka* (distributor of robes), *bhaṇḍā-gāra* (store-keeper), *cīvaranidābaka* (keeper of robes), and *cīvara-paṭiggābaka*, (receiver of robes). Each of these office-bearers were formally appointed by the Saṅgha by unanimous consent.⁵ The *Pātimokkha-sutta* takes notice of several irregularities in the distribution and use of *cīvaras* and so prescribes punishments for the irregularities. Besides *cīvaras*, the bhikkhus were allowed to accept mantles (*pāvāra*), blankets (*kambala*), towels (*mukha-puñchaka colaka*), bags (*parikkhāracolaka*), bathing clothes (*udaka-sāṭika*), and bandages for itches, wounds, etc. (*kaṇḍupaṭicchādī*)⁶ It cannot be definitely stated when the use of shoes by monks came into vogue. According to the tradition, permission was granted by Buddha for the use of shoes when Sāgata was the servitor of Buddha. Once the privilege was given, there were abuses, and to counteract these several restrictions had to be

1 *Mv.*, i, 30. 4; *SBE.*, XIII, p. 173.

2 *Mv.*, viii, 3. 1.

3 *Mv.*, viii, 13. 5; *SBE.*, XVII, p. 212; a double waist cloth, a single upper robe, and a single undergarment.

4 *Mv.*, viii, 12. 2

5 *Mv.*, viii, 5-9.

6 *Mv.*, viii, 17-20.

imposed regarding colour, shape and materials of the shoes¹ and the use of those in the cloisters (*caṅkamana*) or in the presence of the Upajjhāya, and so forth.

Pūtimuttabbhesajjam

Like the previous two *nissayas*, *pūtimuttabbhesajjam* (urine and such other medicines) was the original rule, but later on *sappi* (butter), *navanīta* (cream), *teḷa* (oil), *madhu* (honey), *phānita* (molasses) were allowed to be taken but only in the forenoon. Later on, however, the time was not only extended, but permission was also given for storing the same upto seven days² in supersession of the rule that no food should be stored. In course of time these were found inadequate to keep the bhikkhus free from ailments, so permission was given for using as medicines animal-fats, medicinal roots, herbs, leaves, fruits, gums, salts, and such other drugs prescribed in the *Āyurveda-śāstra*, including even raw meat and blood, besides gruels and broths. Use of hot baths, purgatives, ointments, and dressing of wounds were recommended in cases of necessity. Receptacles, instruments, and other articles required for preparing medicines or applying ointments, letting of blood by lancets, use of surgical appliances and requisities, were sanctioned as a matter of course. Surgical operation was prohibited only in cases of wounds which were within two inches of the anus. The monks, in fact, were allowed to take almost all medicinal and surgical aids available at the time, the only condition being that they in the name of medicines must not drift to excesses or enjoy the comforts of a householder.

Piṇḍiyālopabbhojanam

Originally the monks were enjoined to live only on alms, but in course of time the rule was relaxed and they were allowed

1 *Mv.*, v, 1. 30 ff.

2 *Mv.*, vi, 1. 5; 15. 10.

to accept invitations when extended to a Saṅgha as a body, or to a group of individuals, or to an individual. They could also accept food distributed by tickets (*salākā*), fortnightly meals, meals on the Uposatha days or meals offered on every first day (*pratipad*) of a fortnight.¹

The restrictions regarding food were further relaxed in the section on medicaments. Not only sick but also healthy monks were allowed to take sugar-water,² or other sweet drinks,³ fruits,⁴ meat and fish under certain conditions.⁵

By the sanction of *Kappiya-bhūmi* for the storage of food, further latitude was given to the monks in the matter of obtaining their food, even, if necessary, by cooking. The site of the Kappiyabhūmi had to be selected beyond the boundary limits of a monastery, with the exception that the site if not so found, a cow-shed or a layman's building within the boundaries of a monastery might be used as a Kappiyabhūmi. A bhikkhu was entrusted with the management of the Kappiyabhūmi. He was called Kappiyakāraka. It is said that bhikkhus undertaking a journey were permitted even to receive gold through the Kappiyakāraka and purchase the necessities of life.⁶ Lastly the bhikkhus were given full discretion in matters of food and medicaments regarding which there was no express direction in the Vinaya.⁷

Uposatha and Pātimokkha Assemblies

Following the practice of the non-Buddhistic sects, Buddha introduced (tradition says at the instance of King Bimbisāra) the

1 *Saṅghabbatta, Uddesabbatta, Nimantana, Salākābbatta, Pakkhika, Uposathika, and Paṭipadika*. See *Infra.*, p. 322.

2 *Mv.*, vi, 27. 1.

3 *Mv.*, vi, 35. 6.

4 *Mv.*, vi, 38. 1.

5 *Mv.*, vi, 31. 14. Cf. *Infra.*, p. 312.

6 *Mv.*, vi, 34. 21.

7 *Mv.*, vi, 40.

fortnightly sitting of monks either on the 14th or 15th (and/or 8th) day, to hold discussions about the Dhamma and Vinaya and to recite the rules of the *Pātimokkha*.¹ Before the recitation, the preliminaries to be attended to, were: Sweeping of the Uposatha hall, provision of seats, lamps and drinking water, formal announcement of the day, declaration of *Pārisuddhi* of all the members, selection of monks to put and answer questions relating to *dhamma* and *vinaya*, counting of the members to ascertain the completeness of the Saṅgha.²

As completeness implied a jurisdiction of the Saṅgha, rules were framed for defining the limits (*sīmā*) of a Saṅgha, i.e., of a *Pātimokkha* assembly. Formal selection was made of the spot where the monks were to meet for the purpose of a *Pātimokkha* assembly. Completeness of an assembly implied also the presence of not only all the existing members of an *āvāsa* but also of those who might belong to another *āvāsa* but happened to be present on the Uposatha day within the *sīmā* of that *āvāsa*. There were occasions when the members of an *āvāsa* held an assembly without being assured of the presence of members belonging to another *āvāsa*, but dwelling within the *āvāsa* on the Uposatha day. Rules were prescribed for bonafide mistakes but, as a rule, if the members of another *āvāsa* were larger in number, the assembly had to be held anew.³ When however an assembly was held deliberately to avoid or exclude the incoming members of another *āvāsa*, the members joining the assembly became guilty of either *dukkata* or *thullaccaya* according

1 Cf. *IHQ.*, XII (1936), pp. 383-390: Uposatha by J. Przyluski; *Journal of Buddhist India* (1927), pp. 304 ff.: Uposatha by G. D. De.

2 Saṅgha would not be complete unless all the bhikkhus attended the meeting personally or by proxy.

3 *Mv.*, ii, 28, 4.

to the nature of the intention. The bhikkhus, however, were directed not to leave their residence on the Uposatha day except on an urgent business of the Saṅgha.¹

The bhikkhus were required to attend the assembly fully dressed (*ticīvarena avippavāsa*) with certain exceptions, recite the rules of the Pātimokkha in extenso, abridging it only in cases of danger. In cases of necessity bhikkhus from other āvāsas were invited for reciting the Pātimokkha.

There were special procedures for the declaration of *Pārisuddhi* by a sick monk, for obtaining his consent to the ecclesiastical acts passed in the assembly, and for dealing with a monk who has become insane. The minimum number of members who could hold a Pātimokkha assembly was four; for declaration of *Pārisuddhi* only, the minimum number of bhikkhus required was two,² and in both the cases actual attendance of the members was indispensable. If there were only one bhikkhu in an āvāsa, he had to take to *adhiṭṭhāna*.³ The *pārisuddhi* of an assembly was obtained by making all the members declare individually that they had not committed any breach of the Pātimokkha rules during the preceding fortnight, or by making those who had committed any breach confess their offences. There were exceptional occasions when collective declaration of *pārisuddhi* was accepted.⁴

The recitation of the *Pātimokkha* could be made only in an assembly in which the members had declared their *pārisuddhi* and in which there were no bhikkhunīs, sāmaṇeras, sāmaṇerīs, or

1 *Mv.*, ii, 35.

2 There is a special procedure in case of one bhikkhu. See *Mv.*, ii, 26. 9.

3 *Adhiṭṭhāna*=resolution, self-determination. 4 *Mv.*, ii, 27. 8.

any bhikkhu undergoing punishment, or persons not admissible to the Saṅgha.¹ In the *Cullavagga*² it is laid down that the recitation of the Pātimokkha should be interdicted (*Pātimokkham t̥hapetabbam*) if there were any impure bhikkhu in the assembly. The interdiction was required in cases where bhikkhus were too obstinate to acknowledge their guilt.

Vassāvāsa

The observance of *vassāvāsa* came into vogue among the Buddhist monks at an early date. To avoid the inconvenience of travelling in the rains and the chance of injuring sprouts and insects, it was enjoined that the bhikkhus should stay at one place (*āvāsa*) during three months of the rains, commencing from the day next to the fullmoon of *Āṣāḍha* (June-July) or *Srāvana* (July-August). In cases of urgent calls only for the benefit of the Saṅgha or of the lay-devotees or sick persons, or for some particular business of the Saṅgha, the bhikkhus were allowed to leave the *āvāsa* for seven days only.³ There was however no bar to bhikkhus leaving the *āvāsa*⁴ if there be danger to life through beasts of prey, snakes, robbers, or if the residence be destroyed by fire or water, or if there be great scarcity of food or medicine, or lack of lay-devotees, or any chance of *śīlavipatti* or *saṅghabbheda*.

The bhikkhus could take up *vassāvāsa* with a moving caravan, ship or cattle-pen but not in the hollow of a tree, in the open air or under a sun-shade.⁵

In the selection of the residence during *vassā* the monks were recommended to stay in those places where the number of lay-

1 *Mv.*, ii, 36.

2 *Cv.*, ix.

3 For *Sattābhakarāṇiya*, see *Mv.*, iii, 5 ff.

4 For *anāpatti vassacchedassa*, see *Mv.*, iii, 9 ff.

5 *Mv.*, iii, 12.

devotees was large but a monk who had given previously his word to a lay-devotee must keep it.¹

Pavāraṇā

The ceremony of *Pavāraṇā* was performed at the end of the *vassāvāsa*. The object of the ceremony was to confess all sins of omission and commission (seen, heard or apprehended)² that might have been committed during the *vassāvāsa*. It was almost the same as the declaration of *pārisuddhi* in the Pātimokkha assemblies dealt with before. Elaborate rules were laid down regarding the procedure of the *pavāraṇā* ceremony, most of them being identical with those of *pārisuddhi*. Like the *pārisuddhi-ṭhapanam* (interdiction of *pārisuddhi* declaration), there was also the system of *pavāraṇā-ṭhapanam* (interdiction of *pavāraṇā* ceremony).³

Kaṭhina

Another ceremony on the termination of *vassāvāsa* was the making of robes out of the gifts of cloth made by the laity to the bhikkhu-saṅgha within a very short time. The Saṅgha might decide upon a Kaṭhina ceremony if there were any need for it. In that case, it must announce its intention formally before the Saṅgha and obtain the unanimous consent of the members, and then select by another formal announcement the bhikkhu to be entrusted with the making of the robes. The bhikkhu so entrusted was allowed a few privileges regarding his food, dress, and rules of daily life.⁴ The ceremony would not be complete unless and until the cloths had been cut to measurement, sewn, braided or doubled where necessary, washed and dyed, distributed

1 *Mv.*, iii, 13.

2 *Diṭṭhena vā sutena vā parisāṅkāya vā.*

3 *Mv.*, iv, 16; cf. *Cv.*, ix. See above, p. 291-2.

4 *Mv.*, vii, 1. 3.

among the monks, and the words of thanksgiving uttered. In certain circumstances, the ceremony might be either postponed or abandoned. The bhikkhus taking part in the robe-making were allowed the use of knives with handles, needles, needle-cases, wooden frames and other appliances required in tailoring. If necessary, they could set up temporary open halls or sheds with high basement and balustrade and could have them plastered and coloured.¹

The general rule regarding the distribution of robes was that a residing bhikkhu in an *āvāsa* was entitled to a share in the robes, and if among the residing bhikkhus any one went away beyond the limits of the *āvāsa* without the intention of coming back, he was excluded from a share in the division. One, who had the intention of coming back but failed to do so before the last day of Kāṭhina ceremony, lost his privilege of sharing the robes.²

Formation of the order of nuns

Buddha was strongly opposed to the creation of the order of nuns as he rightly apprehended that the weaker male members of the Saṅgha might have greater chances of moral lapses.

He, however, as a Teacher, whose watchword was reason, could not withstand the well-reasoned arguments of Ānanda as to how could sex stand in the way of attaining perfection and why should the female sex be deprived of the benefits of the religion.³ Buddha was silenced by Ānanda's arguments and consented

1 *Cv.* v, 11.

2 *Mv.*, viii, 1 ff.

3 *Cv.*, x, 1. 3; Ānanda said to Bhagavā: bhabbo nu kho mātugāmo tathāgatappavedite dhammavinaye agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajitvā sotāpattiphalaṃ vā sakadāgāmiphalaṃ vā anāgāmiphalaṃ vā arahattaṃ vā sacchikātun ti. Bhagavā answered in the positive.

to the formation of the order of nuns though he recognised that such a step was going to shorten the duration of his religion, based as it was on the maintenance of pure morals. In view of the position of women prevailing at that time, several restrictions were imposed on the movements of the nuns, some of which were so humiliating that they brought forth protest from Mahāpajāpati Gotamī though without any effect.

The restrictions were as follows:—

- (i) a nun, however old, must show respect to a bhikkhu, but never a monk to a nun,¹
- (ii) a nun must not pass *vassā* in a monastery where there was no bhikkhu,
- (iii) every fortnight a nun was required to ascertain from a bhikkhu the date of *uposatha* and the day fixed for bhikkhu's exhortation (*ovāda*) to the nuns,
- (iv) a nun must perform *pavāraṇā* first in the bhikkhu-saṅgha and again in the bhikkhunī-saṅgha,
- (v) a *mānatta* discipline must be taken by a nun first from the bhikkhu-saṅgha and then from the bhikkhunī-saṅgha,
- (vi) a nun after training in the six *pācittiya* rules (63-68) of *Bhikkhunī-pātimokkha*, should seek *upasampadā* from both the Saṅghas one after another,
- (vii) a nun must not revile a monk,
- (viii) a nun must not admonish a monk or fix for the monks any date for *uposatha* or *pavāraṇā*.

They were to observe all the *sikkhāpadas* prescribed for the monks, and were given the general directions that they should

1 Mahāpajāpati protested against this condition. See *Cv.*, x. 3.

not indulge in such acts as would give rise to desire (*rāga*), attachment (*sañhoga*), acquisition (*ācaya*), dissatisfaction (*asantiṭṭhi*), and so forth.

The mode of life prescribed for them was substantially the same as that of the monks. The Pātimokkha rules, however, differed partially from those of the monks.¹ Most of the twenty-four restrictions that had to be observed in conferring ordination were common to the monks and nuns with a few meant specially for the nuns.² The formulae (*kammavācā*) for ordination, selection of *upajjhāya* and *ācariya*, prescription of *nissayas* are all identical with those of the monks. In the case of nuns, sanction for ordination had to be taken twice first from the bhikkhu saṅgha and then from the bhikkhunī saṅgha. It is interesting to note that in case a woman was unable to present herself before the Saṅgha for ordination on account of dangers on the way, she could send a messenger to the Saṅgha to seek ordination on her behalf. Such ordination by proxy was allowed. There are a few special directions for such ordinations by proxy. There are also special provisions for conferring ordination on a woman with child, and rules for her mode of life after delivery. The nuns who had once left the order or joined a heretical teacher were refused readmission (x. 26).

As a general rule, the nuns were not allowed to dwell in forests. They could live in a *Uddosita* (outhouse), *Upassaya* (hermitage), *Navakamma* (cottages specially built for them). Regarding their residence, use of beds, seats, and vehicles, they were asked to be more discreet than the monks. They were

¹ See *Infra*, ch. XVIII.

² *Cv.*, x, 17: animittā, nimittamattā, alohitā, dhuvalohitā, dhuvacolā, paggharanti, sikhariṇī, itthipaṇḍikā, vepurisikā, sambhinnā, and ubhatovyañjanā.

prohibited from using bathing or beauty powders, fancy girdles. Utmost caution has been taken to keep the monks and nuns apart, several restrictions having been imposed on the giving and taking of food, dress, and articles of use between monks and nuns.

The nuns were required to observe the *Upasatha* and *Pavāraṇā* ceremonies, confess their omissions and commissions, if any, and receive admonitions (*ovāda*). Originally in all these functions, the nuns had to take the assistance of a monk, specially nominated for the purpose by the bhikkhu-saṅgha, but later on this condition was relaxed and the nuns could perform the functions by themselves without the help of a monk. In matters of dispute, however, the service of a bhikkhu was compulsory, but after the infliction of a disciplinary measure, a nun watched the punished nun while undergoing *parivāsa* or *mānatta*.¹

1. For detailed treatment, see Miss D. Bhagvat, *Early Buddhist Jurisprudence*, ch. IX.

CHAPTER XVII

ECCLESIASTICAL ACTS AND PUNISHMENTS

The Saṅgha grew up into an out and out corporate institution and performed every ecclesiastical act of any importance in an assembly in which the presence in person or by proxy of all monks dwelling within the *sīmā* of an *āvāsa* was compulsory. Every act had to be performed by putting the resolution in formal words¹ before the assembly once or twice, usually thrice and could be passed only on the unanimous consent of all the members.² There were *āvāsas* in unwonted places in which the number of bhikkhus was so small that no assembly in its proper sense could be held, so a minimum number was fixed for the validity of certain ecclesiastical acts, which is as follows,

- (i) Four monks³ for all acts except ordination, *pavāraṇā* and *abbhāna* (readmission of a monk into the saṅgha after *parivāsa*).
- (ii) Five monks for all acts except ordination and *abbhāna* but including ordination outside the limits of the Buddhist *majjhimadesa*.
- (iii) Ten monks for all acts excepting *abbhāna* but including ordination.
- (iv) Twenty monks for *abbhāna* and all other ecclesiastical acts.

1 The formal words *ñatti* and *kammavūcā* were also prescribed.

2 The members must be fully ordained monks and placed under no disability.

3 Of these four monks, one must be a *Vinayadhara*.

Among the ecclesiastical acts figured largely disciplinary measures taken for the breach of any rule or for any moral delinquency, procedure for finding out the guilt of a monk and inflicting punishment therefor, conduct of the monks while undergoing disciplinary punishment, and the restoration of the monk to all the privileges of the Saṅgha. The disciplinary measures as enunciated in the *Cullavagga* are:—

Tajjanīyakamma

A monk who is quarrelsome and pick-up quarrels within the Saṅgha, or one who is foolish and given to commission of offences (*āpatti*), or one comes into frequent contact with householders deserves censure (*tajjanīyak*). A monk who is not scrupulous about his moral conduct and doctrinal views, or one who speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha also deserves censure (*tajjanīyak*).

The procedure for inflicting the *tajjanīyakamma* is as follows:—

The guilty bhikkhu should be first warned, then reminded of the rule of Pātimokkha which he is infringing, and then charged with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. A qualified bhikkhu is to move thrice before the Saṅgha which must be complete the *ñatti* that so and so is guilty of such and such an offence, and request the Saṅgha, if it thinks fit, to pronounce the *tajjanīyak*. against him. The guilty bhikkhu also must be present at the meeting and given an opportunity to defend himself, or to confess his guilt. Any deviation from the procedure described above made the act invalid.

The monk, against whom *tajjanīyak*. is pronounced, is denied the following privileges: He cannot

- (i) confer *upasampadā*,

- (ii) give *nissaya* (instruction) to a *samaṇa*,
- (iii) take a *sāmaṇera*,
- (iv) exhort the nuns even if he had been nominated for the purpose beforehand,
- (v) object to the presence of a particular *bhikkhu* in the Uposatha or Pavāraṇā ceremony,
- (vi) guide the movements of a younger monk,
- (vii) move any resolution for censuring a *bhikkhu*,
- (viii) warn a monk or remind him of his offence.

If the monk so censured observes the above restrictions without any demur against any member of the assembly inflicting the punishment, the *tajjanīyak*. will be revoked. The revocation will have to be effected by a competent *bhikkhu* by placing the case before Saṅgha with the request to revoke the punishment. The guilty *bhikkhu* also must appear before the Saṅgha and respectfully request for its revocation. A competent *bhikkhu* then announces the resolution thrice before the Saṅgha and if there be no objection, the *tajjanīyak*. is revoked.

Nissayakamma

If a monk, though indiscreet and indiscriminate in his association with the householders and prone to commit minor offences, takes part in ecclesiastical matters like giving *parivāsa* (probation), *mūlāya patikassanā* (renewal of probation), *mānatta* (suspension for Saṅghādisesa offences) and *abbhāna* (recall of monks to the Saṅgha), the Saṅgha should pronounce against him *nissayakamma*, i.e. compel him to take a teacher, abide by his instructions, and study with him the 'Piṭakas. The procedure for pronouncing the *nissayak*., the disabilities prescribed, and the manner of revocation are all similar to those of *tajjanīyak*. dealt with above.

Pabbājaniyakamma

If a monk becomes a defiler of good families (*kuladūsaka*) and gives himself up to unholy conduct (*pāpasamācāra*) like garlanding, and encouraging playing, singing and dancing deserves *pabbājaniyakamma* (temporary removal from the monastery). The same may also be pronounced against one who is quarrelsome, unscrupulous about moral conduct and doctrinal views, picks up quarrels in the Saṅgha, or speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha, or one who is frivolous (*dava*), or lacks in manners (*anācāra*), or earns his food by evil means, or harms others either by speech or action or both.

A monk punished with *pabbājaniyak.* is required to leave the monastery, behave properly in his new residence, and observe all the restrictions imposed upon him. The restrictions imposed and the procedure for inflicting and revoking the disciplinary measure is similar to that of *tajjanīyak.*

Paṭisāraṇīyakamma

The *Paṭisāraṇīyak.* (act of making one ask for pardon) is pronounced against a monk who tries to cause loss to a householder, or reviles him, or speaks ill of Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha in his presence or runs him down. A bhikkhu so punished should behave properly as indicated in the case of *tajjanīyak.*, and the procedure for inflicting and revoking the disciplinary measure is the same as in *tajjanīyak.* Before the *Paṭisāraṇīyak.* can be revoked, the guilty bhikkhu is required to approach the offended householder and ask for his pardon, or he may take an attendant (*anuduta*) formally selected by the Saṅgha to ask for him pardon of the householder.

Ukkhepaniyakamma

A monk who declines to acknowledge or confess the offences committed by him, or upholds an un-Buddhistic doctrine in spite of being asked to give it up is liable to *Ukkhepaniyakamma* (act of suspension), i.e., he is not allowed to dwell, or take food with other monks, or associate himself in any way with them. The procedure for fixing the guilt upon the offending monk and also the ultimate revocation of the punishment is the same as that of *tajjanīyak*. Besides the disabilities prescribed for *tajjanīyak*, the monk is prohibited from repeating the offence for which he is punished, receiving salutations, courtesies, or services from other monks, bringing any charge against another bhikkhu, taking the dress of a householder or a *tittbiya*, or performing any ecclesiastical ceremony in company of other monks.

Paṭikkosāṇā, Nissāraṇā and Osāraṇā

Three other disciplinary measures are mentioned in the *Mahāvagga* (ix. 4.), viz., *paṭikkosāṇā*, *nissāraṇā* and *osāraṇā*.

Paṭikkosāṇā (reproving) is a mild form of disciplinary measure applied for minor derelictions. A nun, a female novice or an insane monk, or a monk against whom *ukkhēpaniyakamma* has already been pronounced are not to be reproved. Those who commit heinous crimes, or joins a *tittbiya* order, or pass beyond the *sīmā* are also beyond reproof.

Nissāraṇā is a general term for expulsion of bhikkhus from the Saṅgha while *Osāraṇā* is the act of revocation of a disciplinary measure, including *Parivāsa*. All the exceptions mentioned as above in the case of *Paṭikkosāṇā* are applicable to these two disciplinary measures also.

Parivāsa, *Mūlāya Paṭikassanā*, *Mānatta* and *Abbhāna*

There are four kinds of *Parivāsa*, one of which is the probationary period of four months prescribed for persons belonging to non-Buddhistic sects and desiring to enter the Buddhist order. The other three are prescribed for Saṅghādisesa offences. A *parivāsika* cannot dwell with a regular monk under the same roof or at the same spot, but he cannot also dwell alone in a monastery in which there is no regular bhikkhu. While undergoing *parivāsa*, a monk is debarred from enjoying the usual privileges of a bhikkhu, some of which are mentioned above (p. 300) in connection with *tajjanīya* and *ukkhepanīya kammās*. There are several other minor restrictions, among which one is that a *parivāsika* monk has got to tell every incoming bhikkhu that he is a *parivāsika*, and the other is that he is to announce the same personally in every Pātimokkha or Pavāraṇā assembly. In short, a *parivāsika bhikkhu* has to behave like an unclean person and keep himself aloof from the generality of monks. If a monk fails to observe three of these restrictions, viz., *sabhāvāsa*,¹ *vippavāsa*,² and *anārocana*,³ he is regarded as having broken the vow of probation. A *parivāsika* can terminate temporarily his probationary period, and resume it with the permission of the Saṅgha.

Mānatta and *Parivāsa* are prescribed for Saṅghādisesa offences. The former is limited to six days during which period a monk is debarred from enjoying the usual privileges of the membership of a Saṅgha. The latter is of three kinds, (i) *Paṭicchanna* (ii) *Suddhanta* and (iii) *Samodhāna*. If a guilty monk conceals

1 Dwelling with monks.

2 Going to a residence where there are no bhikkhus.

3 Non-announcement of *parivāsa* before an assembly.

(*paṭicchādeti*) his guilt for a certain period, his period of probation extends to the number of days he had concealed it plus the six days for *mānatta*, while for one who has not concealed his guilt, no *parivāsa* is prescribed, he is to observe only *mānatta*. For persons who cannot remember the number of days he has concealed the offences committed by him, *Sudbhantapariivāsa* is prescribed, the *parivāsa* in that case is to extend over as many days as have passed between the day of his ordination and the commencement of his *parivāsa*. When an offence is committed during the period of probation, the guilty person is required to go through the probation anew and the period of *parivāsa* already observed by him is not taken into account. This is called *Samodhāna parivāsa*. In both the cases, *mānatta* also has to be observed after the *parivāsa* period.

It is after the *mānatta* which lasts for six days, that the monk is recalled (*abbhāna*) to the Saṅgha provided he has observed properly the restrictions imposed upon him for *parivāsa* and *mānatta*. If he has failed to do so, he is given *mūlāya-paṭikassanā*, i.e., he is to undergo *parivāsa* or *mānatta* anew for the offence committed by him during the period of *parivāsa* or *mānatta*.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PĀTIMOKKHA

There are two Pātimokkha codes, one for the monks and the other for the nuns. In the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha there are nine sections, and in the Bhikkhunī-pātimokkha eight. The ecclesiastical offences are arranged in them in a gradual order from the more serious to the lighter ones.

I. *Bhikkhu-Pātimokkha*

SECTION I mentions four offences under the heading *Pārājikā* [= lit. those immoral actions by which a bhikkhu is overcome (*parājita*), i.e., make him unfit to remain within the order]. Commission of any of these entails expulsion from the order. These four relate to misconduct with women or animals, theft, murder or abetment of murder, and exaggeration of one's power of performing miracles, etc.

SECTION II deals with thirteen offences under the heading *Saṅghādisesa* (*Saṅgha + ādi + śeṣaḥ*). It is so called because infliction of punishment and absolution from the offences must have the sanction of the Saṅgha at the beginning and end. A monk is first taken before the Saṅgha for the punishment to be undergone by him, i.e., temporary exclusion from the Saṅgha and so forth, and then after having undergone the punishment, he is to appear again before the Saṅgha (composed of at least 20 monks) to obtain permission for rejoining the order. Of the thirteen offences, the first five relate to sex-matters; the next two (6-7) to the construction of cottages by

monks; nos. 8-9 to false accusations; nos. 10-11 to dissensions in the Saṅgha; and the last two (nos. 12-13) to obstinacy of monks and their refusal to have admonitions.

SECTION III speaks of two kinds of offences concerning the conduct of a monk with a woman. The guilt of the monk may or may not be of a serious nature, so the punishment may range from that inflicted for Pārājikā to that for Pacittiya. On account of this reason, this section is entitled *Aniyatā* (i.e., to be decided).

SECTION IV is called *Nissaggiya-pācittiya* (*naihsargika-prāyaścittikāḥ*). It contains twenty-six restrictions to be observed by monks while accepting gifts of robes (*cīvara*), woollen mats (*santbatam*), bowl and medicinal requisites—and four miscellaneous rules, one (no. 181) of which is about the acceptance of gold and silver, two (nos. 19-20) are about the engagement of monks in buying and selling, and the fourth (no. 30) is a general direction that a monk must not appropriate to himself anything given to the Saṅgha in general. The punishment prescribed for the offences falling within this section is that the things, received by a monk in contravention of the condition imposed, must be given up (*nissaggiya*) and then he must express regret for it (*pācittiya*) formally.

SECTION V is entitled *Pācittiya* (Tib. *ltun byed* = *pāpātmikā*) and contains ninety-two rules, which, it seems, have been drawn up as circumstances have arisen and hence lack a system. There are in it restrictions prohibiting the monks from lying and slandering,—digging earth or cutting trees or drinking water carelessly and thereby committing insecticide,—giving food to the Parivrajakas or Acelakas,—showing disrespect to the teaching of Buddha, Vinaya teachers or the rules of the Pātimokkha,—instructing unordained persons or giving ordination to persons below twenty,—not complying with the conditions

laid down for imparting instructions to nuns,—visiting soldiers or entering king's chamber,—removing valuables from a monastery,—giving unnecessarily mental pain to comrades,—bringing a false charge of *Saṅghādisesa* against any monk,—associating with unordained women,—and disobeying the orders of the Saṅgha. Besides these prohibitions there are some general directions regarding bed, seat, robes, bath, and such other things of daily life of a monk while living in a monastery. The offences included in this section are regarded not serious and hence expiation from them is attained by simple confession before a monk or by self-imposition of *parivāsa*.

SECTION VI contains four rules and is entitled *Pāṭidesanīyā*, i.e., absolution from the offences included in this section is obtained by formal confession. All the rules relate to the taking of food by a monk without it being offered by any person.

SECTION VII entitled *Sekhiyā* contains 75 instructions, in eight sub-sections, for the good conduct of monks. By the first twenty-six rules, bhikkhus are directed how to enter into the houses of laymen; by the subsequent 35 rules (26-60), they are instructed how to take food inoffensively and how to behave while eating, and after finishing meals. Rules nos. 61 and 62 prohibit monks from entering into a sick-room with shoes on, and the rules nos. 63-72 point out the places and circumstances, in which instructions are not to be imparted to laymen and the last two (nos. 74 and 75) forbid monks from committing nuisance on green grass or in water.

As this section deals with more or less general advices for good conduct, no punishment is prescribed for a person deviating from the rules.

SECTION VIII is entitled *Adhikaraṇa-samatha* or the ways of settling disputed matters. Observance of the Pātimokkha

rules occasioned differences of opinion among the members of the Saṅgha and hence, some rules became necessary for their settlement. The rules are as follows:—

(1) *Sammukhavinaya* (*Mvyut. sammukha-vinayaḥ*) = the method of settling disputes either in the presence of the Saṅgha, or by a reference to the Piṭakās, or by the disputing persons, coming face to face and making up the difference.¹

(2) *Sativinaya* (*Mvyut. smṛtivinayaḥ*) = the method of settling disputes, arising out of a charge that may have been brought against a monk who denies it, by requesting him to appear before the Saṅgha and to declare that he is innocent as far as his memory goes. The members who form such a Saṅgha must be distinguished in the power of recollection.

(3) *Amuḍhavinaya* (*Mvyut. amūḍhavinayaḥ*) = the method of settling disputes, arising out of un-Vinayic acts done by a monk while he was not in a sane mood in spite of the repeated remonstrance made by other monks against such actions, by requesting the former to appear before the Saṅgha and declare that for some time he lost sanity and regrets for the improper deeds done by him during that time.

(4) *Paṭiññā* (*Mvyut. pratijñā-kāraṇaḥ*) = formal (and not indirect) confession of a wrong committed by a monk in the presence of another monk who must be senior to him.² Strictly speaking, it should not have been included in the *Aḍḍhikarāṇa-samathas*, but perhaps the questioning of the formality and informality of a *paṭiññā* occasioned frequent disputes and that led to its inclusion in this section.

(5) *Yebbuṃyasikā* (*Mvyut. Yad-bhūyasikīyaḥ*) = settlement of disputes by votes (*saḷākā*) in a large assembly of monks.

¹ The last two alternatives are not given in the *Majjhima* (II, 147).

² *Majjhima*, II, p. 248.

Literally the word means that (*yad*) which is to be settled by a fresh (*bbūyas*) appeal to a larger assembly. From the illustration given in the *Cullavagga*,¹ it is apparent that *yebbhuyyasikā* method was taken recourse to only on the failure of the *ubbābikā* method (i.e., decision by a committee formed out of the whole assembly of monks). Both the *ubbābikā* and *yebbhuyyasikā* methods of settling disputes are carried out by means of *salākā* (votes), the distributor and scrutiniser of which must be a well-qualified monk formally chosen by the Saṅgha for the occasion as the *salākagāhāpaka*.²

(6) *Tassapāpiyyasikā* (*Mvyut. tat-svabhāvaiṣiyah?*). This method is adopted when a monk prevaricates, i.e., first confesses his guilt and then denies it or *vice-versa*. The *Majjhima Nikāya*³ says that in trying to exculpate himself, he, in fact, indirectly implicates himself in the commission of an offence.

Its procedure is as follows: The guilty monk is brought before the Saṅgha and is reminded of his guilt. Though he vacillates, he is charged with an offence and then after the formal three proclamations the due punishment is inflicted upon him.

(7) *Tiṇavatthārakā* (*Mvyut. tṇaprastāraka*). This method is adopted when there is the likelihood that the matter of dispute if discussed in an open assembly will give rise to questions which may impair the well-being of the Saṅgha. The *Majjhima*

1 *Cv.*, iv, p. 97.

2 In the *Majjhima* (II, p. 24) *yebbhuyyasikā* is placed after *sammukhavinaya* and is interpreted in a slightly different form. Here it means that when the dispute is not settled by a Saṅgha by the *sammukhavinaya* process, its decision is referred to another parish where the members of the Saṅgha are larger in number; such cases are called *yebbhuyyasikā*. See *Infra*, p. 319.

3 *Majjhima*, II, p. 249.

*Nikāya*¹ offers a better interpretation. According to it, this method is to be adopted only when a group of monks breaks some laws and they in a body regret for it. The procedure to be adopted in such cases is to shut up any discussion relating to the matter. As filth, which, if disturbed, becomes a greater nuisance, and the safest way is to cover it up by grass, so also some matters relating to the Saṅgha should be shelved in the interest of the Saṅgha.²

II. *Bhikkhunī-Pātimokkha*

SECTION I mentions eight offences under the heading *Pārājikā* as against four of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. Of the additional four, the fifth and eighth speak of offences having a tinge of 'sexuality' (*ubhayajānumāṇalikā* and *aṭṭhavatthukā*) while the sixth relates to the suppression of the *pārājika* offence committed by a nun (*vajjapaṭicchādikā*). The seventh prohibits a nun from siding with a monk who is under suspension (*ukkhittānuvattakā*).³

SECTION II contains 17 rules under the heading *Saṅgbādisesa* as against 13 of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha, of which 7 are common to both (nos. 7-9, 14-17 = nos. 5, 8-9, 10, 13 of the Bhikkhu-pā.). Of the remaining ten, the first deals with quarrelsome nuns, the second with those who admit into the Saṅgha a guilty woman. Rules 3, 5 and 6 relate to actions which may occasion moral lapses while rules 4, 10 and 11 refer to cases when a nun does not observe the Pātimokkha restrictions, *viz.*, readmitting a suspended nun without the sanction of the Saṅgha,

1 *Majjhima*, p. 250.

2 An excellent exposition of these seven methods is given in the *Majjhima*, II, pp. 247-9; *Āṅguttara*, I, p. 99; IV, p. 144.

3 See *ante*, p. 302.

showing disrespects to the teaching imparted by a nun, and resenting a decision of the Saṅgha. The remaining two, 12-13, forbid nuns to associate closely with householders and conceal one another's lapses.

There is no section corresponding to the *Aniyata* section of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha.

SECTION III called the *Nissaggiyā-pācittiya* contains 30 rules like the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. It is divided into three sub-sections: *patta*, *cīvara* and *jātarūpa*,¹ (bowl, robe, and gold and silver). Eighteen of these rules contained in the last two sub-sections are identical with those of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. Of the remaining twelve, the first prohibits nuns from collecting bowls and the second from appropriating a *cīvara* untimely. The third condemns indecision regarding the exchange of robes. Rules 4-10 prohibit nuns from trying to obtain something which the donee did not intend to give. Rules 11 and 12 limit the price of a nun's warm *cīvara* to four *kamsas* and that of a cotton *cīvara* to two and a half *kamsas*.

SECTION IV contains 166 rules under the heading *Pācittiya* as against only 92 of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. It is similar in contents to the Bhikkhu-pā., and does not admit of a clear classification. The rules deal with the following: warnings against self-abuse,—prohibitions relating to food,—decorum to be observed at the house of a host,—keeping away as far as possible from monks, householders and fearful places,—mutual obligations of nuns,—shirking responsibilities once undertaken,—abiding by the *vassāvāsa* restrictions,—reverting to householder's habits,—size and making of *cīvaras* as also their distribution,—several restric-


1 In the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha the corresponding name for the third sub-section is *Elaka-lomaka-vagga*.

tions to be observed in giving or refusing ordination to females,—avoidance of articles of luxury, dress, and manners not befitting a nun.

SECTION V contains 8 rules under the heading *Pāṭidesanīyā* as against four of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha. All the rules are new and have nothing in common with those of the Bhikkhu-pā. These rules only prohibit nuns who are not sick from begging and partaking of (i) butter, (ii) oil, (iii) honey, (iv) molasses, (v) fish, (vi) meat, (vii) sweet milk and (viii) curds.

SECTION VI contains, under the heading *Sekhiya*, 75 rules which are identical with those of the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha.¹

SECTION VII contains four rules under the heading *Adbhikaraṇa samatha* and are the same as those in the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha.



1 The statement in the *Āṅguttara* (I, p. 230) that there were about 150 rules in the *Pātimokkha* may be supported by excluding the 75 rules of *Sekhiya* from the code. No punishment is prescribed for breach of the *Sekhiya* rules and so these can well be left out of calculation.

CHAPTER XIX

CONSTITUTION OF THE SAṄGHA

We shall now turn to the constitution of the Saṅgha that led to the growth of the several Buddhist institutions or *saṅghārāmas* which trained up the Buddhist monks and sent them out to the world to preach the religion and alleviate human sufferings. A glance at the ancient map of India shows what a large number of such institutions grew up in the different parts of India and how magnificent were some of them, their ruins striking us even to-day with awe and wonder. These *Saṅghārāmas* wielded at a time a great amount of influence over the people of India. Some of these institutions were built by the devotees at an immense expense and were large enough to accommodate thousands of monks. They were mostly located at a distance from the din and bustle, but not beyond the easy reach, of the city to which the inmates looked for their daily necessities of life. The sites chosen by them were in many cases valleys separated from the inhabited localities by hills, mountains or forests. In cases where such sites were not available, they were shut out from the world by huge walls with gates guarded by competent gate-keepers. Great discretion was used to keep the site aloof from the distractions of the town or village life, giving at the same time an opportunity to the townsfolk and villagers to frequent the *āvāsas* for listening to religious discourses and making their offerings. An individual monk or a donor was not allowed to select the site for a monastery. It is enjoined in the *Pātimokkha-sutta* that it must be done by a group of monks (see *Saṅghādisesa* rule 6).

The *saṅghārāmas* offered shelter to all who submitted to the discipline enforced in them and dedicated their lives to the cause of Buddhism. There appeared from among them brilliant intellects who would shed lustre on any sphere of activities that might be allotted to them. The training imparted by these scholars produced a number of expositors of Buddhist philosophy and religion who carried far and wide the torch of Buddhism within and outside India. In short, these institutions radiated the force which made Buddhism an all-Asiatic faith.

To these institutions flocked from different parts of India and sometimes countries outside India men with different aims and inclinations. They remained there under the strict disciplinary rules for years, receiving instructions from distinguished monks; and it was only when they were found thoroughly chastened in body and spirit that they were sent out to the outside world for carrying on the work of the great Teacher. The fame of the institutions at Takṣaśilā, Nālandā, Sārnāth, Ajantā or Amarāvātī reached far-off places like China, Central Asia, Siam, Cambodia and Ceylon, and attracted hundreds of students.

The Saṅghārāmas

The members of the Buddhist order at the very beginning of its formation lived mostly in caves and forests, staying for only a short time at a particular place. It was probably the gift of Veluvana to Buddha that constrained him to permit his followers to dwell in hermitages; but he gave his formal consent¹ when he was requested by a merchant of Rājagṛha to accept the sixty *vihāras* (monasteries) that had been built by him for acquiring merit to go to one of the higher

¹ See above, pp. 278, 284.

worlds. Once the sanction was given, the monks as well as the devotees showed so much zeal in the building of monasteries that it necessitated Buddha to frame a number of rules¹ restraining the monks from drifting into luxury. These monasteries were originally used for residential purposes only, but grew up later on into academic centres even during the lifetime of Buddha.

Headship not by succession or nomination

Probably as a member of the clans which favoured democratic constitutions, Buddha became imbued with democratic ideas. He wanted to see his *saṅgha* grow on democratic lines and framed the rules accordingly. He himself, however, acted more as a dictator than as a constitutional head, prescribing rules and giving orders as he thought fit. He consulted the wishes of the people and kings more than those of his followers, and this was probably due to his eagerness to popularize the religion. In spite of the supreme authority wielded by him within the *saṅgha*, he did not like to admit that he was its leader or that the *saṅgha* relied on him as the leader.² From the words of Devadatta and Buddha's reply to the same,³ it is apparent that the question of the headship of the *saṅgha* after Buddha's demise was raised, but Buddha would not nominate any, not even his best disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna. In the history of Indian religious orders, the absence of the system of nominating a successor to the headship of an order was probably unknown before Buddha and so it was a riddle to men like Gopaka-Moggallāna who enquired of Ānanda how the *saṅgha* could maintain its concord when neither Buddha had named his successor nor had the *saṅgha*

1 *Pātimokkha*, section ii.

2 *Digba*, II, p. 100; cf. *Milindapañha*, p. 159.

3 *Vinaya*, II, p. 188.

elected one to the supreme headship of the whole congregation.¹ Ānanda's answer was that the *saṅgha* was not without a guide and that guide was the book of *Pātimokkha* containing the rules prescribed by Buddha himself for the monks. The *Pātimokkha* retained the concord of the *saṅgha*, for it required all the monks residing in or about a parish (*gāmakhetta*) to assemble on the *uposatha* days (i.e., 8th, 14th or 15th day of a fortnight), listen to the rules recited by one of them selected for the purpose, confess their derelictions, if any, and undergo the penance deemed necessary.² Ānanda added that the monk who was asked to recite the rules was regarded for the time being as the chief of the *saṅgha* and was called *saṅghatthera*, *saṅghapitara* or *saṅgha-parināyaka*. The qualities that an ideal *saṅghapitara* or *saṅgha-parināyaka* was expected to possess were as follows:³ (a) he must be a true *brahmacārin*, observing all the restrictions prescribed in the *Pātimokkha*; (b) he should be vastly learned in the details of the *dhamma*; (c) he must be always satisfied with the food, bed and clothing that he might obtain; and (d) he must be proficient in the four forms of meditations and be in possession of the supernatural powers and *abhiññās*.

The *saṅghatthera* was generally selected from among the older monks. In the account of the Second Council⁴ Sabbakāmi is described as a *saṅghatthera* as he was the oldest ordained monk at the time. Generally the *saṅghatthera* presided over the functions of *Pātimokkha*-assemblies, but in the deliberations of the Second Council, Revata therā took the lead, perhaps because he was more learned⁵ than Sabbakāmi, though spiritually he did not rise as high as the latter.⁶ The

1 *Majjhima*, III, p. 9.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 299.

2 *Ibid.*, III, p. 10.

4 *Vinaya*, II, p. 303.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 304.

saṅghatthera was given the highest position in an assembly of monks and it is enjoined in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sūta*¹ that he must be respected by all the monks.

Cātuddisa-saṅgha

To the constitution of a *saṅgha*, the term *democracy* or *republic* cannot be justifiably applied, for it does not exactly follow the principles on which a democratic or a republican constitution is based. Though there existed the system of election of the President, the moving of a resolution, use of ballot voting by *salākās*, strict adherence to the rules of a meeting and so forth, the constitution of a Buddhist *saṅgha* differed in many respects from that of a political institution.

One of the main differences is that any ordained monk, to whatever locality he might belong, was counted as a member of an assembly if he happened to be present on the day of the sitting of the assembly (which was usually the *uposatha* day) within the limits of the parish. An assembly would not be regarded as complete for an ecclesiastical action if a single monk, not excepting an *āgantuka-bhikkhu* (incoming monk), failed to join it either personally or by proxy (*i.e.* by sending *chanda*, consent).² The only condition for the membership of a *saṅgha* was ordination and residence on the day of the assembly.

Quorum

In the Buddhist *saṅgha* there was no question of quorum. No sitting was valid unless all the monks living within the *sīmā* (jurisdiction) of a *saṅghārāma* (*āvāsa*) were present personally or by

¹ *Digba*, II, p. 77.

² *Majjhima*, III, p. 10.

proxy. Some scholars have confused "quorum" with "committees" of the *saṅgha*, the minimum strength of which is fixed according to the nature of the ecclesiastical business (*saṅghakamma*) to be transacted.¹ In short, there was no question of quorum of a meeting.

Sub-committee or a body of assessors

The resolutions were formally moved generally from the chair. Every resolution had to be announced thrice and no resolution was carried unless it had the unanimous consent of all present. Hence ordinarily there was no question of majority or voting. The question of majority was raised on rare occasions, e.g. in the holding of a *Pātimokkha*-assembly by the existing members of an *āvāsa* without *āgantuka-bhikkhus*. If the *āvāsikas* (existing members) were larger in number than the *āgantukas*, the actions of the assembly were regarded as valid provided the *āgantuka-bhikkhus* who joined the assembly after the fixed time were apprised of the proceedings of the assembly.² If in the determination of the *uposatha* day (i.e. the 14th or 15th of a fortnight) any difference of opinion took place between the inmates of an *āvāsa* (*āvāsikas*) and the incoming monks (*āgantukas*), it was settled as follows: the opinion of the former prevailed if their number was greater than or equal to that of the latter, but the opinion of the latter prevailed only if their number was greater than that of the former.³

There was a system of *ubbābika* which is usually translated by the term 'voting' but it bears quite a different sense. It corresponds to something like the formation of a sub-committee

1 See above, p. 298.

2 *Vinaya*, I, p. 129.

3 *Ibid.*, I, p. 132-3.

or a body of assessors. The method of *ubbābika* was restored to when there was a dispute relating to a particular question of discipline (*vivādābikaraṇa*) and when there was no possibility of settling it in an assembly without unnecessary discussions. In a case like this, two or more monks possessing the requisite qualifications¹ were selected from among the members of the assembly and their names were placed before the assembly for approval, and were adopted if the members be unanimous. The selected monks were then entrusted with the duty of settling the dispute. This method of *ubbābika* was adopted in the Second Council to settle the disputes between the Vajjian monks and Yasatthera. It was by *ubbābika* that four monks of the eastern countries and four of Pāṭheyya were chosen, and the decision of this sub-committee of eight was placed before the whole *saṅgha* for confirmation.²

Voting

When the selected monks failed to settle a dispute, the matter was referred back to the *saṅgha*, which then proceeded to appoint one of the members possessing requisite qualifications as *salākāgāhāpaka*.³ The votes were then taken by means of *salākā* (marked sticks) and the will of the majority was accepted as just. As great responsibility rested on the *salākāgāhāpaka*, many rules had to be framed to guard any misuse of power by him. Such occasions were rare in the *saṅgha*; hence the question of majority or voting is not a subject that has been discussed at length in the *Vinaya Piṭaka*.

1 For details, see *Vinaya*, II, p. 95-6.

2 *Vinaya*, II, p. 305.

3 *Ibid.*, II, p. 84.

Thus we see that the constitution of the *saṅgha* was clearly democratic in principle but differed in many vital points from a democratic institution of the present day.

A study of the *Vinaya Piṭaka* further reveals that the *bhikkhus*, apart from religious practices, were required to act through the corporate body, the *saṅgha*, and never individually, and it is for this reason that it is said in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sūta*¹ that so long as the monks will assemble frequently, transact business in concord, adhere to the rules already prescribed and avoid laying down new rules, the progress of the *bhikkhu-saṅgha* is assured and not its decline.

As the members of the order had no individual rights, it became incumbent on the organizers of the *saṅgha* to frame rules for the receipt and proper distribution of properties, food, clothing and other requisites of a monk.

Ownership of monasteries

Monks as a rule take the vow of poverty, hence individually they cannot own any property. The *vihāras* cannot be given to a monk; they can be given only to a *saṅgha* of monks and that again should preferably be to the *āgātānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅgha*, i.e. a *saṅgha*, the members of which are not only the *bhikkhus* of the four quarters but also those who will be *bhikkhus* in future. In some of the donative inscriptions of a later period (3rd century B.C. to 5th century A.D.) there are specific directions, dedicating the monasteries to a particular sect. This tendency developed when the Buddhist *saṅgha* had split up into many rival sects, and the devotees of one sect wanted to give their support to their own sect only.² When for the first time

¹ *Digha*, II, p. 76-7.

² *Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 314 n.

Buddha permitted his followers to accept *āvāsas*, *ārāmas*, *viḥāras* or *pariveṇas*, he enjoined that they should be given to *āgatānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅgha*.¹ Even while accepting the Jetavana viḥāra from Anāthapiṇḍika, he directed the donor to give it to *āgatānāgata-cātuddisa-saṅgha*.²

The *saṅgha*, therefore, became the owner of the properties given away by the devotees, but the ownership was not absolute, for it could not alienate the properties nor even divide them among the members of the order.³ This restriction was applied not only to the landed properties including the grass, shrubs, etc., but also to the articles of furniture, utensils made of earth or iron, spades and such other things of common use in an *ārāma*.⁴ To what extent individual ownership was denied, becomes apparent from the fact that on the death of a monk, his robes and other articles of use became the property of the *saṅgha*,⁵ and the *saṅgha* is advised to distribute the robes and other small articles by proper announcement in an assembly among the monks or novices who served the deceased *bhikkhu* during his illness. This power of the *saṅgha* is denied in the case of heavy articles, for they were inalienable and indivisible.⁶

Office-bearers for distribution of food etc.

In regard to food and the daily necessities of life also, an attempt has been made to keep the sense of individuality in the background as far as possible. If a devotee wished to offer food to the monks, he had to invite the whole *saṅgha* and not any particular individual or individuals. In days of scarcity, provision was made for invitations by batches, and so *saṅghabbatta*

1 *Vinaya*, II, p. 147.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 164.

3 *Ibid.*, II, p. 170-1.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*, I, p. 303.

6 *Ibid.*, I, p. ; II, p. 171.

(food for the whole *saṅgha*) was allowed to be replaced by *uddesabbatta*, *nimantana*, *salākābbatta*, etc.¹ i.e. the devotees might provide food not for all the monks of the *saṅgha* but for some, who, however, were not to be selected by the hosts. This naturally gave rise to troubles. To avoid these, it became necessary to fix the responsibility of selection upon a particular monk possessing the requisite qualities.² He was called a (i) *Bbatuddesaka* or the distributor of food. His appointment had also to be made formally by the *saṅgha* with the unanimous consent of all the members. Besides him there were other office-bearers whose duty was to distribute rice-gruel (*yāgu*), fruits (*phala*) and hard food (*kbajjaka*) and they were called (ii) *yāgubhājaka*, (iii) *phalabhājaka* and (iv) *kbajjakabbājaka* according to their respective charges.

With the increase in the number of monks and devotees bestowing gifts on the *saṅgha*, it became indispensable to appoint further office-bearers for maintaining concord in the *saṅgha*. They were: (v) *senāsanagābhāpaka*, i.e., the monk who was entrusted with the duty of accepting *vihāras*, *pariveṇas*, etc., on behalf of the *saṅgha*;³ (vi) *senāsanapaññāpaka* or the distributor of beds and seats within a monastery, cave-dwelling, etc., (vii) *bhaṇḍāgārika* or the store-keeper; (viii) *cīvarapaṭiggābhāpaka* or the receiver of upper robes; (ix) *cīvarabhājaka* or the distributor of upper robes; (x) *sāṭiyagābhāpaka* or the receiver of under-garment; (xi) *appamattakavissajjaka* or the distributor of trifling things, like needles, girdles and stores; (xii) *pattagābhāpaka* or the receiver of bowls.

Besides the above there were other office-bearers for different kinds of work. Some of these were (xiii) *navakammika*⁴ or the

¹ *Vinaya*, II, p. 175. See above, p. 289.

³ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 167, 176.

² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

monk entrusted with the supervision of the new construction or repair of monasteries; (xiv) *ārāmikapesaka* or the overseer of labourers engaged for construction or repair work; (xv) *sāmaṇera-pesaka* or the overseer of the novices; (xv) *āsanapaññāpaka*¹ or the arranger of seats at the meetings of monks, and (xvii) *sālā-kāgāhāpaka*.²

In the appointment of every office-bearer, the usual formality must be observed, *i.e.* a monk possessing the requisite qualifications was selected first, then his name was announced thrice before an assembly, and if there be none dissenting, he was formally appointed to the office for which his name was proposed.

Every act of the *saṅgha* was performed in this way. Without the formal announcement and sanction of the assembly, no ecclesiastical act could be performed or was regarded as valid. This discipline in working was strictly enforced and this was the secret of the great power which the *saṅgha* developed and by which it spread itself all over Asia. It was in and through an organization like this that scholars like Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Āryadeva, missionaries like Bodhidharma and Atiśa, disputants like Dharmakīrti and Dinnāga, writers like Vimuktasena and Kamalaśīla, expositors like Subhūti and Kaccāyana, translators like Kumārajīva and Jinamitra radiated rays of light that dazed the whole world.

1 *Vinaya*, II, p. 177.

2 See above, p. 319.

CHAPTER XX

THE FIRST BUDDHIST COUNCIL

The Buddhist tradition speaks of eight Buddhist Councils, in which the Piṭakas are said to have been recited. The first Council held at Rājagṛha and the second at Vaiśālī are referred to in all the traditions whether in Pāli or Sanskrit; the one that was held by the Mahāsaṅghikas as a supplementary council immediately after the session of the second council may be counted as the third, though it is not done so by the porāṇās. The third in the Pāli tradition is the one held during the reign of Aśoka under the presidentship of Moggaliputta Tissa. This is, however, ignored in the Sanskrit works, according to which, the third was held at Jalandhar or Kashmir during the reign of Kanishka under the presidentship of Vasumitra and the vice-presidentship of the famous poet Aśvaghoṣa. This again is ignored in the Pāli books. If we take into account all the councils as handed down by the different traditions, we have in all five councils. The sixth, seventh and eighth were held in Ceylon during the reigns of Devānaṃpiyatiśa, Duṭṭhagāmaṇī and Vaṭṭagāmaṇī respectively and it was in the eighth Council that the Pāli Tipiṭaka that we read today was put into writing.

Modern writers on the Councils

Of the many problems that awakened the interest of orientalists interested in the history of Buddhism, the question of the authenticity of the traditions about the first council is not an insignificant one. The earliest of the scholars to take

up this problem was the Russian savant I. P. Minayeff,¹ to refute whose arguments, Prof. Oldenberg² wrote the long dissertation in the *ZDMG.* in 1898. Materials for the discussion about the Councils were collected by different scholars, from different sources, *viz.*, by Wassilief, Schiefner and Rockhill from Tibetan, by Beal and Suzuki from Chinese, by Turnour, Rhys Davids, Geiger and a few others from Pāli. An examination of the traditions as well as the arguments of Minayeff and Oldenberg was made thoroughly and comprehensively by Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin³ in 1905. Prof. Otto Franke⁴ took up this problem and wrote his long dissertation in 1908 in the *JPTS.* his attention, however, was directed solely to a searching examination of the Pāli texts with a view to trace the growth of the tradition as recorded in the *Cullavagga*. After the labours of these scholars there was nothing left for further discussion until the year 1926 when the indefatigable zeal of Prof. Jean Przyluski brought forth the volume *Le Concile de Rājagṛha* covering about 400 pages and dealing with all the traditions about the first council available in Chinese and Tibetan. In 1931 Dr. R. C. Mazumdar,⁵ perhaps unaware of the appearance of the work of Prof. Przyluski, presented us with an excellent summary of Prof. La Vallée Poussin's long paper referred to above. Of the latest scholars who have entered into

1 *Recherches sur le Bouddhisme* (1887), tr. from Russian into French by R. H. Assier de Pompignan (1894).

2 *Buddhistische Studien*, *ZDMG.* (1898), pp. 613-694; Intro. to the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, Vol. I, xxv-xxix.

3 *Le Muséon*, VI, pp. 213-323, tr. into English in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1908. See also *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, sv. Councils.

4 *JPTS.*, 1908, pp. 1-80.

5 *Buddhist Studies* (edited by Dr. B. C. Law), pp. 26-72.

this arena of discussion, mentionable are the names of Profs. Finot¹ and Obermiller² whose main contention is that the traditions of the first two councils originally formed the last section of the *Mahāparinibbānasutta*, and that in course of time the compilers separated the last section from the *Sutta* and tagged it on to the *Cullavagga*. By this finding they have cut the ground from underneath the feet of Oldenberg whose main stand for establishing the unauthenticity of the *Cullavagga* account of the first Council was that the account of the first council did not form a part of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*.³

Sources

Of the Pāli accounts the most exhaustive and probably the earliest is the one given in the *Cullavagga*, XI, from which are derived the traditions preserved in the Ceylonese chronicles and Buddhaghosa's commentaries.

Of the extant Sanskrit accounts there are left only two short notices, one in the *Mahāvastu* and the other in the *Manjuśrīmūlakalpa*, and the rest are all in Chinese but derived from the Sanskrit sources. These are:—

- (a) Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas;
- (b) „ „ „ Dharmaguptas;
- (c) „ „ „ Mahāsaṅghikas;
- (d) „ „ „ Sarvāstivādins;
- (e) *Kāśyapa-saṃgīti-sūtra* (Kai-ye-kie-king) (tr. A.D. 148-170);
- (f) *Aśokāvadāna* (A-yu-wang-king) (tr. about 300 A.D.);

¹ *Indian Historical Quarterly*, VII (1923), pp. 241-246.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 781-784. See also *History of Buddhism* by Buxton, tr. by Obermiller, II, pp. 73-96.

³ See *Infra*, p. 336.

- (g) *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (tr. A.D. 402-405);
- (h) *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra* (tr. A.D. 290-306).
- (i) Account of the compilation of the Tripiṭaka and of *Tsa Tsang* by Kāśyapa and Ānanda after the nirvāṇa of Buddha in the kingdom of Magadha, on the north of the town of Saṃkāśya; (this work is in verse of five Chinese characters, dated between 317 and 420);
- (j) The commentary on the first chapter of the *Ekottar-āgama*.¹

Tibetan sources

- (k) Bu-ston's *Chos, bbyung* (History of Buddhism) translated into English by Obermiller.
- (l) Tāranātha's History of Buddhism.

The story of the Council may be split up into seven parts thus:

(a) Reasons adduced for convening the Council

Immediately after Buddha's death an aged monk called Subhadda or Upānanda, who was ordained towards the end of Buddha's life, gave out that Buddha, so long he had been alive, was a source of trouble to the monks for he constantly admonished the monks to do a certain act and not to do certain others. Now that he was dead, the monks would be free to do as they liked.

This event is related with slight variations in all the Vinaya texts (*a, b, c, d*)¹ but not in any of *Sūtras* (*e, f, g, h, i, j*

¹ Relevant portions of all these texts (*a-j*) are translated into French by Prof. Przyluski.

and *k*),² in which it is said that the suggestion for convening the Council came from the devas who were aggrieved at the prospect of the world being thrown again into evil days at the absence of Buddha or his great disciples. In the *Asokāvadāna* (*f*), it is said in the fashion of Mahāyānic sūtras that Buddha just before entering into parinirvāṇa requested Mahākāśyapa to make a collection of the Piṭakas after his disappearance and asked the gods to protect them, and to which request the gods readily acceded. In the *Parinirvāṇa-sūtra* (*b*), the account is realistic—Mahākāśyapa, Anuruddha and Kātyāyana deliberate over the matter of collecting Buddha's sayings with Ānanda's help and decide to write them on bamboo pieces and silk-rolls. In the works (*i* & *j*) there are no such prefatory remarks; Mahākāśyapa straightaway strikes the *gaṇḍi* (gong) to collect the monks and then announces that he wishes to compile the Piṭakas.

(*b*) *Question of the inclusion of Ānanda*

In all the accounts (*a* to *j*), the indispensability of Ānanda for the compilation of the Piṭakas is acknowledged but at the same time, in most of the accounts, it is pointed out by Kāśyapa that Ānanda was yet a *śaikṣa*³ and not an *aśaikṣa* (arhat), and hence

1 The italic letters *a* to *k* refer to the works mentioned above.

2 In the *Mahāsaṃghika Vinaya*, the bhikkhu is not named but is simply pointed out as old (*mahallaka*), the word *Mahallaka* transliterated in Chinese was taken by Mr. Suzuki as a proper name, and strangely enough this mistake of his is repeated by Dr. R. C. Mazumdar (*Buddhist Studies*, p. 30). In the text *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* also the same mistake has been committed; in it the name of the bhikṣu is given as *Maballah* as well as *Maballakah* (see pp. 593, 596).

3 A *śaikṣa* is one who is in any one of three stages of sanctification, *viz.*, *sotāpatti*, *sakadāgāmi* and *anāgāmi*. As some texts attri-

he was unfit to take part in the Council which was composed exclusively of Arhats. Some of the sources (e, g, f) make Ānanda attain arhathood (*āśaikṣa*) just on the eve of the Council.

The *Āśokāvadāna*¹ and the *Mahīśāsaka*,² *Mahāsāṅghika*³ and the *Dharmagupta*⁴ *Vinaya* locate the place of Ānanda's exertion at Vaiśālī and credit one Vṛjipatra, a disciple of Ānanda, for encouraging Ānanda to make the exertion. Vaiśālī was one of the stopping places of Mahākassapa and his colleagues on their way from Kuśinagara to Rājagṛha, and it was at Vaiśālī that Ānanda stayed behind to qualify himself for membership of the Council.⁵

This account appears more plausible than that of *Cullavagga* in which Ānanda is stated to have suddenly attained arhathood on the eve of the session of the Council, but still more plausible is the account of the Sarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, in which it is said that Ānanda though a *śaikṣa* was admitted into the Council by courtesy with the special permission of the assembly (*Saṅgha*) of monks⁶

(c) Charges against Ānanda

All the sources agree about the fact that the *Saṅgha* found Ānanda guilty of a few ecclesiastical offences, and that for the expiation of same Ānanda was to make his confessions as required by the rules of the *Pātimokkha*. Though it sounds discordant

bute *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* to Ānanda, we have to infer that Ānanda must have been either in the *sotāpatti* or *sakadāgāmi* stage.

1 *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 34 ff.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 138.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 138.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 1733-4.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 173-4. The *Cullavagga* (p. 286) is, however, silent about Vaiśālī; its account leads us to infer that the attainment of arhathood by Ānanda happened at Rājagṛha.

6 *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 225.

that an arhat was taken to task for some minor ecclesiastical offences,¹ it was nonetheless necessary to make the chief figure of the Council absolutely pure according to the Pātimokkha laws. After Buddha's demise Ānanda as a repository of Buddha's teachings naturally became the cynosure of all eyes and it became imperative to raise his status to arhathood and to place him above all reproach.

There are slight differences in the list of charges as given in the different accounts,² though they agree in the main. The charges were:—

(1) Ānanda did not ascertain the *kbuddakānukkbuddakāni sikkhāpadāni* (minor precepts), the abrogation of which was permitted by Buddha;

(2) he stepped upon Buddha's rainy season robe (*vassika-sāṭika*) when sewing it;

(3) he persuaded Buddha to form the order of nuns;

(4) he permitted women to have a look at the dead body of Buddha;

(5) he did not request Buddha to live longer when a hint to that effect was given to him by Buddha himself.

It may be observed that none of these charges are serious from the moral point of view but they loomed large in the eyes of the devotees at a time when their object of adoration had just disappeared, and this disappearance, they believed, could have been delayed had not Ānanda been inadvertent to the matter.

(d) *The Members of the Council*

There is very little disagreement among the different accounts about the fact that Mahākassapa proposed an assembly of arhats

¹ Cf. *Infra*, p. 336 fn.

² For details, see the *Indian Antiquary*, 1908, pp. 4-5.

preferably endowed with *paṭisambhidā* and *abhiññā*, and this was agreed to by all the monks present. The number of members was limited to five hundred. Upāli was unanimously selected to recite the Vinaya and Ānanda the Dhamma (which according to some sources included Abhidhamma). Mahākassapa took upon himself the task of putting questions both to Upāli and Ānanda. In some of the sources, (e.g., Vinaya texts of the Mahīśāsakas, Dharmaguptas, Mahāsaṅghikas) a list of monks by seniority is given,¹ the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya adding that whatever was uttered by Upāli and Ānanda was referred to these old monks for approval and confirmation.

(c) *Gavāmpati and Purāṇa*

Gavāmpati and Purāṇa were distinguished and old arhats of the time, hence an attempt was made by Mahākassapa to have the results of the deliberations of the Council approved by them. Gavāmpati however kept himself aloof, indicating neither his approval nor disapproval of the same while Purāṇa, who lived with a large following at Dakkhināgiri, a place near Rājagṛha (perhaps a forest), preferred not to associate himself with the decisions of the Council but he requested Mahākassapa to incorporate seven rules regarding restrictions about storing and cooking food indoors, taking food of one's own accord, etc.² Prof. La Vallée Poussin has traced some of these rules in the *Mahāvagga* (vi. 17-19, 20). It should be observed that while

1 Mahīśāsaka Vinaya (*Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 168): Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya (1st), Purāṇa (2nd), Dharmika (3rd), Daśabala Kāśyapa (4th), Bhadra Kāśyapa (5th), Mahākāśyapa (6th), Upāli (7th), Anuruddha (8th). For Haimavata list, see *op. cit.*, p. 176 and Sarvāstivāda list, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-229.

2 *Indian Antiquary*, 1908, p. 56; *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 160.

speaking of Purāṇa, *Cullavagga* does not refer to his seven rules though they appear in the *Mahāvagga*, while the Vinayas of the Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptas mention them in detail. This shows that the Pāli version of the Vinaya accepted the opinion of Purāṇa. The dissenting voice of Purāṇa¹ and to a certain extent of Gavāmpati indicates that even at that early date the germs for *saṅghabheda* had already appeared and within the following century they sprouted up, resulting in the appearance of the Dharmaguptas, the Mahīśāsakas, the Haimavatas, and others.

(f) *The Site*

The traditions differ as to the exact site where the Council was held, i.e. whether at Veluvana, or Gṛdhrakūṭa or Sattapaṇṇi but there is no question about the place being Rājagṛha. The proposal of holding a Council was made at Kuśīnārā, wherefrom the monks travelled through Vaiśālī and other countries and ultimately congregated at Rājagṛha. The members of the Council, it seems, were collected in course of their journey from Kuśīnārā to Rājagṛha.

(g) *Texts recited*

Though Profs. Minayeff and La Vallée Poussin were convinced about the historicity of the Councils, they expressed their grave doubts about that part of the story which spoke of the recitation of Vinaya and Dharma texts.² Prof. La Vallée Poussin relegated the task of deciding this question to the future scholars who would explore the Chinese documents. Prof. Przyluski took

1 Cf. *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 8.

2 See Winternitz, *History of Literature*, vol. II, p. 4.

up this task and acquitted himself well in his work *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*.¹

The following information can be elicited from the various Vinaya texts about the rehearsal of the Piṭakas:—

Theravāda Vinaya (*Cullavagga*):—

- (a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās and the rest—the two Vinayas;
- (b) *Sūtras*: Brahmajāla, Sāmaññaphala, etc.—the five Nikāyas.

Mahīśāsaka Vinaya:—

- (a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās and the rest;
- (b) *Sūtras*: Ekottara, Daśottara, Mahānidāna, Sakra, Saṅgīti, Brahmajāla; Kāśyapa classified the sūtras into Dīrgha, Madhyama, Saṃyukta, Ekottara and Tsa Tsang (= Kṣudraka?).²

Dharmagupta Vinaya:—

- (a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās, Saṅghāvaśeṣa, Aniyata; Naiḥ-sargika, Prāṭideśanīya, Śikṣāpadaś, Varṣā, Pavāraṇā up to Ekottara, Bhikṣuṇī Vinaya, Uposatha, Kaṭhina, etc.;
- (b) *Sūtras*: Brahmajāla, Ekottara, Daśottara, Saṅgīti, Mahānidāna, Śakradevendra; these were classified into Dīrgha, Madhyama, Ekottara, Saṃyukta, Jātaka, Vaipulya, Adbhutadharma, Avadāna, Upadeśa, Arthapada, Dharmapada, Pārāyaṇa and Scha-viragāthā and Tsa Tsang (Kṣudraka?), Kathāvatthu and some books of Abhidharma.³

1 Sylvain Lévi and Edouard Chavannes collected from the different accounts of the Council the titles of the sacred texts said to have been recited in the first Council vide *Journal Asiatique* 1916.

2 *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, pp. 144-148.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 187-195.

Haimavata Vinaya:—

- (a) *Vinaya*: Bhikṣu and Bhikṣuṇī Vinaya, Kaṭhina, Mātṛkā, and Ekottara.
- (b) *Sūtras*: Dīrghāgama, Madhyamāgama, Ekottarāgama, Saṃyuktāgama, Dharmapada, Arthapada, Pārāyaṇa, etc. up to Upadeśa, Tsa Tsang, and some books of Abhidharma.

Mahāsaṅghika Vinaya:—

- (a) *Sūtras*: Dīrgha, Madhyama, Saṃyukta, Ekottara and Kṣudraka;
- (b) *Vinaya*:—
 - (i) La purété de la zone interdite.
 - (ii) La purété de la loi territoriale.
 - (iii) La purété de la pratique des defenses.
 - (iv) La purété de la des vénérables.
 - (v) La purété du vulgaire.

Sarvāstivādin Vinaya:—

- (a) *Vinaya*: 4 Pārājikās, 5 Saṅghāvaśeṣas and the rest;
- (b) All sūtras commencing with the words "evam me śrutam;"¹ Dharmacakra-pravartanasūtra; Abhidharma beginning with the 5 precepts (not to kill, not to steal etc.).

A comparison of the above lists distinctly show that the traditions differ about the recitation of texts excepting the Pātimokkha rules, hence it seems that these are not derived from a common source. Almost all the accounts, as we have seen, agree more or less in regard to the account of the council dealt with under different sub-headings and hence we have not much hesitation to say that they are the outcome of a common basis.

¹ *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, p. 230.

It is with regard to the rehearsals of suttas that we notice some disagreement and this leads us to infer that the story of recitation of the *Sutta Piṭaka* in the first Council was an afterthought. It, however, cannot be denied that there was some discussion about Dhamma and Vinaya in the Council, though the rehearsal of the complete *Sutta-piṭaka* or all the sections of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* cannot be accepted as true.

The story in brief

At Subhadda's (or Upānanda's) words apprehending lack of discipline in the church, Mahākassapa proposed a Council of 500 Arhats for taking a stock of Buddha's teachings. The proposal was made at Kuśinārā and the site selected for the session of the Council was Rājagṛha. Mahākassapa tried to include all the old arhats living at the time among the members of the Council and succeeded in securing the co-operation of arhats like Ājñāta Kaundinya, the two Kāśyapas, and Anuruddha, but failed to persuade Gavāmpati (who was one of the few friends of Yaśa to be converted by Buddha) and Purāṇa (the abbot of Dakkhināgiri) to take part or acquiesce in the proceedings of the Council. The presence of Ānanda as the repository of Buddha's teachings in the Council was felt indispensable but as he was not an Arhat, he could not be included without the special permission of the Saṅgha. Fortunately Ānanda attained arhathood immediately before the session of the Council and was admitted into the Council, as a matter of course. The Council was held at Rājagṛha, all the necessary arrangements for seats and residence of monks having been made by Ajātasattu. Upāli was selected unanimously to recite the Vinaya rules and Ānanda the Suttas. On the completion of the recitation, Ānanda mentioned about the *khuddakānukkhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni*, the abrogation of which

was permitted by Buddha but the exact significance of which was not ascertained by him. This failing of Ānanda was brought to the notice of the Council. Ānanda did not regard these failings of his as anything serious but out of reverence to the wishes of the Saṅgha, he made the formal confession for getting absolution.¹

Refutation of Oldenberg's theory of fiction

We have indicated above the number of works that preserve the tradition of the Council. Some of them are no doubt reiteration of the earlier ones but the fact remains as pointed out by Minayeff that these earlier ones on account of their unanimity must have a common tradition as their basis. To dismiss this as fictitious was rather too bold on the part of Prof. Oldenberg and it is strange that a number of scholars accepted Oldenberg's dictum until Prof. La Vallée Poussin challenged it. Prof. Oldenberg's conclusion is based mainly on the fact that in the

1 In this account the disciplinary action taken against Channa is related thus:

Ānanda then announced to the Saṅgha that Buddha had asked him to punish a monk called Channa by *brahmadāṇḍa*, and this he was going to do at Kāśūāmbi. Ānanda reached Kāśūāmbi. The queen of King Udena approached him with gifts, which were doubled by the King himself after he had been pleased with a talk with Ānanda. Channa on his being so punished made a strong effort for arhathood and attained it soon. He then approached Ānanda to have *brahmadāṇḍa* withdrawn but in reply he was told that the moment he had attained arhathood the *dāṇḍa* had ceased.

[A monk punished with *brahmadāṇḍa* is not admonished or instructed by any other monk and he is left to do whatever he likes. Prof. La Vallée Poussin uses the appropriate synonym "boycotting."]

Mahāparinibbāna-sutta the motive of the Council is given but not a word about the session of the Council.

As against this remark of Oldenberg, I think, the recent writings of Finot and Obermiller¹ are a sufficient answer. Prof. Finot points out that the chapters XI and XII of the *Cullavagga*, which contain the account of the two Councils, have such an abrupt beginning unlike the other chapters of the *Cullavagga* that they could not have been originally a part of this work.² He further points out that the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* also differs from the other Suttas of the *Dīgha Nikāya* in the nature of its contents, being more historical in character, and that the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* and the two chapters (XI, XII) of *Cullavagga* are so similar in nature that they must have been originally parts of one and the same work. In support of this contention of his, he refers to a work entitled *Samyukta-vastu* (Nanjio 1121), the Vinaya of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins,³ which contains the account of both parinirvāṇa and the Councils, and concludes therefrom that the Theravādins too had a work corresponding to the *Samyukta-vastu*, and that it was dismembered at a later date by the ancient editors of the Nikāyas and Vinaya. Dr. Obermiller corroborates Finot's contention and in support gives us in detail

1 *IHQ.*, VIII, pp. 241-6, 781-4.

2 According to Prof. Finot, both the chapters XI and XII did not form a part of the original *Cullavagga*. It would have been better if he had distinguished chapter XI only in that way, and not chapter XII, for all the chapters of the *Cullavagga* commence with the words *tena samayena buddho bhagavā* including chapter XII while chapter XI only commence with the words *atha kho āyasmā Mahākassapa*, i.e. in the form in which the chapters of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* are commenced.

3 Also referred to by Prof. La Vallée Poussin in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1908, p. 704.

the contents of the *Vinaya-kṣudraka* (in Tibetan),¹ and shows that it contains not only the account of the two councils but also the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*. He further points out that "the story of the Councils begins just on the same line (fol. 301, a, 3) in which the narrative of the burial of the Buddha finishes, without any indication whatsoever."² In view of these evidences, we may safely take Prof. Fīnot's contention as sound, viz., that the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* and at least the chapter XI (and not the chapter XII) of the *Cullavagga* originally formed one treatise, and on the analogy of the *Vinaya-kṣudraka* it may further be stated that the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* formed originally the first portion of the chapter XI of the *Cullavagga*. This takes away the force of Oldenberg's arguments and we may now brush them aside.

Oldenberg remarked also that there were many incoherent and contradictory statements in the account of the *Cullavaga*. Prof. La Vallée Poussin has gone into them in detail and shown that Oldenberg's interpretation of internal evidences is based upon some pre-conceived notions and should be taken at their worth. He has discussed at length the pros and cons of the charges brought against Ānanda, and for reconciling them with the then form of Buddhism, he has brought in also the doctrinal deviations found in the *Kathāvatthu* and attributed to the Mahā-saṅghikas. To me it seems that we need not go so far as to trace in the charges germs of schisms which later on appeared in the Buddhist Church, for the doctrines and rules of discipline were then in an undeveloped state and it must have taken a few decades since then for their development into a clear-cut shape.

1 Coresponding roughly to *Cullavagga*.

2 *IHQ.* VIII, p. 784.

Conclusion

Once more we can safely revive the Russian savant's contention of 1887 "that the Council was originally a tribunal composed of monks to decide the failings of Ānanda and Channa, and speaks of a time when the Vinaya was not yet codified, and that in course of time the story of the recitation of the piṭakas was added to it and the tribunal was given an appearance of a conclave with a theological and literary object."¹ This was a little modified in 1905 by Prof. La Vallée Poussin who would regard this Council as an enlarged Pātimokkha assembly. In our opinion also it was so but with an object greater than that of a Pātimokkha assembly.

The kernel of truth embedded in the various accounts as it appears to me is that the principal motive of the Council, was to ascertain the *khuddakānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni*, abrogation of which was sanctioned by Buddha just before his demise. There must have been a good deal of difference of opinion about the interpretation of the lesser and minor precepts, and it was to settle this difference that Mahākassapa took the initiative to collect the seniormost monks, and have their approval of the rules that would be recited by Upāli, who had been praised by Buddha as the foremost of the Vinayadharas. As required by the rules of a Pātimokkha assembly, the preliminaries (*uposathakammasa pubbakaraṇa-pubbakiccāni*) were gone through, viz., the selection of the monk who was to put questions relating to Vinaya² (in this case, it was Mahākassapa) and the monk who would answer them³ (i.e. Upāli). After this

1 *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, Intro., p. ii.

2 *Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho, yadī saṅghassa pattakallam, ahaṃ itthan nāmaṃ vinayaṃ puccheyyāṃ.*

3 *Suṇātu me bhante saṅgho yadī saṅghassa pattakallam ahaṃ itthan nāmena vinayaṃ puṭṭho vissajjeyyāṃ.*

and other preliminaries, the question of *pārisuddhi* had to be brought up, and so the turn of Ānanda came. As he was not really guilty of any ecclesiastical offence, he had nothing to confess, but the monks resented the heedlessness of Ānanda in certain matters, particularly in regard to non-ascertainment of the minor precepts that could be abrogated. Ānanda in deference to their wishes asked for forgiveness on this account as well as on other accounts and had his *pārisuddhi*. Then the turn came of Upāli to recite the Pātimokkha rules, which in all probability he did, and there is unanimity of the accounts with regard to this. This was probably followed up by the infliction of *brahmadanda* by Ānanda, on Channa. The story of the recitation of the *suttas* by Ānanda, as suggested by Minayeff, was engrafted on to the account later on and that explains the wide divergences in the different traditions regarding the recitation of *suttas*. And it must be due to this interference by later writers that we find the formality of *pārisuddhi* of Ānanda shifted from its proper place, the Dharmagupta Vinaya being the only text which put the *pārisuddhi* in the proper place, i.e., before the recitation of texts.

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